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The Triumph of Broken Promises:  
Oil, Finance, and the End of the Cold War 
 




 This dissertation puts forth a new interpretation of the collapse of communism and the 
end of the Cold War by examining the energy and financial markets that developed in the wake 
of the 1973-74 oil crisis.  Drawing on newly released archival documents from both public and 
private archives throughout Europe and North America, it places the history of communist and 
capitalist states in the 1970s and 1980s in comparative perspective.  The intertwined histories of 
oil, sovereign debt, and austerity touched every society on both sides of the Iron Curtain after the 
oil crisis.  Energy and financial markets forced governments to impose economic and social 
restraint on their own societies, so the survival of political regimes and governing ideologies in 
both East and West came to depend on governments’ ability to impose discipline.  Governments 
that could successfully impose discipline without inviting a destabilizing social backlash 
survived; those that could not, collapsed.  Thus, this dissertation proposes that the end of the 
Cold War was fundamentally different from its beginning.  The competition between democratic 
capitalist states and state socialist regimes began as a race to expand the social contracts that 
prevailed in their societies, but it ended as a competition to discipline their respective social 
contracts.  The Cold War, in other words, began as a race to make promises, but it ended as a 
race to break promises. 
Explaining the peaceful and abrupt end of the Cold War has long been a significant 
challenge for historians.  Some have focused their explanations on the unique role played by 
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Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and, to a lesser extent, U.S. President Ronald 
Reagan.  Others have focused on the role of civil society and non-violent protest in spurring the 
revolutions of 1989.  In contrast, this dissertation contends that the peaceful end of the Cold War 
was primarily the product of socialist states’ desire to gain political legitimacy through 
democratic elections in order to implement economic and social discipline.  Through detailed 
case studies of the collapse of the communist regimes in the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, and 
East Germany, this work demonstrates that the pressure to implement austerity in communist 
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 Over the course of writing this dissertation, I have accrued as many debts as the 
governments I have studied.  Much as they did, I have told myself (and those to whom I became 
indebted) that I was putting the borrowed time, money, or expertise toward enlightened ends.  
Unlike the subjects of my study, I hope that I have actually done so, and my creditors can see in 
the document that follows a handsome return on their investment. 
 I could not have asked for a better group of teachers and scholars to form my dissertation 
committee.  Each member added unique and important insights to my own thinking as it rapidly 
evolved over the course of the project.  I have viewed Fred Logevall as an exemplary scholar and 
writer since I was an undergraduate, and to have him as my doctoral advisor was the height of 
good fortune.  Where other advisors surely would have resisted my attempts to roam expansively 
(and often confusedly) over diverse subjects, geographies, and time periods in search of this 
dissertation, he welcomed it.  I thank him for his confidence in me and his expert guidance of the 
project.  Holly Case has a uniquely powerful and creative mind, and I was privileged to learn 
from her on countless occasions over the course of this project.  Holly was always generous with 
her time, insightful in her commentary, and keen to push the boundaries of my thinking in new 
and fascinating ways.  This dissertation is certainly bigger in scope and more in interesting in 
content because of her manifold contributions to it.  For much of my time working on this 
project, I felt (as many other scholars have) that I was merely catching up on things Peter 
Katzenstein had long since learned.  It quickly became clear to me that such a position was an 
excellent one for a young scholar to be in.  Whatever precision and insight the argument of this 
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dissertation holds, much of it is a product of Peter’s consistent request (no, demand) that I be 
more clear about what, exactly, I was trying to say among the crowded field of scholars who had 
come before me.  Finally, Louis Hyman enthusiastically welcomed me into the History of 
Capitalism community, and connected me early and often with key resources in financial history.  
Though this dissertation does not meet Louis’s pioneering vision of writing “history from the 
bottom up, all the way to the top,” it is much better for having been subjected to his unique 
critique. 
 Numerous organizations provided financial support to make the research required for this 
project possible.  The Marion and Frank Long Fellowship from Cornell University’s Reppy 
Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies supported a year of research in Washington, D.C., during 
which I stumbled upon the documents in the International Monetary Fund’s archive that set this 
project in motion.  The German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) supported a very pleasant 
and productive year of research in Germany, where I found the East German archival records 
that form the basis of this dissertation’s commentary on the Eastern Bloc.  My host professor at 
the Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Werner Plumpe, enthusiastically supported this 
project and introduced me to an important community of German scholars from whom I have 
learned a great deal.  The National Fellowship at the University of Virginia’s Miller Center 
supported the final year of research and writing that brought this dissertation to completion.  
Daniel Sargent, my “dream mentor” during that wonderful program, not only inspired this 
project through his own research on the history of international economics and politics in the 
1970s, but also provided expert commentary on the entire dissertation once it was completed. 
 Lastly, there has always been my family.  My mom and dad, Ellen and Mike Bartel, have 
supported me through thick and thin, and there was plenty of both on the long road through 
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graduate school.  Their love sustained me during these years, as it has during all the years of my 
life.  My dad deserves special gratitude for editing every word of every chapter in this 
dissertation before it was submitted.  Over a lifetime of friendship, my brother, Mitch, has 
influenced me in ways that go far beyond this dissertation, but he supported and influenced this 
effort too.   
Most important, however, has been my wife, Amanda.  If, for some very strange reason, a 
future historian wanted to write a history of this history – the story of how this dissertation was 
written – he or she would not have to search very hard to find the thesis: Fritz met Amanda, and 
everything else – from the first vague inklings of what this project could be to the last lines of 
this dissertation’s conclusion - started falling into place.  Through her love, commitment, editing, 
and contributions to endless hours of discussion about Cold War politics and economics, 
Amanda added more to this project than I can ever fully know or say.  Lucky for me, this stage 
















“Individuals can be expected to restrain the exercise of their 
individual power in the interest of protecting the fabric of their 
society if, but only if, they believe the society as a whole to be a just 
one.” 
 





                                                     
1 Fred Hirsch, The Social Limits of Growth ((Cambridge, MA, 1976), p. 152. 













 As Christmas came to Eastern Europe in 1989, those who had long lived under the yoke 
of communism had many reasons to celebrate.  In quick and unexpected succession, the 
authoritarian governments that had ruled over the region since shortly after the Second World 
War had peacefully collapsed.  Dignified citizens who had resisted communism’s countless 
injustices had begun to take their place in the governing chambers of Warsaw, Budapest, and 
Prague.  On the night of November 9th, the Berlin Wall had fallen, vanquishing the most 
oppressive symbol of Europe’s division and Eastern Europe’s captivity.  East German citizens 
that had been separated for four decades from their freer and richer countrymen in West 
Germany had begun to use a new slogan of unity - “Wir sind ein Volk” (We are one people) – 
and German reunification looked to be a real possibility for the first time since the early postwar 
years.  In Moscow, Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev’s launch of glasnost and 
perestroika had transformed Soviet society, set Eastern Europe free to choose its own fate, and 
allowed all Europeans to imagine a future in which they lived in one “common European home” 
rather than two antagonistic blocs.  Taken together, the evidence of political progress was so 
swift and overwhelming that observers had begun to speak of 1989 as an annus mirabilis, a year 
of miracles.  In a New Year’s Day speech to the Czechoslovak nation, Václav Havel, the former 
playwright and dissident and now, astonishingly, the newly elected president of the country, 
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distilled the meaning of the preceding year to a simple, yet powerful, sentence. “People,” he told 
a massive crowd gathered in central Prague, “your government has returned to you.”2  After 
decades of stolid oppression, winds of hope and renewal were in the air. 
But Laszlo Kezdi did not care.  The collapse of communism and the birth of electoral 
democracy in Eastern Europe may have been momentous events in the grand schemes of postwar 
European history and Cold War politics, but they were little solace for Kezdi, a Hungarian 
pensioner living in Budapest, as he watched his economic security evaporate before his eyes.  
The Hungarian government was making daily life across the country worse with each passing 
day, and Kezdi could feel it.  Government officials had announced that pensioners would be 
receiving a Christmas bonus of 2,000 forints, the national currency, but the temporary cash 
infusion paled in comparison to the rising cost of everything in Hungarian society.  By December 
15th, Kezdi was fed up, and he took to the pages of one of Hungary’s leading newspapers, 
Magyar Nemzet (Hungarian Nation), to express his displeasure in an open letter to the nation’s 
leading financial official.  “Minister of Finance Laszlo Bekesi!” he began.  “I am turning to you 
with the following respectful request: With the Christmas bonus of 2,000 forints…please also 
send me an appropriately long and sturdy rope as an extra gift.  I do not think I need to detail 
what purpose this rope will serve.  Allow me to describe the reason for my request.”3 
In the paragraphs that followed, Kezdi detailed that he had “earned” his current state 
pension of 5,300 forints per month through 42 years of work.  Additionally, “after thirteen years 
of patient waiting,” he had obtained a 52 square meter (560 square foot) cooperative apartment 
through a thirty-five year mortgage, which was subsidized by the government.  Before 1989, all 
                                                     
2 Quoted in Victor Sebestyen, Revolution 1989 (New York, 2009), p. 404. 
3 “In Today’s Mail,” Magyar Nemzet, December 15, 1989, p. 6, translated in Joint Publication 
Research Service, Eastern Europe Report (JPRS-EER), JPRS-EER-90-005, p. 28-29. 
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the costs associated with the apartment – the “mortgage payments, required insurance, shared 
coop fees, gas, hot water, heating, and electricity” – came to 3,500 forints per month.  That left 
him with 1,800 forints per month for food, medicine, transportation, and the general costs of life.   
The times, however, were changing.  Recently, the government had announced a plan to 
raise gas and electricity prices, which would cost Kezdi “at least an extra 500 forints per month.”  
Officials had also announced plans to tax mortgages like Kezdi’s that were subsidized by the 
government.  This would cost him another 800 forints per month.  “So far,” Kezdi reminded his 
reader, “this adds up to 4,800 forints.”  But that was not all.  The price of medicine was set to 
increase 80%, and the price of public transportation would soon go up 45%.  This would mean 
another 200 forints out of Kezdi’s pocket.  “To sum up,” he wrote, “from the monthly 5,300 
forints I will have 300 forints left for food, clothes, and a decent human life.”  This was 
unacceptable.  “I cannot imagine anyone who is able to live on 300 forints a month,” he wrote.  
“I cannot bring myself to steal, rob or cheat; neither my parents nor my teachers taught me how 
to do these things; my pride does not allow me to beg.”  The grim prospects left him “no choice,” 
he concluded, but to make his special request. “Respected Mr. Bekesi!  Because of the above 
reasons, and to lighten the burden on the state budget, I repeat my request: Please issue the extra 
bonus, a strong rope, to me.  Thank you in advance, Laszlo Kezdi.”4 
It was no accident that Kezdi’s missive appeared at a time of profound political change. 
Austerity - broadly defined as government policies that willfully cause domestic economic 
hardship - was the cause of Kezdi’s sarcastic anger, and it represented a potent political force 
that affected almost every society on both sides of the Iron Curtain in the last two decades of the 
                                                     
4 Ibid, p. 29. 
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competition between democratic capitalism and state socialism.5  Eight years earlier, in the 
richest country on earth, the Chairman of the United States Federal Reserve Paul Volcker had 
felt the brunt of a similar backlash.  As his restrictive monetary policy forced the United States 
into the deepest recession of the postwar period in the early 1980s, construction workers and 
builders had expressed their anger by mailing the Fed Chairman unused two-by-fours from 
houses they could no longer build because his policies had wrought havoc on the real estate 
market.  Car salesmen sent coffins to the Federal Reserve full of keys to unsold cars, and farmers 
blocked the Fed’s front entrance with their tractors to protest the rising costs of doing business.6  
The stiff resistance to his policies led Volcker to retrospectively conclude that policymakers 
always try to avoid causing economic downturns because “that is when the political flak 
ordinarily hits.”7   
                                                     
5 In the interest of narrative, I will use terms such as “democratic capitalism” and “state 
socialism,” “industrialized nations of the West,” “state socialist countries of the East,” Western 
bloc and Eastern Bloc, Western welfare states and late socialist regimes, interchangeably 
throughout the text.  I do so with the recognition that there was a great deal of variation within 
“the West” and “the East,” and that any term such as “welfare state,” “democratic capitalist,” or 
“late socialist regime” presupposes certain characteristics about nation-states within each bloc 
that were present in varying degrees in each state.  This dissertation, however, is primarily 
interested in comparing the experience of the two blocs in the global economy of the 1970s and 
1980s as a means of explaining the end of the Cold War, so terms that signify what united rather 
than divided each bloc will have to be used.  Therefore, when using any term for the nations of 
“the West,” I am referring to the nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), which in this period included Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, West Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States.  When using any term for the nations of “the East,” I am referring to the 
Soviet Union and the so-called “CMEA six:” Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, 
Hungary, Poland, and Romania. 
6 Kenneth Rogoff, The Curse of Cash (Princeton, NJ, 2016), p. 119. 
7 Paul Volcker and Toyoo Gyohten, Changing Fortunes: The World’s Money and the Threat to 
American Leadership (New York, 1992), p. 166. 
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Despite their efforts at avoidance, leaders on both sides of the Iron Curtain were hit with 
the political flak of austerity many times in the 1970s and 1980s.  Oil and financial markets 
largely determined why and when governments were forced to implement austerity in these 
years, so the history of oil and finance will anchor the narrative that follows.8  The political 
effects of austerity varied widely from country to country, so this dissertation will also explore 
why the political consequences of austerity were sometimes as small as coffins full of car keys 
and other times, as in the late 1980s, large enough to topple longstanding social and political 
orders.  The histories of oil, finance, austerity, and political change are, in short, deeply 
intertwined, and explicating their myriad interactions during the 1970s and 1980s is one subject 
of this dissertation.  The other is the end of the Cold War.  If this dissertation accomplishes its 
goal, it will demonstrate that these two subjects are in fact part of the same global history, and 
that the end of the Cold War was the most important political consequence of the global history 
of oil, finance, and austerity that unfolded after the oil crisis of 1973-74. 
Perhaps, then, it is best to begin at the end, and identify that which is ultimately to be 
explained, namely, the end of the Cold War.  What was it, and what is required to explain it?9  I 
                                                     
8 For nation-states that relied on the production of a single or a few natural resources, why and 
when their governments were forced to introduce austerity was also determined by the world 
market price of those natural resources, not just oil.  Therefore, at the broadest level, why and 
when nations had to implement austerity was determined by commodity and capital markets.  
However, this dissertation will only focus on oil and capital markets because oil was the most 
important commodity for both the industrialized West and the state socialist regimes of the 
Eastern Bloc. 
9 Because of the breadth and complexity of the end of the Cold War, it has been the subject of 
numerous edited volumes that have sought to weave together the subject’s many disparate parts.  
Most of these include very interesting essays that present new archival material and analytical 
insights.  Among the best are Vladimir Tismaneanu, ed., The Revolutions of 1989 (London, 
1999); Silvio Pons and Federico Romero, eds., Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War: Issues, 
Interpretations, Periodizations (New York, 2005); Wolfgang Mueller, Michael Gehler, and 
Arnold Suppan, eds., The Revolutions of 1989: A Handbook (Vienna, AU, 2015); William 
Wohlforth, ed., Cold War Endgame: Oral History, Analysis, Debates (Univerity Park, PA, 
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believe the end of the Cold War comprised four distinct processes that unfolded at the end of the 
1980s,10 all of which are already the subject of significant popular and scholarly writing - the end 
of the nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States;11  the end of the global 
ideological competition between democratic capitalism and state socialism;12 the peaceful and 
                                                     
2003); Jeffrey Engel, ed., The Fall of the Berlin Wall: The Revolutionary Legacy of 1989 
(Oxford, UK, 2009); Mark Kramer and Vít Smetana, Imposing, Maintaining, and Tearing Open 
the Iron Curtain: The Cold War in East-Central Europe, 1945-1989 (Lanham, MD, 2014); 
Richard K. Herrman and Ricahrd Ned Lebow, eds., Ending the Cold War (New York, 2004); 
Olav Njølstad, ed., The Last Decade of the Cold War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict 
Transformation (London, 2004).  Though not a collection of scholarly articles, but instead a 
collection of primary documents with two introductory essays, Thomas Blanton, Svetlana 
Savranskaya, and Vladislav Zubok, eds., Masterpieces of History: The Peaceful End of the Cold 
War in Europe, 1989 (New York, 2010) is an extremely important contribution to our 
understanding of the end of the Cold War.  
10 Some may be inclined to include a fifth process, the breakup of the Soviet Union, in the end of 
the Cold War.  But while the collapse of the state socialist regime in the USSR from 1985-1990 
was an integral part of the end of the Cold War, the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 was 
not.  As a geopolitical conflict, the Cold War had started over the Soviet-American contest to 
determine the fate of postwar Germany.  Thus, it ended on October 3, 1990 when the German 
Democratic Republic was dissolved, and the newly reunited Germany emerged on fully Western 
terms - democratic, capitalist, and a member of NATO.  The breakup of the Soviet Union, 
therefore, is not part of the end of the Cold War and not part of the dissertation that follows. 
11 Raymond Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold 
War (Washington, DC, 1994); Don Oberdorfer, The Turn: From Cold War to a New Era, the 
United States and the Soviet Union, 1983-1991 (Baltimore, MD, 1998); Jack Matlock, Jr., 
Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended (New York, 2004); Melvyn Leffler, For the 
Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War (New York, 2007); 
James Graham Wilson, The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev’s Adaptability, Reagan’s 
Engagement, and the End of the Cold War (Ithaca, NY, 2014); Frances FitzGerald, Way Out 
There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of the Cold War (New York, 2000); James 
Mann, The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War (New York, 
2009); an important study that focuses on how changing international norms affected the end of 
the arms race is Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End 
the Cold War (Ithaca, NY, 2002). 
12 Robert English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals and the End of the 
Cold War (New York, 2000), and “Power, Ideas, and New Evidence on the Cold War’s End: A 
Reply to Brooks and Wohlforth,” International Security 26, No. 4 (Spring 2002); Journal of 
Cold War Studies, “Ideas, International Relations, and the End of the Cold War” (special issue), 
7, 2, (Spring 2005).  Sarah Snyder, Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A 
Transnational History of the Helsinki Network (Cambridge, UK, 2011); Daniel Thomas, The 
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democratic collapse of state socialist regimes in Eastern Europe (except for Romania) and the 
Soviet Union;13 and the reunification of Germany.14   
Two things immediately stand out about these four processes.  First, they occurred both 
within and between nation-states.  And second, they involved change in material and ideational 
structures or, put differently, power and identity.  Each of the processes that comprised the end of 
the Cold War took place on a continuum of these four traits.  A case such as the end of the arms 
race clearly depended on both diplomacy between the superpowers and domestic politics within 
                                                     
Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism (Princeton, 
NJ, 2001). 
13 The classic account of the 1989 revolutions is Timothy Garton Ash, Magic Lantern: The 
Revolution of ’89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague (New York, 1990).  A 
highly revisionist account is Stephen Kotkin, Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the 
Communist Establishment (New York, 2009).  Other monographs focused on explaining change 
across Eastern Europe in 1989 include Charles Gati, The Bloc That Failed: Soviet-East European 
Relations in Transition (Bloomington, IN, 1990); Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down: 
The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe (Oxford, UK, 1993); Padraic Kenney, Carnival 
of Revolution: Central Europe 1989 (Princeton, NJ, 2002); Recent scholarly monographs on the 
collapse of various state socialist regimes include Gregory Domber, Empowering Revolution: 
America, Poland, and the End of the Cold War (Chapel Hill, 2014); Lazlo Borhi, Dealing with 
Dictators: The United States, Hungary, and East Central Europe, 1942-1989 (Bloomington, IN, 
2016); Mary Sarotte, Collapse: The Accidental Opening of the Berlin Wall (New York, 2014); 
Hans-Hermann Hertle, Der Fall der Mauer: Die unbeabsichtigte Selbstaufloesung des SED-
Staates (Opladen, DE, 1996).  Charles Maier, Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the 
End of East Germany (Princeton, NJ, 1997); for US policy toward the revolutions and German 
reunification, see Robert Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War 
(Baltimore, MD, 1997); On the collapse of the Soviet regime, see Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon 
Averted: The Soviet Collapse 1970-2000 (Oxford, UK, 2008); Christopher Miller, The Struggle 
to Save the Soviet Economy: Mikhail Gorbachev and the Collapse of the USSR (Chapel Hill, NC, 
2016); Stephen Solnick’s Stealing from the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions 
(Cambridge, MA, 1999), as well as many works discussed below. 
14 In this dissertation, I do not actually deal with German reunification, but I have a plan to do so 
for the book.  I believe it is a process that very clearly fits within the argument I am making here.  
Works that have dealt with the history of German reunification so far include Phillip Zelikow 
and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft 
(Cambridge, MA, 1995); Mary Sarotte, 1989: The Struggle to Create Postwar Europe 
(Princeton, NJ, 2014); the four volumes of the Geschichte der Deutschen Einheit (Stuttgart, DE, 
1998, 1999); Angela Stent, Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and 
the New Europe (Princeton, NJ, 1999).  
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each state.  It also depended on significant changes in the relative power of the superpowers and 
changes in how the Soviet leadership understood its place in the world.  The revolutions of 1989 
were a different mix of changes in power and identity both within and between nation-states.  A 
perquisite for the revolutions’ occurrence was the Soviet Union’s decision to refrain from 
intervening to stop them (a change between states), but they were also crucially determined by 
developments within Eastern European states.  The revolutions resulted from changes in material 
power (oil and capital markets, I will argue), but also from changes in how state socialist 
governments understood the socialist identity they had long espoused. 
Thus, the first challenge of the history of the end of the Cold War is that it requires 
explanation of change across four areas – domestic and international, as well as power and 
identity.  In the specific context of the end of the Cold War, I believe that this challenge means 
that explaining the end of the Cold War as a geopolitical conflict requires an explanation of the 
collapse of communism as a system of governance.  The eminent Soviet expert Archie Brown 
has written, “It is impossible to understand how the Cold War came to an end…without an 
understanding of the Soviet domestic political context.”15  Indeed, but one must not stop there, as 
most scholars, including Brown, do.  Revolutions are domestic processes, and the fact that there 
were many across Eastern Europe in 1989 indicates that the domestic context of Eastern 
European states must be taken into consideration as well.  The necessity of including processes 
of domestic change means that any history of the end of the Cold War that only considers 
developments in international relations will be incomplete.16  The same holds true for material 
                                                     
15 Archie Brown, Seven Years that Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective (New York, 
2007), p. 253. 
16 This is the overriding limitation of strictly diplomatic histories and realist explanations of the 
end of the Cold War.  For all of its new archival research and intricate detail, the most recent 
diplomatic history of the end of the Cold War, Robert Service’s The End of the Cold War, 1985-
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and ideational structures.  Any explanation that considers only one or the other will be inherently 
limited.17  The end of the Cold War occurred both within and between nation-states, and it 
involved changes in both power and identity.  Therefore, its history must include explanations of 
change across all four of these areas. 
The second, and most difficult, challenge of explaining the end of the Cold War is that it 
stands out in modern history for one very profound reason - at every step of the way, those in 
possession of imperial and authoritarian power willingly and peacefully gave it up.  John Lewis 
Gaddis, the dean of Cold War historians, succinctly summarized just how confounding and 
unprecedented this development was in a 1999 essay.  “Wars, hot or cold, do not normally end 
with the abrupt but peaceful collapse of a major antagonist,” he wrote.  “Such an event had to 
have deep roots, and yet neither our histories nor our theories came anywhere close to detecting 
these.”18  Neither history nor theory detected the end of the Cold War because nothing in modern 
history suggested anything like it was possible.19  And yet, as the previous paragraph just 
                                                     
1991 (New York, 2015), remains a history of great power diplomacy that cannot adequately 
explain the revolutions of 1989.   
17 This is the limitation of the long running debate between realists and constructivists within 
political science over the end of the Cold War.  Both sides are convinced of the primacy of either 
material or ideational change, but have so far failed to convince the other side of how one 
influenced the other in the late Cold War.  See Stephen G. Brooks and William Wohlforth, 
“Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case of Ideas,” 
International Security 25, no. 3 (Winter 2000-2001), and Robert English, “Power, Ideas, and 
New Evidence on the Cold War’s End: A Reply to Brooks and Wohlforth,” International 
Security, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Spring, 2002), pp. 70-92. 
18 John Lewis Gaddis, “On Starting All Over Again: A Naïve Approach to the Study of the Cold 
War,” in Arthur Rosenbaum and Chae-Jin Lee, eds., The Cold War: Reassessments (Claremont, 
CA, 1999), p. 3.   
19 Perhaps no better example of this came from Paul Kennedy, who in his sweeping and 
otherwise authoritative account of international politics in the modern period, The Rise and Fall 
of the Great Powers, concluded in 1987, just two years before the collapse of the Soviet empire, 
“There is nothing in the character or tradition of the Russian state to suggest that it could ever 
accept imperial decline gracefully.  Indeed, historically, none of the overextended, multinational 
empires…the Ottoman, the Spanish, the Napoleonic, the British – ever retreated to their own 
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stressed, this exceptional development occurred both within and between nation-states.  The 
Soviet Union retreated from its pursuit of global confrontation with the United States as well as 
its empire in Eastern Europe, and at the same time, political leaders throughout the Eastern Bloc 
gave up power peacefully within their own societies (with Nicolae Ceaușescu in Romania again 
serving as a brief exception).  This unique and fundamental characteristic of the end of the Cold 
War is what made it so difficult to predict before it occurred and continues to make it so difficult 
to explain in retrospect.  As Gaddis wrote in 1999, “Historians are still at the stage of saying, in 
effect: ‘here’s what happened, don’t push us on why.”20  Of course, scholars have made great 
strides in understanding parts of the end of the Cold War since Gaddis’s essay, but his words 
serve as warning.  Explanations of the end of the Cold War that lack a compelling reason for 
why those in possession of imperial and authoritarian power consistently gave it up in the late 
1980s will remain stuck at the stage Gaddis identified – fully capable of explicating what 
happened, but unable to explain why it happened. 
A third challenge of the history of the end of the Cold War is that of timing.  Gaddis, 
again, put it nicely.  He titled his essay, “On Starting All Over Again: A Naïve Approach to the 
Study of the Cold War,” and he set out to imagine how a Martian, with “no prior memory or 
knowledge or understanding of the Cold War,” would view the conflict upon first learning about 
it.  The first “naïve impression” a Martian would have, Gaddis posited, would be that “The Cold 
                                                     
ethnic base until they had been defeated in a Great Power war, or (as with Britain after 1945) 
were so weakened by war that an imperial withdrawal was politically unavoidable.” Kennedy, 
The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 
2000 (New York, 1987), p. 514. 
20 He added, “The theorists’ performance is even less impressive: I have the uneasy sense that 
international relations theory is still being taught pretty much as if the Cold War had never 
ended.” Gaddis, “On Starting Over,” p. 4.   
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War went on for a very long time, and then all of a sudden it went away.”21  Indeed, the question 
of why the Cold War persisted for four decades and then suddenly, in the late 1980s, disappeared 
is of predominant importance.22  Thus, any compelling explanation of the end of the Cold War 
must attend not only to the question of why, but also why then?   
The last challenge of the history of the end of the Cold War is to explain the character of 
its principal outcome: the emergence, with varying degrees of success and legitimacy, of market 
economies and electoral democracies in the nation-states that formerly comprised the Eastern 
Bloc.  In retrospect, it is easy to take these outcomes for granted, but as the end of the Cold War 
unfolded, few believed them to be foregone conclusions.  Francis Fukuyama’s declaration in the 
summer of 1989 that the end of History had been reached and that the future would be dominated 
by capitalism and democracy was a bold (and in retrospect, unfounded) prediction, not a 
statement of the consensus viewpoint.  The foreign policy of the George H.W. Bush 
administration, which tried to slow the pace of change in Eastern Europe for fear of what might 
come next, is a better guide to the thinking of the period.  It speaks to the broader concern in both 
Western and Eastern capitals about the range of possible outcomes that could follow state 
socialism.  Some believed market socialism was possible; others feared that reactionary 
nationalism was imminent.23  Since market economies and electoral democracies were not 
                                                     
21 Gaddis, “On Starting All Over Again,” p. 3. 
22 An innovative and forceful argument for why the Cold War persisted for so long is put forth in 
Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity 
(Cambridge, MA, 2009), where the authors argue that powerful entities within American 
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23 On the prospects of market socialism, see Johanna Bockman, Markets in the Name of 
Socialism: The Left-Wing Origins of Neoliberalism (Stanford, CA, 2011).  On the foreign policy 
of the first Bush administration, see Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside 
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predetermined, why did they emerge?  Answering this question is the final challenge of writing 
the history of the Cold War’s end. 
Therefore, explaining the end of the Cold War is, to say the least, a tall order.  As I have 
defined it, the end of the Cold War as a geopolitical conflict was dependent on the collapse of 
communism as a system of governance.  It involved four processes that occurred both within and 
between nation-states – the end to the nuclear arms race, the end of the ideological competition 
between democratic capitalism and state socialism, the peaceful and democratic collapse of state 
socialist regimes in the Eastern Bloc, and the reunification of Germany.  These were changes in 
both power and identity, and explaining them requires answering three questions – Why did the 
holders of imperial and authoritarian power in the Eastern Bloc willingly give it up?  Why did 
they do so at the end of the 1980s?  And why did market economies and electoral democracies 
emerge from the ashes of state socialist regimes?   
One way to address a tall order (particularly when writing a dissertation) would be to 
split it into many smaller ones, and tackle one or two components of the larger challenge.  The 
foremost scholars of Cold War and European history, however, have not been calling for such an 
approach.  Upon reviewing a large group of historical monographs that appeared to mark the 
twentieth anniversary of the revolutions of 1989, Timothy Garton Ash, one of the leading 
chroniclers of those momentous events, wrote that he came “away dreaming of another book: the 
global, synthetic history of 1989 that remains to be written.”  Besides stating that such a history 
would have to “empathiz[e] both with powerholders and with so-called ordinary people,”24 he 
                                                     
Politics of Diplomacy (New York, 1995); George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World 
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24 Timothy Garton Ash, “1989!”, New York Review of Books, Nov. 5, 2009, 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2009/11/05/1989/, Accessed April 20, 2017.  
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did not elaborate in any great detail on what a global “synthetic” history would entail.  Gaddis’s 
essay from a decade earlier, however, provided a similar and more prescriptive call.  The fact 
that the end of the Cold War “had to have deep roots” that scholars had missed led him to ask 
“What would it take…to achieve an interpretive breakthrough that would account for why the 
Cold War lasted so long but ended so abruptly – and so peacefully?”  As a first practical 
suggestion, he wrote that historians would have “to back off from their preoccupation with 
particular trees to look at the forest as a whole.”  Second, scholars would “have to abandon a 
definition of power that accords primacy to military capabilities.”  And lastly, in a message 
intended for international relations theorists, Gaddis believed that scholars would “have to 
jettison the curious belief that there can ever be, in this complex and inter-related world, such a 
thing as an independent variable.”25 
So, what has become of these new interpretive, “synthetic” approaches?  Oddly, since 
Gaddis’s essay in 1999, it has not been international relations theorists, but rather historians, that 
have shown an inclination to reduce the end of the Cold War to an independent variable, though 
they do not usually refer to him as such.  Mikhail Gorbachev looms ever larger in the 
historiography, and one gets the strong sense from the current scholarly literature that, like an 
independent variable, Gorbachev’s exogenous shock to Soviet society and the Cold War was the 
essential cause of the conflict’s end.  In his 1996 monograph, The Gorbachev Factor, which 
defines the field to this day, the Soviet expert Archie Brown argued that Gorbachev was “a 
highly untypical product of the Soviet nomenklatura” who “did more than anyone else to end the 
Cold War between East and West.”  With regard to the events of 1989, he went so far as to argue 
that they required “no elaborate explanation” because “the stimulus of radical reform in the 
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Soviet Union, the new Moscow doctrine of freedom to choose, and above all, the growing (and 
accurate) perception that the Soviet Union would no longer intervene to uphold Communist party 
rule” were the “main factors” in explaining “the timing of the overthrow of Communist systems 
through East and Central Europe.”26  Since then, every leading historian of the end of the Cold 
War – Mark Kramer, Stephen Kotkin, Vladislav Zubok, Gaddis, Melvyn Leffler, Jacques 
Lévesque, Svetlana Savranskaya, Thomas Blanton, and many others – has echoed Brown’s 
conclusion in their own work.27  In each of the four processes I have identified as comprising the 
end of the Cold War, Gorbachev reigns supreme as an exceptional figure who drove history 
forward.28 
This Gorbachev consensus has been used to reject the three most prominent competing 
explanations for parts of the end of the Cold War – that the cause for change came from the 
                                                     
26 Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford, UK, 1996), pp.  316-17, 247. 
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worth quoting, “The sweeping political reforms launched by Gorbachev within the USSR and the 
bold changes he carried out in Soviet foreign policy helped generate unrest and instability in 
Eastern Europe,” he writes.  Kramer, “The Collapse of East European Communism and the 
Repercussions within the Soviet Union, Part 1,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4 Fall 
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A Failed Empire, p. 335.  Lévesque has argued “Soviet acceptance of the collapse of East 
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leading to the end of the Cold War.”  Jacque Lévesque, “The East European Revolutions of 
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1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe (Berkeley, 1997). Gaddis, The Cold War: 
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(New York, 2007), p. 448.   
28 On ending the arms race, recent scholarship has recognized Reagan’s vision of a nuclear free 
world as important, but Gorbachev remains the primary force for change.  See Wilson, The 
Triumph of Improvisation.  On ending the ideological competition, see Robert English, Russia 
and the Idea of the West.  On the collapse of state socialist regimes, see previous footnote, and 
on German reunification, see Sarotte, 1989.   
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West, and specifically the administration of Ronald Reagan; that the cause for change came 
“from below,” i.e. from the peoples of Eastern Europe; and that the cause for change came from 
a growing structural crisis within the Soviet Union in the early to mid-1980s that made 
Gorbachev’s reforms unexceptional and even highly likely.  First, besides adherents to the so-
called Reagan victory school, few scholars – John Lewis Gaddis being a notable exception – 
hold the view that American policy caused the end of the Cold War in any significant way.29  In 
a conclusion that represents the prevailing consensus, Melvyn Leffler has written, “Reagan’s 
greatest contribution to ending the Cold War was not the fear he engendered but the trust he 
inspired” at the highest levels of the Soviet-American relationship.  Nevertheless, “It was 
Gorbachev who ended the Cold War.”30  Second, an early wave of popular authors and social 
scientists argued that the revolutions of 1989 were, to a significant degree, the result of a broad 
push for freedom by the peoples of Eastern Europe.31  In a conclusion that has gained the support 
of most scholars, Mark Kramer has rejected this ‘revolution from below’ narrative, writing, 
“What changed in 1989, compared to earlier crises in Eastern Europe, was not the depth of 
popular opposition to the Soviet-backed regimes.  Instead, what changed was the whole thrust of 
Soviet policy in the region.”32  Third, proponents of realist international relations theory, most 
notably William Wohlforth, have argued that Soviet economic decline had reached such a severe 
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his Forty-Year Struggle and Final Triumph Over Communism (New York, 2002); Roger 
Robinson, Jr., “Reagan’s Soviet Economic Take=Down Strategy: Financial and Energy 
Elements,” in Douglas Streusand, ed., The Grand Strategy That Won the Cold War: Architecture 
of Triumph (Lanham, MD, 2016), pp. 159-74. 
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point by the early 1980s that Soviet leaders had “few options” other than “engagement,” 
“retrenchment,” and “to sue for peace on the best possible terms.”33  Archie Brown has 
consistently criticized Wohlforth and his collaborators, calling their ideas “far-fetched in the 
extreme” and declaring it “quite wrong to imagine that the Soviet Union was forced to change its 
foreign policy comprehensively” because of economic factors.34  Thus, pressures from the West, 
from below in Eastern Europe, and from within the Soviet economic system have been 
consistently discounted.  The leading scholars in Cold War, Soviet, and European history have 
concluded that the end of the Cold War is scarcely thinkable without the exceptional “Gorbachev 
Factor.” 
On its face, this Gorbachev consensus explains a great deal of the end of the Cold War as 
I have defined it.  Clearly, the Soviet General Secretary had an effect both within and between 
nation states as well as on the material power and socialist identity of the Eastern Bloc.  He was 
central to the end of the Cold War as a geopolitical conflict and the collapse of communism as a 
system of governance.  This means he played a role, sometimes a predominant one, in the four 
processes I have defined as comprising the end of the Cold War – ending the arms race, ending 
the ideological competition, the collapse of state socialist regimes in the Eastern Bloc, and the 
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reunification of Germany.  And when thought of as an exceptional, anomalous, or exogenous 
figure in Soviet and Cold War history, Gorbachev can answer at least two of the three questions I 
defined as essential to the end of the Cold War.  Why did those who held imperial and 
authoritarian power willingly give it up throughout the Eastern Bloc?  They did so because 
Gorbachev, as Jacques Lévesque concluded, was motivated by a “rarely” seen “idealistic view of 
the world…in which the image of the enemy was constantly blurring, to the point of making it 
practically disappear.”35  Without strong Soviet support, this line of reasoning continues, the 
authoritarians of Eastern Europe simply lost “heart” and gave up their power peacefully.36  For 
the Gorbachev consensus, the question of timing takes care of itself.  Why all this happened in 
the late 1980s requires “no elaborate explanation,” as Brown put it, because that was when 
Gorbachev appeared on the scene.  Jack Matlock, the American ambassador to the Soviet Union 
in the late 1980s and author of two highly regarded books on the end of the Cold War, has 
written, “To understand why the Cold War ended in 1989 rather that 2089…we must think about 
the decisions that actual people made.  Impersonal social and economic trends may have molded 
the environment in which decisions were made, but it was decisions made by political leaders 
that determined the timing and character of events.”37  For those who study the emergence of 
market economies and electoral democracies in the former Eastern Bloc, Gorbachev alone does 
not explain everything because the leading figures of Eastern European civil society played an 
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essential role in constructing the post-communist systems.  But even here, Gorbachev is viewed 
as the first cause without which nothing else was possible.  Stephen Kotkin has written, 
"Freedom...came in varying degrees to the countries of Eastern Europe" after 1989, but 
"outcomes do not mean causation.  The revolutions of 1989 did not happen because of a broad 
freedom drive.”  Rather, they were “precipitated by Gorbachev’s unilateral removal of the Soviet 
backstop.”38   
There are two significant problems with this entire line of explanation, however.  One is 
empirical, and the other is methodological.  First, empirically, the dissertation that follows will 
demonstrate that the Gorbachev consensus is wrong about its most important point.  Mikhail 
Gorbachev did not cause the revolutions of 1989.39  That he did is perhaps the most fundamental 
causal assumption in the historiography of the end of the Cold War,40 but it is not supported by 
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In her recent book, The Collapse, Mary Sarotte writes, “In both Warsaw and Budapest 
Gorbachev’s actions provoked real change.  In Poland, the independent Solidarity labor 
movement seized upon the new era of openness to convince the Polish ruling party to meet for 
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the archival record.  In fact, as I will expand on in the conclusion, there is significant reason to 
think that all of the conditions for revolution in Eastern Europe would have been present in the 
late 1980s had Gorbachev never become General Secretary of the Soviet Union in 1985.  And if 
it is true that Gorbachev did not cause the revolutions of 1989, then the question of what did 
cause them becomes wide open.  To answer it, we must point out and move past the 
methodological problem with the reigning Gorbachev consensus.  As long as Gorbachev remains 
the linchpin of the entire story, there is very little reason to explore the long-term causes of the 
end of the Cold War in any way that does not add to our understanding of Gorbachev himself or 
the “new thinking” he espoused.41  Did the end of the Cold War have “deep roots,” as Gaddis 
thought it must in 1999?  Or was it merely a fortuitous confluence of events flowing from the 
unique influence of one man?  In the shadow of the Gorbachev consensus, historians have settled 
for the conclusion that it must have been the latter.  
But the end of the Cold War did have deep roots, and it is the task of this dissertation to 
explain them.  Three of the leading scholars of Cold War, European, and Soviet history – Gaddis, 
Charles Maier, and Kotkin – have each in their own way laid out pieces of an approach to 
studying the deep roots of the end of the Cold War, and this dissertation will take up their 
agendas.  First, the “naïve impressions” that Gaddis discovered led him to the following 
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observation. “It is worth recalling that two of the most striking revolutions in the history of 
science – Darwin’s and Einstein’s – came with the recognition…that objects and organisms 
evolve, that structures and processes are related to one another.”  If historians thought in these 
terms, he wrote, it might lead them “to think of great powers as living organisms who have to 
stay healthy while adapting themselves to shifting environments.  Some manage it, others do 
not.”42  This evolutionary approach helpfully draws our attention away from the old scholarly 
debate over how the Eastern and Western blocs perceived threats from each other, and instead 
draws it to how they perceived threats and pressures from their environment.  Perhaps, then, 
thinking along with Gaddis, the end of the Cold War was the product of nation-states adapting 
(and failing to adapt) to changes in the international system, and the collapse of communism as a 
system of governance should be thought of as an extinction.43  
The question then becomes what changes in the international system were driving nation-
states’ adaptation and what threats drove communism’s extinction.  Eight years before Gaddis 
called for an evolutionary approach to the end of the Cold War, Charles Maier was thinking in 
similar terms, and he specifically pinpointed the global economy as the driving force behind 
adaptation.  “Some of the crises of communism have also been crises for capitalism,” he wrote in 
a 1991 article laying out an agenda for future historians of the collapse of communism.  “Each 
system paid for them in different ways.  Comparative analysis helps.”  Both capitalism and 
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communism, he wrote, “have been subject to severe long-term difficulties. The superiority of the 
Western economies lay not in their immunity to these systemic challenges, but in their capacity 
to overcome them.”  The collapse of communism, for Maier, “was a reaction to forces for 
transformation that have gripped West and East alike, but which Western Europeans (and North 
Americans) had responded to earlier and thus with less cataclysmic an upheaval.”44  In the years 
that followed, Maier expounded on this viewpoint in a highly regarded monograph on the 
collapse of East Germany.45  But by 2010, he was still urging historians to investigate “what 
relationship the crisis that so lethally afflicted the European Communist regimes in the 1980s had 
to the crisis that Western economies had undergone from the late 1960s to the end of the 1970s.”  
He noted that “most narratives make no connection between the two,” but he nevertheless 
believed that they were “two phases of one epoch of unrest confronting the industrial world – 
capitalist and communist.”46 
So, too, does Stephen Kotkin.  The noted Soviet historian began the first chapter of his 
history of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Armageddon Averted, not in Moscow or Leningrad, 
but in the industrial heartlands of the West - Bethlehem, Pennsylvania; Gary, Indiana; Sheffield, 
England; and the Ruhr Valley of West Germany.  The oil crisis of 1973-74, he wrote, put “the 
entire fossil-fuel industrial economy” on a path “towards extinction.”  It caused a “wrenching of 
industries and communities” throughout the West, as factories closed by the thousands and 
millions of workers lost their jobs.  But over the long term, these processes of economic 
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46 Quotes from Maier, “Malaise: The Crisis of Capitalism in the 1970s,” in Ferguson et. al. eds., 
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adjustment constituted “a crossroads leading to a resounding triumph in the cold war [sic].”47  
Because of its own oil boom in the 1970s, the Soviet Union and its Eastern Europe satellites 
were temporarily exempt from this crisis in the West, “but [oil] merely delayed the inevitable” 
adjustment, Kotkin wrote.   When economic reform began under Gorbachev, political collapse 
soon followed.  Socialism, Kotkin concluded, “proved very good – too good – at putting up a 
rust belt; and, unlike a market economy, socialism proved very bad at taking its rust belt 
down.”48 
Alongside the history of oil, Kotkin has also placed the end of the Cold War in the 
context of the Eastern Bloc’s reliance on Western capital markets.49  In a 2009 book and 2010 
book chapter, he argued that “The regimes [of Eastern Europe] lacked the political legitimacy to 
take the necessary hard measures of a structural [economic] adjustment, such as cutting off 
subsidies (that is, raising prices) and throwing people out of work in the worst-performing 
sectors.”  As a result, “they needed continued access to Western capital markets…for their 
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survival.”50  In a causal chain that was less than clear, Kotkin argued that this dependence on 
Western capital combined with Gorbachev’s repeal of the Brezhnev Doctrine to produce “the 
equivalent of political bank runs” in 1989, during which elites within Eastern European regimes 
began to sense that their time was running short and decided to give up power peacefully.51  “The 
GDR was a Ponzi scheme that fell in a bank run,” he wrote.52  The fact that the argument was 
framed as a metaphor pointed to its central weakness – Kotkin still could not explain how the 
history of Western capital markets and Soviet oil actually, not metaphorically, caused the 
revolutions of 1989.  This weakness left him open to severe scrutiny, with Timothy Garton Ash 
writing in the New York Review of Books that Kotkin’s general explanation was “revisionism on 
stilts” and that his history of East Germany’s 1989 was “little short of ludicrous.”53 
Thus, from the work of Gaddis, Maier, and Kotkin, the outline of a new history of the end 
of the Cold War has emerged, but the challenge that remains is clear.  The end of the Cold War 
should be examined as an evolutionary process in which nation-states reacted to profound 
changes in the global economy that followed from the oil crisis of 1973-74.  The most important 
of these changes occurred on oil and financial markets, and these markets in turn influenced why 
and when governments in both East and West had to inflict economic pain on their own 
populations.  And yet to hit its mark and demonstrate that the end of the Cold War was a political 
consequence of the intertwined history of oil, finance, and austerity, this agenda will still have to 
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meet the very high standards historians have set for explaining the discrete events of the end of 
the Cold War.  What influence, exactly, did these long-term trends in the global economy have 
on, for instance, the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the launch 
of glasnost, the repeal of the Brezhnev Doctrine, the start of the Polish Roundtable, and the fall 
of the Berlin Wall?  How exactly did economic change lead to political and ideological change?  
How, in short, can this research agenda exactly explain the processes and answer the questions 
that I have identified in this introduction as essential to any compelling history of the end of the 
Cold War? 
It can do so on the basis of two foundations: the use of new and illuminating evidence 
from archives in both East and West, and the formulation of a new framework for connecting 
economic and political change in the late Cold War.  The new archival evidence will be 
presented in the chapters that follow, but for now, it is the new framework that needs to be 
introduced.  This framework begins from the conviction that the oil crisis of 1973-74 spurred a 
fundamental change in the global competition between capitalism and communism: it privatized 
the Cold War. 
 
The Privatization of the Cold War 
During the first twenty-five years of the Cold War, oil and financial markets played 
relatively small roles in the foreign and domestic policies of the Eastern and Western blocs.  
Until its collapse in 1971, the Bretton Woods system pegged Western currencies to each other at 
fixed values and severely restricted flows of capital across national borders in the Western world.  
The global financial markets that would come to play such a large role in the 1970s and 1980s 
did not exist in the 1940s, hardly existed by the end of the 1950s, and remained relatively small 
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through the 1960s.  The Eastern Bloc did not participate in the Bretton Woods system, but its 
member states maintained even firmer control over trade and finance than their Western 
counterparts.  Eastern bloc currencies were not convertible into each other or Western currencies, 
which meant that they too were completely under governmental control.  And other than the 
Soviet Union, which maintained a banking presence in the West to conduct international trade, 
the bloc as a whole remained isolated from the nascent development of global financial markets.   
As for oil, it was cheap and plentiful in the capitalist world, and cheap and scarce in the 
communist world until the early 1970s.  This simultaneous ubiquity in the West and scarcity in 
the East ironically made it less important in both blocs than it would become after 1973.  In the 
West, oil’s low price and uninterrupted flow allowed governments to build mass consumption 
industrial societies after the Second World War that showed little regard for oil’s use or country 
of origin.  Only after 1973 would Western societies awaken to the implications of their fervent 
consumption of a commodity whose price and production levels they did not control.54  In the 
East, the Soviet government spent the 1950s searching its vast hinterland for oil deposits, and in 
the 1960s, it struck black gold in Western Siberia, where it found some of the largest oil fields in 
the world.  Developing these fields took time, so it was only in the early 1970s, right before the 
oil crisis struck, that the Soviet Union and, by extension, the entire Eastern Bloc enjoyed “for the 
first time the luxury of cheap and efficient energy.”55  After the oil shock, this luxury would also 
fill the state coffers through oil exports to the world market, and energy would become the 
material basis of Soviet power.  That was squarely a post-1973 development, however.  For the 
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first two and a half decades of the Cold War, neither oil nor finance played significant roles in 
both the East and West. 
  Instead of oil or finance, both Eastern and Western states based their power and 
legitimacy before 1970 on something else: economic growth.   After World War II, the global 
economy grew for two and a half decades at an unprecedented and almost uninterrupted rate.  
People around the world, but particularly within the Eastern and Western blocs, experienced 
sustained increases in their standard of living on a scale never before seen in human history.  In 
the capitalist world, this period would be remembered under a number of names that signal its 
uniqueness: the West Germans called it the Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle), the French 
called it les trente glorieuses (“the glorious thirty” years), and historians now simply refer to it as 
“The Golden Age.”56  Not to be outdone, the Eastern Bloc matched and, for a while, even 
exceeded the growth of the capitalist West.  Over the entire period 1951-73, per capita GDP 
grew at an annual rate of 3.7% in the industrial West as a whole, while it grew at a rate of 4.0% 
in Eastern Europe and 3.6% in the Soviet Union.57  Of course, the two blocs were not economic 
equals.  The West began the postwar period as a vastly richer territory, and remained vastly 
richer in the early 1970s.  Moreover, mass consumption became a reality in the West while it 
remained only a far-off aspiration in the East.   
Nevertheless, economic growth underwrote an important shared tenant in the politics in 
both blocs.  Both capitalist and communist governments used this economic boom to expand the 
social contracts that underlay their domestic legitimacy.  They partook in what I will call the 
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Politics of Making Promises.  Indeed, after the economic horrors of the Great Depression had 
given rise to fascism and world war, it was a fundamental premise of political life in both East 
and West after 1945 that government’s first and most fundamental domestic responsibility was to 
improve the economic security and prosperity of all its people.  The two systems fundamentally 
disagreed about what mix of economic security and prosperity was best – unable to match the 
West’s prosperity, communist governments promised their citizens greater economic security – 
but both systems professed to provide both.  Across the West, welfare states emerged to 
redistribute the economic gains of the market, and labor unions were empowered to allow the 
working class to share equitably in the benefits of growth.  In the East, Soviet General Secretary 
Nikita Khrushchev famously used the Soviet Union’s decade of stellar economic growth and 
scientific advancements in the 1950s to declare that the country would reach communism – the 
final stage of economic advancement and social organization in Marxism-Leninism – by 1980.  
Along the way, the government would provide its citizens with free housing, plentiful food, 
quality education and healthcare, longer vacations and shorter work hours.58  These conveniences 
were the fodder of postwar political legitimacy in both East and West, and the two sides in the 
Cold War based their claim to the superiority of their own system on their ability to provide a 
bountiful and equitable distribution of modernity’s “good life.”   
When Khrushchev and U.S. Vice President Richard Nixon met in Moscow in 1959 for 
their famous impromptu “Kitchen Debate,” they were debating the merits of two different 
versions of government directed modernity, two different sets of promises.  In front of a global 
TV audience, Nixon sang the praises of his system that could provide “any steel worker” with an 
affordable home complete with a dishwasher and color television.  Khrushchev boasted that 
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under communism workers were “entitled to housing,” and that in another seven years the Soviet 
Union would be “at the level of America, and after that we’ll go farther.”  Confident in his 
system and its ability to provide material abundance, Khrushchev gleefully declared, “As we 
pass you by, we’ll wave ‘hi’ to you, and then if you want, we’ll stop and say, ‘please come along 
behind us.’”59  For its first twenty-five years, then, the Cold War was a competition between two 
systems of governmental promises underwritten by economic growth. 
Then, around 1970, something unexpected happened.  Contrary to the confident 
predictions of both ideologies, economic growth in both systems severely stagnated.  Normally, 
scholars of the Cold War and communism only focus on the rigid economic stagnation of the 
Eastern Bloc during the 1970s and 1980s.   But “The Great Slowdown,” “Declining Growth, 
Rising Rigidities,” and “The Descent of Growth” are titles or subtitles in the leading histories of 
capitalism, not communism, for sections about the period after 1970.60  Only in the 1980s, after 
growth had recovered slightly and inflation had been significantly lessoned in capitalist 
countries, did Western confidence in the natural superiority of capitalism to communism return.  
Throughout the 1970s, the West’s economic problems appeared equally intractable to any of 
those bedeviling the East.61  
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It was in this context of slower growth that the oil crisis of 1973-74 burst onto the scene 
and changed the Cold War forever.  The fourfold increase in the price of the world’s most 
important commodity accelerated the development of two vast pools of wealth, global capital 
markets and energy resources.  After 1973, nation-states in both the Western and Eastern blocs 
became increasingly dependent on access to these pools of wealth to fund their societies.  Guns 
and butter became dependent on finance and oil.  This dependency was the defining feature of 
the privatized Cold War.  As long as states had either access to global capital markets or oil 
wealth after the onset of the oil crisis, they could continue to fund their foreign and domestic 
policies.  They could, in other words, continue to fight the Cold War abroad and implement the 
Politics of Making Promises at home. 
If, however, states lost access to one or both of these sources of funding, they would have 
to implement domestic austerity programs to regain the favor of capital markets or outlast a 
downturn in world oil prices.  Such austerity programs could force governments to alter both 
their domestic and foreign policies through cuts in commitments to domestic constituencies, 
international allies, or national defense.  In the chapters that follow, we will observe instances of 
all three.  Changes in global capital and energy markets, then, produced dramatic political 
changes both within and between nation-states after 1973.  In place of the Politics of Making 
Promises that prevailed in the first two and half decades of the postwar period, the privatized 
Cold War forced nation-states to confront the Politics of Breaking Promises.  Rather than 
championing further expansions of the social contract, governments on both sides of the Iron 
Curtain were forced to discipline their domestic social contracts or delay disciplining their social 
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contracts through infusions of oil wealth and debt.  For its first two decades, the Cold War was a 
race between the communist and capitalist blocs to make promises to their people.  But because 
oil and finance privatized the conflict after 1973, the Cold War over its last two decades became 




 These are the dynamics that the figure above encapsulates.  It is the framework that will 
guide the chapters that follow, and it draws attention to a number of important relationships that 
would define the end of the Cold War.  First, at the heart of the privatized Cold War was a social 
question: how to revise the postwar social contracts that developed in both the East and the West 
after the Second World War.  If the end of the Cold War is to be thought of as a product of states 
adapting to changes in the international system, then this social question was the challenge thrust 
upon them by the post-1973 global economy.  States’ ability to discipline their social contract 
would prove to be the key difference between those who survived and those who went extinct.  
Placing this social question at the center of the end of the Cold War means that ideology and 
domestic politics are essential components of this history.  Revisions to the social contract 
Nation-States in the Privatized Cold War 
Guns and Butter 
 
Oil Finance 
Discipline the Social Contract 
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needed to be justified in ideological terms to domestic constituencies.  We will see in the 
following chapters that both states’ governing ideologies and domestic political structures 
changed during the privatized Cold War in order to meet this challenge of revising the domestic 
social contract.   
Therefore, on the fundamental question of the relationship between economic change and 
ideological and political change, the framework above puts forth a very particular viewpoint.  In 
the privatized Cold War, the challenge of revising the domestic social contract drove states to 
adopt political and ideological “new thinking” in both East and West after 1973.  Scholars 
normally identify “new thinking” as the particular idealistic movement that arose among the 
reformers around Gorbachev in the Soviet Union.  But when one pulls back from the particular 
Soviet context, it is clear that many governments on both sides of the Iron Curtain adopted new 
thinking of various types during the 1970s and 1980s.  These new forms of thinking emanated 
from diverse ideological traditions, but they shared one commonality – they were all approaches 
to disciplining the domestic social contract.   
This is not to say that change in the global economy completely determined the creation 
of new thinking, but rather to argue that it drove the adoption of new thinking within 
governments and societies.  Whether it was Thatcherism in Great Britain, monetarism and 
deregulation in the United States, perestroika and glasnost in the Soviet Union, or roundtable 
democratization in Poland and Hungary, these forms of new thinking were adopted by the 
governments in power because they appeared to provide the ideological and political means 
required to achieve the end of disciplining the social contract.  In 1987, Gorbachev told the 
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Soviet Politburo that Thatcher was also “carrying out a perestroika” in the United Kingdom.62  If 
Gorbachev himself saw parallels between perestroika and Thatcherism, then perhaps historians 
should too.  The thread that united these two ideologically opposed movements in the 1980s is 
that they were both efforts to ideologically and politically justify structural adaptations to the 
changing global economy.  Oil and finance thrust this challenge of breaking promises onto 
nation-states after 1973, and domestic political orders and ideologies adjusted to meet the 
challenge. 
Though this framework centers our attention on a core domestic concern, it also makes 
clear that changes in the international system were of vital importance as well.  Indeed, through 
oil and financial markets, developments at the international level were what forced states to 
address the challenge of revising their social contract.  Although these changes occurred at the 
international level that did not mean that they were products of inter-state relations.  Most 
changes in oil and financial markets were outside the control of any particular nation-state.  This 
was the period when the nebulous, but all-important, opinion of “the market” began to decide the 
fate of nations.   
Nation-states could not fully control oil or financial markets, but they could wield power 
in the privatized Cold War by altering other states’ access to oil or finance.  Statecraft in this new 
international system consisted of granting or denying other states’ access to oil and financial 
resources, and late Cold War diplomacy reflected this reality.  In the 1970s, the Soviet Union and 
its Western adversaries fought a quiet battle for control of Eastern Europe through oil and capital 
markets – the Soviets by granting its bloc allies growing and subsidized deliveries of oil; the 
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West by granting Eastern Bloc states growing and subsidized access to global capital markets.  In 
the 1980s, the process reversed.  The Soviet influence over the bloc waned as the growth and 
subsidy of its oil deliveries tapered off, and the West’s influence increased as it sought to attach 
conditions to the Eastern Bloc’s access to credit.  Therefore, statecraft mattered in the privatized 
Cold War, but the power of diplomacy was always limited by the fact that nation-states, even 
very powerful ones like the United States and the Soviet Union, could never completely control 
other states’ access to finance and oil.  The opinion of “the market” always existed alongside 
Cold War statecraft, and together they comprised the two key international determinants of any 
state’s access to oil and finance. 
It will not surprise the reader to note that this framework closely maps onto the four areas 
of change I identified at the beginning of this introduction as essential to explaining the end of 
the Cold War.  The privatized Cold War produced changes within and between states, as well as 
changes in power and identity.  This close alignment means that the framework I have outlined 
can potentially explain the collapse of communism as a system of governance, and in so doing, 
explain the end of the Cold War as a geopolitical conflict.    
I also stated at the beginning of this introduction that the end of the Cold War comprised 
four processes – the end of the nuclear arms race, the end of the global ideological competition, 
the collapse of state socialist regimes, and the reunification of Germany.  The history of each of 
these processes will be taken up in the second half of the dissertation, chapters five through 
eight.63  The first four chapters will instead be devoted to explaining the emergence of the 
privatized Cold War after the oil crisis of 1973-74, and the shift from the Politics of Making 
Promises to the Politics of Breaking Promises that accompanied it.  Chapter 1 compares the 
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reaction of both the East and West to the oil crisis in the middle of the 1970s, and details how the 
states of Eastern Europe became dependent on subsidized Soviet oil and Western credit markets.  
Chapter 2 examines how governments in both the East and West tried to avoid, and then were 
forced to confront, the challenge of implementing austerity in the late 1970s.  It brings new 
attention to two key turning points in the late Cold War: the stagnation in Soviet oil production 
beginning in 1977, and Paul Volcker’s dramatic increase in US dollar interest rates beginning in 
1979.  The intertwined histories of oil, finance, and austerity clearly emerge in chapter 3, where I 
will analyze the history of the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981.  The Polish Crisis was the Eastern 
Bloc’s turning point from the Politics of Making Promises to the Politics of Breaking Promises, 
and also the moment at which the Soviet leadership realized that the economic costs of empire 
had become too much to bear.  Both of these developments will be the focus of the chapter.  Just 
as the Soviet leadership was discovering the limits of its material power in the early 1980s, the 
United States under Ronald Reagan was discovering, as I detail in Chapter 4, that the material 
limits on its power were virtually limitless.  Through what I am calling the Reagan Financial 
Buildup, the United States began to borrow capital from its allies in Western Europe and Japan 
to pay for its own guns and butter.  By tapping global capital markets at a level unprecedented in 
history and unmatchable by the Soviet Union, the Reagan administration fundamentally altered 
the relative power of the two superpowers and decisively influenced the Soviet decision to seek 
arms control in the late 1980s.   
The second half of the dissertation will consider the period normally thought of as the 
end of the Cold War, 1985-1990.  Chapter 5 will take up this history from the Soviet side, and 
cover the decline of the world oil price in 1985-86, Gorbachev’s launch of perestroika and 
glasnost, his repeal of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Eastern Europe, and his effort to seek arms 
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control with the United States.  In this chapter, we will begin to see how the economic challenge 
of breaking promises led to ideological and political change in the Eastern Bloc, as Gorbachev 
attempted to legitimize his economic reform through revisions to communist ideology and the 
introduction of electoral democracy.  Chapters 6 and 7 will examine how similar processes 
unfolded in Poland and Hungary in the late 1980s, where the governments attempted to use 
roundtable democratization to legitimize economic austerity and reform.  Importantly, these 
chapters will demonstrate that the impetus for the roundtables, and thus the cause of the 
revolutions of 1989, was neither pressure from Gorbachev nor Eastern European civil society, 
but rather pressure to implement austerity emanating from the global economy.  These 
developments in Poland and Hungary spilled over into East Germany, where the government was 
dealing with its own foreign debt problem and feared the prospect of having to implement its 
own domestic austerity program.  Chapter 8 will detail how the East German government tried to 
avoid the challenge of this austerity by leveraging the opening of the Berlin Wall in exchange for 
new loans from the West.  This attempt failed when, on the night of November 9th, 1989, the 
Wall was accidently opened, and East Germans freely and defiantly walked into West Berlin for 
the first time in almost thirty years.  Within a year, the Cold War ended on October 3, 1990, 
when the four occupying powers of postwar Germany – the United States, the Soviet Union, 
Great Britain, and France – revoked their rights to control over German territory, and a newly 
united, democratic, and capitalist Germany emerged on fully Western terms.64 
Each of these chapters will make new empirical contributions to important specific 
problems in the current historiography on the end of the Cold War and the collapse of 
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communism.65  But beyond specific empirical contributions, this dissertation aims to provide 
precisely the new interpretive framework for understanding the end of the Cold War that scholars 
ranging from Gaddis to Maier to Garton Ash have called for.  To do that, it will finally have to 
answer the three questions identified at the outset that lie at the heart of the end of the Cold War.  
Why did the holders of imperial and authoritarian power in the Eastern Bloc willingly give it up?  
Why did they do so at the end of the 1980s?  And why did electoral democracies and market 
economies emerge from the ashes of state socialism?   
My answers to these questions rest in the Politics of Breaking Promises.  In the global 
economy that prevailed after the oil crisis, the only practical purpose the Soviet empire in 
Eastern Europe served was to insulate socialist states from the pressure of breaking promises.  
This insulation, which came in the form of subsidized oil and other raw material deliveries, was 
extremely costly.  By the early 1980s, the Soviet leadership decided that protecting its allies from 
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the pressures of the global economy was in fact too costly, and they committed themselves to 
lowering these costs, even if that meant risking the loss of the empire itself.  When Gorbachev 
informed his allies of the repeal of the Brezhnev Doctrine in October 1986, he was not self-
consciously liquidating the Soviet empire, but rather breaking the promise the Soviet Union had 
made to its allies since the oil crisis to protect them from the disciplining demands of the global 
economy.  When the empire crumbled in 1989, Soviet leaders peacefully accepted the result 
because they no longer believed that protecting Eastern Europe from the challenge of breaking 
promises was in the Soviet Union’s national interest. 
The loss of Soviet imperial protection from the global economy, however, did not 
automatically lead the holders of authoritarian power in the Eastern Bloc to peacefully give up 
their power within communist states.  They did not lose ‘heart’ or suffer from a political ‘bank 
run.’  Instead, authoritarians throughout the bloc gave up their power in order to gain the political 
legitimacy they believed was necessary to implement the Politics of Breaking Promises.  
Beginning with Gorbachev’s launch of perestroika and glasnost, extending through the 
roundtable discussions in Poland and Hungary, and culminating in the fall of the Berlin Wall and 
the peaceful reunification of Germany, authoritarian leaders proactively tried to legitimize their 
power so that they would in turn be able to discipline the domestic social contract.  When it 
became clear that these attempts to legitimize their power would in fact result in their loss of 
power, communist leaders chose not to violently prevent their loss of power because they 
understood that the challenge of breaking promises would still remain.  Under the Politics of 
Breaking Promises, there were no spoils for the powerful and victorious, only costs.  Communist 
leaders chose to let their successors bear the burden of the costs that came with breaking 
promises. 
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These stunning events in the Soviet empire and within communist states happened when 
they did because the global history of oil and capital markets made the challenge of breaking 
promises unavoidable within the Eastern Bloc by the late 1980s.  Access to Soviet oil and 
Western capital markets allowed the bloc to delay the task of disciplining the social contract 
throughout the 1970s.  But the advantage of Soviet oil deliveries to Eastern Europe and Western 
capital markets’ confidence in the region peaked in 1980, and never fully recovered.  By 1986 
and 1987, Poland and Hungary faced severe international pressure to break domestic promises, 
which led their governments to the roundtable process and set in motion the events of 1989.  
Thus, the timing of the end of the Cold War was a product not only of individual agency and 
historical contingency, but also of structural developments in the international system dating 
back to the oil crisis.   
Lastly, electoral democracy and market economies emerged in the East after the collapse 
of communism for the same reason that they survived in the West during the last two decades of 
the Cold War – they were the best political and economic systems for breaking promises.  
Democratic capitalist states were not immune from the challenges that befell the communist 
world in the late Cold War.  They too had to rewrite their social contracts in the 1970s and 
1980s.  But unlike the state socialist regimes of the Eastern Bloc, the democracies of the West 
were able to do so because they were viewed as legitimate by their own citizens.  The major 
difference between the Politics of Making Promises and the Politics of Breaking Promises is that 
the latter favored governments with political legitimacy.  Eastern Bloc governments had lacked 
political legitimacy since their founding, but only when faced with the Politics of Breaking 
Promises did this lack of legitimacy become fatal.  State socialism survived the 1950s, 1960s, 
and 1970s, but failed to survive the 1980s precisely because a particular history of oil and 
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finance caused the switch from the Politics of Making Promises to the Politics of Breaking 
Promises in both East and West after 1973.  From then on, the fate of both blocs rested on their 
respective ability to renegotiate their domestic social contracts.  Democracy granted the 
industrial nations of the West the legitimacy to meet this challenge.  Authoritarianism granted 
the communist regimes of the East no such legitimacy.  
This suggests a peculiar, and perhaps troubling, kind of Western triumph in the Cold 
War, but it is the only kind of triumphalism that the end of the Cold War can teach us.  We 
should have no problem stating that the West won the Cold War, but we should recognize clearly 
why it did.  The triumphalism of broken promises is a theme to which I will return in the 
conclusion.  But first, we must begin with the crisis that forever changed the Cold War.  In the 
fall of 1973, the price of oil suddenly quadrupled, and the world was never again the same.  
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 On December 10th, 1976, East German Prime Minister Willi Stoph was leaving Moscow 
disappointed and empty handed.  He had come to the Soviet capital seeking an increase in Soviet 
oil deliveries to the German Democratic Republic (GDR), but his Soviet counterpart Alexei 
Kosygin had roundly rejected his request.  “We don’t have the resources for it,” Kosygin had 
said during their meeting in the Kremlin.  “We have an acute energy shortage in our country…. 
You must get your mind out of the clouds.”  “My mind’s not in the clouds,” Stoph had shot back.  
“But you want us to increase our deliveries,” Kosygin had responded. “We cannot meet that 
level of demand.  No one in the world can do that.”67 
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Now, as the two men drove through the streets of the Soviet capital on the way to the 
airport for Stoph’s departure, Kosygin tried to lighten the mood by reminding his comrade of the 
overriding advantages of the socialist system compared to the chaos that currently prevailed in 
the capitalist world.  “We understand that the situation in the GDR is not easy,” the Soviet 
Premier said, speaking for the entire Soviet leadership, but “compared with the predicament in 
capitalist states, all socialist states – the USSR as well as the GDR – [are] in an incomparably 
better situation.”  To him, the advantages were clear.  The socialist countries were “in a position 
to plan” their economies “until 1980, 1985, and beyond” as well as “agree on the course of our 
development.”  In contrast, Kosygin said, “capitalist states couldn’t even plan for the next three 
months.”  Perhaps shaken from his disappointment by Kosygin’s comparison, Stoph piled on the 
criticism of their ideological foes.  “All of the planning efforts of capitalist states have only led 
them into crisis,” he said.  Kosygin agreed and concluded, “Our situation is a thousand times 
better.”68 
 In the mid-1970s, one did not need to be a communist ideologue to share this view.  
Indeed, many in the West believed that the oil crisis of 1973-1974 had exposed fundamental 
flaws in both capitalism and democracy.  The combination of widespread unemployment and 
high inflation throughout the West confounded both the professional economists who studied 
market economies and the democratically elected leaders who governed them.  The reigning 
economic doctrine of Keynesianism offered few answers in this world of “stagflation,” and those 
that it did put forth – increased government spending and accommodating monetary policy – 
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appeared to only make the problems worse.  Because democracy subjected Western governments 
to the demands of all their citizens, it was widely believed that Western welfare states were 
doomed to chronic high inflation because politicians needed to promise their citizens too much 
of the good life in order to get elected.  In foreign policy, a new buzzword – interdependence - 
dominated discussions of the West’s place in the world and appeared to portend an end to 
Western societies’ control over their own fates.  What could the developed West do in the face of 
dependence on oil from the Middle East?  To many on both sides of the Iron Curtain, the answer 
appeared to be nothing at all.  Could democratic leaders, who were beholden to the interests of 
their constituents, solve the riddle of stagflation if it meant inflicting pain on those they 
governed?  Smart money said no.   
 The Soviet Bloc was thought to be different.  Socialist states appeared to Western 
observers to be largely immune to the crises afflicting the capitalist world.  As the Kosygin-
Stoph exchange shows, socialist leaders maintained a similar confidence in the superiority of 
their own system.  The Soviet Union was one of the world’s largest producers of energy 
resources, so the fourfold increase in the price of oil at the end of 1973 and early 1974 first 
arrived as a financial windfall rather than a structural economic challenge for the leadership in 
Moscow.  The socialist states of Eastern Europe had few oil resources themselves, but under the 
generous patronage of the Soviet Union, they received large and growing deliveries of Soviet 
energy during the 1970s at highly subsidized prices.  Because almost all trade and prices were 
fixed under Five Year Plans within the bloc, socialist states appeared exempt from the violent 
gyrations of inflation and commodity price shocks that crippled the Western world after 1973.  
And if democracies’ penchant for promising their citizens too much was the cause of Western 
inflation, then the socialist states’ authoritarian structure appeared to make them helpfully 
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unresponsive to the demands of their populations.  Taken together, these traits were enough to 
keep Kosygin and Stoph brimming with confidence as they drove through the Soviet capital that 
day in 1976. 
 And yet this chapter begins by recounting their exchange because beneath the professions 
of confidence, the discussion also pointed to the problems upon which state socialism itself 
would founder.  Stoph had made the initial request for more Soviet oil for a very particular 
purpose: to lower the GDR’s ballooning sovereign debt to Western banks and governments.  
With more oil, the GDR would be able to produce more petrochemicals and export them to the 
West for hard currency.  This, in turn, would lower the need to take out Western loans to pay for 
imports and service old debts.  In the first half of the 1970s, Western banks had been eager to 
loan money to the socialist bloc for the very reasons that socialism appeared ascendant to all 
manner of Western observers in the 1970s: it had energy, authoritarianism, and no inflation.  But 
by 1976, the first inklings of doubt had begun to bubble up in the minds of Western bankers: 
would socialist states really be able to pay them back?  Seen in this light, it becomes clear that 
Stoph’s pilgrimage to Moscow in search of oil was, in fact, an indirect effort to put the minds of 
Western bankers at ease and keep the flow of Western capital running smoothly. 
The GDR’s predicament was far from unique; all states in the Council of Mutual 
Economic Assistance (Comecon) shared the East German dependence on both Western capital 
and Soviet oil to varying degrees.69  Thus, Kosygin’s rejection of Stoph’s request points to the 
second problem lurking in the background of their discussion: after a ten-year period of dramatic 
growth, Soviet energy resources began to plateau in the mid-1970s and were projected to decline 
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after 1980.   The Eastern Bloc’s apparent imperviousness to the travails of the global economy 
rested on these two foundations: easy access to Western capital and an ever-increasing supply of 
Soviet energy resources.  If either or both of these faltered, as they would around 1980, the entire 
bloc would be forced to reckon with the social, economic, and political problems that beset the 
West after 1973. 
 Thus, this chapter tracks the response of both the industrial West and the socialist East to 
the oil crisis to make one overriding point clear.  Although the crisis at first appeared to validate 
the fundamental differences between democratic capitalism and state socialism, in time it 
demonstrated that both blocs were subject to the pressures of the same world market.  It was a 
market that neither side could fully or even partially control,70 so how the states within each 
system reacted to the whims of the global economy became the key determinant of their success 
and survival.  The dramatic expansion of global capital markets after the crisis presented both 
sides with a means of softening the blow of adjustment to the new market conditions.  But the 
fundamental challenge that the crisis posed to both the democratic welfare states of the West and 
the late socialist systems of the East could not be permanently avoided.  The crisis challenged 
governments on both sides of the ideological divide to domestically distribute the economic 
losses caused by the oil price shock, transition their societies to more profitable and energy 
efficient systems of production and consumption, and maintain access to the global capital 
markets that rapidly expanded after the oil shock.  All of these pressures threatened the 
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legitimacy of both the welfare states in the West and the late socialist regimes of the East.  At 
first faintly felt and then stridently resisted, the crisis began for both blocs the transition from the 
Politics of Making Promises to the Politics of Breaking Promises. 
 
A Visible Crisis in Welfare State Capitalism 
On October 6th, 1973, the Egyptian armed forces crossed the Suez Canal into the Israeli-
occupied Sinai Peninsula, and Syrian forces pushed from their homeland to confront Israeli 
forces occupying the Golan Heights.  Over the next three weeks, the Arab coalition and the 
Israeli Defense Forces fought pitched battles in what would come to be known as the Yom 
Kippur War.  In the early days of the fighting, the Soviet Union resupplied its Arab allies, and on 
October 14th, the United States responded with its own decision to resupply Israel.  For the Arab 
Gulf states that supported the Egyptian and Syrian campaign, this American decision demanded 
a response equal to the perceived injustice of supporting Israel.  Thus, they unsheathed ‘the oil 
weapon’ and unilaterally announced a 70% increase in the price of their oil to $5.11 a barrel.  
The next day, they committed themselves to a rolling embargo against supporters of Israel, chief 
among them the United States, cutting oil production 5% a month.  After US President Richard 
Nixon announced a new $2.2 billion aid package to Israel on October 19th, King Feisal of Saudi 
Arabia upped the ante considerably by imposing a complete embargo on oil supplies to the 
United States.  
By the end of October, the guns had fallen silent, but the effects of the price increase 
were only beginning to ripple outward.  In December, ministers from the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) met in Tehran to discuss where to peg the oil price going 
forward.  At the urging of their host, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the group settled on an 
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even higher price target of $11.65, one that would have been unfathomable only months before.71  
As recently as 1970, OPEC had only been able to fetch $1.80 per barrel on the world market.  
With the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 and the resulting devaluation of the 
US dollar (in which oil was priced), some of the oil price could be accounted for by producers’ 
desire to recapture the value they had lost with the dollar’s decline.  But the fourfold increase 
from $2.90 in mid-1973 to $11.65 at the end of the year represented more than that.  
Economically, it reflected the fact that the development of affluent industrial societies in the 
West had increased oil demand six fold since 1950 and had pushed the United States beyond 
energy autonomy to dependence on foreign oil in the late 1960s.72  Politically, the price increases 
represented a precipitous culmination of decades of struggle on the part of developing nations to 
increase the value of the commodities that formed the basis of their national wealth.  When they 
collectively called for a “New International Economic Order” at the United Nations in May 
1974, they did so with the winds of long-sought wealth at their backs.  
The boon for the developing world delivered a bust to the developed world on a scale 
unknown in the postwar years.  The Western world was first and foremost a world of industries, 
and through the early 1970s, industrial production had relied on ever increasing amounts of 
cheap energy resources to fuel economic growth.  Between 1949 and 1970 US oil consumption 
increased from 5.8 million to 16.4 million barrels per day.  Western Europe’s grew over the same 
period from 970,000 to 14.1 million barrels per day, and Japan’s skyrocketed from a few 
thousand to 4.4 million barrels per day.73  By the eve of the oil crisis, Western countries were 
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also lands tormented by inflation.  The rising price level had a diverse set of causes including US 
President Lyndon Johnson’s attempt to fund his Great Society programs and the war in Vietnam 
without a tax increase, an explosion of real wage increases across the West from 1968-1972, and 
the 1971 American decision to suspend the convertibility of the dollar into gold, which freed the 
United States from the nominal constraint of limiting its money supply to amounts that could be 
converted into gold by the US Treasury at $35 an ounce.   In combination, these forces had 
pushed consumer price inflation in OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development) countries to an annual rate of 8.2% in 1973.74   
With prices already galloping ahead at a steady pace, the fourfold increase in the price of 
the commodity that formed the basis of industrial society was bound to have dramatic economic 
effects.  In short order, the West experienced its worst economic downturn since the Great 
Depression in 1974-1975.  After growing at a rate of 5.7% in 1973, real growth in the 
industrialized West dropped to 0.7% in 1974 and contracted by 0.3% in 1975.75  From mid-1974 
to mid-1975, international trade fell at an annual rate of 13% and industrial production in 
developed countries declined by 10%.76  This decline was quickly reflected in job losses, as 
unemployment across the OECD reached 5.5% in 1974, and peaked at 8.9% in the United States 
in May 1975.77  Under the economic conditions that had prevailed since 1945, a downturn of 
such scale would have nipped the problem of inflation in the bud.  But the skyrocketing oil price 
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made this contraction different, and consumer price inflation increased across the West to 14.1% 
in 1974 and 11.8% in 1975.78 
And so, in defiance of postwar economic theory and experience, “stagflation” was born.  
In the realm of public policy, the years since 1945 in the West had unfolded in the long shadow 
of the British economist John Maynard Keynes and the body of economic theory that bore his 
name.  During their heyday in the 1960s, Keynesian economists who populated Western 
governments had declared victory over the business cycle and professed the ability to prevent 
economic downturns through changes in monetary and fiscal policy.  “Recessions are now 
considered fundamentally preventable, like airplane crashes and unlike hurricanes,” Arthur 
Okun, Lyndon Johnson’s chief economist, declared in 1970.79  On the European continent and in 
Japan, two decades of almost uninterrupted economic growth from 1950-1970 lent the credibility 
of lived experience to such claims.  Even in the United States, where recessions had been a 
recurrent, if also mild, part of postwar life, economists found reason in the 1960s to think that 
economic performance was ultimately subject to government control.  The Phillips Curve, named 
for the New Zealand economist, A.W. Phillips, who had first theorized its existence in 1958, 
purported to show that inflation and unemployment were inversely related – the more one went 
up, the more the other would go down.  With this knowledge in hand, economists argued in the 
1960s that governments could control the level of both inflation and unemployment through 
fiscal and monetary “fine tuning.”  If inflation was running too hot, this thinking held, 
governments could simply cut spending or raise interest rates to return the price level to a 
desirable rate of growth.  Unemployment would temporarily increase while inflation receded, 
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and the economy would return to equilibrium.  If instead unemployment was the overriding 
problem, as indeed it was in the 1950s and 1960s, then governments could increase spending and 
lower interest rates in order to increase demand in the economy and cause firms to hire more 
workers.  Using this line of thinking, postwar governments had based their policy and built their 
legitimacy on the promise of optimizing the social effects of the economy.  From this, the central 
economic goal of the Western welfare state emerged: full employment.  As Charles Maier has 
written of the postwar years, “a full employment ‘standard’” emerged after 1945 as the 
measuring stick by which all Western governments were judged.  Under this standard, it was 
now the responsibility of government to ensure that everyone who wanted a job had one.  This 
commitment was a dramatic departure from the responsibilities of democratic capitalist 
governments in the prewar years, when under the gold standard, the nations of the West 
prioritized their international solvency over the interests of their domestic working class.  The 
horrid experience of the Great Depression, Europe’s descent into Fascism, and the emergence of 
a socialist bloc that purported to govern in the interest of the working class, all forced democratic 
capitalist governments after the war to adopt the interests of the working class as their own.  The 
result of this fusion of interests between the working class and its governments was full 
employment.  As Maier writes, “Accepting the primacy of full employment meant that a major 
priority of the working class had become that of society in general.”80 
Stagflation, quite plainly, called into question the entire promise of Keynesian 
governance, and with it, the legitimacy of Western welfare states too.  If the basic task of 
postwar government was to do something to protect the interests of the working class (and, by 
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extension, society in general), it was not clear after 1973 what that should be.  Inflation appeared 
to signal that governments and the unions they supported had already done too much.  As a 
financial phenomenon, inflation was straightforward to understand - the price level increased 
when there was more money than goods in an economy.  But as a social phenomenon, inflation 
was a signal of unresolved conflicts within a society over how wealth should be distributed.  
Workers believed they should get a greater share, so they demanded wage increases.  Capital, 
unwilling to see its profits decline, responded by increasing prices, and the process continued 
without resolution until there was more money than goods.  More than simply a monetary 
phenomenon, inflation appeared in societies where competing social groups had been promised 
more than the market could deliver.81  In Western societies, the culprit of the accumulated 
promises was widely believed to be the postwar welfare state and its foundational promise of full 
employment.  Inflation was caused by “the worldwide commitment to full employment and 
maximum production,” the American magazine Business Week wrote in October 1974.  This 
view was not confined to the spokesmen of the business community.  Even those sympathetic to 
the interests of labor and the welfare state, such as the Keynesian economist Paul Samuelson, 
agreed that the 1974-1975 crisis signaled that governments were doing too much to protect 
workers from market realities.  Inflation “is deep in the nature of the welfare state,” he 
concluded, because “even when there is slack in the system, unemployment doesn’t exert the 
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downward pressure on prices the way it did under ‘cruel capitalism.’”  The problem, he wrote, 
was that “I don’t think anyone wants to turn the clock back.”82   
This is precisely what made defeating inflation so difficult.  It implied that someone 
would have to lose.  The oil crisis compounded the challenge by bringing about the situation that 
the Phillips Curve had proclaimed impossible – high unemployment and inflation at the same 
time.  Governments could fight one or the other, but not both at once.  The IMF’s 1975 Annual 
Report couched the problem in dry language.  “Unfortunately… recent experience cannot readily 
be translated into precise guidelines for current policy, inasmuch as the present situation is so 
different from that in previous postwar periods.”  Simultaneous high unemployment and inflation 
made “it very difficult to judge the degrees of monetary or fiscal expansion that might prove 
sufficient to restore adequate levels of resource utilization at a satisfactory pace without touching 
off new difficulties regarding inflation.”83  The stability of Western societies and the legitimacy 
of their governments depended on the restoration of economic growth; the fight against inflation 
required that this restoration not add more claims on societies resources to those already going 
unfulfilled.   
In Europe, this predicament threatened to destroy the fragile order that had emerged since 
1945.  “The postwar era is over,” the historian Fritz Stern declared in a May 1974 article.  “For 
some twenty-five years...a steadily expanding economy protected Europe from major political 
upheavals.”   In the upheavals of 1968, students and radicals may have rebelled against the 
conformity of bourgeois life, but the core constituents of postwar politics – the workers – had 
been appeased with ever increasing promises of prosperity.  “The workers of Europe found 
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embourgeoisement a novel and, on the whole, exhilarating experience…. [E]ach year, in every 
European country, more workers were able to afford cars, take vacations, dream of country 
bungalows, hope for a better life for their children.”  That world was now gone.  With Europe 
headed toward “‘zero growth’ – at best,” Stern believed democracies on the continent would be 
robbed of the premise of prosperity that had underpinned them since the Second World War.  
The prospects were dim.  “[T]he unthinkable has suddenly become thinkable.  Is there anyone 
who has the temerity to assume that the range of freedom in Europe will be as great in five years 
as it is now?....[O]ur hope that the worst tyranny that Europe ever saw would also be the last will 
have to be defended to remain true.”84   
The essence of this defense was to keep the promise of the postwar order alive, even as 
its economic foundation crumbled all around it.  Across the West, governments and the unions 
they supported ensured that the living standards of the working class were protected as the oil 
crisis took hold in 1974.  In the United States, workers’ pay increases for the year outpaced 
inflation.85  In West Germany, the first public employees strike in the country’s history in May 
brought workers across the board a 3.4% real wage increase for the year.86  In Great Britain, a 
tense national election in February yielded a weak Labour government which immediately 
granted the nation’s industrial workers a 29% nominal wage increase.87  In Italy, where all 
salaries were indexed to inflation through a system called the scala mobile, workers even 
received a 10% increase in real wages in 1975.88  In Japan, where inflation ran at an astounding 
                                                     
84 Fritz Stern, “The End of the Postwar Era,” Commentary, Vol. 57, No. 4, April 1974, pp. 27. 
85 Cowie, Stayin’ Alive, p. 72. 
86 Appendix 10, “Wages and Productivity per Person,” in Andrei Markovits, The Politics of West 
German Trade Unions, (Cambridge, UK, 1986), p. 459. 
87 Kevin Hickson, The IMF Crisis of 1976 and British Politics (London, 2005), p. 53. 
88 James, International Monetary Cooperation, p. 283. 
  63 
24% in 1974, workers covered the increase and more with a 32% increase in wages.89  Across 
the West, the first reaction in every political system was to protect the nation’s workers from the 
changing global market. 
Since the habits of postwar politics were not easily jettisoned, new sources to fund them 
had to be found.  The oil crisis transferred roughly 2% of the world’s wealth to the oil producing 
nations, and if life in the West was to go on as it had before, a way needed to be found to bring 
these funds back into Western economies.90  “Looking out to 1980 and beyond,” the US 
Treasury noted in August 1974, “the World’s capital requirements will be massive by historical 
standards.”91  To be successful, the United States would need to claim a lion’s share of this 
capital, even if this meant relying on foreigners to provide it.  At a 1974 US Treasury Secretary 
seminar, the participants deemed it “questionable” whether the United States would “have the 
capital required for the economic expansion which will be required in the foreseeable future.”  
Adapting to the energy crisis would require “a great influx of capital, much of which may have 
to come from oversees.”  They noted that “since a very large share of the world’s savings will, in 
the near future, be in the hands of the oil producing nations” it might be “necessary” to 
encourage these nations to invest in the United States “if we are to obtain the share of world 
savings which our capital requirements demand.”92  If these were the concerns of the government 
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with the world’s largest economy and deepest capital markets, it is easy to imagine how much 
more pressing these concerns were for the many other countries of the world, including in the 
Eastern Bloc, who did not receive a financial windfall from the oil price shock. 
The Euromarkets – the forerunners of today’s unregulated global capital markets - 
presented on possible avenue to distribute world savings from oil producers back to oil 
consuming nations.  Founded in London in 1955 using Europeans surplus US dollars, the 
Euromarkets were comprised of all currency held outside its country of origin and thus subject to 
little regulation.  Because the US dollar was the most important and widely used currency in 
international trade, Eurodollars represented the overwhelming majority of liquidity in the 
Euromarkets, though West German Deutsch Marks, Swiss Francs, and British Pounds played a 
role as well.  Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the United States heavily regulated the interest 
rates that banks could apply to their deposits within the United States, so increasing numbers of 
companies, banks, and central banks began to keep their US dollar holdings abroad and receive a 
higher rate of return in the Euromarkets.  Neither the U.S. nor British government was eager to 
regulate this activity, so the Euromarkets continued to grow.  By 1970 the markets were valued 
at $110 billion, and by the time the oil crisis struck, they represented one option for managing 
the world’s rapidly growing financial interdependence. 
But they were far from the only one.  Many financial observers and policymakers 
believed that governments or the International Monetary Fund would have to manage the 
recycling process rather than leave such an important element of the global economy to the 
volatility of the marketplace.  In the first ten months of 1974, OPEC nations deposited $16.5 
billion of their $45 billion surplus in the Euromarkets compared with just $10.5 billion in the 
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United States.93  This was a strong start for the unregulated markets, but most doubted that it 
could last long.  On June 26, 1974, West Germany’s largest private bank, Herstatt, collapsed 
under the pressure of speculative foreign exchange losses.  Many within the financial community 
itself believed the crash would be just the first of many dominoes to fall if the recycling process 
remained the responsibility of banks and the Euromarkets.  David Rockefeller, the Chairman of 
Chase Manhattan Bank and one of the leading voices in international finance, worried in the 
summer of 1974 that banks were “loaned up” and would soon be unable to meet industrial 
countries’ demands for credit without exposing themselves to Herstatt’s fate.  Banks were using 
short term deposits from OPEC countries that could be withdrawn after thirty days to make loans 
to oil importing countries with maturities ranging from seven to ten years.  That was, as The 
Wall Street Journal noted days after the Herstatt collapse, “borrowing short and lending long, the 
bankers’ classic formula for trouble.”  Given what appeared to be an untenable situation, the 
Journal concluded that governments and the IMF would have to take over the primary task of 
petrodollar recycling.  “The only other choice is an ominous one,” it noted, “drastic reductions of 
imports, currency devaluations and sharp economic slowdowns at the cost of rising 
unemployment.”94 
Once more, events defied expectations.   By late 1974, it became clear that oil producers 
had no interest in using finance to destabilize the countries that purchased their oil, and they 
moved to secure their deposits with Western banks on a longer-term basis.  Banks, in turn, found 
fewer reasons to worry about lending countries more money than ever before.  By the summer of 
1975, a US Treasury official could report that “the financing problems due to the OPEC financial 
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accumulations now are generally recognized by most banks as manageable.”95  If the private 
banking system could manage the recycling process, then there was little role for the IMF or 
governments to play.  From the start of 1975 onward, government efforts to control the recycling 
process waned, and the vast majority of sovereign borrowing stayed on the Euromarkets.   
This was, for the history of both capitalist welfare states and late socialist regimes, a 
fateful development.  With the world’s surplus capital now at its disposal, the international 
financial community became an arbiter of politics around the world.  Neither bankers nor most 
politicians were eager to see the role of finance in these terms, but it was true nonetheless.  Any 
nation-state, in either East or West, that relied on the borrowed capital of the Euromarkets to 
fund the products of its domestic politics was now subject to the capricious confidence of 
capitalists.  As long as markets remained convinced that borrowed capital would be repaid on 
time and with interest, politics within states could proceed normally.  Politicians could continue 
to promise their people prosperity, and the legitimacy of the government could survive 
unquestioned.  But should market confidence ever falter, the domestic politics of borrowing 
states would be thrown into immediate disarray.  In both East and West, the temptation to use 
borrowed capital to support domestic living standards proved too strong to resist.  This meant 
there was now a direct connection between the promises governments made to their citizens and 
the capital markets they used to fund them.   
As the importance of global capital markets rose after 1975, the importance of central 
banks increased in equal measure.  If governments could not control the capital markets to which 
they were now subject, central banks still could control how much liquidity pulsed through these 
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markets on a daily basis.  Lower interest rates would lead to more liquidity, more loans, and 
more government promises kept.  They would also lead to more inflation.  Higher interest rates 
would bring the exact opposite chain of events.  Thus, in a world of countries that depended on 
borrowed capital to finance politics, monetary policy was inherently political.96  This made the 
reaction of the most important central banks in the world to the oil crisis as important as the 
response of governments.  At the US Federal Reserve, the most important central bank in the 
world because of its control over the liquidity of the US currency now circulating the globe as 
petrodollars, the bank implemented a brief period of high interest rates in 1974 to counter the 
price shock, only to return to an accommodating policy after the failure of Franklin National 
Bank in October 1974 to prevent a wider crisis of confidence in the American banking system.  
This left interest rates at or below the level of inflation, which in turn made the real cost of 
borrowing US dollars around the world virtually zero.  With minor variations, the real cost of 
dollars remained close to zero until the late 1970s.97  Needless to say, this encouraged the global 
sovereign lending process a great deal.  Other central banks tried harder to restrict the growth of 
money and reduce inflation in their societies.  In West Germany, the Bundesbank adopted annual 
targets for monetary growth in December 1974 in the hope of lowering expectations of future 
inflation throughout the Federal Republic.  If workers and corporations knew that the money 
supply would grow at 8% (the bank’s first growth target), then it was hoped that growth in wages 
and prices would be stunted.  Although the bank consistently overshot its targets until the late 
1970s, the strategy was generally effective and West German inflation stayed far below the 
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OECD average throughout the 1970s.98  In Tokyo, the Bank of Japan also adopted a form of 
monetary targeting in 1975 aimed at influencing the wage bargaining process and inflation 
responded, dropping from an average of 10.8% from 1970-1975 to 6.4% in 1975-1980.  Both the 
West German and Japanese moves to control inflation with stricter monetary policy were 
important in solving their own countries’ inflationary pressures.  But as long as the real engine of 
global liquidity, the U.S. Federal Reserve, failed to attack inflation with all its might, 
governments would continue to have little trouble financing their domestic priorities.  Until the 
Federal Reserve adjusted, political systems throughout the world would not be forced to adjust 
either. 
This made any governmental attempt to adjust to the post-oil crisis reality a political 
choice, and an extremely unpopular one at that.  Three days after assuming the presidency in 
August 1974, US President Gerald Ford told the nation in a nationally televised address, 
“inflation is our domestic public enemy No. 1,” and proceeded to launch a campaign to WIN 
(Whip Inflation Now), under which he encouraged Americans to grow their own food, balance 
their budgets, and use credit sparingly.  Doing little to halt inflation, the only real effect of the 
WIN campaign was to contribute to the record losses of the Republican Party in the November 
1974 midterm elections.  Chastened by electoral defeat and dealing with massive Democratic 
majorities in both houses of Congress, Ford signed a series of simulative tax cuts in 1975 and left 
the challenge of government-imposed austerity to another day.99  Throughout the rest of the 
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West, governmental attempts to prioritize fighting inflation over restoring full employment were 
ground to pieces by the forces of political opposition.  Only in West Germany did Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt, a social democrat who enjoyed strong ties with the West German trade unions, 
succeed in passing a contentious austerity package in 1975.  He did so by leaning on his stature 
as a representative of the workers who was merely delivering the economic bad news that the 
new market conditions demanded.  As he told the nation the year after the austerity measures 
passed, “Nothing will ever be like it was before 1974.”100 
Most Western politicians and the constituents they served did not want to believe 
Schmidt’s fatalistic conclusion.  Even those who did found their message unpopular in 
democracies that favored those who promised a return to the glory of the pre-oil crisis years.  
Perhaps no other work captured the prevailing mood across the West like the British economist 
Fred Hirsch’s 1976 The Social Limits to Growth.  “Economic liberalism,” Hirsch wrote, is “a 
victim of its own propaganda: offered to all, it has evoked demands and pressures that cannot be 
contained.”  The promise of affluence had been extended to everyone in Western societies 
because of the “principle of universal participation” and “the demands of political legitimation.”  
Although “the spread of bourgeois objectives downward through the social scale strengthens the 
political legitimacy of liberal market capitalism,” Hirsch wrote, “the same process proves 
ultimately disruptive to economic performance.”  To restore the economic performance of 
bygone years, Hirsch argued that “a major adjustment needs to be made to the legitimate scope 
for individual economic striving.”  The fundamental economic problem of “advanced societies,” 
he wrote, “is a structural need to pull back the bounds of economic self-advancement.”  The 
prospects of this occurring were dim because the “central fact of the modern situation is the need 
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to justify.” That, Hirsch wrote, was “its moral triumph and its unsolved technical problem.”  The 
fact that resolution to the West’s economic problems needed to be “ethically defensible” 
imposed “drastic limits on the set of feasible solutions.”  This meant that the biggest challenge to 
industrial societies was formulating policies to solve the crisis, but rather gaining “the public 
acceptance necessary to make them work.”101   
Public acceptance was indeed the challenge of the hour, and few Western states appeared 
capable of fostering it.  If social consensus would forever evade Western democracies, perhaps 
political systems that discarded it all together would fare better in the post-1974 world.  If 
nothing would ever be the same after the oil crisis, perhaps the future at last belonged to the 
community of socialist states. 
 
An Invisible Crisis in State Socialism 
Quite understandably, the socialist leaders of the Eastern Bloc wanted to avoid the 
problems vexing their democratic capitalist counterparts.  At first glance, they appeared well 
positioned to do so.  Over the course of the decade, however, it would become clear that they 
could no more escape the instability of the world market than the nations of the West.  Until the 
mid-1970s, prices within Comecon were fixed as part of the five year planning process for the 
duration of the plan period.  Thus, in 1970, the USSR had set the price for its oil within Comecon 
for the entire period 1971-1975 at 14 rubles per ton, roughly $2.43 per barrel.102  At that time, oil 
prices on the world market hovered around $2 per barrel, so Comecon states paid a slight price 
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premium for Soviet oil.  It was a premium they were happy to pay because trade with the Soviet 
Union was not conducted in “hard currency" - currencies that were freely convertible such as the 
US dollar, British pound, or West German Deutsch Mark.  Although Soviet oil was priced in 
rubles for accounting purposes, Comecon trade was conducted on a barter basis within the five-
year plans.  Before the oil crisis, planners would use the five year planning process to determine 
that Soviet oil was worth a certain amount of East German television sets, Czechoslovak 
engineering equipment, or Polish ships, and trade for the entire period would proceed at that 
price.  For Eastern Bloc countries, which generally imported raw materials and exported finished 
products, this arrangement had two overriding advantages compared to the trade they conducted 
on Western markets: their products had a guaranteed buyer, and the could be sold without regard 
for their quality.  Soviet officials could (and did) protest about the quality of East European 
goods sent their way, but without radically altering the structure of Comecon, there was little 
they could do to stop the flow of inferior goods.  These advantages for Eastern Europe 
notwithstanding, trade within Comecon before the oil crisis was not fundamentally different 
from trade on the world market.  The barter system did not emphasize quality, but the economic 
value ascribed to goods (as seen in the rough parity of Comecon and world oil prices) was 
basically in line with world market values. 
The commodity price explosion of the early 1970s fundamentally altered this dynamic.  
Within a matter of months from late 1973 to early 1974, the world market value of the Soviet 
Union's energy resources quadrupled, and with it, the country's dominion over the rest of the bloc 
became an enormous economic liability.103  As long as world energy prices remained above ten 
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dollars a barrel, any deliveries of Soviet oil to Eastern Europe at two and a half dollars a barrel 
would represent a breathtaking loss on the sale of the country’s most valuable asset.   However, 
if Comecon prices were adjusted to reflect the new world market prices, Eastern Bloc countries 
would have to dramatically increase their exports to the Soviet Union to pay the new prices.  
This increase in exports would have to come at the expense of domestic consumption, and thus it 
had the potential to disrupt the unwritten social contracts of late socialism and produce another 
1953, 1956, 1968, or 1970.  This was a prospect that all Eastern Bloc leaders hoped to avoid, so 
they used all the tools at their disposal to insulate their domestic social contracts from changes in 
the world market and Comecon.  After the oil crisis, a new tension defined relations among the 
“fraternal allies” - the economic interests of the Soviet Union now stood in stark opposition to 
the geopolitical, ideological, and social priorities of the bloc as a whole. 
This tension first appeared in 1974 after the Soviet leadership proposed a new Comecon 
pricing system that would dramatically increase the price of Soviet energy resources to move 
them more in line with the new world market prices.  The Soviet Politburo debated the issue on 
numerous occasions that year, and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev “personally 
attache[d] great importance to this question,” Gosplan chairman Nikolai Baibakov told his East 
German counterpart Gerhard Schürer in December of that year.  The Soviet leader believed “that 
no socialist country, nor the Soviet Union, should have a setback in national economic 
development due to price regulation.”  For the leadership, the issue of oil prices was 
“fundamentally a political question, not just a purely economic problem,” Baibakov said.  Soviet 
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leaders knew that a transition to current world market prices “could lead to the emergence of 
chaos in the economies of the socialist countries, as is currently the case in capitalist countries.”  
At the same time, however, they believed the socialist countries could not “completely separate 
themselves from the development on the world market” because the price changes were “an 
objective [and] irreversible process.” This meant that the socialist bloc could not “escape the 
prevailing price increase on the world market.”104 
Escape was precisely what Eastern European leaders believed the bloc should do.  For 
them, the oil crisis was the clearest sign yet that capitalism was prone to crisis and doomed to 
failure.  Official East German policy maintained that the oil price shock was “influenced to a 
large degree by speculative and inflationary factors,” which arose “out of the intensification of 
the general crisis of the capitalist system, especially from the chronic energy, currency, and 
financial crisis.”105  Similarly, the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party concluded that 
“manipulations of international capitalist monopolies” had produced the commodity price shock.  
Hungarian party documents declared in 1975, “The general crisis of capitalism deepens, ... it is 
demonstrated by phenomena such as the slowdown and decline in industrial production in a 
number of capitalist countries, accelerating inflation, economic imbalance, and frequent 
disruption.”106  
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Faced with capitalism’s evident failures, Eastern European leaders thought it foolish to 
willing import the effects of capitalism’s crisis through changes to Comecon prices.  As GDR 
policymakers told their Soviet comrades, the bloc “should under no circumstances” incorporate 
price increases into the Comecon price system that are based “on speculative… factors of the 
imperialist system.”  Such a move would only “transmit the effects of capitalist inflation into our 
economic relations.”  Therefore, bloc leaders would have to eliminate “the competitive, 
speculative, and inflationary factors in the imperialist system from the world market price” 
before setting Comecon prices.  Failure to do so would have drastic social consequences on bloc 
countries.  “In addition to the economic effects," they said, "we must also recognize that political 
problems could arise if price increases for raw materials trigger a general price increase within 
our community of states.”107 
Soviet leaders understood the explosive social potential of price changes, but they 
remained firmly convinced that the price increases were something to be celebrated, not 
admonished.  Far from signaling the power of monopolies and speculators in the capitalist world, 
the commodity price shocks represented a resounding victory for the global forces arrayed 
against Western imperialism.  “Something fundamental has happened in the world,” Nikolai 
Patolichev, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade, told his East German colleagues.  “Developing 
countries have achieved their economic independence in recent years.  1973 was the conclusion 
of this struggle.  This is not an imperialist process but an anti-imperialist development.”   The 
socialist community had “supported developing countries in their political struggle, and now 
                                                     
válsága mélyül, [... ] ezt olyan jelenségek is mutatják, mint az ipari termelés megtor‐panása vagy 
visszaesése számos tőkés országban, a felgyorsuló infláció, a gazdaságiegyensúly mind 
gyakoribb megbomlása.”] 
107 “Standpunkt der DDR zur Gestaltung der RGW-Preise 1976-1980,” May 30, 1974, 
DE/1/58577, BArch Berlin. 
  75 
they have triumphed,” Patolichev said.  This meant that “by their very nature, the new 
commodity prices are the result of the anti-imperialist struggle.”108   
In both the East European and Soviet positions on the oil crisis, ideology and material 
self-interest seamlessly aligned.  East European leaders, who had a strong economic interest in 
maintaining low energy prices, unsurprisingly found ideological justification for their position in 
the long-standing Marxist-Leninist assumption that capitalism served the capitalist class and 
inevitably tended toward crisis.  The Soviet leadership, which had an overwhelming material 
interest in extracting a greater price from their allies for their most valuable asset, drew on an 
ideological tenet with an almost equally long pedigree: Marxism-Leninism's historic alliance 
with forces of anti-imperialism and decolonization.  These differences in ideological 
interpretation reflected differences in national self-interest and domestic politics that the oil crisis 
had exposed.  As the Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev rhetorically presented it to GDR 
officials, “How are we to explain to our people that we are selling our oil 30 rubles below the 
world market price?”  The East German side, and by extension, all Eastern European countries, 
needed to “understand,” Patolichev said, “what it would cost the Soviet side to sell the raw 
materials so cheaply.”  The Soviets could not go on providing such a subsidy because they could 
no longer “explain it to the Soviet people.”  This made it “absurd to reject” the Soviet Union’s 
“right (Berechtigung)” to revise the Comecon price structure.109  Conversely, as Honecker wrote 
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in a 1974 letter to Brezhnev criticizing the proposed price increases, the East German leadership 
felt it could not allow “a reduction of the population's standard of living" because the state's 
"class enemies” in the West led “a daily ideological diversion against the people of the GDR.”  
To counter this threat, Honecker wrote, the East German leadership thought it “necessary to 
solve a series of social questions (increases in pensions, the minimum wage, support for young 
families, aid for children, [and] acceleration in the construction of housing, hospitals, and 
schools, etc.).”110  The same governing strategy defined the regimes János Kádár in Hungary, 
Edward Gierek in Poland, Gustáv Husák Czechoslovakia, Todor Zhivkov in Bulgaria, and 
Nicolae Ceaușescu in Romania.  Higher Soviet energy prices would mean fewer houses in 
Leipzig, lower wages in Gdánsk, emptier shelves in Sofia, and more political instability 
everywhere. 
Ultimately, it was the Soviet Union that had the oil, so it was the Kremlin that set the 
policy.  At first, according to Gosplan chairman Baibakov, the Soviet Politburo decided that 
energy prices within Comecon for 1975 should be set based on an average of the world market 
price in 1973 and 1974.  Because these two years contained the dramatic price increases, this 
would have served Soviet economic interests handsomely.  But after hearing the loud 
protestations of their Eastern Bloc allies, particularly “Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria,” the 
Politburo decided that the two year price average would be "too difficult for the socialist 
countries because only the years with the high world market prices would be covered."  Instead, 
they chose to base the 1975 price on an average of 1972, 1973, and 1974 in order to include "one 
year each with low, medium, and high price[s]."  After 1975, in what would become known as 
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the Bucharest Formula for the city in which it was agreed upon, the Comecon price system 
would adjust based on a rolling average of the previous five years of world market prices.   
It was a decision worth billions of rubles, and by extension, billions of dollars.  As 
Baibakov explained, if Comecon moved immediately to world market prices, the socialist 
countries would have to export an extra sixteen billion rubles worth of goods to the Soviet Union 
during the 1976 to 1980 Five Year Plan.  Under the system of flexible prices, the sixteen billion 
ruble burden on Eastern Europe would fall to seven or eight billion rubles.  "In other words," 
Baibakov made clear, "the Soviet Union [will] receive 7-8 billion rubles less from the CMEA 
countries than if [trade] were based on current world market prices.”111  Patolichev described the 
new sliding price system as "an optimal compromise, which splits the necessary strains between 
the USSR and the other CMEA countries.”  Optimal did not mean easy, however.  Everyone 
involved in the negotiations throughout the bloc knew that the consequences of their decisions 
would be vast and long lasting.  As Patolichev told Erich Honecker in the midst of a particularly 
testy exchange, “The current change in Comecon prices is the most difficult task of my life…. 
The system of sliding prices is not only a question for the USSR, but also politically and 
economically important for the entire socialist community.”112 
That which appeared difficult to Soviet officials appeared life-threatening to Eastern 
European officials.  Even under the sliding price system, it was now clear that the price of their 
energy would dramatically increase in the years ahead.  Upon hearing of Moscow’s move to 
change the pricing system, Erich Honecker called an emergency meeting of the East German 
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leadership to formulate a response.  There were domestic and international dimensions to the 
Soviet decision that needed to be discussed.  Internationally, the General Secretary observed that 
the oil crisis had fundamentally, and perhaps permanently, changed Eastern Europe's economic 
value to the Soviet Union.  “Until now," he said, "we have paid more for a ton of oil from the 
USSR than the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany].  That may have changed as a result of the 
price increases in the West.”  For the foreseeable future, Eastern Europe would now be an 
economic burden on Moscow.  Domestically, the sliding price system presented the prospect of 
social and political disruption. The first estimate of the economic losses for the GDR under the 
new price system projected an additional cost of 7-8 billion Marks in 1975 and 8-9 billion Marks 
per year during the period 1976-1980.  To put the scale of these costs in perspective, Horst Sölle 
warned that the new annual costs for Soviet oil were “more than the annual increase in national 
income.”  Günter Mittag, Honecker's deputy and chief economic official in the GDR, understood 
immediately what this would mean for the country: “an absolute fall in living standards in the 
GDR.”  He was furious.  “These measures would practically invalidate Comecon’s system of 
fixed prices,” he said. “Planning without fixed prices is not possible.”  If prices were not fixed, 
then insulating the GDR from world market volatility would be impossible and the inflation 
pervading the capitalist world would creep into the Eastern Bloc.  For Honecker, preventing this 
from happening was a top priority.  "We have no intention of letting inflation penetrate the 
socialist camp,” he told the group.  Budget subsidies were the only way to turn flexible and 
rising import prices into stable and cheap domestic prices, so the fight against world inflation 
would come at the expense of the state budget.113  Honecker gave the new marching orders to his 
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State Planning Commissioner, Gerhard Schürer, on January 31, 1975.  “The main task,” he said, 
was to achieve economic growth “by means of intensification” - the socialist term for increases 
in productivity – and to ensure that “social security is placed at the center of the development of 
working and living conditions.”  Social security meant “above all, stability of prices…. 
implementation of the housing program, preservation and expansion of health care capacities, 
and safeguarding of the school program.”114  Progress in the land of real existing socialism 
would go on, Honecker had decided, no matter the consequences. 
So too would it in Hungary.  In 1972, the Hungarian Politburo had decided on “the need 
to further improve the position of the working class” and “to increase real wages.”  A capitalist 
crisis like the oil price shock was not going to stand in the way of this goal.  János Kádár told the 
country in his speech to 11th Party Congress in 1975, “Despite the external difficulties it is 
possible for our national economy to develop in the coming years at approximately the same rate 
and for living standards to continue to rise as they have in the past.”115  The party program 
adopted at the 1975 congress insisted, as Attila Mong notes, “in the style of the 1950s,” that the 
final stage of communism would arrive in Hungary in the next fifteen to twenty years.  “In order 
to create conditions for the transition from a developed socialist society to the establishment of 
communism, the following production and development targets are to be achieved: a 2-2.5 fold 
increase in per capita national income, a 2.5-3 fold increase in industrial production, 1.5-2 fold 
increase in agriculture, and a 2.5-3 fold increase in construction.”116  The inevitable arrival of 
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communism clearly would not be delayed or deferred.  To minimally account for the oil crisis, 
ministers in the National Planning Office tried to suggest the annual growth rate in national 
income for the 1976-1980 Five Year Plan be modestly reduced to 5-5.5% from the 6.3% it had 
been from 1971-1975.  “We received a vigorous response” from the party leadership, István 
Hetényi, an official in the planning office recalled. “The Chairman of the National Planning 
Office toured the various party organizations, and then came back and composed new [planning] 
materials that did not decrease the pace [of growth].  The “‘give more’ attitude” of the early 
1970s, Hetényi recalled, “exploded into the oil crisis.”117  
The bloc regimes’ decisions to leave the social contract untouched in the face of the oil 
crisis was born of searing historical memories.  Gerhard Schürer, the head of the East German 
State Planning Commission, wrote of the East German leadership, “Since the sugar price 
increase of June 17th, 1953, the fear of price increases on basic goods sat so deep in the bones of 
policymakers that no one achieved a change.”118  In Poland, dangerous history was much closer 
at hand – Gierek owed his entire ascension to the pinnacle of the country to the repeal of the 
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való megérkezés utolsó fázisához. „A fejlett szocialista társadalom megteremtése és a 
kommunizmus építésére való átmenet feltételeinek létrehozása érdekében hazánkban az 
eljövendő 15-20 év alatt a következő termelési-fejlesztési célokat kell elérni: az egy főre jutó 
nemzeti jövedelmet a jelenleginek 2-2,5-szeresére, az ipar termelését 2,5-3-szorosára, a 
mezőgazdaságét 1,5-2-szeresére, az építőiparét 2,5-3-szorosára kell emelni."] 
117 Mong, p. 150. [1966-1970 között átlagosan 6,8, majd 1971-1975 között 6,3 százalékos volt a 
nemzeti jövedelem évi átlagos bővülése.91 Az Országos Tervhivatal szakértői finoman 
felvetették, hogy a kitűzött ütemet az 5-5,5 százalékos tartományba kellene mérsékelni.92 
„Nagyon erőteljes visszautasításban részesültünk. Ne felejtsük el, hogy ez volt az az időszak, 
amikor az 1972-es MSZMP KB-határozat után felmerült, hogy tovább kell javítani a 
munkásosztály helyzetén, növelni kell a reálbéreket, tehát éppen egy ilyen »többet adni« 
hangulatba robbant bele az olajválság. Az OT elnöke végigjárta a különböző pártszervezeteket, 
majd visszajött, hogy készítsünk egy másik anyagot, abban pedig ne csökkentsük a tempót” - 
idézte vissza az eseményeket Hetényi, aki szerint „a remény győzött a tapasztalat felett".] 
118 Gerhard Schürer, Gewagt und Verloren, p. 75. 
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1970 price increases and the start of his “New Development Program” that promised workers a 
better life.  In Hungary, Kádár had secured the political acquiescence of the population after the 
national trauma of 1956 with a single promise: ever increasing living standards.  Gustav Husak 
was detested throughout Czechoslovakia, but after 1968 he had driven a similar bargain.  Higher 
living standards were the price of social peace. 
But if history and politics provided the impetus for late socialism, they are not what made 
it possible.  For that, the particular configuration of the global capitalist economy that emerged 
after the oil crisis was required.  In a supreme irony, it was only the development of global 
finance capitalism that allowed late socialism to exist.  Without the explosive growth of global 
capital markets after 1970, and particularly 1974, the governing model of late socialism would 
have been impossible.  Had there been no transnational pools of capital in the 1970s, or had they 
been more highly regulated and thus less easily accessed, the entire timeline of socialism’s 
denouement would almost certainly have looked completely different.  Rather than speaking of 
the rise of Solidarity in a Polish Crisis of 1980 and 1981, we might instead be writing about a 
Polish, Hungarian, or East German Crisis of 1974 or 1975.  Günter Mittag, the East German 
party leader for economic policy, admitted as much in his memoirs.  Since in the 1970s, he 
wrote, “it was regarded as an indisputable axiom that the standard of living should increase, 
loans were taken out to bridge supply shortages.”  Had these loans not been available, the Unity 
of Social and Economic Policy – the East German version of late socialism - would have quickly 
become untenable.  Abandoning this policy, Mittag wrote, would have “been a funeral for the 
GDR in the 1970s.”  Upending the social contract would have produced “social conflicts with 
political consequences, which would probably have affected more than just the former GDR.”  In 
the 1970s, “a possible political destabilization in the GDR through a restriction of social policy 
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was connected with an incalculable political risk.  In this respect, the guarantee of economic and 
social stability was a basic premise of all political action.”119  In the same way, a basic, yet 
unexamined, premise of our political histories of the last period of the Cold War is the intimate 
relationship between the globalizing financial capitalism of the 1970s and the fragile stability of 
late socialism.  It was a relationship that quietly underwrote everything from the daily lives of 
Eastern Europeans, who unknowingly depended on it to put food on their tables and goods in 
their stores, to the high politics of the Cold War, where it was the prerequisite for détente on the 
European continent.  Its power was really only apparent once it was gone, as it would be in 1980, 
at which point the broken connection between finance capitalism and late socialism would 
produce a crisis in Poland that would disrupt both the daily lives of Eastern Europeans and the 
high politics of the Cold War.   
A closer look at the situation of the GDR at the moment the oil crisis struck will illustrate 
this interdependence.120  Just as the oil crisis was beginning to unfold in November 1973, 
members of the East German Ministry of Finance produced a projection of the GDR’s debt out to 
1980 if the country maintained its trajectory under the rapidly rising world prices.  The results 
were frightening.  The GDR’s debt to the West at the end of 1974 was projected to be 8.7 billion 
                                                     
119 Günter Mittag, Um Jeden Preis (Berlin, DE, 1991), p. 61-63. 
120 Here, as throughout the chapter, I will examine East Germany in depth, because the 
documents are available and I can conduct research in German.  As with Soviet oil prices, 
differences between East Germany, Poland, and Hungary in their interaction with Western 
capital markets were differences of degree, rather than kind.  So, although a complete history 
will await further documentation in domestic archives, it can be assumed that the dilemmas 
present in the history that follows were also present in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and 
Czechoslovakia.  Romania was slightly different because it did not import any Soviet oil, but this 
only exposed it more heavily to the world market changes and dependence on Western credit 
markets.  Yugoslavia stood apart from the rest of the socialist states of Eastern Europe because 
Western governments viewed it with favor, so it received highly subsidized credits to a greater 
degree than any other country. 
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VM [Valutamarks], roughly $3.5 billion.121  Even under the optimistic assumptions that East 
German exports to the West would rise 15% annually while imports would rise only 5% annually 
from 1975-1980, the projection anticipated the hard currency debt growing from 12.1 billion VM 
in 1975 to 25.5 billion VM, or roughly $10 billion, in 1980.  The officials believed such a level 
of debt would simply not be possible to attain.  They estimated that over the entire period of 
1974-1980, 18 billion VM of planned borrowing on global capital markets was simply “not 
financeable.”  “All calculations show,” they wrote, that the nation’s economic trajectory “is not 
viable” because “of the development of the debt and the impossible financing [requirements].”  
The projections, the officials wrote, showed that “viable solutions for the balance of payments up 
to 1980 require a change of exports and/or imports on a scale of about 2 billion marks in 
1974.”122  Two billion marks worth of goods would have to be removed from the domestic 
economy and sent abroad (or, conversely, prevented from being imported in the first place) to 
ensure the long-term solvency of the country, and similar amounts would have to be removed 
each year from 1975-1980 as well.  This was, in numerical form, a call for a revision of the 
domestic social contract and an end to the Unity of Social and Economic Policy.123 
                                                     
121 Valutamarks were the East German accounting unit meant to signal the value of a West 
German Deutsch Mark without, for political and ideological reasons, using the designation 
Deutsch Mark.  At this time, a Valutamark was valued at a rate of 2.5 VM to 1 US Dollar, so this 
total represented about $3.5 billion. 
122 Günter Ehrensperger and another author whose signature is illegible, “Probleme und 
Konsequenzen aus der Arbeit am Volkswirtschaftsplan 1974 auf dem Gebiet der Zahlungsbilanz 
gegenüber dem nichtsozialistischen Wirtschaftsgebiet bis 1980,” November 6, 1973, 
DY/30/25761, BArch Berlin.  
123 Sixteen years later, Ehrensperger would rise to address the East German leadership on the 
morning of November 10, 1989, the day after the surprise opening of the Berlin Wall.  With the 
entire leadership stunned at the collapse of communist order and authority unfolding all around 
them, there was a desperate search for answers as to how they found themselves in such a dire 
position.  Ehrensperger drew their attention back to the early 1970s.  “In 1973 there was a huge 
worldwide price explosion,” and “the purchase of oil and other raw materials became much more 
expensive for the GDR.”  In November of that year, he recounted to the group, the Finance 
  84 
In its first months, the oil crisis only seemed to make the prospects for substantial Eastern 
Bloc borrowing worse.  As discussed above, many Western observers did not think the 
Euromarkets could sustainably manage the process of petrodollar recycling for any period longer 
than a couple of months.  David Rockefeller, chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank, worriedly 
noted in the summer of 1974 that “both the capital of the banks and the increasing lending risks 
are becoming serious constraints.”  Banks, in short, did have enough money to meet the world’s 
credit needs, and they were beginning to hesitate in lending out the money they did have.  This 
dynamic, Rockefeller said, could “sharpen the scarcity of funds in the market.”124  This analysis 
was immediately and urgently echoed within the East German leadership.  In March 1974, there 
were “fundamental differences of opinion” among the economic leadership on the question of 
whether “the necessary sources of credit for financing the planned imports of 1975-1980” could 
be found.  It remained an open question because East German bankers had recently been forced 
to “meet existing debt payments by taking out new loans.”  This was “already a tense goal 
because the existing sources of credit [were] largely exhausted.”  Foreign banks were 
“increasingly questioning the liquidity of the GDR.”  As a result, there were “already increasing 
                                                     
Ministry put together a “calculation of the effects” of the oil crisis that showed that if the country 
“drew no conclusions and went on living [as it had been], we would have 20 billion VM in debt 
by 1980.”  Ehrensperger told the assembled leaders that he submitted the projection to leader of 
the Finance and Planning Division at the time, Werner Krolikowski, who in turn took the report 
to Honecker for the General Secretary’s review.  The reaction was swift and firm.  After meeting 
with Honecker, Krolikowski summoned Ehrensperger to his office that night and told him that 
“effective immediately” he “did not have to work on such calculations and planning” any longer.  
“I did not get the material back,” Ehrensperger recalled, “and I was to arrange that all relavant 
documents [to the calculations] were destroyed.”  With the shock of the fall of the Wall still fresh 
in everyone’s mind, he concluded, “If you want to know in a sentence why we are in this 
position today, then you must say completely objectively (ganz sachlich) that year after year we 
have lived beyond our means and deluded ourselves since at least 1973.”  See “Diskussionreden 
E. Krenz, G. Ehrensperger, Gerhard Schürer auf 9. Und 10. ZK-Tagung,” November 8-10, 1989, 
DE/1/58736, BArch Berlin. 
124 Quoted in James, International Monetary Cooperation, p. 320. 
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difficulties” in financing “the growing payment obligations by promptly taking out new loans.”  
The first months of higher commodity prices had made the availability of credit worse, not 
better.  “Leading capitalist industrial states, France, Great Britain, and Italy for example, have 
significant problems in funding their balance of payments…This results in a high level of credit 
requirements for these countries, which restricts the possibilities of mobilizing credit sources for 
the banks of the GDR.”125  Markets, it seemed, might force a change in East German domestic 
policy whether the leadership wanted one or not. 
Throughout the tumultuous summer of 1974 in the West, the debate over the 
sustainability of the bloc’s access to global capital markets continued.  As the Soviet Union 
worked to change Comecon prices in September, a newly formed group of top economic 
officials in the GDR, “The Balance of Payments Working Group,” discussed a Marxist-Leninist 
analysis of the Euromarkets designated “Top Secret.”  In the first section titled, “The Nature of 
the Eurocurrency Market and Its Risks,” the author (who remained unnamed) detailed how the 
markets had begun in the late 1950s when surpluses of US dollars ended up in Europe due to the 
“unrestricted political and economic predominance of US imperialism on the world capitalist 
market.” Then, in the late 1960s, “objectively acting laws of the capitalist mode of production” 
such as the “uneven economic development of capitalist industrial states” and “the excessive 
expenditure of US imperialism on financing its aggressive global strategy” led to a breakup of 
the Bretton Woods system in 1971.  The report reminded the working group that the party had 
recently decided that “the general crisis of capitalism has reached a new stage,” and declared that 
                                                     
125 Grünheid, “Information für Genossen Schürer über die Planberatung mit dem Minister für 
Außenhandel, Genossen Sölle, zum Stand der Ausarbeitung der Staatlichen Aufgaben für 1975 
und zur Konzeption für den Zeitraum 1976 bis 1980,” March 28, 1974, DE/1/58580, BArch 
Berlin. 
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this conclusion was “fully applicable to the development of the Eurocurrency market.”  Global 
confidence in the US dollar was falling “constantly,” the report noted, and the floating exchange 
rate system had led to “more and more speculative transactions” on the capitalist financial and 
foreign exchange markets, which made activities on these markets “ever more risky.”  The 
upshot was clear: “with its inherent risks, the Eurocurrency market does not provide a long-term 
basis for financing balance of payments deficits.”126  Exactly how officials in other socialist 
states analyzed their prospects on the Euromarkets at this moment awaits further archival 
research.  Because Western banks tended to evaluate all socialist states as a single group, it is 
likely that Polish and Hungarian officials shared the East German doubts.  But whether analysis 
in other bloc capitals echoed that coming out of East Berlin, all bloc states nevertheless 
confronted the same precarious situation.  As 1975 approached with all Eastern European leaders 
determined not to let increases in Soviet energy prices lead to a fall in domestic living standards, 
bankers throughout the bloc had no choice but to test how much money Western capital markets 
would let them borrow.   
To universal surprise, it turned out to be a great deal.  Once it became clear that private 
banks could manage petrodollar recycling on a permanent basis, economic plans across the world 
that had been deemed “not financeable” in 1973 became eminently so by 1975.  The rapid 
expansion of the Euromarkets that began in 1974 pushed the horizon for living on credit to a 
level that would have been deemed dangerous and impractical just one year earlier.  OPEC 
nations accumulated a $60 billion current account surplus in 1974.  Of this $60 billion, $21 
                                                     
126 No author, “Die Auswirkungen der krisenhaften Situation auf dem Eurogeldmarkt auf die 
Lösung der Finanzierungsaufgaben der Außenhandelsbank im Rahmen der Zahlungsbilanz 1975 
und für die weiteren Jahre,” attachment to “Tagesordnung für die Sitzung der Arbeitsgruppe 
Zahlungsbilanz am 27. September 1974, 8.30 Uhr, Zimmer 441,” September 27, 1974, DY 
3023/963, BArch Berlin. 
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billion was deposited with Eurocurrency banks, and the total assets of the five largest US banks 
grew at an unprecedented annual rate of 40% in 1974.127  The US Federal Reserve’s attempt to 
ease the recession in the United States through accommodating monetary policy kept interest 
rates low and liquidity high.  Western banks were, in short, flush with cash and eager to find 
places to put it. The time was ripe for a marriage of convenience, and in 1975, the Eastern Bloc 
as a whole borrowed more money than they ever had before.  Publicized Eurocurrency loans to 
the bloc – the type that East German officials had feared would suddenly become scarce - more 
than doubled from 1974 to 1975, rising from $1 billion to $2.4 billion.  Quite literally, the 
surplus capital generated by a global crisis in capitalism was now funding state socialism’s 
defense against the global capitalist system.128 
Indeed, by the opening of 1976, the growth of socialist borrowing was so notable that 
Euromoney magazine, the publication of record for the Euromarkets in the 1970s, put the Eastern 
Bloc on the cover of its January issue (Figure 1).  “It is customary to begin the new year with a 
backward look,” the lead article noted, “and if we focus on the Euromarkets, the number and 
nature of Comecon borrowings in 1975 are striking.”129 
                                                     
127 William Witherell, “Policy Issues in International Finance,” June 17, 1975, Folder “June 
1975,” Box 1, Office of Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, Chronological Files of the 
Office of Financial Resources and Energy Finance, 1974-1977, National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 
128 Publicized loans were only one type of loan that the Eastern Bloc received.  A much greater, 
but also untraceable, percentage of the debt was built up through short-term deposits that 
Western banks placed in Eastern Bloc central and foreign trade banks.  These short-term deposits 
also dramatically increased in 1974-75, though by precisely how much is unclear.  Short-term 
deposits and the level of publicized credits are discussed in “How the East Bloc Tapped the 
Euromarkets,” Euromoney, January 1977, p. 24. 
129 Charles Schmidt, “Comecon’s Borrowing Requirements in 1976,” Euromoney, January 1976, 
p. 12.  
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Figure 1: The January 1976 and January 1977 covers of Euromoney magazine, the 
periodical of record for the international bankers in the 1970s, demonstrates the 
importance the Western financial community placed on its lending to socialist 
states. 
 
There was so much Comecon borrowing in 1975 that by early 1976, Western financial 
and political leaders were beginning to question the bloc’s creditworthiness.  The January 1976 
Euromoney article noted it was “inevitable” that “the magic” would eventually “go out of 
lending to Comecon countries.  Western commercial banks are beginning to conduct business 
with the Socialist [sic] world on the same terms that they extend to the rest of the international 
community.”130  In May, a widely discussed article in Business Week quoted Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, a leading voice in the Trilaterist movement and soon to become Jimmy Carter’s 
National Security Advisor, on the political dimensions of the increase in the Eastern Bloc’s debt.  
“We are dealing with both an opportunity and a threat,” Brzezinski told the magazine in a 
                                                     
130 Ibid, p. 14.  
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quintessential expression of the logic of interdependence.  “Indebtedness often increases the 
leverage of the debtor and decreases the leverage of the creditor,” he said.  “If a Comecon 
country defaulted, it could create considerable problems” for banks in Western European 
countries, who had lent out the most money.131  This threat of interdependence was the concern 
of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who warned a gathering OECD officials in June 1976 
of “possible efforts” by socialist states “to misuse economic relations for political purposes 
inimical” to the West.132  Amidst more pressing East-West problems like the war in Angola and 
nuclear arms control, these vague concerns only momentarily rose above the general din of Cold 
War concerns. 
Nevertheless, the flurry of commentary in the West caught the ear of officials in the East 
who were now highly sensitive to changes in global market sentiment.  “The capitalist national 
and international banks,” East German officials wrote in early 1976, “have recently expressed 
doubts about the creditworthiness of the socialist countries. That was not always so. A few years 
ago, outstanding credits to socialist countries were among the safest credits of any capitalist 
bank.  Insolvency from a borrower in a socialist country was as unthinkable, for example, as an 
insolvency from the American automaker General Motors.”133  A translated copy of the Business 
Week article citing Brzezinski made the rounds through the East German leadership.  Horst 
Kaminsky, the President of the East German State Bank, attached an explanatory cover note 
stating that the article “points to the imperialist side’s particular intentions and objectives in 
granting credit to socialist countries.”  But if the dangers of a Comecon default had become 
                                                     
131 “The Debt That Overhangs East-West Dealings,” Business Week, May 3, 1976, pp. 118-119. 
132 Bernard Nossiter, “U.S. Urges Wariness in East Trade,” The Washington Post, June 22, 1976 
133 “Information über Aspekte und Beziehungen SW/NSW Nr. 8,” February 2, 1976, 
DN/11/6431, BArch Berlin. 
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thinkable for both sides by the spring of 1976, that did not stop the banks from lending.  As the 
Business Week article summarized, “Comecon will continue to rely heavily on Western financial 
resources,” and for now “Western banks and governments are still lending.”134  By the start of 
1977, the bloc was once more the star of the Euromarkets and reappeared on the cover of 
Euromoney.  “Any concern over the rapid increase in the level of indebtedness of the CMEA 
countries has not restricted the volume of lending.  On the contrary, 1976 was a vintage year,” 
journalists for the magazine wrote.  Banks seemed to agree they had lent Comecon too much, but 
they couldn’t help themselves from lending more.  Eurocurrency credits had increased 33% in 
1976 to $3.2 billion, and there was no end in sight.135   
So, why did the banks continue to lend?  Money and erroneous assumptions pushed their 
enthusiasm beyond rationality.  “On any normal criteria” one London banker told Euromoney, 
the Eastern Bloc was “certainly overborrowed.”  But banks were not holding the bloc to high 
standards of creditworthiness “because they’re so flush with funds,” another said.136   A 
confident ideology compounded the enticements of easy liquidity.  Citibank CEO Walter 
Wriston, the leading proponent of the global movement toward sovereign lending in the 1970s, 
had notoriously proclaimed, “Countries don’t go bankrupt.”137   Above and beyond “normal” 
capitalist countries, bankers believed socialist countries had three other advantages.  First, they 
had a pristine record of timely payment and had never defaulted on their debts.  Second, bankers 
                                                     
134 “The Debt That Overhangs East-West Dealings,” Business Week, May 3, 1976, pp. 118-119. 
135 Richard Ensor and Francis Ghiles, “CMEA Debts May Be $45 Billion, but the Loans Have 
Kept Flowing,” Euromoney, January 1977, p. 23.  
136 Ibid, p. 23. 
137 There are many versions of Wriston’s phrase, usually quoted by his critics and followed by a 
derisive comment about his foolhardiness, but this version comes from the IMF website. 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/center/mm/eng/mm_dt_01.htm. Accessed on 12 December 
2013. 
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assumed that socialist states’ authoritarian structure meant they had the “ability to control 
domestic consumption and investment,” which would put them “in a better position” to exercise 
“restraint.”138  Unlike capitalist democracies that promised their citizens too much, socialist 
authoritarianism was assumed to be adept at implementing austerity.  Should that fail, however, 
bankers saw a strategic reserve behind the Eastern Bloc unparalleled throughout the rest of the 
global economy – the Soviet Union.  Over the course of the decade, they came to believe in what 
was termed “the umbrella theory,” whereby they anticipated that the USSR would “come to the 
rescue” of its allies if they ran into financial trouble.  A U.S. Congressional analysis from the 
period noted that the umbrella theory had “no known legal premise…as there is no signed 
agreement, bilateral or multilateral, within the context of Comecon, that would make it 
incumbent upon the USSR to be the lender of last resort” for Eastern Europe.  But, “It is 
presumed to be in the political interest of the USSR to provide that function…possibly in 
exchange for non-membership in the IMF.”139  Under the Soviet umbrella, Eastern Europe 
seemed safe from financial harm. 
On top of favorable ideological and financial structures, a group of very talented 
communist central bankers represented their countries on Western financial markets with 
aplomb.  To read the Western press coverage of these men is to sense the potent mix of intrigue 
and respect with which Western bankers look upon their communist counterparts at this time.  
Standing at the head of this group, and on par with any financial official in the West, was János 
Fekete, the Deputy Vice President of the Hungarian National Bank.  Fekete had earned his 
venerable reputation in Western financial circles for accurately predicting a devaluation of the 
                                                     
138 Charles F. Schmidt, “Comecon’s Borrowing Requirements in 1976,” Euromoney, January 
1976, p. 12.  
139 Eichler, “Country Risk Analysis,” in Eastern European Economic Assessment, p. 767. 
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US dollar in 1971 and the global recession of 1974-75.  By the time he was profiled in 
Euromoney in 1977, the magazine treated his opinions with what verged on oracle-like 
reverence.  There was an entire separate article on the topic of “What Fekete Says About the 
West,” presumably to help the magazine’s readers glean insight into the future of capitalism 
from this astute “Marxist economist.”  Described as “bespectacled and ebullient,” Fekete told 
Euromoney and thus the banking community, that the Eastern Bloc was vastly under borrowed, 
not overly indebted. “If you take the economic potential of these countries, their debts are 
ridiculously low,” he said.  Playing on the Western notion of an umbrella theory, he seamlessly 
shifted questions about Eastern Europe’s problems to a discussion of the Soviet Union’s material 
strength.  “In a year, [the Soviet Union] is producing 480 million tons of petrol, it is producing 
about 300 billion cubic metres of gas, and 700 million tons of coal.  It is an enormously strong 
economy.”140  With such strength in Soviet natural resources, it was implied that the debt of the 
rest of the bloc hardly mattered.  For the time being, Western banks couldn’t help but agree. 
If Fekete projected self-confidence, Poland’s Jan Wołoszyn, the First Deputy President of 
Bank Handlowy, the Polish foreign trade bank, projected stately elegance.  The same 1977 
Euromoney issue described him as a “distinguished, elder statesman of Polish banking who 
would look equally at home in the boardroom of any bank in the West.”141  In October 1980, the 
magazine ran a profile of Wołoszyn as the Solidarity protests grew in Poland.  “If Poland’s 
political leaders have a credibility problem with their own citizens,” the article reassured, 
“Wołoszyn…has none with the banks of the West.”  Contrary to their views of his country’s 
                                                     
140 Padraic Fallon, “Hungary’s Marxist Economist and Central Banker, János Fekete,” 
Euromoney, January 1977, pp. 14-17. 
141 Description of Wołoszyn in Padraic Fallon, “Roman Malesa.  Bank Handlowy’s President 
and Negotiator,” Euromoney, January 1977, p. 31.  
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economic system, bankers had nothing to fear with “Mr. Poland”: Wołoszyn was “credible, 
knowledgeable, and…impressive,” had never joined the Polish Communist party, and had 
thought more than once about leaving banking for more leisurely bourgeois pursuits, gardening 
foremost among them.  “This is a people business,” bankers reported to Euromoney, and 
Wołoszyn was “the one who, through his own charisma, standing, and personality, persuades 
many banks to lend to Poland.”142  
In East Germany, two men, Werner Polze and Horst Kaminsky, ran the country’s public 
financing efforts on the Euromarkets.  Polze and Kaminsky went about their business in the West 
without the fanfare of Fekete or Wołoszyn.  After the Cold War, their actions receded further 
into the background in Germany after the revelation that a man named Alexander Schalck-
Golodkowski – known simply as Schalck - had been running an organization within the East 
German government called Kommerzielle Koordinierung.  KoKo, as it was called, was charged 
with creating hard currency for the East German state using any means available.  From the late 
1960s to the collapse of the state in 1989-1990, this mission led KoKo into all manner of 
activities including currency and commodity speculation, hotel management, highway 
construction, consumer goods stores, garbage disposal services for West Berlin, and weapons 
sales to developing countries.  Schalck became one of the most important people within the East 
German leadership because he became the state’s chief negotiator with West Germany on almost 
all financial matters.  After the launch of Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik in the late 1960s and the 
signing of the Basic Treaty normalizing relations between the two German states in 1972, the 
West German government began to use its financial resources as a tool of its détente policy.  East 
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Germany was granted access to a “Swing” credit with West German banks, under which it could 
borrow Deutsch Marks without interest up to a negotiated limit, which ranged from DM500 
million to DM800 million in the 1970s and 1980s.  Bonn also made an annual transportation 
payment to the GDR that was ostensibly for the maintenance of the roads running between the 
Federal Republic and West Berlin, but in fact was free for the East Germans to use as they 
pleased.  Most spectacularly of all, the Federal Republic began buying East Germans’ freedom, 
transferring increasing sums of money to the East German government in exchange for the 
release of dissidents (and eventually, many others) to the West.  Schalck played a role in all of 
these negotiations while still organizing KoKo’s varied commercial activities, so his influence 
within the East German hierarchy steadily grew over the last two decades of the Cold War.  Once 
the Berlin Wall fell, the public revelations of Koko’s dubious activities led many in the newly 
reunited Germany to label Schalck “public enemy #1.”143 
The East German situation was a particularly vibrant example of how the politics of 
détente further eased the reigns of capital constraints beyond their already lax hold.  Gierek’s 
regime in Poland proved particularly adept at using Western governments’ interest in better 
relations with the Eastern Bloc to unlock Western state coffers.  Each US President in the 1970s 
– Nixon, Ford, and Carter – visited Poland under the banner of détente, and each time they 
landed in Warsaw, they brought with them increases in US government loan guarantees as a sign 
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of goodwill and a means of boosting US exports.144  In 1975, on the sidelines of the meetings to 
sign the Helsinki Accords, Gierek and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt signed an 
agreement granting Warsaw a “jumbo credit” of 500 million DM in exchange for the Polish 
government’s willingness to let its German minority emigrate to the Federal Republic.145  
Ceausescu’s Romania parlayed its reputation for independence from Moscow into membership 
in the International Monetary Fund in 1972, which in turn helped the country gain broader and 
cheaper access to Euromarket credit.  The Kádár regime generally refrained from using détente 
to gain politically motivated credits from Western governments, but it nevertheless used its 
reputation in the West as the most liberal and reform-minded country in the bloc to great 
financial effect.  
Even if the question of access to Western credit markets turned out to be surprisingly 
easy to solve, the question of how to use the borrowed capital proved infinitely vexing.  Every 
foreign borrowing strategy in the Eastern Bloc was at least officially premised on a single idea: 
using the hard currency to import Western technology, modernize domestic production, and 
develop industries capable of producing exports to the world market that would earn enough hard 
currency to pay off the loans.  “My principle is that if a country takes a credit and invests it well, 
producing goods that are necessary to the market, goods that can be sold at the right price, then 
that credit is a well covered credit,” Fekete, the Hungarian central banker, summarized in 
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1977.146  In Poland, Gierek’s New Development Strategy had augmented the country’s 
traditional export strengths in copper and coal with new hard currency investments in heavy 
industry, chemicals, aircraft, construction equipment, and auto parts on the assumption that these 
industries would produce exportable goods by the end of the decade.  In East Germany, planners 
had funded a massive expansion of the petrochemicals industry in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
to take advantage of growing Soviet energy supplies to produce more exports of refined 
petroleum products to the West.  In each case, some of the imported capital made it all the way 
to improving the quality of Eastern European factories and production processes, but much of the 
rest of it merely presented rampant opportunity to expand domestic corruption and patronage 
networks.  More importantly, the decision to base long-term development on future exports to 
the world market broke an important barrier between Comecon and the rest of the world 
economy.  Eastern Bloc countries would have to compete with the developing countries of Latin 
America and East Asia to sell their goods in the developed West.  This competition subjected 
Eastern Bloc goods to direct competition with capitalist goods and pitted socialist methods of 
production against the capitalist methods the bloc had long eschewed.  As Fekete said in the 
quote serves as this chapter’s epigraph, in the 1970s there was a socialist world and a capitalist 
world, but there was only one world market.  Implicit in the Eastern Bloc’s choice to borrow on 
global capital markets was also the choice to compete on global trade markets.   
It was a competition that the bloc would lose time and again in the 1970s.  Despite 
constant exhortations from the very top of each state’s governing structure about the importance 
of increasing exports and eventually producing hard currency trade surpluses, the Eastern 
                                                     
146 Fallon, “Hungary’s Marxist Economist and Central Banker, János Fekete,” Euromoney, 
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European members of Comecon (excluding the Soviet Union) ran, by one authoritative estimate, 
a cumulative hard currency trade deficit from 1970-1977 of roughly $26 billion dollars.147  
Eastern Bloc officials liked to blame their inability to increase exports on the slow growth and 
high inflation of Western economies as well as discriminatory Western trade policies that 
prevented their goods from reaching Western consumers.  But the reality was that they simply 
were not producing goods that Westerners wanted to buy.  If, as Fekete claimed, there were no 
“‘capitalist and socialist’ machines and products, but only good or bad machines, modern or 
obsolete products," then the Eastern Bloc most assuredly was producing flawed obsolescence by 
the late 1970s.  And if the trade surpluses required the pay back the debt could not be created 
through increases in exports, then they would need to be created through decreases in imports.  
The challenge of austerity lurked just around the corner. 
  
                                                     
147 Dollar figure converted from SDRs at rate of 1 SDR / 1.21 U.S. Dollar. Based on author’s 
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Chapter 2 




By the summer of 1976, the rapid rise in Eastern debts and Western doubts led Edward 
Gierek to alter his plans for Poland.  Although the socialist bloc as a whole remained credible in 
the eyes of Western bankers, Poland was setting a torrid pace for debt accumulation that 
appeared unsustainable.  From 1971 to 1975, the nation’s debt to the West had exploded from 
$764 million to $7.4 billion, and it showed no sign of slowing down unless the country’s 
economy underwent dramatic changes to lower imports and increase exports.148  To that end, on 
June 24th the Polish government announced a plan to increase food prices across the country by 
an average of 60%.  Real wages in Poland had grown at an annual rate of 6.8% from 1971 to 
1975, and the price increases were meant to bring the consumer market back into balance with 
the increased buying power of the population.  The increases would contribute mightily to 
solving the debt problem by lowering domestic demand.  All of this was to the better, but two 
glaring problems stood in the way: the increases would make Polish citizens poorer and undercut 
late socialism’s foundational promise to always increase living standards.  Recognizing that the 
proposal would be unpopular, the government committed to holding “public consultations” to 
discuss the plan with the population.  The fact that the consultations were scheduled to take place 
                                                     
148 Figures given in Joan Parpart Zoeter, “Eastern Europe: The Hard Currency Debt,” in Eastern 
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in the course of a single day signaled the propagandistic intent that underlay them, but Polish 
workers nevertheless took the invitation to express their opinion of the decision seriously.  On 
June 25th, strikes and street demonstrations broke out in industrial centers, and countless smaller 
work disruptions rippled through the rest of the country.  Workers from the Ursus tractor factory 
near Warsaw marched to the transcontinental railway line nearby and halted the Paris-Moscow 
express, while workers in Radom took more direct action and set fire to the local party 
headquarters.  Shaken and unwilling to risk a full reprise of the events of 1970, the authorities 
claimed by nightfall to have held production consultations with the working class and rescinded 
the price increases indefinitely.149   
In what context should these events be placed?  Normally, the events of June 1976 are 
placed at the midpoint of Polish, late socialist, or Eastern Bloc narratives about the rise of 
Solidarity that begin with the food price strikes of 1970 and end with the formation of the union 
in the summer of 1980.  In this light, the attempted price increases signal the ineptitude and 
injustice of the Gierek regime as well as the broader economic stagnation and political 
illegitimacy in the bloc.  Workers were not going to let such an illegitimate ruling class solve the 
nation’s financial problems on their backs, so the strength and cohesion of their resistance grew.  
With the founding of the Workers’ Defense Committee (KOR), an organization of Polish 
intellectuals committed to supporting the workers’ opposition in the aftermath of the unrest, the 
attempted price increases marked an important moment in the construction of a unified Polish 
opposition that would unleash the full power of its resistance under the banner of Solidarność in 
August 1980.  As Timothy Garton Ash, one of the first Western chroniclers of Solidarity, wrote 
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of the attempted price increase and the founding of KOR, “it was the first bridge thrown over the 
fatal gulf between workers and intellectuals….Without this bridge Solidarity would have 
developed, if at all, very differently.”150   
But there is another way to describe the events of that June.  Removed from their 
particular Polish context, they were emblematic of phenomena occurring across the industrial 
world as nations adapted to the oil crisis.  First, they exemplified the power of financial markets 
to force changes in domestic policies.  Second, they reflected governments’ torturous attempts to 
legitimize changes in domestic policy that would harm the interests of the population.  And 
finally, they spoke to the potential power of the working class to thwart governmental plans for 
domestic austerity.  Described in this way, the Polish attempt to increase prices represents just 
one of many instances of the basic riddle at work in both Eastern and Western politics in the late 
1970s: how could governments extract economic sacrifice from their peoples?  It was a challenge 
that few governments mastered and most tried to avoid until they had no choice.  In the 1970s, 
the power of the working class was, if anything, stronger in the West than in the East, and most 
governments on both sides of the Iron Curtain waited as long as financial markets would allow 
before asking their citizens to sacrifice.  Because Western currencies were internationally 
convertible and Eastern currencies were not, crises in the West appeared under a different name 
than in the East: currency crises bedeviled Western societies, while debt crises came to haunt 
Eastern ones.  But Western currency crises and Eastern debt crises were different manifestations 
of the same thing: international capital's loss of confidence in the viability of a nation's economy.  
As such, they required the same response, which can broadly be defined as austerity – 
government policies that intentionally lower the living standards of the domestic population in 
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order to restore financial markets’ confidence in the national economy.  Calling this austerity 
economic “adjustment,” as financial officials did in the 1970s and 1980s, disguised the policy's 
fraught social and political consequences.  In both East and West, economic "adjustment" was 
nothing short of a direct challenge the legitimacy and governing ideology of any government that 
tried to implement it.  In Poland, the power of austerity to challenge the legitimacy and ideology 
of the regime only became fully apparent when another attempt to raise prices in 1980 spawned 
the most direct challenge to communist authority since 1968, Solidarity.  But as the first attempt 
at austerity was withdrawn in 1976 before it could spark a political crisis, the power of economic 
adjustment to transform political orders was already on display in many Western societies. 
This chapter chronicles these fraught moments of economic crisis that rolled across the 
Western and Eastern world over the course of the late 1970s.  Governments of the Eastern Bloc 
continued to rely on their access to cheap Soviet raw materials and Western credit markets to 
avoid the disruptive adjustments that austerity brought to Western societies beginning in 1976.  
But as this chapter will show, both of these economic lifelines ran out in the late 1970s, and 
economic adjustment became unavoidable.  The Soviet announcement in 1977 that it would no 
longer be able to increase energy deliveries to the rest of the bloc after 1980 weakened one of the 
crutches that Eastern European governments used to defer the effects of the oil crisis since 1973.  
It left them overwhelmingly reliant on the continued flow of Western capital, and particularly US 
dollars, from the Euromarkets to defer the encroaching demands of the world market.  Because 
the US dollar was controlled by the US Federal Reserve, Western capital would continue to flow 
easily only as long as US monetary policy remained loose, as it had been throughout the 1970s to 
help the United States defer its own adjustment to the new world market conditions.  America’s 
reckoning with economic adjustment, which came in the form of runs on the US dollar in 1978 
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and 1979, forced the US government to implement domestic austerity at the decade’s end to 
restore international capital’s confidence.  The US, like the Eastern Europeans, had been 
deferring adjustment as long as possible.  But by the late 1970s, its time too had run out.  As this 
chapter will show, US Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker’s resolution of the 1979 dollar 
crisis through the imposition of domestic austerity brought an end not only to the United States’ 
years of deferring the effects of the oil crisis, but also to the days of easy money on the 
Euromarkets.  The centrality of the US dollar to the entire world economy meant that when the 
United States finally decided to face its reckoning with austerity, the rest of the world, including 
the communist states of the Eastern Bloc, had no choice but to reckon with austerity too. 
 
The Dominos Begin to Fall 
Her Majesty’s Government in London was the first to fall into austerity’s grip.  Like its 
counterpart in Warsaw, the British government had borrowed heavily on international credit 
markets after the oil crisis to defer adjustment.   As was recounted briefly in the previous 
chapter, the British Labour Party had returned to power in the months following the onset of the 
oil crisis on the promise that British workers would receive large pay increases.  Through 1974 
and 1975, the government of Harold Wilson had relied on the inflow of petrodollars into London 
and heavy borrowing from the IMF to keep funding this promise to his constituents.  But by 
March 1976, international capital holders began to doubt the long term viability of the British 
economy, and they started moving their wealth out of the British Pound.  This precipitated a run 
on the currency (the pound lost a significant amount of value relative to other currencies), and 
the Bank of England was drawn into supporting the pound on international currency markets.  
Soon, its resources were exhausted and the government was forced to approach the other 
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Western central banks for a loan.  They granted the British a $5.3 billion loan, but the US 
Treasury and the German Bundesbank attached the condition that the Wilson government reach a 
"high-conditionality stand-by agreement" with the IMF.   This would involve the Fund dictating 
changes in domestic policy that would bring about an improvement in its balance of payments 
(thus reassuring international capital holders), but also domestic austerity (thus infuriating the 
British working class).  A package of measures was agreed to in July, but it failed to stem the 
flow of capital out of the country.   
By November, the Labour government, now under the leadership of James Callaghan, 
was back at the IMF with a request for further assistance.  The terms of the deal that emerged 
were stiff: 3.5 billion pounds in government spending cuts over the next two years, a reduction in 
the state borrowing requirement, limits on domestic credit creation, and the adoption of an 
"incomes policy" under which British workers' wage increases would barely match inflation.  
Callaghan lobbied the US and West German governments to get the IMF to ease its terms.  But 
both President Ford and Chancellor Schmidt demanded that Callaghan accept the IMF's 
demands.  Out of international lifelines, Callaghan had no choice but to move ahead with the 
IMF plan, which was adopted in December 1976.151 
The country’s arrival at the precipice of insolvency led to further diagnoses of 
democracy’s ultimate propensity to promise more than it could deliver.  “The greatest sacred 
cow of all – unfettered representative democracy – will have to be questioned,” the British 
financial writer Samuel Brittan concluded in 1977 book The Economic Consequences of 
Democracy.  “The basic trouble is the lack of a budget constraint among voters,” he wrote.  “Is it 
possible,” he went on to doubtingly ask, “to create or evolve a consensus, so far missing, on a 
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legitimate social order which would appeal to people’s sense of justice and persuade them to 
moderate their pursuit of private interest, both in the ballot box and in their other collective 
activities?”152  The prospects for the emergence of such a system appeared bleak. 
At the highest levels of the British government, however, the resolution of the crisis 
began to fundamentally alter the Labour Party’s views on the role of government.  IMF austerity 
made budget constraints the order of the day and led to a rejection of Keynesianism in the 
economist’s home country.  A fierce divide emerged between those, led by Callaghan, who 
believed the country’s only choice was to discard Keynesianism in favor of austerity in order to 
maintain the favor of international capital and those, led by Callaghan’s rival Tony Benn, who 
demanded that the government solve the crisis by taking further control of the economy.  Benn 
circulated what he termed the “Alternate Economic Strategy” among the Labour leadership as it 
considered the IMF’s proposal.  The plan called for solving the crisis by imposing strict controls 
on imports and exports, nationalizing banks and insurance companies, increases taxes on the 
wealthy, and withdrawing Britain from the European Common Market.   These inclinations had 
to be resisted, Callaghan believed, if the country was to restore economic growth, lower 
inflation, and maintain its standing as a home for international capital.  As he famously declared 
in a speech to the Labour Party conference on September 24, 1976, "We used to think that you 
could just spend your way out of a recession...I tell you in all candor, that that option no longer 
exists and that in so far as it ever did exist, it only worked...by injecting bigger doses of inflation 
into the economy, followed by higher levels of unemployment."  Callaghan’s position ultimately 
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carried the day, and his speech inaugurated a period of profound change for the British Left.  
Coming as they did from the political standard bearer of the British working class, Callaghan’s 
words stood as a profound rejection of the Keynesian economics that had dominated the British 
politics since the Second World War.  History has remembered them as such, and the crisis now 
stands as the beginning of the end for the British Left as the defender of the working class in 
British politics.153   
As global financial markets battered the postwar social contract in Great Britain, they 
also mounted a sustained assault on Italy.  Since the oil crisis, Italian unions had brought their 
workers significant gains in real wages under the automatic wage indexation mechanism known 
as the scala mobile and protected their members from the threat of labor “redundancy” as firms 
moved to become more efficient through layoffs.  By 1976, Italian workers were, in short, 
expensive and difficult to fire, and the ruling coalition led by the Christian Democrats (known by 
its Italian initials, DC) was at a loss for how to slow labor’s momentum.  To cover the yawning 
gap between national production and consumption, the government had borrowed heavily on the 
Euromarkets and from the IMF in 1974 and 1975, but financial lifelines had run out by the start 
of 1976.  Negotiations with both the IMF and the European Community early in the year 
produced demands that the government slow the growth of real wages, domestic monetary 
creation, and government spending.  Lacking enough credibility with Italian labor to get them to 
agree to voluntary wage restraints and facing a tough election in June against the Italian 
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Communist Party (PCI), the Christian Democrats balked at international capital’s demands.  In 
the context of the Cold War, the threat of a PCI victory in the elections appeared to signal that 
the Italian Left was dangerously ascendant.  But in the crucible of financial crisis, it became clear 
that, like its British counterpart, it too would accommodate international pressures for austerity.  
After narrowly winning the June election, the Christian Democratic leader, Giulio Andreotti, 
formed a government of “national solidarity” that relied on the PCI to make the internationally 
demanded austerity policy “socially acceptable.”154  The Communist Party leader, Emilio 
Berlinguer, embraced what he described as the “ideology of austerity” in the hope of leading the 
nation out of its financial crisis.  After the passage of deflationary measures in the fall of 1976 
that were estimated to reduce domestic demand by 3% of GDP, the leading Italian industry and 
labor groups signed a “social compact” in January 1977 that began to restrict the use of the scala 
mobile and marginally boost labor mobility within firms.  It remained difficult to outright fire 
workers and most wages remained indexed to inflation, but the social compact nonetheless 
marked a turning point in Italian politics.  From then on, labor was on the defensive.  With the 
support of the CPI and over the objections of many Italian unions, the government reached an 
agreement in April with the IMF on cutbacks in public spending and domestic consumption.155 
As in Britain, the deleterious legacy of the financial crisis took both material and 
ideological forms.  After rising by an average annual rate of 10.8% from 1970 to 1975, real 
wages in Italy grew at a rate of 2.6% from 1976-1979.156  The tenuous working relationship 
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between the CPI and the Christian Democrats proved only marginally effective in fixing the 
nation’s economic problems.  But their attempt to forge a “historic compromise” between the 
two parties spurred high-profile human tragedy, ideological rebellion from the Far Right and 
Left, and national instability.  On March 16, 1978, Aldo Moro, a former prime minister and 
president of the Christian Democrats at the time, was kidnapped by the Red Brigades, an Italian 
Marxist-Leninist paramilitary group that had sought throughout the 1970s to turn Italy into a 
“revolutionary” state through armed struggle.  The Red Brigades were stridently opposed to any 
accommodation with capitalism, and the kidnapping of Moro was meant to torpedo the 
compromise between the Christian Democrats and the CPI.  After almost two months of 
negotiations over Moro’s release, the brigade leaders concluded their demand for a prisoner 
exchange would not be met, and they murdered Moro, leaving his body in the trunk of a car 
parked (legend had it) half way between the headquarters of the DC and CPI.  The killing 
destroyed the basis for the historic compromise, and the communists returned to the opposition 
in the spring of 1979, never to enter the government again.  With wages stagnant and 
unemployment rising, domestic terrorism became a destabilizing part of daily Italian life at the 
turn of the decade, as both the far Left and the far Right of Italian politics rebelled against the 
political compromises mandated by austerity’s arrival.  As Tony Judt wrote of this period in 
Italian history, “That democracy and the rule of law in Italy survived these years is a matter of no 
small note.”157 
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The disruptive legacy of austerity in Western democracies reinforced socialist regimes’ 
reluctance to implement restrictive policies.  For Erich Honecker and Janos Kadar, it also pointed 
the way to how their regimes could lay claim to superiority over their Western rivals.  Austerity, 
they believed, was for capitalists whose system was evidently failing.  Socialist countries, by 
contrast, had to appear as lands of economic serenity.   “Many people admire the GDR,” 
Honecker told a meeting of East German officials addressing the country’s economic problems 
in November 1976 as the crises in London and Rome were unfolding.  “Under capitalism there is 
the path of deflation or inflation. We don’t use either one. We go the way of methodical, 
proportional development of the economy to ever higher levels.”  Any economic reform must be 
sure not to “break the backs of the workers,” he told his comrades.158  In a Hungarian Politburo 
meeting that same month, financial officials warned that country’s “debt burst” of 1974-1976 
might not be sustainable without revisions to the national plan.  Kádar, however, remained 
committed to the necessity of raising workers’ standard of living.  In early 1977, he said, “We 
cannot responsibly say that there is a need to constantly raise living standards, but it does mean 
that there must be a systematic increase in living standards with the construction of socialism. 
This in turn is reflected in the improvement in living standards in our plans for this year.”  After 
a pause in the increase in real wages in 1976, Kádar committed the country to a 3.5-4% increase 
in 1977.  The debt, in turn, increased apace.159 
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After the price increase debacle of 1976, Gierek undertook what he termed an “economic 
maneuver,” which would supposedly lower the nation’s debt to the West without lowering 
domestic standards of living.  It would achieve such an improbable feat by cutting back 
investment instead.  Polish rates of investment were extremely high, so there was some room for 
restriction, but unless the remaining investment was used more effectively, the new policy would 
only worsen the long-term debt picture by lowering future economic growth.  Polish officials 
were well aware of this, but like their counterparts in both East and West, they chose the policy 
that guaranteed present social stability, no matter the long term consequences.160  In March 1977, 
financial officials within the Polish Central Committee warned, “The level of Poland’s 
indebtedness to capitalist countries at the turn of 1976/1977 should be seen as the maximum.  Its 
further growth threatens to negatively impact Poland’s socio-economic development throughout 
the current five year plan.”161  But the political mandates of the moment prevailed over the 
economic concerns of future years.  As long as the nation could borrow money and import 
subsidized Soviet resources, political expediency would be the order of the day.  
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By the spring of 1977, the gap in East Germany between the political priorities of the 
party and the economic capacities of the state had grown so large that the chairman of the State 
Planning Commission Gerhard Schürer and the party’s economic leader Günter Mittag wrote a 
secret letter to Honecker pleading for an adjustment.  “For the first time we are experiencing 
acute payment difficulties,” they wrote in March 1977.  They anticipated that in 1978 the country 
would have “to come up with [VM] 11 billion just to pay back the principle and interest on the 
debt.  The hard currency income from our exports amounts to [VM] 9.3 billion and is already 
insufficient to finance new imports.”  The recurrent fear since the first moments of the oil crisis 
that credit would suddenly become unavailable was once again at the forefront of their minds.  
To ward off the threat of looming insolvency, the two men urged the General Secretary to 
undertake an immediate export offensive and restriction of imports.162   
Honecker took their warning as a personal affront.  Referring to his cherished Unity of 
Social and Economic Policy, the General Secretary scolded his two deputies in a face to face 
meeting.  “We cannot change the entire policy overnight.  What is suggested means deep cuts in 
the policy….The material gives the impression that the policy followed after Ulbricht [his 
predecessor, who was removed in 1970] was wrong, that Ulbricht didn’t increase the debt and it 
was only Honecker.  What policy should we have followed instead?  The policy of price 
increases would not have solved any of the problems.”163  Social and price stability were the 
hallmark advantages of socialism over capitalism, and Honecker was not about to give them up.  
In describing the Schürer/Mittag proposal later that year, he would tell the Central Committee 
that the two men had “submitted a plan which would not allow for the continuation of the social 
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policy program. But the path of restriction is not possible. Under capitalist conditions we would 
have great complications.”164  Chastened by the browbeating, the two men beat a hasty and 
sycophantic retreat.  “It was not our intention to give you such an impression,” Mittag replied.  
“If there are formulations that do this, we will be sure to change them.”  Schürer laid it on thick.  
“How could I and how could we in the State Planning Commission, who are so thankful to you, 
Erich,…formulate personal attacks on you and the policy that has been adopted?  We are ready 
to correct [the] formulations…”165  Correct them they did, and the challenge of asking the nation 
to sacrifice was delayed another day.  The nation’s bankers returned to the Euromarkets to 
continue financing real existing socialism on credit.  They could only hope that the days of easy 
money would not soon run out.  
Lucky for them, 1976 was a “vintage year” for the socialist states on the Euromarkets, as 
Euromoney termed it, and all indications were that 1977 would be the same.166  So long as 
Western capital and Soviet oil keep flowing freely, the day of reckoning could continue to be 
deferred.  After the Polish attempt to raise prices was abandoned, leaders in Warsaw, Budapest, 
and East Berlin decided to defer the challenge of economic adjustment as long as possible.  
Some of their counterparts in the West, such as those in London and Rome, had no such luxury.  
For the moment, real existing socialism had defied the laws of economic gravity dragging the 
rest of the industrialized world down.  But in 1977, cracks in the foundation of Soviet oil 
production signaled that the reckoning would not be long in coming.   
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When the Wells Ran Dry 
“The Soviet oil industry is in trouble.”  So began a bombshell March 1977 report from 
the Central Intelligence Agency titled “The Impending Soviet Oil Crisis.”  The CIA kept close 
tabs on the industry that formed the economic base of Soviet power, and they now projected that 
Soviet oil production would "soon peak, possibly as early as next year and certainly no later than 
the early 1980s…Maximum [production] levels are not likely to be maintained for long, 
however, and the decline, when it comes will be sharp.”  The giant Samotlor oil field in Western 
Siberia, which had accounted for most of the growth in Soviet oil production since the late 
1960s, was projected to reach peak production by 1978 and maintain that level for only four 
years.  The country had large amounts of coal and natural gas that could compensate for the drop 
off in oil but, the agency noted, these were “east of the Urals” so “distance, climate, and terrain 
will make exploitation and transport difficult and expensive.”  The Soviet government had long 
prioritized maximizing current oil production over investing in exploration, so the CIA believed 
it would soon find it difficult to replace declining output from existing wells with production 
from new fields.  Any new fields they did discover would take at least a decade to bring on line 
because they were located in geographically challenging areas like East Siberia and the Arctic.  
Taken together, the picture was bleak and the repercussions “profound.”  With plateauing oil 
production, the Soviet Union would “find it extremely difficult to continue to simultaneously 
meet its own requirements and those of Eastern Europe while exporting to non-Communist 
countries on the present scale.”  These were “important considerations” for the leadership in 
Moscow, the agency wrote, because it currently supplied three quarters of Eastern Europe’s oil, 
and “it undoubtedly wishes to retain the political and economic leverage that goes with being 
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their principle supplier.”  At the same time, however, oil exports to non-Communist countries 
were “the USSR’s largest single source of hard currency.”167  Thus, as the Soviet Union’s era of 
exceptional oil growth came to end, fundamental political choices awaited the Brezhnev regime. 
The CIA’s timing was impeccable.  At the very moment the report was published, the 
Soviet government was itself grappling with the knowledge that its oil production might soon 
begin to decline.  As early as 1973, Soviet oil specialists had been warning the political 
leadership that the West Siberian oil boom was temporary and would not provide a basis for 
growth after 1980.  Brezhnev had rebuffed the warning signs even as his Prime Minister Alexei 
Kosygin began to call for greater oil and gas conservation in the mid-1970s.  As quoted earlier, 
Kosygin referred to an “acute energy shortage” in the USSR in his December 1976 discussions 
with East German Prime Minister Willi Stoph.  By the end of 1977, the signs of impending crisis 
forced action, and Brezhnev decided on emergency changes to the Five Year Plan to redirect 
investment to the oil industry to ensure that the output targets through 1980 were met.  This 
bought the country some time and prevented the CIA’s prediction of plateau and decline from 
coming to fruition, but it did so at significant costs to the efficiency of the oil industry and the 
productivity of the rest of the economy, which lost out on precious investment resources.  Even 
with the emergency investment plan, the challenge of energy stagnation after 1980 remained 
unsolved.  A fierce debate broke out within the Soviet leadership around how to rectify it, but all 
sides agreed on one thing: the future would not be like the past; the time of energy abundance 
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had come to an end.168  As a Soviet official told his East German counterpart in early 1978, “The 
question of raw materials is very difficult…As of today…one cannot expect an increase in oil 
resources.  There are also comrades in our country who cannot believe it.  We had grown 
accustomed to having an increase of around 100 million tons of oil in each Five Year Plan and 
not 0% growth, as it will be for the Five Year Plan from 1981-1985.”169 
As the CIA anticipated, the crisis had immediate effects on Moscow’s relations with its 
satellites.  At a meeting of Comecon ministers in June 1977, Premier Kosygin told a room full of 
officials hoping for increases in Soviet energy supplies after 1980, “the real rate of growth of the 
oil production after 1980" would be "considerably lower” than in the 1970s.   The problems in 
the Soviet oil energy industry were numerous.  “Our expenses for exploration, exploitation…and 
the transport of oil and gas are increasing rapidly," he said.  "The specific expenses for the 
increase in the production of oil are increasing three to four times.”  Under such conditions, 
Kosygin told the group that the only answer for the bloc was to increase its energy efficiency.  
He framed the challenge as global in nature, one equally shared by East and West.  “The fuel and 
energy problem is one of the sharpest problems of economic development in the world.  All 
countries are looking for their solution by increasing the effectiveness of energy consumption 
through substantial savings of energy resources.”  As examples, Kosygin cited the United States, 
which, he said, aimed to reduce the annual growth rate of its energy consumption from the 3.5% 
it had been over the last twenty-five years to 2% or less in the 1980s.  Western Europe was 
aiming for similar targets, he said.  To adapt to the new environment, the Soviet Union had made 
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increasing its energy efficiency a priority as well.  “We intend to achieve a turnaround in saving 
fuel and energy by making use of the achievements of scientific and technological progress.”  
Although the Soviet Union could not match Western countries’ gains in efficiency, Kosygin said 
the country still planned “to reduce the annual growth rate of fuel and energy consumption to 
about 4.1%,” down from 4.7% annual growth in the 1970s. 
The same could not be said, Kosygin believed, for the rest of the bloc.  Satellite 
governments had put forth woefully inadequate plans to increase their energy efficiency.  Given 
the wastefulness of the Soviet economy, this had more than a tinge of the pot calling the kettle 
black.  Nevertheless, Kosygin had come to the meeting to scold his allies into action.  In 
preparation for the gathering, each nation had submitted projections of their energy needs out to 
1990 to the leadership in Moscow.  The resulting picture of the bloc’s energy situation over the 
next decade was sorry indeed.  “It is clear from these materials,” Kosygin said, “that most 
countries are planning to increase the rate of growth in energy consumption over the period up to 
1990 [my emphasis].”  While they collectively planned to increase their energy demand by 47% 
through 1990, the Eastern European nations only planned to increase their energy production by 
23%.  To the Soviet leader, it was clear that they planned to make up the difference “mainly by 
an increase in petroleum and gas supplies from the USSR.”    This, Kosygin firmly told them, 
was not possible.  The numbers simply did not add up.  When considered together, the Eastern 
Europeans were counting on a 74% increase in Soviet oil deliveries, a 130% increase in Soviet 
natural gas, and a 135% increase in Soviet electricity from 1980-1990.  “We have made thorough 
calculations,” Kosygin told his audience, and those calculations made clear that “energy supplies 
from the Soviet Union at such levels are not possible.”   
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Not only was dramatic growth not possible, but even keeping deliveries constant at the 
level set for 1980 (the last year of the current five year plan) over the course of the 1980s would 
be a challenge.  “We will make every effort to maintain the volume of annual Soviet supplies 
of…fuels to the CMEA countries in the years 1981-85 at the 1980 levels,” Kosygin told the 
group.  But Soviet energy could no longer be the bloc's economic elixir.  “The CMEA countries’ 
fuel supply problem cannot be solved only through an increase in supplies from the Soviet 
Union.”  Instead, Kosygin said, each country would have to look inward, to their own 
economies, and figure out how to use resources more efficiently.  “All countries must take 
additional measures to save and rationalize energy resources.”  “We must say," he concluded, 
"that so far this work is insufficiently accomplished in all Comecon countries, including the 
Soviet Union.”170 
 
Figure 1: Soviet energy exports to the so-called “CMEA Six”: East Germany, 
Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.  Source: PlanEcon, 
Inc., East European Energy Databank, cited in Table 8.2 in Gustafson, Crisis 
Amid Plenty, p. 275. 
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The news that Soviet energy deliveries were likely to peak in 1980 sent shock waves 
through the bloc.  For states whose economic growth depended on ever increasing inputs of 
energy rather than the more efficient use of energy, Kosygin’s message was nothing short of 
alarming.  A full record of the reaction in all bloc capitals will have to await further archival 
research, but the GDR’s reaction to the news is likely indicative of the broader group.   
Throughout the 1970s, East German policymakers had closely linked the fate of their 
nation to the supply of Soviet raw materials.  The changes in Comecon prices announced in 1974 
had altered the price of these raw materials, but they had left their year-over-year growth rate 
untouched.  Even at higher prices, it was clear to the leadership that the continued growth of 
Soviet resource deliveries was essential to their survival.   “It was and is an invaluable advantage 
for our national economy," the State Planning Commission wrote in 1975, "that we import the 
majority of our raw materials from the socialist economic area, especially from the USSR, at 
long term contract rates that are below the capitalist world market price.”171  A year and half 
later, as planners began to work on the 1980-1985 plan period, they returned to the fundamental 
importance of increasing Soviet deliveries.  "The questions of covering [our] demand for raw 
materials and energy," planners wrote at the end of 1976, occupied "a central place" in the 
Soviet-East German relationship.  The GDR was undertaking "great efforts" to develop "its own 
energy and raw material base," but nevertheless would "continue to depend on growing imports 
for many energy sources and raw materials."  Even under the country's plan to make "the most 
efficient use of fuels and energy," the planning commission stressed that "we need further 
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increases in oil and natural gas supplies from the USSR."  To that end, the policymakers asked 
that annual oil deliveries be raised from their 1980 level of 19 million tons to a level of 22 
million tons by 1985 and 25 million tons by 1990.  Similarly, they requested that the annual 
natural gas deliveries be raised from the 1980 level of 6.5 billion cubic meters to 9 billion cubic 
meters in 1985 and 11 billion cubic meters in 1990.172 
Kosygin's announcement in the summer of 1977 clearly threw a significant wrench in 
these plans.  Without the increases in energy after 1980, the GDR would have two options: either 
it could figure out a way to use energy resources more efficiently, or it could make up for the lost 
Soviet deliveries by taking out more debt from the West to purchase the raw materials on the 
world market.  With regard to the first option, East German officials who studied the problem 
knew that despite the leadership's commitment to undertaking "great efforts" to save energy, 
there was a fundamental problem at the heart of the economy that would prevent any substantial 
gain in efficiency from occurring: energy was too cheap.  The Western gains in energy efficiency 
that Kosygin praised in his 1977 speech occurred primarily because the price of energy had 
skyrocketed after 1973.  Naturally enough, in market economies higher energy prices encouraged 
companies and countries to use less of it and develop energy efficient innovations across the 
economy.  But the same was not occurring under socialism.  East German officials raised 
industrial prices on a number of occasions after 1975, but they remained too low to spur 
efficiency.173  By the late 1970s, officials concluded that "current energy prices in the GDR are 
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too low and are an inadequate stimulant to energy savings.  The share of energy costs in the total 
costs of industry is on average only 6.4%."  The current planning system did not take into 
consideration that "in many cases, it is cheaper to save energy than it is to obtain or produce it."  
This led them to conclude that "the current stimuli in our planning system are no longer 
sufficient to meet the significant need for a more effective energy economy” and recommend that 
domestic energy prices be increased by 50-70%.   Perhaps out of fear that looking to the West for 
solutions might have a treasonous ring, the officials could only suggest that the leadership 
examine "the experience of other socialist states" with energy saving measures to examine their 
"applicability in the GDR."174  Even with higher energy prices (which were raised in 1980) the 
basic structure of the planned economy, which prioritized gross output over quality and 
efficiency, led firms to hoard input materials, rather than try to save them.    
At a loss over how to increase energy efficiency, officials quickly recognized that the 
only other option would be to make up for the shortfall in Soviet deliveries with imports from the 
West.  This would, in turn, worsen their already serious sovereign debt problem.  Indeed, 
presumably to both increase their leverage over the Soviets in negotiations and to gain a sense of 
the problem for themselves, East German officials began to quantify the connection between a 
decline in Soviet energy and raw materials and increasing hard currency imports from the West.  
First, they tallied the gains they had already received in the 1970s from the Soviet Union’s 
patronage.  In 1977, planners concluded (and underlined for emphasis), “If the GDR had been 
forced to buy the amount of oil it received from the Soviet Union from 1974-1976 on the world 
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market, it would have been forced to pay about 4.5 billion VM more than it paid the Soviet 
Union.”  Even that figure, the planners recognized, understated the benefit because rather than 
paying for the oil with hard currency, East Germany had been allowed to pay for the Soviet oil 
“with goods from the GDR, which as experience shows, would have been difficult to sell on the 
capitalist market.”  Similarly, from 1971-1975, 6.1 million tons of Soviet grain had been 
delivered to the GDR.  The planners emphasized that “if the GDR had bought this amount of 
grain on the capitalist world market, it would have had to raise 1.6 billion VM [to buy it].”175  In 
countless other areas like natural gas and steel, the planners well understood that Soviet price 
patronage had directly lowered the country’s debt to the West.  As high as the debt was, it was 
clear that it would only have been higher without Soviet raw materials.   
This was a point East German officials tried to make over and over to their Soviet 
counterparts in the late 1970s.  After numerous conversations in 1977 in which the Soviet side 
emphasized that there could be no increase in deliveries after 1980, East German officials 
opened 1978 by stressing that Soviet shortfalls would only drive them further into the arms of the 
West.  After being told yet again in a February 1978 meeting that increases were not possible, a 
member of the State Planning Commission told his Soviet counterpart that he could “not imagine 
the extent of the possible consequence” of such a decision.  “If in the case of oil, steel, and other 
raw materials, the supplies of the USSR cannot be increased…we would have to buy the raw 
materials in the West.”176 
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This back and forth continued between the two sides at various levels of government until 
October 1978, when Kosygin informed his East German colleagues that rather than level off 
their deliveries after 1980, the Soviet Union would in fact have to cut them back.  The East 
Germans were furious.  They immediately told him that such a decision would either “call into 
question” the economic development of the GDR or force the country to carry out “a politically 
and economically unacceptable increase in hard currency imports.”  In response, Kosygin told 
them that Soviet deliveries had given the GDR the luxury of being “largely independent from 
raw material imports from capitalist countries.”  Because the development of raw materials in the 
Soviet Union had become “increasingly difficult and expensive,” that luxury was now winding 
down.177 
Back in East Berlin, planners quickly calculated that the Soviet decision to cut back 
deliveries would lead to 10.7 billion VM more in imports (and debt) from the West.178    
Schuerer, the State Planning Commissioner, returned to Moscow to plead his nation’s case once 
more.  In a meeting with Gosplan chairman Nikolai Baibakov, he told his counterpart that the 
reductions were “unacceptable.”  Baibakov made clear that he understood the “difficulties that 
had been created for the GDR” due to the raw materials decision, but he asked for 
“understanding from the GDR side about the complicated situation in the USSR.”  Already under 
the current Five Year Plan, he said, “there are enormous problems in securing the supply of raw 
materials and fuels.”  To make matters worse, the USSR was “compelled to further strengthen its 
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efforts to ensure its military security because of the activities of the United States.”179  Because 
of these widespread struggles, the plan to cutback deliveries could not be changed.  Schuerer 
returned to East Berlin alarmed and empty handed. 
The time had come to take their case to the highest court.  In late 1978, Honecker made a 
direct appeal to Brezhnev to hold energy and raw materials at their 1980 level during the next 
Five Year Plan.  By the time East German Premier Willi Stoph returned to Moscow in December 
to meet with his old friend and comrade Kosygin, Honecker’s appeal had worked.  Kosygin 
announced that the 1980 levels would be maintained because "Comrade Brezhnev has decided to 
find possibilities to help the GDR in this matter."  The announcement removed a contentious 
issue from the agenda, but left a simmering tension between the two sides that boiled over in the 
remainder of the meeting.  Socialist solidarity could no longer mask the widely divergent 
economic interests of the allies.  Kosygin began by demanding that unlike the 1970s, when the 
USSR had granted the GDR long-term loans to help compensate for the rise in Soviet energy 
prices, loans would not be made available in the 1980s and trade between the two states would 
have to be fully balanced.  Current projections showed the GDR running a substantial trade 
deficit with the USSR in the 1980s, and Kosygin warned that the Soviet Union would not be 
stepping in to cover this shortfall with credits.  "I must tell you openly that we cannot grant 
larger loans,” Kosygin said.  “We have large additional expenses for defense.  Agriculture also 
requires increased expenditures."180  After Stoph pushed his luck by asking for more oil, Kosygin 
launched into an extended tirade about how easy the GDR had it in the grand scheme of the 
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global economy.  “I would like to...say that the entire economy of the GDR is in a rather 
privileged position," the Soviet Premier said.  "You will not think about that sometimes, but I 
would like to remind you of it."  Posing what he termed "a foundational question (Basisfrage) for 
the entire economy," Kosygin asked, "Where can you find, Comrade Stoph, such a situation in 
the world, where oil and also natural gas come by pipelines practically to your front door?  There 
is no need for transportation, no oil tankers, no double or triple pumping into tankers, no 
handling in ports."  Pushing the thought further, he said, "The economy of the country is in 
paradise.  The GDR [is] in a much better and more privileged position than the economy of Italy, 
France, or the Federal Republic.  This also applies to natural gas....France pays enormous costs.  
But for you it comes to your front door.”  “What do you mean Italy, France, and the Federal 
Republic?," Stoph angrily shot back.  "We’re not them at all.  We are the GDR!”  Kosygin 
responded, “I understand that you are not Italy or France.  But very often you hear – ‘We have 
different conditions.’”  On the question of energy, this was not so.   "I would only like to say," 
Kosygin concluded, "that one of the fundamental questions…is that of [energy] savings."  Its 
"effect on economic efficiency is very large, and in this respect, you have a favorable situation, a 
very favorable situation.”181  With that, the two parted ways. 
As Stoph left Moscow, the worst case scenario had been averted.  The Soviet leadership 
had committed to maintaining deliveries at the 1980 level for the 1981-1985 period.  But there 
were few reasons for optimism.  The basic dilemma remained the same – either the GDR could 
achieve radical advances in energy efficiency or it would have to increase its Western imports 
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and debt.  In 1979, the State Planning Commission tried to formulate a realistic estimate of how 
the burden of stagnating Soviet supplies would be split between these two elements.  The results 
were a lopsided reflection of the problems with the planned economy.  Frozen at their 1980 
levels, Soviet oil deliveries to the GDR from 1981-1985 would be 19.5 million tons below what 
the GDR had planned for.  Of these 19.5 million tons, planners believed that only 3.8 million 
could be saved through increased efficiency.  That meant that 15.7 million tons of oil, worth 
about 8 billion VM, would have to be imported from the West for hard currency.182   
But just as Soviet stagnation was increasing the GDR’s demand for Western loans, 
warning signs were appearing in the West that financial markets’ confidence in the socialist bloc 
was wearing thin.  While officials from the State Planning Commission were busy shuttling back 
and forth to Moscow to try and secure more Soviet oil, officials from the East German Foreign 
Trade Bank were making the rounds in the nerve centers of global capitalism to secure more 
Western loans.  In May 1978, the president of the bank, Werner Polze, made a two week trip 
around North America to drum up support for a new round of finance credits.  He wined and 
dined with the leading titans of global finance, Chase Manhattan Chairman David Rockefeller 
and Citibank CEO Walter Wriston, as well as representatives from eighteen other banks scattered 
across North America, including Bankers Trust, Union Bank of Los Angeles, Continental Illinois 
Bank, Bank of Montreal, and Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC).  Upon his return, 
Polze filed an ominous report.  Many bankers had told him that “although the socialist countries 
have always repaid their loans on time, there is now no absolute confidence in the future 
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repayment capacity of the socialist countries.”  Eastern Bloc states had always published very 
few national financial statistics in order to obscure their economic situation, but even without 
firm numbers, Western bankers could see that the situation was starting to become untenable.  
“The question was continuously raised,” Polze reported, of how the GDR planned to “balance its 
trade and payments accounts” in the face of “considerably higher import prices, poor export 
opportunities to capitalist markets…and the stable domestic price level, which leads to 
constantly increasing domestic demand.”  The same questions could be (and surely were) equally 
asked of all socialist countries.183   
In the eyes of Western banks, the most pressing problem was Poland.  Since the aborted 
1976 price hikes, the debt had continued to rise at a torrid pace.  Polish officials, led by 
Wołoszyn, had returned to the Euromarkets over and over again in 1977 and 1978 for the same 
reason East Germany had: to take out new loans to pay off old debts.  By the fall of 1978, this 
search for Western capital led them to announce that they would seek to organize a $500 million 
loan on the Euromarkets, an unprecedented and shocking amount for a socialist country.  The 
First Deputy Finance Minister Marian Krzak told The Financial Times in a front page article that 
the loan was for “general economic purposes,” a readily transparent admission that it would be 
used to pay off old debt, and that Poland planned to “be an active client on the credit market” in 
the years to come.  He was not worried, though, because “some of the world’s foremost banks 
would like to be among the leaders” in organizing the capital for the loan.184  Despite the public 
                                                     
183 Werner Polze, “Bericht über eine Dienstreise nach den USA und Kanada in der Zeit von 8. 
bis 19.5.1978,” May 23, 1978, DN/10/447, BArch Berlin. 
184 The front page article is Christopher Bobinski and Anthony Robinson, “Poland Seeking 
Long-term $500m Euro-loan” The Financial Times, Thursday, November 30, 1978; pg. 1.  
Quotes from Christopher Bobinksi, “Poland to Open Its Books for $500m Loan,” The Financial 
Times, Thursday, November 30, 1978; pg. 2 
  126 
efforts to minimize the growing financial difficulties, the truth was plain enough in private.  Just 
as Poland was getting set to announce its new loan, Polze returned to the West, this time to 
London, to once more test the waters for East German credit.  In meetings with National 
Westminster Bank, Lloyds, Barclays, Royal Bank of Scotland, and the Bank of England, “the 
question of socialist countries’ debt again played a clear role in the negotiations,” he reported.  
“Almost all banks emphasized that Poland’s frequent appearance in the market had led to a 
certain distrust of granting further credit to the Poles.”  In the shadow of Warsaw’s spiraling 
financial needs, the banks “warned [against] a country or a bank entering the market for finance 
loans too often.”185   
Thus, with Soviet raw material deliveries about to level off and Western financial 
confidence hanging by a thread, the task confronting all Eastern Bloc countries at the dawn of 
1979 was daunting.  Perhaps best summed up by the East German State Planning Commission 
that summer, "the basic problem" for their economies was that "despite the fraught task of 
increasing performance under extremely limited commodity supplies” and despite efforts to raise 
exports and lower imports from the world market, “a significant unresolved financial deficit of 
10.3 billion VM remains."186  The “unresolved financial deficits” in Hungary and Poland were 
no doubt of different magnitudes, but the basic problem was the same.  Try as they might to cut 
their dependence on Western capital, policymakers in East Berlin, Budapest, and Warsaw, 
remained more dependent than ever on the financial markets of the West to finance their 
regimes.  Moscow could no longer be relied on to shield the bloc from the world economy.  In 
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their own ways, each regime surely received the same basic message from their imperial patron.  
The times were changing, as Brezhnev demonstratively told Honecker in the fall of 1979.  
Pounding his fist on the table during a meeting with the entire East German Politburo in East 
Berlin, the Soviet General Secretary declared, “Those who say that you can only consume what 
you produce are correct.”  In a thinly veiled warning, he continued, “None of us wants to live at 
the expense of others or declare ourselves bankrupt.”187    
What could tip the scales and turn this array of warning signs into a full-blown crisis?  
Only the United States Federal Reserve.  As Fed Chairman Paul Volcker would one day say of 
the US dollar, “Our money is the world’s money.”188  So long as the Fed, the engine of global 
monetary creation, kept real interest rates low and US dollars flowing easily around the world, 
late socialism would be able to retain its veneer of tranquility amid the choppy waters of the 
world market.  A shining example of this fact came in the spring of 1979, when despite their 
profound misgivings about the Polish economy, Western bankers pooled their capital together 
and granted the Polish request for the $500 million loan anyway.189  But if events ever conspired 
to force the Fed to change its policy and restrict the easy flow of capital around the world, then 
the bloc would be exposed to the crisis that it had fought to avoid since 1973.  It was a 
frightening prospect.   
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But as late as 1979, it also remained an unlikely one.  A significant increase in the 
Federal Reserve’s interest rates would surely bring austerity to the United States, and just like the 
communist states of Eastern Europe, the American government had shown little inclination and 
no ability to impose austerity on its own people in the 1970s.  By the end of the decade, even 
officials within the US government had come to question whether their democracy would ever be 
able to solve their own riddle of austerity.  Inflation, the telltale sign of too many promises 
chasing too few goods, was running at 13% in 1979 and showing no sign of slowing down.  “Can 
a democracy discipline itself?” Alfred Kahn, a prominent American economist and advisor to US 
President Jimmy Carter, weightily asked in 1979.190  The answer would have implications on 
both sides of the Iron Curtain.  
 
Dollars in Doubt 
In the fall of the previous year, the future of the US dollar had hung in the balance.  After 
menacing Great Britain and Italy with currency crises in 1976, international capital holders had 
turned their attention to United States and forced the dollar to depreciate 40% against the 
Japanese Yen and 13% against the Deutsch Mark from September 1977 to October 1978.  As 
with the more acute currency crises in London and Rome, capital holders’ departure from the 
dollar in search of financial security in other currencies and precious metals signaled their doubts 
about the long-term viability of the US economy.  After declining to 4.86% at the end of 1976, 
the consumer price index had risen back to 9.02% by 1978, which lead capital holders to worry 
that the future value of their US dollar holdings would be frittered away by inflation.191  Their 
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departure from the currency sent policymakers across the West scrambling to support the dollar 
in foreign exchange markets.  The Federal Reserve gradually raised interest rates from 6.5% in 
January 1978 to 9.5% in November, but these moves barely brought interest rates in line with 
inflation.  It was clear that more aid would be needed, so on November 1st Western central banks 
unveiled a dollar “rescue package” aimed at saving the currency.  Through further restrictions in 
monetary policy, increased support from the German Bundesbank and the Bank of Japan, and 
increased American borrowing from the IMF, Western governments hope to stabilize the global 
economy’s core currency.  From all sides, the central banks intervened in foreign exchange 
markets to prevent the decline from ballooning into a full blown run on the dollar.  From October 
1977 to December 1978, the Federal Reserve bought $10 billion worth of its own currency and 
other central banks bought $37 billion just to make sure that the dollar maintained a semblance 
of its former value.  For a time, the coordinated efforts worked and the dollar stabilized at the 
end of 1978.  But for everyone involved, the crisis was a wake up and a harbinger of the far 
reaching crisis that would come if American domestic policy did not change.192    
The dawn of 1979 brought renewed challenges, as the crescendo of revolution in Iran led 
to the ouster of the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi in January and a wave of uncertainty on 
world oil markets.  Iran, the world’s second largest oil producer, had stopped exporting oil in 
December 1978, and the social instability that followed the Shah’s departure gave reason to think 
those exports would not return anytime soon.  Panic ensued, and OPEC members took the 
opportunity to engineer another massive increase in oil prices.  From December 1978 to 
December 1979, crude oil prices rose 150%, this time from $13 a barrel to more than $30.  By 
the time this second oil crisis hit, almost half of the United States’ energy came from foreign 
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imports, so the price increases had a dramatic and immediate effect on the domestic economy.  
Gas prices within the US climbed 55% in the first half of 1979, and inflation quickly followed 
suit, rising to 13.4%.  If it were allowed to continue, there was no telling when international 
capital holders might again lose confidence in the United States and precipitate another run on 
the currency.193 
Thus, like the pressure that they had applied to many smaller nations since 1973, oil and 
capital markets conspired in the spring of 1979 to put pressure on the United States to implement 
austerity.  The question, as always, was how to make this policy socially acceptable to the 
domestic population.  “How best to sell publicly a policy of long-term economic austerity” read 
the coversheet of a memo sent from US Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal to President 
Carter on May 25, 1979.  Blumenthal considered the “continuation of tough and austere 
macroeconomic policies requiring sacrifices by many” to be “the only viable course” for the 
nation going forward.  This path would create, however, “political dissatisfaction among a broad 
array of interest groups whose support” Carter needed “for re-election.”  Therefore, the 
administration would have to find a way to make austerity domestically palatable.  “I freely 
concede,” Blumenthal wrote, “that this is no easy task.”  Nevertheless, it was in the nation’s 
interest “to convince the American people (and electorate) that it makes sense…to sweat through 
a period of slow economic activity and slowly unwinding inflation.”  How to do this?  To be 
successful, Blumenthal believed, “an economic program of austerity needs an overarching theme 
that engages the imagination and deep convictions of the people.”  The Treasury Secretary 
believed the best theme to touch these chords within Americans was “American economic 
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preeminence in the world.”  In a “frank appeal to national pride,” the President needed to present 
himself “as the leader making the hard choices” to restore the United States’ lost dominance of 
the global economy.  Carter would have to tell the nation that “as individuals, a national 
economy, and as a government, we have been borrowing and consuming – living off deficits in 
our personal, governmental and trade accounts.”  The message had to be “We can no longer 
afford this.”  In order to return to economic preeminence, Carter would have to tell the country, 
“We must now sacrifice and rebuild.”  He would not be able to promise Americans any 
immediate economic gains, but rather “the creation of more jobs for all in future years!”  If 
Carter adopted this appeal to national pride, Blumenthal believed it could create “genuine 
excitement and commitment” for difficult economic policies that would otherwise cause “great 
political problems.”194 
Carter did not adopt Blumenthal’s solution, but he certainly shared his Treasury 
Secretary’s sense of the problem.  For the President, the question of how to regain control of the 
country’s economic fortunes quite literally produced a period of deep soul searching.  For ten 
days in the summer of 1979, he withdrew to Camp David, the presidential retreat in the foothills 
of Maryland.  There he discussed the nation’s dilemmas with a wide array of experts and 
considered his own journey to that point.  He was a Democrat who had risen to the Presidency in 
1976 on promises of enacting full employment legislation, fiscal stimulus, and labor law reform 
to strengthen the bargaining power of unions.  And yet circumstances now appeared to dictate 
that he transgress the interests of the constituents that had elected him.  There were three options 
for controlling inflation – cutting government spending, inducing wage restraint through 
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negotiations with the nation’s labor unions, and tightening monetary policy.  At various points 
during his first two and a half years in office, he had half-heartedly tried all three.  But the 
challenge remained undiminished.  Indeed, with Americans now waiting in lines at gas stations 
across the country, inflation running at 13%, and GDP contracting at a rate of 3.3% in the second 
quarter of 1979, the task steadying the American economy amid the volatility of the world 
market appeared more intractable than ever before.  
The crisis, Carter decided, was spiritual.  When he descended from the mountains of 
Maryland, he took to the nation’s airwaves to tell Americans that they were collectively 
experiencing “a crisis of confidence” in a nationally televised address.  “The erosion of our 
confidence in the future is threatening to destroy the social and the political fabric of America,” 
he said.  Amid a wide ranging diagnosis of the nation’s ills, the President told the nation that “too 
many of us now tend to worship self-indulgence and consumption.  Human identity is no longer 
defined by what one does, but by what one owns.  But we’ve discovered that owning things and 
consuming things does not satisfy our longing for meaning.  We’ve learned that piling up 
material goods cannot fill the emptiness of lives which have no confidence or purpose.”195  
Although he did not directly say it, the undertone of Carter’s speech was a call for the nation to 
live within its means.  Little did he know, it would be the exact same message (minus the appeals 
to individual ownership) that Brezhnev would deliver more bluntly to his East German comrades 
a few months later in East Berlin.  A healthy nation could only consume what it produced – 
everybody could agree on that.  Both sides in the Cold War believed they had consumed too 
much; both were distinctly aware of their dependence on global capital and foreign energy to 
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fund their way of life; and both sides believed their time was running out.  The question now was 
how to remedy these conditions. 
Like Western European governments before him, Carter had come to believe that 
managing the relationship between business and labor held primacy of place.  If unions could be 
made to moderate their wage demands, Carter and his advisors believed, then the long road back 
to low inflation could slowly begin.  To that end, in the summer of 1979 the President launched 
an initiative to bring business and labor together around a program to moderate wage growth.  At 
the end of September, he signed a National Accord with representatives of the American labor 
movement that aimed to ensure that “the austerity arising from battling inflation is fairly shared” 
and that “those members of society who are least able to bear the burden” were protected.  
Modelled on the social contracts that had been used in Western Europe to try and restrain real 
wage growth in the 1970s, the National Accord was seen in its immediate aftermath as a decisive 
step in shifting the country to a more austere footing.  As Jefferson Cowie has written of the 
Accord, “It stood as an inverted homage to the triumphs of the [nineteen] thirties and forties.  
Rather than FDR’s compact for working-class plenty, the accord looked to shared austerity to 
overcome political hostility.”196 
Rather less consequential in Carter’s mind was the nation’s monetary policy.  In the days 
following the “crisis of confidence” speech, he shook up his cabinet and asked a number of 
people, including Treasury Secretary Blumenthal, to resign.  He replaced Blumenthal with the 
current Fed Chairman, William Miller, which in turn left a vacancy at the helm of the central 
bank.  Many names from the world of private business and banking were floated for the job, but 
Carter eventually settled on Paul Volcker, the head of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  
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By all accounts, the President chose Volcker with little sense of his vision for monetary policy 
beyond a vague knowledge that he was “very tough on inflation.”  Volcker’s 6’7’’ stature and 
cigar smoking habit appear to have made as much of an impression as any thoughts he had about 
interest rates or inflation.197 
Carter was not alone in paying relatively little attention to monetary policy and the role of 
the Fed Chairman.  Most observers in the late 1970s believed that there was little central banks 
could do to stem the tide of inflation in the face of the well-entrenched habits of postwar 
democratic governance.  The politics of the welfare state simply would not allow it.  None other 
than a former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Arthur Burns, proclaimed as much in a speech to 
global financial elites in the fall of 1979.  Titled “The Anguish of Central Bankers,” Burns’ 
speech sought to make everyone aware that central banks could not be relied on to solve the 
inflationary challenge.  “It is illusory to expect central banks to put an end to the inflation that 
now inflicts the industrial democracies,” Burns said.  He had governed the Fed during the period 
when inflation accelerated from 1970-1978, so his words were both an act of self-exoneration 
and a distillation of the prevailing wisdom at the highest levels of government and finance.  The 
causes of inflation, in Burns’ mind, ran much deeper than mere interest rates and monetary 
supply targets. “The philosophic and political currents of thought that have impinged on 
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economic life since the Great Depression and particularly since the mid-1960s” were to blame.  
Across the West, “rising economic expectations, wider citizen participation in the political arena, 
governmental commitment to full employment, liberal income maintenance programs, expanding 
governmental regulations, and increasingly pressing demands on government for the solution of 
economic and social problems” had driven governments to perpetually promise more than their 
economies could deliver.  “Once it was established that the key function of government was to 
solve problems and relieve hardships – not only for society at large but also for troubled 
industries, regions, occupations, or social groups – a great and growing body of problems and 
hardships became candidates for governmental solutions,” he said.  In such an environment, 
Burns concluded, central banks “will be able to cope only marginally with the inflation of our 
times.”198   
Volcker understood the purpose and power of his new office very differently.  Inflation, 
he believed, was a product of people’s expectations about the economy.  By 1979, rising prices 
had become such a standard part of life that people had begun to factor them into their behavior.  
Workers asked for higher wages, consumers borrowed more money, the government ran a larger 
deficit, and speculators bet against the US dollar because they universally accepted it as fact that 
US dollars would be worth less tomorrow than they were today.  These actions, in turn, were a 
self-fulfilling prophecy; they created the very inflation that they anticipated.  Higher wages, 
higher borrowing, and higher government spending increased the demand for goods, and prices 
inevitably rose as a result.  Therefore, if inflation was to be vanquished, Volcker believed that 
expectations would have be altered.   
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To alter expectations, one first had to understand them. Where did they come from?  
What assumption underlay the universal confidence that inflation would always continue?  The 
answer was, in short, the Politics of Making Promises.  If, as I wrote in the previous chapter, 
inflation was an inherently political phenomenon, then inflationary expectations were by 
definition assumptions about politics.  They signaled widely-shared and unconsciously held 
beliefs about what society and government valued.  By 1979, people in the market had come to 
believe instinctively what intellectuals in the West had been writing since the mid-1970s: the 
government, and by extension its central bank, was incapable of breaking its promises.  For 
reasons of public morality and electoral expediency, governments were unable to turn a blind eye 
to the fates of their constituents.  Given the choice between preventing unemployment or fighting 
inflation, postwar governments had always chosen to prevent unemployment, and there was no 
reason to think they would not continue to do so.   
Volcker believed he had to change precisely this line of thinking.  He and the Federal 
Reserve had to convince the country and the world that they were willing to let Americans suffer 
economic hardship.  As he privately told his colleagues at the Federal Reserve in 1980, “when 
we take on this inflation fighting job…we should not look around for much of a constituency.  If 
we…go to the brink or let some…things happen that we have not allowed to happen during the 
entire postwar period, people…are not going to be very happy.”  But, he said, they could not 
“change inflationary expectations without it happening.  That, I think, is the nature of our 
problem.”  To illustrate the point, he recounted a recent conversation he had had with a banker in 
Chicago.  The banker, when pressed on why his bank was aggressively expanding despite the 
poor economic conditions, responded, “If we get in trouble, the government will protect us.”  If 
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there was “a real problem in the economy,” Volcker concluded, people thought that the Fed was 
always “going to give way.”199  
Thus, changing inflationary expectations entailed nothing short of changing citizens’ 
assumptions about what they could expect from their government.  It was the most political of 
tasks.  Inflation would end once people believed that the Federal Reserve cared more about price 
stability than it did about full employment or economic growth.  The United States government’s 
commitment to breaking promises had to become credible.  
If that was the end goal, what were the means by which it could possibly be achieved?  
As Volcker told his colleagues, it was a task that would invite intense political backlash.  During 
any economic downturn, the popularity of political leadership suffers because people expect the 
government to do something to fix it.  Austerity was different because the source of the 
economic pain was the government itself.  In the Federal Reserve’s case, every time it voted to 
raise interest rates it would look like (and it would indeed be) a conscious decision to inflict 
economic pain on the American people.  With inflation running at 13% and inflationary 
expectations firmly entrenched, no one at the Federal Reserve knew how high they would have 
to raise rates or how long they would have to keep them elevated in order to get people to believe 
that they really were comfortable inflicting pain on American society.  All they did know was 
that every one of their decisions would create a political blowback.   
Best then to minimize the number of decisions they had to make.  Monetarism, the school 
of economics promoted in the 1970s by the University of Chicago economist Milton Friedman, 
posited that the sole responsibility of a central bank was to ensure a constant annual rate of 
growth in a nation’s money supply.  Friedman held little faith in the powers of central bankers to 
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accurately understand the economy, so he argued they should give up trying to influence it.  The 
Federal Reserve should simply set a simple target for annual monetary growth - 3% was 
Friedman’s ideal – and call it a day.  
Volcker, and most of the other members of the Federal Reserve, found the economic 
fundamentals of monetarism to be woefully simplistic.  The idea that monetary policy was as 
easy as setting an annual target offended both their self-regard and life experience.  But in the 
face of the horrendous politics of the anti-inflation fight, Volcker became attracted to 
monetarism because it offered an escape from political culpability.  Traditionally, every interest 
rate increase was the product of a Federal Reserve decision.  If, instead, under monetarism the 
Fed could simply commit to growing the monetary supply at a constant low rate, then the 
dramatic increases in interest rates that would inevitably result would appear to the public not as 
active and mean-spirited decisions of the Fed, but rather as unfortunate byproducts of market 
forces.  President Carter’s chief economist, Charles Schultze, said of Volcker’s embrace of 
monetarism, “This whole move was, in the broadest sense, a political move, not an economic 
move.  In theory, the Fed could have kept on raising the bejesus out of the interest rates, but 
that’s what it couldn’t do politically.  The beautiful thing about this new policy was that as 
interest rates kept going up, the Fed could say…‘We’re not raising rates, we’re only targeting the 
money supply.’ This way they could raise rates and nobody could blame them.”200     
For his first month on the job, however, Volcker found most of his colleagues at the Fed 
leery of both monetarism and higher interest rates.  At a meeting on September 18th, 1979, the 
Federal Reserve Board publicly split its vote 4-3 on whether to raise the discount interest rate it 
charged to US banks.  The interest rate was raised, but because the board normally reached 
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decisions by consensus, the public dissent appeared to signal to the market that the effort to 
implement a more restrictive monetary policy would eventually fail.  This signal of failure held 
global significance.  The East German Foreign Trade Bank wrote the week after the decision, 
“The Carter government obviously does not want to tolerate such a drastic restriction policy 
because it fears a slowdown in economic development, a faster rise in unemployment, and all 
social tensions that result.”  The fact that the latest “increase in the discount rate on the Federal 
Reserve Board could only be achieved by a majority of votes” was an indication “that the 
restrictive monetary and credit policy has reached its climax.”201  
If this was clear to the bankers of the communist world, then it was certainly clear to the 
speculators of the capitalist world as well.  And faced with a political system that appeared 
unable to implement austerity, speculators did what they always did: bought gold and sold the 
currency in question.  In the weeks following the September split decision, markets lost 
confidence in Volcker’s ability to control inflation and a second run on the dollar began.  The 
price of gold soared more than $25 in a day to a new all-time high of $376.25 an ounce.  By 
early October, it reached $442.  Soon the price explosion spread to other metals ranging from 
silver and platinum to copper, zinc, and lead.  The number of entities betting against the dollar 
rose as well: everyone from American farmers and builders, who bought up every raw material 
they could get their hands on, to South American and Arab central banks, who started selling 
their dollars for gold, wanted to get their wealth out of American currency.  “Every day you got 
this sense that the world was coming apart at the seams,” said Fed Vice Chairman Fred Schultz.  
“There was a genuine flight from the currency – people investing in tangibles, art, jewelry, 
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stamps, gold.  Everything that was tangible was increasing in value.”  The dollar, in turn, was 
losing its purpose as a store of value.  At the Fed, the need for radical change now beckoned.202 
On Saturday October 6th, Volcker called a secret emergency meeting of the Federal Open 
Market Committee, the Fed’s main governing body, and gained its assent for the switch to 
monetarism.  The wild speculation in the markets since the September split decision had 
convinced previous doubters that change was needed.  The implications of their decision were 
clear to everyone who gathered around the table.  “There wasn’t any question that the board 
knew that recession would follow” the vote, Federal Reserve Governor Phillip Coldwell 
recalled.203   At a press conference that evening, Volcker announced the change in policy.  A 
reporter asked him if the new policy meant that the Federal Funds Rate (the rate the Fed used to 
control interest rates) would be “completely free to go as high as it might?”  The Fed Chairman 
responded, “I don’t know what you think is as high as it might.  There will be substantial 
freedom in the market.”  The United States’ fate, Volcker now told the country, rested in the 
hands of the marketplace.204  
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Figure 2: The course of the US Prime Loan Rate, one of the important interest 
rates, from 1978-1983 shows the increase in both interest rate levels and 
interest rate volatility that accompanied the Fed’s switch to monetarism.  
Source: FRED Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MPRIME, Accessed March 28, 2017. 
 
 
Over the next three years, the United States experienced the highest real interest rates 
and, from 1981-1982, the deepest recession of the postwar period.  Millions lost their jobs, wage 
growth evaporated, industries went bankrupt, and the entire American savings and loan industry 
collapsed.  By August 1980, an editorial in the New York Times titled “Economy as Titanic” 
howled in outrage at the Fed’s “decision to throw two million crew members into the stormy seas 
of unemployment.”205  At great social, political, and economic cost, Volcker and his colleagues 
successfully convinced Americans and the world market that they were willing to break 
promises, and for that, the country was rewarded with renewal.  It was, as a following chapter 
details, a precarious renewal built on unprecedented inflows of foreign capital, but it was renewal 
nonetheless. 
 
                                                     
205 Quoted in Evan A. North, “Saudi Arabia and the US Dollar Crisis of 1978-1980,” 
unpublished paper, Georgetown University, 2008, p. 19.  
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Of course, the effects of Volcker’s actions were hardly limited by national borders or 
ideological boundaries.  Across the Iron Curtain, bankers and policymakers in the communist 
world watched as their last lifeline of external support began to slip away.  On October 25th, 
three weeks after Volcker’s decision, Horst Kaminsky, the President of the East German State 
Bank, wrote in a memo to Günter Mittag marked “Strictly Confidential,” “Recently a dramatic 
increase in interest rates has commenced on the capitalist financial and credit markets.  The 
current interest rate on the Euromarket stands at about 16%.  Further increases in the coming 
weeks cannot be ruled out.”  Even if interest rates rose no further, Kaminsky calculated that the 
prevailing rates would increase the GDR’s interest payments by 520 million VM over the next 
year and a half.  The bank president told Mittag that he had informed Schürer, the State Planning 
Commissioner, of these estimates so that he could include the higher interest rate assumptions in 
his plans for the economy.  Clearly, more would have to be exported and less imported to 
compensate for Volcker’s actions.206  
Two weeks after Kaminsky’s estimates, an event half way around the world that had 
nothing to do with the Cold War, socialism, or even finance caused the Eastern Bloc’s financial 
predicament to go from bad to worse.  On November 4th, 1979, Iranian students stormed the 
American embassy in Tehran and took fifty two Americans hostage.  Ten days later, the Carter 
administration responded by freezing all Iranian assets in US banks, roughly $11 billion at the 
time.  As the diplomatic crisis between Tehran and Washington played out over the next year, 
the frozen Iranian assets caused significant uncertainty in the international financial community 
                                                     
206 Letter and Attachment from Horst Kaminsky to Günter Mittag, October 25, 1979, DY 
3023/1093, SAMPO Berlin, 129-131. 
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and further limited their willingness to lend to socialist states.207  In December 1979, Polze, the 
Foreign Bank President, wrote to Mittag, that “the large US banks” had rejected his efforts to 
organize a new loan for $150 million because of “a confluence of reasons.”  Among them were 
“the current uncertainty on the Euromarket that has been triggered by the blockade of Iranian 
assets in the USA” and “the frequent appearances of the GDR on international financial 
markets.”208 
Just as Polze was composing his note to Mittag, the final nail was being hammered into 
the coffin of the Eastern Bloc’s access to Western capital.  At the end of December 1979, Soviet 
forces invaded Afghanistan to topple as Islamist government that had recently overthrown a 
socialist government allied with Moscow.  President Carter responded by placing a grain 
embargo on the Soviet Union and asking all US banks to review their credit policies toward the 
Eastern Bloc.  He also announced a new US defense posture in the Middle East, dubbed the 
Carter Doctrine, and requested corresponding increases in the US military budget. 
The renewal of superpower tensions over Afghanistan destroyed the last semblance of 
normalcy for socialist borrowing on the Euromarkets.  In early February, Polze and Kaminsky 
produced a new confidential report which began, “The situation on the international finance and 
credit markets…has significantly tightened in the last few weeks.”  Because of “the uncertainty 
arising from the blockade of Iranian assets in the USA” and “the blackmail (Erpressung)” 
launched by the US government against the Soviet Union, banks “temporarily could not grant 
any new loans” or were “demanding higher credit costs due to the increasing risk.”  Leading 
                                                     
207 Benjamin Cohen, In Whose Interest? International Banking and US Foreign Policy (New 
Haven, CT, 1986), chapter 6. 
208 Letter from Werner Polze to Günter Mittag, December 29, 1979, DY 3023/1093, SAMPO 
Berlin, 341-342. 
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capitalist banks believed, Polze and Kaminsky wrote, that “credit granted to socialist countries in 
the future would be considerably restricted.”  The entire market continued to suffer from 
“prolonged high interest rates.”  “The arms buildup in the USA and other imperialist states” in 
response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan would, they noted, “lead to interest rate increases 
in the future” because it would force Western governments to spend more money. Thus, “a 
decline in the high interest rates can hardly be expected in 1980.”209 
The arrival of spring brought no change.  In May, Polze was still writing to Mittag, 
“Currently there is no indication that capitalist banks’ position on granting finance credits to 
socialist states has changed.”  As always, the telltale sign of market sentiment was Poland.  On 
April 24th, 1980, Bank Handlowy convened a meeting in Warsaw with representatives from the 
thirty banks that had granted it the $550 million loan the year before.  After telling the 
assemblage that his country had to make $5.8 billion in principle payments and $1.8 billion in 
interest payments in 1980, Deputy Finance Minister Krzak asked them for new $1 billion loan to 
help rollover the debts.  The representative from National Westminster Bank in London told 
Krzak that $1 billion was unrealistic and that Poland was more likely to receive a $200 or $300 
million loan.  Moreover, the interest rate spread that the banks would have to put on the loan 
“would put Poland in the category of the worst debtors in the world.”210   
                                                     
209 Horst Kaminsky and Werner Polze, “Analyse der Lage auf den internationalen Geld- und 
Kreditmärkten, besonders des US-Dollar als Leit- und Reservewährung und Massnahmen zur 
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210 Werner Polze, “Information über die Lage auf den kapitalistichen Geld- und Kreditmärkten 
und das Verhalten der großen kapitalistischen Geschäftsbanken hinsichtlich der weiteren 
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Their hopes for new credit dashed, Polish officials had no choice but to turn inward and 
revise the country’s domestic policy.  Since the June 1976 price increases, Gierek and his 
government had avoided asking Polish citizens to sacrifice at all costs, but they could avoid it no 
longer.  At the end of May 1980, the Polish Planning Commission urgently warned the party 
leadership that the “conditions for implementing the national plan” had “deteriorated markedly.”  
“Notably,” they wrote, “the payment situation has worsened” because of “credit difficulties.”  
The “main problem” was “the issue of obtaining financial loans for the purchase of raw 
materials.”  In the first four months of the year, the planners reported, “we have been able to get 
financial credits only for the amount of 1.9 billion zł dew. [foreign currency złotys, equivalent to 
$1] compared to 2.8 billion zł dew. in the same period last year.”  At the same time, they noted, 
“the interest rate on those credits has greatly increased, at times exceeding 20%.”  These 
conditions led the commission to project a financing shortfall for the remainder of the year of 4.1 
billion zł dew.  In order to compensate for this difference, the ministers proposed to increase the 
exports to the West by about 3 billion zł dew and to restrict hard currency imports by 1-1.5 
billion zł dew.  If these corrections could be achieved, the planners wrote, they would 
compensate for “the current evaluation of the deterioration in credit possibilities.”211   
In addition to restricting imports and boosting exports, the Planning Commission noted 
that “determining the correct level of employment” was “an important socio-political 
problem.”212   According to their calculations, 338,000 people needed to be fired across the 
economy in order to produce the growth in labor productivity that would be necessary to drive 
                                                     
211 “Notatka w sprawie aktualnej oceny warunków realizacji Narodowego Planu Społe‐czno-
Gospodarczego na rok 1980 i wniosków wynikających z tej oceny,” May 31, 1980, in Tajne 
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economic growth.  The planners noted that “the task of reducing employment is extremely 
difficult due to certain socio-political repercussions, especially since layoffs on such a scale 
would have to affect many workplaces.”  But failure to implement these cutbacks would 
“negatively affect productivity, economic relations, and the increase in national income.”  And it 
was only going to get worse.  “The preliminary analysis of the conditions of payment in 1981, 
which will be characterized by even higher set debt payments, indicates that the plan for 1981 
will also be very difficult.”213 In short, the challenge of breaking promises had arrived in the 
Eastern Bloc.   
Even in the first moments of the onrushing crisis, a decisive weakness of the state 
socialist system was already apparent.   When contemplating the fate of democratic welfare 
states in the doldrums of the mid-1970s, Fred Hirsch had approvingly written of the capitalist 
system, “A great strength of liberal capitalism has been its ability to dispense with an explicit 
ethical standard for the distribution of awards.  Justification is provided by the benign outcome 
of autonomous unregulated processes.”214  Under the postwar ethos of the welfare state, this 
“great strength” had been supplemented by, if not submerged under, explicit government 
commitments to distribute economic gains fairly and broadly throughout society.  Volcker’s fight 
against inflation dispensed with these government commitments - the commitment to full 
employment foremost among them - and his embrace of monetarism allowed the US government 
to claim that it was no longer responsible for social outcomes.  Once more, “autonomous 
                                                     
213 “Notatka w sprawie aktualnej oceny warunków realizacji Narodowego Planu Społe‐czno-
Gospodarczego na rok 1980 i wniosków wynikających z tej oceny,” May 31, 1980, in Tajne 
Dokumenty Biura Politycznego (London, UK, 1992), pp. 13-15. 
214 Hirsch, The Social Limits of Growth, p. 175. 
  147 
unregulated processes” were producing social outcomes, benign or otherwise.  As a member of 
the Fed put it, “Everyone could say: ‘Look, no hands.’”215   
Under state socialism, by contrast, the Party’s hands were in everything, and explicit 
ethical standards for the distribution of economic benefits formed the ideological foundation of 
the state.  The communist parties of the Eastern Bloc had spent the entire postwar period 
purposefully creating states in which they were responsible for everyone’s fate.  This would 
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Figure 1: Citicorp, “Freedom and Peace on Earth,” New York Times, 27 December 1981, 24. 
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 In time, critics would say it was all a mirage.   But as Americans opened their newspapers 
on December 27th, 1981, they were sure to see a message from President Ronald Reagan 
splashed across a full-page Citicorp advertisement in their daily broadsheet.  Below a picture of 
the bank’s flagship building in New York made to look like a giant candle, Reagan proclaimed, 
“Let the light of millions of candles in American homes give notice that the light of freedom is 
not going to be extinguished.”216  Four days earlier, the president had delivered a nationally 
televised speech from the Oval Office in response to a declaration of martial law in Poland.  On 
December 13th, the Polish military, led by General Wojciech Jaruzelski, had declared martial law 
with the intention of dismantling the national trade union, Solidarność (Solidarity), whose 
protests against the government had destabilized the country since its founding in the Gdańsk 
shipyards during the summer of 1980.  Reagan took to the nation’s airwaves to announce a series 
of policy responses and to ask Americans to show their support for the Polish people by placing 
a candle in their home window.  Citicorp CEO Walter Wriston saw both commercial and 
political opportunity in Reagan’s speech, and he crafted the ad to position his bank as a leading 
force of anticommunism in an evidently worsening Cold War.217    
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 The rapidly changing role of banks in international politics necessitated such public 
relations.218  At the moment General Jaruzelski declared martial law, his government stood on 
the brink of defaulting on the $26 billion it owed international banks and Western governments.  
Since the early 1970s, the Polish government had borrowed enormous sums of hard currency on 
Western capital markets to fund industrial development and subsidize domestic consumption.219  
Often with the encouragement of government loan guarantees, but primarily of their own accord, 
Western commercial banks had eagerly funneled capital into Poland to meet the government’s 
needs.  This borrowing and lending binge came to a grinding halt in 1980 when banks lost 
confidence in Poland’s ability to repay its debts, and the Polish government raised food prices 
throughout the country in the hope of restoring international market confidence in the country’s 
creditworthiness.  Striking workers in Gdańsk responded by forming Solidarity, and for the next 
fifteen months the banks, governments, and the Polish people vied for influence over the 
country’s future. 
                                                     
218 The relationship between commercial banks and U.S. foreign policy, and financial 
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 Scholars who have analyzed the international relations of the Polish Crisis have 
overwhelmingly examined it through the analytical lens of the Cold War.220  This has led them to 
focus on the diplomatic and military maneuverings of the Soviet, American, and Polish 
governments during the crisis, and to frame the motivations of all parties involved in the crisis in 
ideological or national security terms.221   But the role of Western commercial banks and 
sovereign debt in the crisis has not been examined in detail, and thus the financial motivations 
and concerns of each party have gone largely unnoticed.  This chapter foregrounds these interests 
by analyzing how international financial relations between banks and governments triggered the 
outbreak of the crisis, affected the Polish government’s response to Solidarity, and guided 
Western governments’ responses to events.  In tracing the history of Poland’s international 
borrowing and the delicate multilateral financial diplomacy that accompanied the tumultuous 
months of crisis from the summer of 1980 to the spring of 1982, this article details a game of 
financial brinksmanship that unfolded alongside the crisis on the ground, as banks, Western 
governments, the Polish government, and the Soviet government all sought to force the others to 
bear the burden of Poland’s financial folly.  Indeed, the crisis on the ground in Poland and the 
                                                     
220 The most recent treatment in English of Poland in the late Cold War is Domber, Empowering 
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international diplomacy over Poland’s debt were directly linked because everything for which 
Solidarity fought in Polish workplaces – higher wages, free trade unions, no work on Saturdays – 
stood to worsen rather than improve the country’s sovereign debt position.   
 This connection between the crisis on the ground and the politics of debt brought the 
economic and political interests of Western actors into direct conflict.  The financial 
globalization that followed the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 provided the 
United States with new opportunities to extend its influence behind the Iron Curtain.  But these 
opportunities entailed new risks as well.  In Poland, an unprecedented reality of the late Cold 
War emerged: by 1980, the Eastern and Western blocs had become financially interdependent.  
In response to these circumstances, a new strand of American strategic thought, one that sought 
to compel banks and countries to “share the burden” of supporting delinquent debtor nations, 
crystallized in this period and undercut the traditional Cold War priority of sustaining Poland’s 
liberalization.   As will be shown below, Western governments oscillated between policies aimed 
at sharing the burden and those aimed at sustaining Poland’s liberalization, and they ultimately 
chose a policy of sharing the burden.  Despite this strategy, interdependence largely foiled 
American attempts to exert leverage over putative subordinates, long-standing allies, and 
ideological enemies.  Banks, allied governments, the debtor government of Poland, and the 
Soviet Union all maintained independent and competing interests in Poland’s debt, and each 
achieved a partial measure of success in pursuit of these objectives.   
 The Polish Crisis also marks a turning point in the international financial history that led 
to the Sovereign Debt Crisis of the 1980s.  Scholars have traditionally looked to the Mexican 
default in August 1982 as the starting point of crisis, but this article demonstrates that it was in 
fact Poland’s debt troubles from 1980 to 1982 that caused commercial banks to lose confidence 
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in sovereign lending and central banks to worry about the financial viability of sovereign 
borrowers.  Beneath the veneer of Cold War politics and rhetoric, the Polish Crisis exhibited the 
traditional traits of a debt crisis – actors attempted to spread the burden of the delinquent debt to 
other stakeholders, and financial interdependence led to a muddled outcome.  What made the 
Polish debt crisis different from other debt crises was the radically new context within which it 
unfolded, namely the Eastern Bloc during a particularly tense moment in the Cold War.  In 
focusing on this new context, this article argues that the history of the late Cold War and the 
history of global finance after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system did not unfold 
independently, but were instead intimately linked.  To understand the financial history of the 
Polish Crisis is to gain greater insight into a turning point of two of the defining historical 
processes of the 1980s: the Sovereign Debt Crisis and the last years of the Cold War.  
 
Austerity Arrives 
As the last chapter made clear, by the spring of 1980, Polish officials were well aware 
that their financial lifeline to the Euromarkets had been cut.  Market confidence would return 
only once the government had shown the ability to impose austerity on the Polish population.  So 
for a third time in a decade, the regime attempted to raise the price of food on July 1st, 1980.  
Within three weeks, strikes had consumed the nation’s industrial centers with the help and 
coordination of KOR.  In mid-August, unrest returned to the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk where 
activists now made both economic and political demands, including the reinstatement of two 
workers who had been fired for union organizing.  One of these workers, Lech Wałęsa, went on 
to lead the local strike committee and eventually the Solidarity movement as a whole.  The speed 
and size of the protests overwhelmed the normal state apparatuses of repression, so just as they 
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had done in 1970, the regime sought to appease the protesters with a change in leadership and a 
recognition of some of their basic demands for wage increases.  Most importantly, on August 
31st the government and the fledgling opposition signed what became known as the Gdańsk 
Accords, which acknowledged the right of workers to form free labor unions.  In September, 
Stanisław Kania replaced Gierek as party secretary and conceded the workers’ right to form 
independent labor unions.  But by November, the disparate network of independent unions had 
coalesced around Solidarity, which eventually counted 10 million members, and the crisis 
showed no signs of abatement.222  Clearly, the government did not have the domestic legitimacy 
to impose economic austerity on its own people.  Indeed, the economic concessions granted to 
Solidarity only exacerbated the country’s hard currency problems.  As the British Foreign Office 
noted in an analysis of the first months of Solidarity’s existence, “The whole thrust of the 
concessions won by the workers is towards greater consumption at home.…[I]t is evident that 
Polish authorities will have to make every effort at least partially to redeem the promises they 
have made and therefore to divert goods from the export to the home market.”223  For the next 
fifteen months, Poland’s economic and political future hung in the balance, and banks, 
governments, and the Polish people competed to determine the country’s fate.   
  
A Game of Chicken 
 Ronald Reagan and his senior advisors entered the White House believing that Poland 
would be the first test of their Cold War mettle.  Recalling the transition period of December 
1980, Casper Weinberger wrote that Reagan believed Poland would be his “first test” and “that a 
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great deal would depend, for at least the next four years, on how he, and the nation, reacted to 
Soviet pressures in Poland.”224 Reagan’s first National Intelligence Estimate for Poland as 
president legitimately feared that “a swift and steep decline in living standards – capable of 
triggering civil disorder that could cause Soviet intervention” was a real possibility in the year 
ahead. The only way to prevent this precipitous decline, the report told the new president, was 
for Poland to receive a new round of financing from Western banks to stave off default and 
dramatic alterations in the price and availability of basic staples.  But banks were likely to make 
new loans “only if they received government guarantees.”  Therefore, Poland would “require 
prompt financial assistance from either Western governments or the Soviet Union, and probably 
from both.  Large-scale assistance may be required very soon.”225   
 Very soon indeed.  Two months into Reagan’s term, Jaruzelski issued a “cry for help” to 
the West and formally requested a rescheduling of the country’s debt.226  This request brought 
the thorny issue of sharing the financial burden among governments and banks to a head.  
Although Western governments were eager to sustain Poland’s nascent experiment with 
liberalization, they did not want the rescheduling to turn into an opportunity for the Soviet Union 
or Western banks to gain financially from the governments’ politically motivated generosity.  
Western governments, who gathered in Paris to discuss the Polish situation, demanded that 
Poland seek “parallel action by the CMEA countries and by Western banks.”227   At the end of 
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February 1981, the Soviet Union granted Poland a four-year moratorium on its debt, thus 
assuring Western officials that “the Soviets were playing their part.”228 Soon after, the banks 
indicated their willingness to follow the governments’ lead in rescheduling, and in April the 
governments rescheduled 90% of the $2.3 billion in principle and interest due in 1981.  
Rescheduling 90% of the debt was unusually generous (agreements with other debtor countries 
had rescheduled 75%), and the governments chose such a high percentage on encouragement 
from the Reagan administration, which wanted to both support Solidarity and ensure that the US 
government would not have to provide new credits in 1981.229  Only one condition was attached 
to the agreement, “the exceptional circumstances clause.”  Under this clause, which was known 
as “the Tank Clause” by the time it entered public discourse after the declaration of martial law, 
the creditor governments could suspend the rescheduling agreement if exceptional 
circumstances, such as a political crackdown or Soviet intervention, occurred in Poland.230  Only 
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in the face of actual repression would it become clear whether Western governments could bring 
themselves to invoke the clause.  
 For at least a year after Solidarity’s formation, the Polish government and the Soviet 
Union navigated the competing pressures of the crisis with an eye toward pleasing Western 
creditors.  In the fall of 1980, the Soviets reduced shipments of oil to all Comecon countries 
except Poland so that it could be sold on the world market for hard currency.231  These earnings 
were in turn given to the Polish government in the form of $1.1 billion in hard currency loans.232  
But the scale of the Soviet aid paled in comparison with the scale of Poland’s financing problem.  
Kania told the leaders of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in January 1981, “In order to exist it is 
necessary to borrow, this and next year, 10 billion dollars…This is also why, in our internal 
actions, we must take into account the kind of repercussions they may engender in the West.”233  
Soviet officials were helpless to discourage the regard their Polish colleagues showed for 
Western opinion because they could not meet all, or even most, Polish requests.234  Their advice 
was therefore consistently rebuffed.  At an August, 1981 meeting between the Polish and Soviet 
leaderships in the Soviet province of Crimea, Kania and Jaruzelski told Soviet Premier Leonid 
Brezhnev that they could not take more stringent repressive measures because they needed 
Western financial aid.  This prompted Brezhnev to respond, “it is necessary for each Pole to 
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understand that the credits extended by Western banks and governments are by no means a gift 
but a commercial transaction for which it is necessary to pay enormous interest.  For Poland this 
is bondage.”235  
 But though they needed further financial support, the Poles also held leverage over the 
banks that made them far from slaves of Western masters.  The Poles feared a loss of Western 
aid, but the banks dreaded a Polish bankruptcy.  All international loans included what was 
known as a “cross-default clause,” which was supposed to provide creditors with the legal means 
to seize a debtor’s assets and recover a portion of their loss, if a default were to occur.  The 
problem was that Poland had virtually no assets in Western countries.  “What good would 
declaring default do?” a banker rhetorically asked in Euromoney, “There aren’t any funds to 
seize.”236  Therefore, the banks would do all they could to prevent a declaration of default.  As 
long as default had not been called, they could continue pretending that the Poles would one day 
pay them back and thus continue to count the loans as assets on their balance sheets.  The actual 
prospects for repayment did not matter; as long as no one called a default, their accounting ruse 
could continue.  In previous debt crises, the banks had also been able to turn to the IMF.  But as 
they entered negotiations to reschedule Poland’s 1981 debt, no such recourse existed.  To make 
matters worse, government officials in Paris had told the banks that they needed to sign a 
“comparable” rescheduling agreement to the one that the governments had signed in April so that 
the burden of Poland’s debt would be equitably shared between private and public institutions.  
Therefore, as the Poles entered negotiations with the banks, they maintained leverage over the 
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banks born of a hint of mutually assured destruction – if Poland collapsed, the banks would 
suffer significant losses of their own.  
 With these dynamics in mind, bankers gathered throughout the spring to develop a 
unified policy through the formation of a lead negotiating committee.  This proved difficult 
because American and European bankers had differing economic incentives and diplomatic 
approaches.  With more loans outstanding and pressures to maintain the viability of the Polish 
export market, the European bankers took no issue with offering the Poles a “comparable” 
agreement that rescheduled the vast majority of the principle and attached few demands for 
economic reform.  The Americans, who had much less of their balance sheets committed to 
Poland and were much more concerned about the precedent any Polish agreement would set for 
other countries’ debt reschedulings, demanded that structural economic reforms to be attached 
and required that Poland still pay all of the interest on its 1981 debt.  Euromoney reported on 
“weeks of arduous and often frustrating discussions” during which “committees were formed and 
re-formed, named and re-named, committee chairmen came and went.” The restructuring terms 
that emerged were a compromise between the two positions: 95% of the debt would be 
rescheduled over the next seven and a half years with a interest rate margin of 1¾ percent, but 
Poland would have to retain “a technical advisor” with an “IMF-type role,” who would have 
direct access to the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs.  In what came to be known as 
“The Polish Memorandum,” the banks and the Polish government negotiated this package to 
reschedule Poland’s $2.1 billion debt to private creditors, provided that Poland pay the $500 
million in interest on their 1981 debts by the end of the year.  Euromoney concluded, “On paper, 
then, bankers have assigned themselves a political role in shaping Poland’s economy.”237  As 
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with traditional diplomatic agreements, each side would have to return home and receive their 
leadership’s approval for such a deal.  In the meantime, the Polish government would have to 
find 500 million dollars. 
 Skepticism abounded that approval would be forthcoming from the communist side, 
particularly among Europeans.  A French banker thought the entire exercise to be a flight of 
fantasy, “Can you imagine that the Soviets will allow an international expert to roam freely in 
Poland to look at the performance of the economy?”  For some reason, this rather obvious point 
was lost on American bankers.  “The US banks in general see the Polish problem…as no 
different from International Harvester or Massey-Ferguson.”238  But even those who saw through 
the illusion of the bankers’ control over the Polish economy remained under the illusion of the 
Soviet Union’s ultimate saving grace.  The financial community still wondered in July, “With the 
situation as it is, with the country stumbling along from one crisis to another, how many western 
bankers would secretly sigh with relief in the event of Soviet intervention, military or otherwise? 
In that event, would Polish debt become Russian debt?”239  Only time would tell. 
 As the multilateral financial brinksmanship progressed on the international level, 
Poland’s debt crisis took a toll on the domestic economy.  Foreign creditors from above and 
Solidarity from below squeezed the government’s financial position.  As Poland lost access to 
global capital markets in 1980, the government was forced to dramatically curtail the country 
imports of investment materials and industrial inputs.  This cutback combined with Solidarity’s 
strikes in the second half of 1980 led to a severe decline in economic output.  In addition, the 
wage concessions won by Solidarity through strikes increased the monetary overhang in the 
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economy.  More money chasing fewer goods produced an economy of scarcity.  Long lines for 
basic goods such as milk, cheese, and bread, along with rationing for meat became the reality of 
daily life across the country.  Through the spring of 1981, most segments of society blamed the 
government for this downward spiral, which only increased Solidarity’s social support.240 
 As the domestic economy ground to a halt, the Polish Finance Ministry and Bank 
Handlowy struggled to keep the nation’s international finances afloat.  Western banks had long 
since given up on providing new money to Poland without government guarantees,241 so Finance 
Minister Marian Karcz was forced to turn once again to Western governments for the $500 
million in interest payments due to the banks.  Throughout the fall, he met with government 
representatives in Paris to try and extract more concessions from the West.  But the same 
governments that had been so quick and generous with the rescheduling terms earlier in April 
now told their Polish counterparts that they could not approve any further financial aid. 
 Why the diplomatic change of heart?  In the United States and Western Europe, there had 
been no loss of support for sustaining Solidarity’s experiment with liberalization.  On the 
contrary, the longer Solidarity remained active in Poland and the longer the Soviets refrained 
from intervening, the more government officials allowed themselves to seriously consider the 
possibility that Poland might actually escape the Soviet orbit over the long-term.  In the United 
States, the National Security Council sought authorization from President Reagan to begin 
negotiating a $2.5 billion multilateral aid package with Western European countries that would 
help Poland through 1983.242  Many officials doubted that such a program would provide a 
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sustainable solution to the country’s economic problems and others still anticipated that the 
Soviet Union would intervene.  But most officials nevertheless believed, as Robert Gates did at 
the Central Intelligence Agency, that “the Polish experiment…is a crapshoot for enormous 
stakes,” and therefore “we should ‘wager on the muddle’ and provide the credits” for a long-term 
aid program.243 
 In Paris, however, the same Western governments that professed to support “the Polish 
experiment” stonewalled Poland’s requests for aid.  This, quite simply, was due to banks.  “No 
doubt the banks are hoping to be bailed out,” the NSC concluded. “Western assistance must be 
structured to prevent this.”244  With the banks’ debt rescheduling agreement contingent on the 
Poles paying $500 million in interest by the end of the year, Western governments knew that any 
assistance they provided would go straight back into the banks’ coffers.  In a series of meetings 
throughout the fall, the Polish delegation told the assembled diplomats that the banks were 
betting “that the governments would find the money.” The American delegate in Paris, Robert 
Meissner, retorted that the banks were “playing a game of chicken.”  Western governments, he 
told Karcz, “could not find money to pay off the banks.”245  But because Meissner and his 
colleagues still wanted Poland “to receive the best deal possible,” they sought to tutor their 
novitiate communist counterparts on the tactics of Western financial negotiation. “The present 
                                                     
“Gespräch des Bundesministers Genscher mit den Außenministern Lord Carrington 
(Großbritannien), Cheysson (Frankreich) und Haig (USA) in Brüssel,” [Minister Genscher’s 
Discussion with the Foreign Ministers, Lord Carrington (Great Britain), Cheysson (France) and 
Haig (USA) in Brussels] in Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik, 1895-1903. 
243 Robert Gates to Director of the CIA, “Assistance to Poland: Tuesday’s NSC Meeting,” Dec. 
4, 1981, Box 1, SFC, NSA.  
244 “NSC Discussion Paper on Assistance for Poland,” Dec. 10, 1981, Folder “NSC Meeting 
12/10/1981 (1)”, Box “1981”, Executive Secretariat, NSC Meeting Files, RRPL. 
245 “Meetings of the Poland Creditor Group Taskforce 27-29 October,” Oct. 29, 1981, CAB 
130/1154, Records of the Cabinet Office, UKNA. 
  163 
terms should be seen as the opening bid from the banks, not their final offer,” he said.  “Poland 
should not rush into a resettlement.”  The French and British representatives reassured the Polish 
delegation that obstinacy in negotiation would not lead the banks to declare default.  “Larger 
banks normally dissuaded smaller banks from taking legal action and legal action would only be 
taken if the debtor possessed substantial assets abroad, which Poland did not.”246  Having 
coached the Poles on how best to deal with their own banks, the Western diplomats told them 
that “it was up to them” to strike a new deal with the banks or come up with the $500 million by 
December 10th.247  
 As his diplomats were stonewalled in Paris, General Jaruzelski began to sense that the 
course of domestic events was turning in his favor.  Although the population had initially blamed 
the government for the decline of the economy at the start of the crisis, many segments of society 
began to hold Solidarity at least partially responsible for the prolonged economic chaos and 
uncertainty by the fall of 1981.  Andrzej Paczkowski has written, “the authorities were helped by 
the overall social mood, which by the fall of 1981 had become less supportive of Solidarity’s 
most far reaching demands.  A considerable proportion of the population was tired of the 
unending difficulty of everyday life, of the chaos and constant tension.”248  Sensing his moment 
to discipline Solidarity had arrived, Jaruzelski removed the final institutional roadblock to 
suppression on October 18th, when he replaced Kania as party chief, adding that title to his 
previous roles of premier and defense minister. 
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 When the declaration of martial law came on December 13th, Poland was bankrupt.  The 
military action that came was swift and surprising.  Claiming that his decision saved the nation 
from a political and economic “abyss,” Jaruzelski appeared on state television early in the 
morning to announce the decision.249  The implementation of the operation against Solidarity 
was so successful that few union activists perished. All foreign communication was cut, a curfew 
was imposed, and the nation’s borders were sealed.  Soldiers patrolled the streets of all major 
cities, but there was little organized resistance. 
 The Polish Crisis had begun with Gierek’s attempt to impose economic austerity on 
Polish consumers through price hikes, and it ended with Jaruzelski’s attempt to impose discipline 
on the nation’s workforce.  Over its fifteen-month existence, Solidarity had led many nationwide 
strikes and garnered wage increases that had severely hampered the government’s ability to earn 
the hard currency required to repay its debts.  The strikes had become so commonplace that 
bankers crafted an oft-told joke out of the workplace strife: “There is a rational and a miraculous 
solution to the debt crisis in Poland,” they said, “The rational involves the Archangel Michael 
coming down from heaven with bags of money and paying off Poland’s creditors…The 
miraculous involves the Poles actually working again.”250  
 Martial law was no miracle, but the government did portray it both domestically and 
internationally as a way to implement economic reforms.  In his speech announcing martial law, 
Jaruzelski argued, “blows are continuously being dealt to the flagging economy….distressing 
lines of division run through every workplace….Respect for man’s labor must be restored.”251  
                                                     
249 Maxwell, Jaruzelski, 28 and 34. 
250 Author’s interview with Phillip Sherman, a commercial banker who worked at Citicorp 
during the period.  Oct. 30, 2014.  
251 Maxwell, Jaruzelski, 28, 31. 
  165 
The Polish Vice Premier Mieczyslaw Rakowski told the head of the German Chamber of 
Commerce in the days following the martial law declaration that the government had taken 
action because “worker discipline” needed to be restored.252  One of Jaruzelski’s advisors, 
Wiesław Gornicki, told American officials in Warsaw that Poland’s gross national product had 
fallen 35% in 1981 and “a continued decline would ruin any chance of Poland’s repaying its 
debt…without swift action no plan for economic reform could be introduced.”253  Two months 
after the martial law declaration, the government introduced another round of severe price 
increases.  Unlike 1970, 1976, and 1980, however, these price increases spawned only scattered 
resistance.  Martial law had decisively, if only temporarily, broken the back of the resistance.254  
 Bankers in the West agreed with the Polish government’s contention that martial law was 
the best way of implementing reform.  “Most bankers think authoritarian governments are good 
because they impose discipline,” one financier anonymously told The Wall Street Journal.  
Thomas Theobold, the head of Wriston’s international division at Citibank, told the New York 
Times, “Who knows what political system works? The only test we care about is: Can they pay 
their bills?”255  A Frankfurt banker told The New Republic that he saw “the chance for Poland to 
return to a more normal working schedule” in the declaration of martial law, and “this could be a 
good thing for the banks.”256   
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 The banks, however, were sure not to let their approbation sully their firm stance in the 
negotiations over Poland’s 1981 interest payments.  On the contrary, the game of chicken 
between East, West, and the banks over Poland’s private debts to banks continued unabated.  
December 10th had come and gone with the Poles only paying the banks $150 million of the 
$500 in interest that they owed.  Betting that the banks would extend new loans before writing 
off their old loans as losses, Bank Handlowy requested a $350 million loan from Western banks 
just days after the martial law declaration.  To further increase the pressure on the banks, 
Jaruzelski wrote the head of the West German banking association that Poland would “not be 
able to pay interest on its loans this year.”257  The banks viewed the maneuver as an irritating 
“negotiating ploy” and quickly rejected the request.258  In turn, the banks increased the pressure 
on Western governments, informing them that they would only lend new money if they received 
a full government guarantee, which stood no chance of happening in the tense days following the 
imposition of martial law.259  Other bankers still expected the Soviet Union to step in and save its 
ally, as the umbrella theory predicted.  But the Soviets took comfort in making the banks wait.  
US embassy officials in Moscow reported an “oft-expressed private Soviet view” that “Western 
banks are so exposed in Poland that they will do anything to avoid the collapse of their position 
there.”260  Some Western diplomats even began to postulate that the Soviets were not paying the 
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Poles’ interest to Western banks because “it would set precedent for establishing [the] Soviet 
‘umbrella’ theory for Eastern European debt.”261 
 In reality, the lack of Soviet support for Poland was a product of a paucity of resources 
rather than diplomatic maneuvering.  In the weeks following the crackdown, Jaruzelski made 
great hay out of reorienting the Polish economy away from the West and toward the other 
communist states of Comecon.  On January 6th, 1982, the Soviet and Polish governments 
announced a new Trade and Payments Protocol in Moscow, which promised to deliver increased 
Soviet natural gas, oil, iron ore, and agricultural machinery to Poland in its time of need.  
Beyond the diplomatic fanfare, however, the agreement did little to change the material realities 
of Soviet support.  A week after signing the agreement, Leonid Brezhnev told his Politburo 
colleagues that the Polish economic reorientation posed “a difficult question” for the Soviet 
Union’s allocation of scarce resources.  “We find ourselves at the limit of our abilities in terms of 
assistance to the Poles, yet they are submitting new requests.  Perhaps we still have to do 
something, but we can no longer afford major advances.”262  And so major advances never came.  
In time, the US Defense Intelligence Agency would conclude that far from increasing their 
support, Comecon countries actually decreased their aid to Poland in the first months of 1982.263  
The Polish Ministry of Foreign Trade similarly concluded,  “The items Poland needs to replace 
[Western imports] are not available from other Comecon countries.”264 
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Default: An Ace in the Hole or a Joker in the Deck? 
 President Reagan viewed the martial law declaration as nothing more than naked Cold 
War aggression.  Upon hearing of the crackdown, he scratched in his diary, “Our intelligence is 
that it was engineered & ordered by the Soviet [sic].   If so, and I believe it is, the situation is 
really grave.”  At a series of NSC meetings in the days following the crackdown, the 
administration groped for a response that befitted the gravity of events.  After one such meeting, 
Reagan committed his conviction to his diary.  “I took a stand that this may be the last chance in 
our lifetime to see a change in the Soviet Empire’s colonial policy re Eastern Europe.  We should 
take a stand & tell them unless & until martial law is lifted in Poland…We would quarantine the 
Soviets & Poland with no trade…Also tell our NATO allies…to join us in such sanctions or risk 
estrangement from us.”265  On December 23rd he gave the nationally televised speech that 
prompted Wriston’s candle advertisement, telling the Polish government that its “crimes [would] 
cost them dearly.”266 
 Conspicuously absent from Reagan’s speech was any mention of Poland’s outstanding 
debt to banks and rescheduled debt to Western countries.  Early in the administration’s 
deliberations, Reagan ruled out invoking the Tank Clause written into the 1981 government 
agreement.  He told the NSC, the exception circumstances clause “seems more disruptive to our 
side” than to the Poles.267  Because invoking the clause would send Poland into default, 
administration officials in the State and Treasury Departments agreed with Reagan and felt a 
Polish default would cause significant harm to the Western financial system.   
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 Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger thought differently.   As he watched events unfold 
in Poland, he became convinced that the martial law declaration presented the United States with 
a unique opportunity to inflict economic ruin on the Soviet Union and its allies.  In the days after 
December 13th, Weinberger gathered a team of economic and financial experts at the Pentagon 
for an all-day conference to weigh the prospects and implications of calling a default on Polish 
debt.  Undersecretary of Defense Fred Iklé, economists from the RAND Corporation, Henry 
Rowen and Charles Wolf, and a vice president of Chase Manhattan Bank, Roger Robinson, 
debated “a strategy for virtually killing off the Polish economy already in poor health.”  Most of 
the individuals present favored calling the default, but Robinson argued that “a politically driven 
default” could lead to “‘instant relays’ of sovereign default throughout the world.”268  In time, 
Robinson’s position would win the day.  The threat of debt contagion – a concept more familiar 
to the post-Cold War world – had begun to impress upon the minds of government policymakers.  
And rightly so.  Even without default, the financial implications of Poland’s martial law 
declaration did indeed relay quickly throughout the world, as will be discussed below.  
 The private musings of Reagan’s diary, and even the public declarations of an Oval 
Office speech, were a long way from a coordinated response from the NATO alliance.  Reagan 
and Secretary of State Alexander Haig found a reluctant cohort as they began to build a case for 
unified Western action.  As the economic center of Europe, West Germany held the keys to any 
movement.  The victim of unfortunate circumstance, Prime Minister Helmut Schmidt had been 
in the midst of a twelve-day visit to East Germany when Jaruzelski declared martial law.  Either 
out of respect for his hosts or his business constituents, Schmidt had first told the East German 
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press that Jaruzelski had done what was “necessary.”269  This caused few problems for him in 
Bonn, where the Bundestag decried the Polish transgressions of the Helsinki Final Act and 
temporarily suspended further financial aid, but generally showed little interest in economic 
sanctions.  Across the Atlantic, however, one would have thought that Schmidt had switched 
sides in the Cold War.  The Wall Street Journal lampooned, “Mr. Schmidt’s stance toward 
Moscow speaks of a demoralized leadership whose best vision of West Germany’s future is as a 
Finlandized industrial vassal of a totalitarian empire.”  Another commentator reprised an old 
favorite, “No more Munichs!”270 
 It is no wonder, then, that Schmidt believed the Reagan administration’s response to 
Poland had been driven by the pathologies of “television” (read populist) democracy and the 
“emotionalism” of American domestic politics.  As he arrived in Washington on January 5th, 
1982 for talks with the Reagan administration, he sought to make two points to U.S. officials.  
First, he reminded his hosts that these things happen from time to time in the Cold War and there 
wasn’t much that could be done to stop them.  To partake in a hollow crusade, he later wrote, 
would be to raise the hopes of “freedom-loving Poles and tempt them to risk their lives,” only to 
find out that “the entire dramatic effort was in vain.”  Second, he reminded his hosts that he was 
German, and history was not on his side.  “Any West German attempt to drive a wedge between 
the Polish people and its government…would provide the Communist propagandists in Warsaw 
with arguments against alleged ‘German revanchism.’”271   
 After another week of diplomatic negotiations, the core of the Western response 
coalesced at a NATO foreign ministers meeting in Brussels on January 11th, 1982.  At the strong 
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encouragement of the Reagan administration, alliance members agreed to publicly hold the 
Soviet Union responsible for the crackdown on Solidarity.  The allies also agreed to “not 
undermine” Reagan’s decision to deny Poland new credits and supported the American call to 
delay the rescheduling negotiations of Poland’s 1982 government debt indefinitely.  All parties 
agreed that these sanctions would be lifted once Jaruzelski had lifted martial law, released all 
political prisoners, and begun a meaningful dialogue with the opposition.272   
 A thorn remained stuck in the side of the Western response: Poland still had not paid the 
interest on its 1981 debt to banks, and the risk of one of Poland’s 500 creditor banks calling a 
default increased with each passing day.  The largest banks did all they could, including buying 
out the Polish debt portfolios of smaller banks, to ensure that none of institutions holding Polish 
loans declared default.  But by the end of January, the situation had reached a breaking point.  
 One way for the banks to recoup a portion of their money was to call in the government 
guarantees on their loans.  In the United States, however, standard CCC regulations required 
banks to declare default before the agency could reimburse their loans.  In the heat of the crisis, it 
was now clear that a declaration of default could bring down the Western economy.  If Reagan 
wanted to avoid financial catastrophe, he would have to wave the default declaration requirement 
and begin paying Poland’s debt with U.S. government funds.  In this decision, the president 
found the two foundational principles of his worldview – capitalism and anti-communism - in 
direct conflict.  A default would bring the wrath of the global marketplace to bear on the Soviet 
empire, but it would also severely damage the global capitalist system.273  Frustrated by a choice 
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with no good options, Reagan chose the preservation of capitalism, and authorized the CCC to 
make the first payment of $71 million to banks to cover maturing Polish debt without declaring 
default.274   In the long running game of chicken between the banks, Western governments, and 
the Eastern Bloc, it was thus Ronald Reagan that swerved off the collision course set by the 
prospect of a Polish default. 
 This was a decision best kept private, considering the disruption it would cause to 
Reagan’s domestic Cold Warrior image.  William Safire of The New York Times ensured that no 
such luxury would be enjoyed.  Based on documents leaked to Safire “by officials in defiance of 
lie-detector tests,” the paper reported news of the CCC payments on its front page, while Safire 
fumed over the developments in his weekly column.  “In an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation, the 
Reagan administration has just blinked.  Poland’s rulers can afford to dismiss the Reagan 
rhetoric because they have seen that the U.S. is ready to do regulatory nip-ups to save them from 
default.”275   
 Safire’s revelation added fuel to an already frenzied debate among political elites and the 
American labor movement over the merits of default and the proper course of U.S. foreign policy 
in the new era of financial interdependence.  In the early months of 1982, American Cold War 
politics began to catch up to the new financial dynamics that had been changing the East-West 
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conflict over the previous ten years.  George Ball declared in The Washington Post that “default 
would wreck the Western Alliance,” and “no useful purpose could be served by a measure that 
would only further grind down the Poles,” not the Soviets.  On the very same page, George Will 
demurred that real Cold War “tough[ness]” necessitated default.276  Lane Kirkland, the president 
of the AFL-CIO, labeled Western banks “the soft underbelly of freedom,” and pressured the 
Reagan administration to call the default.277  Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger were on 
the lookout for American credibility.  Brzezinski concluded that the U.S. and its allies may “have 
to bite the bullet” on default, because “anything less than steps like these will not be credible.”278  
Kissinger saw default as the West’s ace-in-the-hole.  Like the nuclear-tipped aces of an earlier 
era, it was only useful if the other side believed the trigger could actually be pulled.279 
 With such rhetoric in the air, it was only a matter of time before the debate found its way 
to the halls of Congress.  A week after the Times broke the news of the CCC payments, Senators 
Robert Kastens, Jr. of Wisconsin and Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York convened hearings 
to investigate the administration’s policy toward Poland.  Officials from Defense, State, 
Treasury, and Agriculture, including Weinberger’s default advocate Fred Icklé, massaged their 
internal differences into a united public front that attempted to portray Reagan’s decision as 
tough and strategic.  This led to a truly illogical series of statements.  First, Icklé let slip that he 
(rightly) believed that “declaring default does not relieve the debtor of his obligations.”  
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Undersecretary of State Robert Hormats walked this back to the official premise of 
administration action - that the Polish government might use default “as an excuse to relieve 
itself of its obligation to make any payments.”  Under this revised premise, the administration 
believed that “best way of keeping pressure on the Polish government and indirectly on the 
Soviet Government” was to insist that they pay their debts by withholding the default get-out-of-
jail-free card.  Nevertheless, Iklé assured the committee that the administration wanted to 
“deliberately retain” default as “a live option” in case events in Poland took a turn for the 
worse.280  It seemed, implausibly, that the financial nuclear option – default – was at once a 
strategy of appeasement and the ultimate deterrent. 
 Needless to say, Kastens and Moynihan were not impressed.  In their eyes, the decision 
not to call a default was motivated not by a desire to gain leverage over Poland but by a desire to 
save banks from writing down bad loans.  Kastens took to the pages of The Wall Street Journal 
to make his case.  “The crisis in Poland provides an unprecedented opportunity to hasten the 
breakdown of the Soviet Communist system,” he wrote.  “Now is the time to declare Poland in 
default.”281  Around him, the neoconservative estrangement from Reagan came into full view.  
Norman Podhoretz confessed in the New York Times, that he looked “with never failing 
amazement” on Reagan’s decision to pay the interest on Polish loans.  “To say that neo-
conservatives were disappointed by all this understates the case to an incalculable degree.”282    
 Bankers paid no mind to the heated politics building in the United States.  Their focus 
remained solely on maintaining their own profitability and (financial) credibility by finally 
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signing a rescheduling of Poland’s 1981 debts.  In early March, the Poles announced that they 
would pay all of the 1981 interest by the end of the month, and indeed they did.  This cleared the 
way for the long awaited pageantry of formally signing the rescheduling agreement on April 6th 
at the Frankfurt headquarters of Dresdner Bank.  While U.S. newspapers reported on the growing 
rebellion in Congress to the Reagan administration’s inaction, Euromoney covered the Frankfurt 
signing as though it were the Versailles Treaty.  Across a two-page picture of Wołoszyn and 
Karcz signing the rescheduling agreement, the banner read, “Signed: The First Comecon 
Rescheduling…The camera catches a moment in Euromarket history.”  Having signed the 
agreement for 1981, the banks and the Polish government were in the absurd position of having 
to turn around immediately and begin the negotiations to reschedule the loans for 1982, which 
were already months overdue.  The Poles did not let the absurdity deter them.  “We will need up 
to $3 billion of fresh money this year,” Karcz told the magazine soberly.  If his country received 
the money, he believed “this year’s rescheduling will be easier.”283 
 
What Debt Hath Wrought 
 
 In the months that followed, fresh money never came.  In fact, the months of crisis in 
Poland had precipitated profound changes in the international financial system that decisively 
influenced the last decade of the Cold War.  “Fundamental change is sweeping the 
Euromarkets,” Euromoney reported in its May 1982 issue.  “The era of the government 
borrower, the main prop of international bank lending in the ’seventies, is dying.”  The president 
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of the Bank of Tokyo told the magazine that “the Eastern European economic situation” had 
generated “a change in attitude” among banks toward the sovereign loan market.284  At the June 
1982 Annual Meeting of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the President of the BIS, 
Fritz Leutwiler, told his colleagues on the Board of Directors, “I do see signs that the banks’ 
perception of the risks involved in their international lending may be changing.  There have been 
indications that the banks are reassessing the creditworthiness of a number of sovereign 
borrowers.”285 
 In turning away from their previous state clients, the banks were unwittingly sowing the 
seeds of their own potential destruction.  A decline in sovereign loans did not mean a decline in 
sovereign debt.  If capitalism was to avert a global crisis, sovereign borrowers were still going to 
have to find someway to repay their debt obligations.  Otherwise the accounting ruse that 
propped up the banks’ house of cards would collapse in a downward spiral of defaults, write-
downs of losses, insolvencies, bank runs, and global depression.  This spiral began with Poland’s 
financial crisis, accelerated after Mexico became insolvent in August 1982, and eventually grew 
into the global financial phenomenon that defined the decade – the so called Third World debt 
crisis.286   
 The Polish crisis and its aftermath also exposed the “umbrella theory” for what it was – a 
theory, with little basis in reality.  As the illusion of a Soviet umbrella crumbled, banks stopped 
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granting communist states new loans and global investors pulled their money out of the Eastern 
Bloc.  The problems began in Hungary, which throughout the 1970s had been known as “a 
model Comecon economy.”  In the first quarter of 1982, foreign institutions, particularly Arab 
investors, removed $1.1 billion of the $1.5 billion in convertible currency that they had deposited 
in the country.  “Sometime during the winter,” Euromoney reported, “banks across the globe had 
not only decided that they did not wish to participate in syndicated loans to Comecon borrowers, 
but that they wished to cut all exposure to the area as much as possible.”287  Just as in Poland, the 
question became who would step in to bail the country out.  The answer was the central banks of 
the economies with the most to lose from a Hungarian collapse: West Germany, France, and 
Great Britain, but not the Soviet Union or the United States.  Through the Bank of International 
Settlements, these three central banks cobbled together a “lifeboat loan” of $510 million.288  The 
problems did not end with Hungary, however.  Because of the fears of debt contagion caused by 
Poland, Romania lost all access to private Western credit and had over $1 billion in overdue 
interest payments by the end of 1981.  By April, those outstanding interest payments had reached 
$3 billion.  Again, the question became who would be the country’s lender of last resort, and this 
time the IMF broke its own conditionality rules to provide the country with a “token drawing” on 
its funds to pay creditors in July.289   
 In each case, Western institutions stepped in to stem the tide, but they could not fix the 
underlying problem.  The basic challenge of structural adjustment - reducing national living 
standards and increasing production of internationally competitive products - remained the 
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responsibility of Eastern Bloc governments themselves.  Eastern Europe, Euromoney concluded, 
“had entered a deflationary period” in which the ability to implement structural adjustment 
would decide the long-term fate of the bloc.  In this matter, no one held out confidence for the 
future,290 and indeed from the declaration of martial law until the Berlin Wall’s fall in 1989, 
Comecon nations struggled to regain their former position in Western capital markets.  
 The financial history of the Polish crisis demonstrates that the reemergence of financial 
globalization after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system deeply affected the last years of 
the Cold War.  The founding of Solidarity in the shipyards of Gdańsk contributed to the end of 
the Cold War not only because it stoked the confidence of millions of Poles and other Eastern 
Europeans living under the yoke of communism, but also because it shook the confidence of the 
Western financial community in the economic viability of communism.  After the crisis broke 
out in the summer of 1980, commercial banks rethought the profitability of lending to sovereign 
countries in general, and to communist states in particular, and the Eastern Bloc lost the easy 
access to global capital markets it had enjoyed throughout the 1970s.  With limited access to the 
ever-deepening pools of global capital that took shape during the 1980s, communist states 
struggled to impose the austerity on their populations that their Western creditors demanded.  
Thus, when the end of the Cold War came in the fall of 1989, it was the result not only of 
communism’s loss of legitimacy among the peoples of Eastern Europe, but its loss of 
creditworthiness on global financial markets.  
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 “We are on a spending binge,” liberal Congressman James Scheuer (D-NY) admonished 
Reagan administration officials in the waning days of Reagan’s presidency in January 1989.  
“Through the grace and tolerance of Japan, West Germany, and a few other countries,” Scheuer 
said, “we are spending about $140 billion or $150 billion a year more than we are producing.”  
Japan and West Germany, the cornerstones of the American imperium in Asia and Europe, were 
“producing approximately $140 billion more than they are spending” and “giving that to us,” 
Scheuer said.  “They are taking our credit.  They are taking our T-bills.”291   
It was one of the most unexpected developments of the 1980s.  Ronald Reagan, who had 
risen to the presidency decrying deficit spending and promising to balance the budget by 1984, 
had overseen an explosion of the federal budget deficit during his eight years in office.  
Additionally, the United States had transformed from a net exporter of capital into the world’s 
largest debtor nation under his tenure.  The U.S. current account balance – the overall measure of 
how much capital a country imports or exports – went from a slight surplus of $8.5 billion in 
Jimmy Carter’s last year in office to unprecedented annual deficits of more than $100 billion 
under Reagan.  Mediated by the increasingly deregulated financial markets of the era, the 
citizens and governments of the United States’ wealthy allies in Europe and Japan covered these 
massive differences between national income and expenditure.  Foreign capital poured into the 
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United States during the 1980s at a rate previously unimaginable.  Attracted to the U.S. by the 
high real interest rates implemented by Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, net foreign 
capital inflows skyrocketed from $6 billion in 1982 to $165 billion in 1986.292  Like a massive 
vacuum cleaner on the world stage, the United States swallowed up the world’s capital in the 
1980s to serve the nation’s domestic and international purposes. 
Thus, an immense Reagan financial buildup underwrote the renewal of American 
prosperity at home and the projection of American power abroad.  Unlike its more famous 
counterpart, the Reagan military buildup, the financial buildup was not an intentional strategy of 
Reagan or his administration.  Indeed, at the turn of the 1980s nobody thought such a buildup 
was even possible.293  As unexpected structural gaps opened between the government’s revenues 
and expenditures as well as the nation’s exports and imports during Reagan’s first term, 
administration officials and outside observers predicted that the emerging ‘twin deficits’ on the 
budget and current account would wreak havoc on the American economy and force significant 
changes in policy.  The newly globalized economy of the 1980s defied their expectations, and 
foreign capital began its great migration to the United States to cover the gaps. 
The ramifications of the buildup for the United States and the world were profound.  
Within the United States, the financial buildup erased the traditional choice between guns and 
butter.  Reagan was able to pursue both the largest tax cuts and the largest peacetime military 
buildup in the nation’s history only through “the grace and tolerance” of foreigners.  Abroad, the 
financial buildup not only enhanced the projection of American power by funding the military 
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buildup; it also fundamentally altered the geopolitics of the decade by preventing the flow of 
capital to other countries.  The more that the United States monopolized the world’s surplus 
capital, the harder other governments found it to attract capital to their own countries.  Capital 
scarcity, in turn, altered the power relations between lenders and borrowers in the world 
economy, and significantly contributed to the many political revolutions in the Global South and 
the Eastern Bloc during the 1980s.  In this way, the Reagan financial buildup proved to be one of 
the most powerful – if also unintended – tools of American foreign policy under Reagan.  Most 
of all, the financial buildup signaled a new era of American leadership in the world.  The 
traditional direction of foreign aid was inverted, and the United States became a Foreign-Aided 
Empire: one no longer based on the provision of resources to other countries, but rather on 
foreigners’ provision of resources back to the United States. While I recognize that there is an 
important difference between capital flows based on return on investment and traditional 
intergovernmental foreign aid based on geopolitical and humanitarian considerations, capital 
inflows nevertheless represent an important form of foreign assistance.294  Since the 1980s, the 
American empire has relied on the aid of foreigners, an imperial structure that originated with the 
Reagan financial buildup.295 
                                                     
294 The economist Nouriel Roubini has famously said, “Once you run a current account deficit, 
you depend on the kindness of strangers.”  See Stephen Mihm, “Dr. Doom,” Aug. 15, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/17/magazine/17pessimist-t.html, Accessed December 28, 
2016.  
295 The budget deficits, current account deficits, and capital inflows of the Reagan years have 
generally attracted little attention among scholars of international relations history.  Charles 
Maier usefully described the United States since 1980 as an “Empire of Consumption” in Among 
Empires (Cambridge, 2006).  Although his analysis included discussion of the foreign capital 
inflows that underwrote the American empire, Maier’s conceptual focus on consumption failed 
to draw explicit attention to the fact that this new imperial formation depended on the capital of 
foreign citizens and governments.  In his various works, including “The World Economy and the 
End of the Cold War, 1970-1990” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Giovanni Arrighi 
portrayed Volcker’s interest rates and Reagan’s economic policy as an intentional “neoliberal 
  182 
 
 Figure 1: Charting the history of the U.S. current account balance as a percentage of 
GDP points to the early 1980s as a significant turning point in the structure of the 
American empire – the point at which the inflow of foreign capital became a 





The Reagan Half-Revolution 
 
“The true Reagan Revolution never had a chance,” David Stockman, a leader of the 
supply-side movement and Ronald Reagan’s first Director of the Office of Management and 
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Budget, wrote in his 1986 memoirs, The Triumph of Politics: How the Reagan Revolution 
Failed.  What started as an “ideas-based” movement to create “minimalist government” turned 
into “an unintended exercise in free lunch economics,” Stockman wrote.  The extensive tax cuts 
of Reagan’s first term combined with the inability to reduce federal spending “unleashed” a 
“massive fiscal error…on the national and world economy.”296  The Reagan Revolution, 
Stockman concluded, was “only a half-revolution – and a fiscal disaster.”297  
The budget director’s views had not always been so dour.  A central tenet of at least the 
rhetoric of supply-side economics on the eve of the Reagan administration was that significant 
income tax cuts would pay for themselves by spurring a boom in economic growth.  In the first 
budget forecast of the Reagan presidential campaign in August 1980, Stockman appeared to 
provide proof of this tenet by producing budget projections that led to a budget surplus in 1985 
of $60 billion.  These projections included Reagan’s plan for a 30% cut in income tax rates, a 7% 
annual increase in military spending, and no significant cuts in domestic spending.  Stockman 
would later call these projections “neither logical, careful, nor accurate within a country mile,” 
but he achieved such a logic-defying budget miracle because of the dramatic effect of inflation 
on tax revenue through ‘bracket creep.’  As inflation raised Americans’ incomes, it also pushed 
them into new tax brackets, which led them to pay a higher share of their income in taxes.  
Stockman’s forecasts were based on the Carter administration’s projection of 10% annual 
inflation for the first half of the 1980s.  In the summer of 1980, this was not an unreasonable 
assumption – inflation had been the scourge of the American economy throughout the 1970s, and 
Paul Volcker’s efforts at the Federal Reserve to tame it had not yet produced results.  With 10% 
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inflation, Stockman recalled, “fiscal miracles were easy.  You could have a whopping big tax cut 
and not create a deficit.  Essentially, high inflation was raising projected taxes as fast as you 
were cutting them.”298  In September, campaign economic advisors Alan Greenspan and Martin 
Anderson produced similarly pristine budget results in a “Fact Sheet” for the Reagan economic 
plan based on similar inflation numbers.  Critics ranging from Jimmy Carter in the White House, 
to George Bush in the Republican presidential primary, to Henry Kaufman, one of the leading 
wise men of Wall Street, painted Reagan’s program as inflationary “voodoo economics” that 
would increase the budget deficit.299  But with the economy still growing and inflation running at 
12.5% in 1980, Reagan’s economic team could produce budget projections to refute the charge.  
Most importantly, the more the Reagan team told itself and the country that it could cut taxes, 
increase military spending, and balance the budget, the more they (including Reagan himself) 
actually believed such a combination was possible.300  Reagan sincerely proclaimed in the early 
moments of his inaugural address in January 1981, “For decades we have piled deficit upon 
deficit, mortgaging our future and our children's future for the temporary convenience of the 
present.”  Normal citizens, he said, “can, by borrowing, live beyond our means, but for only a 
limited period of time. Why, then, should we think that collectively, as a nation, we're not bound 
by that same limitation?”301   
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Before 1981, there was little reason to think that the nation was not bound by the same 
limitation, but the changes wrought in Reagan’s first term would permanently change that.  In 
August 1981, Congress passed and Reagan signed the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA), 
which included a twenty-five percent reduction in personal income tax rates over three years, a 
significant cut in the capital gains tax, and an enormous reduction in corporate taxes through 
extremely favorable changes in depreciation rules.  Combined with financial innovations taking 
place on Wall Street, including the creation of the collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO),302 
the ERTA created two of the economic conditions that would define the Reagan financial 
buildup – an extremely hospitable environment for debt investments and an unprecedented hole 
in federal tax revenues.  In retrospect, the Reagan economic team would estimate that the ERTA 
reduced the effective tax rate on capital by 50%,303 and the Office of Management and Budget 
would calculate the cumulative federal revenue loss of the ERTA over the course of the 1980s at 
almost $1.5 trillion.304 
This decline in tax revenue only became apparent as inflation swiftly receded and the 
economy fell into recession in 1981.  Throughout much of that year, Volcker kept the Federal 
Funds rate at over 19%, which choked off the nation’s money supply and produced economic 
contraction.  While the Reagan team was working to pass the ERTA in the summer of 1981, the 
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inflation rate was falling faster than anyone thought possible – from a high of 12.4% in 1980 to 
3.9% in 1982.305    
As inflation declined and the economy ground to a halt in the fall of 1981, administration 
officials ran new budget projections for the next five years based on lower inflation and 
economic growth numbers.  They discovered, to their surprise, that the fiscal policy they had just 
enacted would produce, in Stockman’s memorable formulation, “deficits as far as the eye can 
see.”  The new projections were “horrifying,” Stockman recalled.  They “showed cumulative red 
ink over five years of more than $700 billion.  That was nearly as much national debt as it had 
taken America two hundred years to accumulate.  It just took your breath away.  No government 
official had ever seen such a thing.”306  In his diary, Reagan called the new deficit projections a 
“bomb.”  “Inflation is a tax,” he wrote with apparent surprise, “We have brought down inflation 
so much faster than we anticipated that tax revenues will be lower than we figured.”307  By 
December 1981, he had resigned himself to the fact that, “we who were going to balance the 
budget face the biggest budget deficits ever.”308   
The question on everyone’s mind at the end of 1981 was how to fund these deficits.  In a 
closed economy, economic theory posited that government budget deficits would harm the 
economy by “crowding out” private investment, driving up interest rates, and killing economic 
growth.  Reagan’s chair of the Council of Economic Advisors wrote in an internal memo, 
“foreign portfolio flows are potentially useful in easing deficit pressures in domestic markets.”309  
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But this was far from certain, and smart minds across the political and economic spectrum 
doubted its feasibility.310  William Niskanen, a member of the Reagan economic staff, speculated 
to an audience at the American Enterprise Institute in December 1981 that “the opportunity to 
import capital” might save the economy from the harm of the deficits.  But, he recalled, “the 
audience rejected the plausibility of net capital inflows in any substantial magnitude.”311   
 
The Birth of the Foreign-Aided Empire 
 
  Throughout 1982, the question of the role of foreign capital in funding the U.S. deficits 
lay dormant as the economy entered the deepest recession of the postwar period.  Real output 
contracted by 3.3% and unemployment reached a peak of 10.8% in 1982.312  In this context, 
there was little danger of government borrowing crowding out private investment because there 
was little private investment to speak of.  The now widespread recognition that the ERTA would 
lead to unprecedented deficits led to loud political debates and a number of “piecemeal” efforts 
to close the gap between revenues and expenditures, including the Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA).313  But, importantly, neither Republicans nor Democrats 
were forced to fold on any of their core commitments:  Reagan never retreated from the income 
tax cuts at the heart of the 1981 bill or the military buildup that bore his name, and Democrats 
never retreated from their defense of the major transfer payments (Social Security and Medicare) 
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at the heart of the American welfare state.  These piecemeal efforts consequently reduced the 
deficit by far less than the ERTA had added to it.  Thus, despite much bluster and consternation, 
the long-term picture remained basically unaltered through the remainder of the Reagan 
administration: a structural budget deficit and current account deficit funded by foreign capital. 
Volcker’s interest rate policy held the keys to unlocking access to this surplus foreign 
savings.  Throughout Reagan’s first term, the Fed chairman was highly critical of the 
administration’s fiscal policy, and publicly warned that the growing budget deficits were forcing 
the Fed to keep interest rates high to fight the inflationary pressures of fiscal policy.  Yet, 
ironically, it was precisely Volcker’s high interest rate policy that attracted the foreign capital to 
the United States.  Volcker himself recognized this reality, and keeping rates high enough to 
attract foreign capital became an important element of Fed policy.   All of the leading members 
of the Federal Reserve in the 1980s later admitted that attracting foreign capital played a key role 
in their decision making.  Vice Chairman Preston Martin explained, “We have to have rates high 
enough to bring in the capital.  All of us have to consider the government financing very 
seriously…. Keeping the rates high enough to attract foreign investors is the argument that’s 
made and it’s an awareness we all had.”  Governor Charles Partee concurred.  “We let conditions 
exist that made U.S. interest rates look favorable compared to foreign investments,” he said.  
“We stayed above the foreign interest rates so that foreign investors would be attracted to the 
U.S.”314  Japanese investors were by far the most important to attract.  Martin explained how the 
Federal Reserve set interest rates just high enough to attract Japanese capital, “How are the 
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Japanese reacting to these new thirty-year securities?” he asked his colleagues.  “What mattered 
was the Japanese.  Are the Japanese buying? Fine, if they are, we don’t have to raise rates.”315  
By 1983, the Japanese, along with their West German, French, Swiss, and British 
counterparts, were indeed buying US government bonds.  $85 billion in foreign capital entered 
the United States in 1983, followed by $103 billion in 1984, $129 billion in 1985, and $221 
billion in 1986.  The federal budget deficit in these years ranged from $208 billion in 1983 to 
$221 billion in 1986, so by the end of this period, foreign capital inflows were directly or 
indirectly covering all of the federal government’s borrowing.316  Because the capital inflow 
prevented the government from crowding out domestic private investment, interest rates also 
remained much lower than they otherwise would have been – 5% lower by one estimate.317  The 
global attraction to U.S. investments also dramatically increased the exchange value of the 
dollar.  While this development severely hurt U.S. exporters, it kept inflation low and boosted 
domestic consumption as the economy started to grow after the recession.   
By 1984, Reagan administration officials had caught on to the new realities of the global 
economy, and they actively sought to exploit them.  In the May 1984 Yen/Dollar Agreement, the 
Treasury Department successfully negotiated a liberalization of the Japanese capital market with 
the Japanese government that made untapped Japanese surplus saving available for U.S. 
investment.  In the summer of that year, the 30% withholding tax on interest earned by foreigners 
on U.S. investments was eliminated in 1984 to further increase foreign inflows.  By the fall, the 
Treasury had initiated a “foreign-targeted securities program” to issue U.S. government debt 
                                                     
315 Ibid.. p. 561. 
316 Krippner, Capitalizing on Crisis, p. 189, n. 34. 
317 Stephen Marris, Deficits and the Dollar: The World Economy at Risk (Washington, 1985), p. 
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specifically to Japanese and European investors.  Treasury officials went on the road to make 
their case, travelling to Tokyo and Frankfurt to promote the purchase of U.S Treasury bills.  
Such efforts led one analyst to give the Reagan Treasury leadership the title of “the greatest bond 
salesmen in history.”318  In the sheer size of the debt they issued, they no doubt had earned the 
designation. 
 In a clear sign of the changing financial landscape, Reagan called for the United States to 
become “the investment capital of the world” in his 1985 State of the Union Address.  Clearly, 
he and the country had changed dramatically since he had questioned how long the nation could 
live beyond its means in his first inaugural.  In the same year, Business Week summed up the 
transformation in economic thinking and practice that had occurred since Reagan had taken 
office.  “The nation’s financial foundation was supposed to shake when a growing economy 
collided with the huge budget deficit,” the magazine noted in February 1985, “Credit demand 
would soar, driving interest rates into the stratosphere.  Instead…the experience of the last two 
years [has] shown that the U.S. does not have a closed system.  Inflows of foreign capital can 
sustain private and public borrowers alike.”319  In other words, foreign capital was now 
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The Global Crowding Out 
 
 Just because the US economy was not suffering from crowding out effects did not mean 
that the crowding out was not happening.  It only meant that it was not happening in the United 
States.  As economists and policymakers adjusted their frame of reference to accommodate the 
reality of the Reagan financial buildup, they realized that it was the rest of the world, rather than 
the private American economy, that was suffering from the unprecedented government 
borrowing.  As William Niskanen, the Reagan administration economist, wrote in 1988, “there is 
evidence that government deficits have substantial ‘crowding out’ effects somewhere in the 
world.”320  That ‘somewhere’ was the Global South and the Communist Bloc.  It is not possible 
to detail the global reach of the crowding out in the confines of this paper, so I will take two 
examples, one general and one specific, to point to the effects of U.S. borrowing on the rest of 
the world.   
 First, at the general level of the global economy, the International Monetary Fund’s 1985 
Global Economic Outlook noted the historic change in capital flows between developed and 
developing nations that had unfolded since the beginning of the decade.  “The emergence of the 
United States as an unprecedentedly large international borrower,” the authors wrote, “is a 
dominant feature of the present pattern of global capital movements.  In 1984, absorption of 
surplus savings by the United States dwarfed the combined absorption by all developing 
countries.”  The authors warned that “continued credit demand from the United States on the 
present scale could severely limit expanded access to external financial resources by many 
developing countries, even if they manage their own economies satisfactorily.”   
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The consequences of the explosion in First World debt for the developing world were 
enormous, the Fund economists wrote.  In the years ahead, developing countries would “have no 
option but to adjust their absorption of external goods and services to levels dictated by their 
actual export earnings and the greatly reduced net financial flows that remain available to them.”  
What did this mean in plain language?  Developing countries had no choice but to impose 
domestic austerity and greatly reduce their level of imports. Net capital flows to developing 
countries would only return to their former levels “as government credit demands recede in the 
United States and other industrial countries.”  The persistence of such credit demands from 
developed nations “would seriously set back the development efforts of [developing] countries.”  
Lower net capital flows, the authors wrote, “would limit the scope for gains in the productivity 
and real income” of developing countries.321  Through the rest of the decade, the credit demands 
of the United States did not significantly recede, and consequently, the developing world 
suffered tremendously.  It is strictly true in theory and roughly true in practice that international 
current accounts must balance out at a global level.  For every current account deficit, there must 
be a current account surplus.  International finance in the 1980s was Newtonian: every action 
produced an equal and opposite reaction.  The equal and opposite reaction to the Reagan 
financial buildup was “The Lost Decade” of development in the Global South. 
 The 1985 Global Economic Outlook also discussed how the new demand for credit from 
industrial nations had caused an important shift in power relations between debtor countries in 
the Global South and their creditors.  Because developed countries were now universally running 
large annual budget deficits, the Fund viewed an increase in foreign aid to the developing world 
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as unlikely.  Indeed, Fund economists foresaw a decline in First World development assistance.  
The authors therefore believed that new capital for developing countries would “probably have 
to come mainly through a revival of confidence and of lending operations on the part of private 
banking institutions.”  Renewed capital flows could not “proceed at all unless the potential 
lenders gain confidence in the policies of borrowing countries.”322  In other words, because the 
sources of public finance from developed countries had all but dried up, it was up to the 
governments of developing countries to make their domestic policies attractive to the interests of 
private foreign capital.  In a world of capital scarcity, lenders hold enormous power over 
borrowers because they are the gatekeepers of capital.  By creating the environment of capital 
scarcity that prevailed for the Second and Third Worlds in the 1980s, the Reagan financial 
buildup helped bring these power relations between lenders and borrowers into existence.  
The general dynamics of the global economy described by the Fund come alive in the 
specific example of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the 1980s.  I have chosen East 
Germany both because it is a country that I have researched relatively well, and because it is 
what could be considered “a hard case.”  If the Reagan financial buildup had significant effects 
on the GDR, a country relatively isolated from the global capitalist economy compared to the 
nations of Latin America or Africa, then we can be reasonably certain that it also had significant 
effects on the Global South.  During the 1970s, the GDR had joined the many nations of the 
socialist bloc and the Global South that borrowed heavily on global capital markets to minimize 
the effects of the 1973-74 oil crisis.  By 1978, the country was so dependent on Western capital 
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that East German financial officials were writing to the party leadership, “Ensuring the solvency 
[of the country] largely depends on the willingness of capitalist banks to grant us loans.”323   
 The Reagan financial buildup fundamentally altered the willingness of global capital 
holders (including banks) to funnel capital to the GDR.  Werner Polze, the President of the East 
German Foreign Trade Bank, laid out the new international financial environment for the party 
leadership in an early January 1984 memo.  Over the previous two years, he wrote, “capitalist 
banks showed no readiness to increase their credit volumes” to the GDR.  He blamed U.S. 
borrowing for the banks’ intransigence.  “The government deficit in the US amounted to $207.2 
billion in the 1982/83 fiscal year,” he detailed, “and is estimated to be about $200 billion in the 
next two years.”  Funding the U.S. budget deficit, Polze reported, would “require” the United 
States to borrow “about $660 billion U.S. dollars in the years 1984-1986.”  The Reagan financial 
buildup was, in short, crowding East Germany out of global capital markets.   
Polze foresaw no end to heavy American borrowing on global capital markets because 
such borrowing served the interests of American power.  “The United States will continue to 
pursue its high-interest policy in the future without any regard for its allies, since it corresponds 
to the interests of U.S. imperialism.  With the help of the high interest rate policy and the 
associated higher real interest rate of the U.S. dollar against other capitalist currencies, capital 
flows are being directed to the USA,” he wrote.  “In this way, U.S. imperialism succeeds in 
financing a considerable part of the rearmament [the Reagan military buildup] through 
international capital markets and limits the risks of the rearmament resulting in inflation.”324  As 
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the head of a communist central bank, it is not surprising that Polze focused on how capital 
inflows were funding the Reagan military buildup.  In reality, American borrowing was funding 
much more than just the rearmament; it was also funding all manner of domestic spending, tax 
cuts, and private debt accumulation in the United States.  But the fundamentals of Polze’s 
perspective were correct, and observers from around the world shared his viewpoint.  West 
German Prime Minister Helmut Schmidt famously decried in 1981 that U.S. economic policy 
had led to “the highest interest rates since Jesus Christ” and to an outflow of capital from Europe 
to the United States.325  Harold MacMillan, the former British Prime Minister, viewed U.S. 
policy in a similar vein, as he told the House of Lords in a 1984 speech.  “In a word Reagan (to 
reverse Keynes) has called in the resources of the old world in order to finance the expansion of 
the new.”326  America’s European allies constantly criticized U.S. fiscal policy, but the Reagan 
administration refused to alter course because it had discovered that tight monetary policy and 
loose fiscal policy served its domestic and international interests quite well.327 
Polze’s policy recommendation to the leadership mirrored precisely what the IMF’s 1985 
Global Outlook deemed “the only option” for developing countries – to reduce their demand for 
borrowed capital by creating export surpluses.  “The long-term high interest rate policy of the 
USA,” Polze concluded, “makes it necessary to reduce [the GDR’s] total borrowing through 
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export surpluses and to use credits, as a rule, only for economically viable projects.”328  As I 
have argued elsewhere, the GDR would spend the rest of the 1980s trying and failing to produce 
export surpluses to pay down its debt, and its ultimate inability to do so would lead to a debt 
crisis, the opening of the Berlin Wall, and the collapse of the state in 1989.329 
 
A Hidden Hand of American Power 
 
Trying to achieve export surpluses may sound like a fairly innocuous policy goal, but for 
the debtor nations of the 1980s it was a process fraught with social and political implications.  
For these nations, export surpluses most often had to be achieved through drastic reductions in 
imports and the imposition of domestic austerity.  On the orders of the International Monetary 
Fund, such austerity programs occurred throughout the Global South – most prominently in Latin 
America - during the 1980s as the region dealt with the Sovereign Debt Crisis.  Political 
revolution, usually in the form of democratization, followed in austerity’s wake.  Samuel 
Huntington titled this global phenomenon “the third wave” of democratization in a 1991 book by 
that name.330  While Huntington listed changes in global capital flows as one among many 
causes of the third wave, recent scholarship has drawn a stronger connection.  In his book, Latin 
America’s Cold War, Hal Brands concludes that the democratization of Latin America in the 
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1980s “was a product of debt” and the austerity programs that arrived with the debt crisis.331  As 
I have briefly suggested here and develop more fully in my dissertation, a similar process 
unfolded in the Eastern Bloc and resulted in the revolutions of 1989.  Deprived of global capital 
and facing their own debt crises by the late 1980s, Poland and Hungary implemented IMF 
austerity programs and tried to legitimize them through Round Table democratization.  Fearing 
the consequences of an IMF austerity program, the GDR sought to escape its own debt crisis in 
the same year by trying to ransom the opening of the Berlin Wall for billions of Deutsch Marks 
from West Germany.  Put very simply, democratization in Eastern Europe was, too, a product of 
debt.332 
Debt is only a tool of power in international relations when a country has no new capital 
with which to service it.  It is here that the international power of the Reagan financial buildup 
lies.  In crowding the Global South and the communist bloc out of global capital markets, 
American borrowing on global capital markets subjected countries in these regions to the 
stringent demands of their creditors.  In this way, the failure (in David Stockman’s sense of the 
term) of the Reagan Revolution within the United States contributed to revolutions abroad during 
the 1980s.  Many of these revolutions were extremely favorable to U.S. national interests, and 
thus, the Reagan financial buildup proved to be a powerful, if unintended, source of American 
influence in the 1980s.   
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Bystander to Revolution: 
 





 In the final days before martial law was declared in Poland in December 1981, the 
leadership of the Soviet Union was unsure whether General Wocjiech Jaruzelski would indeed 
go through with his plan to crush Solidarity.  In the Politburo, Soviet officials discussed their 
options.  They had already funneled billions of dollars and millions of barrels of oil into the 
country to prop up their ally in Warsaw, but the crisis had only worsened.  Now they were left to 
consider how they would react if Jaruzelski failed to move ahead with martial law.  Would they 
use the Red Army to crush the “counterrevolution” as they had done in Hungary in 1956 and 
Czechoslovakia in 1968?  Yuri Andropov, the formidable head of the KGB and acting leader of 
the Politburo in the absence of the increasingly infirmed Leonid Brezhnev, provided the 
definitive answer.  “We don’t intend to introduce troops into Poland,” he said, “That is the 
proper position, and we must adhere to it until the end.  I don’t know how things will turn out in 
Poland, but even if Poland falls under the control of ‘Solidarity,’ that is the way it will be.”  
Intervention, he said, would “be very burdensome for us.  We must be concerned above all with 
our own country and about strengthening the Soviet Union.  That is our main line.”333 Days later, 
Jaruzelski saved the Politburo from reckoning with the implications of Andropov’s conclusion 
when he declared martial law and ordered tanks to roll into Warsaw. 
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Almost a year later, the Hungarian government found itself on the brink of bankruptcy, 
and sent Minister Jozsef Marjai to Moscow to plead for economic support.  Without more oil or 
hard currency from the Soviet Union, Marjai told the Soviet leadership, his country would face a 
crisis.  After forging their resolve in the Polish Crisis the previous year, Andropov and his 
colleagues were unpersuaded, and they stoically turned away the Hungarian plea.  Left empty 
handed, Marjai could only warn his Soviet comrades about the costs of their inaction.  “We are 
talking about the fate of the socialist system,” he said.  The system could easily “collapse.” For 
this to happen, he said, the Soviet Union “simply has to do nothing.”334   
 Seven years later, the Soviet Union stood idly by as its Eastern European empire 
collapsed in 1989.  Observers watched in wonder, and asked how it was possible that one of the 
world’s superpowers could peacefully accept its own defeat in an imperial and ideological 
rivalry that had spanned the forty-five years since the Second World War.  The outcome was so 
puzzling and unexpected that it forced practitioners of international relations theory, whose job it 
was to predict these sorts of seismic shifts in the international system, into a period of deep soul 
searching.335  By the twenty-year anniversary of the fall of the Soviet empire, the outcome was 
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no less astonishing and finding an explanation remained as pressing as ever.  Summing up the 
conundrum, one author wrote in 2009, “No other empire in history had ever abandoned its 
dominions so quickly or so peacefully.  Why did the Soviet Union surrender without a fight?  
And why at the end of the 1980s?”336 
 Answers to these questions have overwhelming focused on the influence of one man, 
Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, and his ideas of reform, perestroika (restructuring) 
and glasnost (opening up).  Indeed, with only a few exceptions, the study of the fall of 
communism has been anchored in the study of men and ideas.337  Scholars have argued that a 
small band of Soviet reformers, led by Gorbachev himself, mobilized a radical set of ideas, 
including a policy of non-intervention in the affairs of other states, disarmament, non-violence, 
and a respect for electoral democracy and human rights, to end the Cold War and push Eastern 
Europe into revolution.  Mark Kramer, perhaps the leading historian of the collapse of 
communism, has long argued that there was a “spillover” from perestroika into Eastern 
Europe.338  Others speak of Gorbachev “coaxing” and “pushing” Eastern Bloc leaders to reform 
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or “export[ing] perestroika to Eastern Europe.”339 In these histories, a small group of unique 
individuals at the top of the Soviet hierarchy channeled radical ideas to bring about the end of the 
Cold War and the revolutions in Eastern Europe.  These were revolutions that they did not 
foresee or intend, but they endorsed them nonetheless because of their idealistic vision of the 
world.  Without these reformers and their ideas, the prevailing viewpoint holds, the collapse of 
communism would not have happened.  
 But what if Marjai was right?  What if the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe 
depended only on the Soviet Union doing nothing?  What if it was not Gorbachev’s action, but 
rather his inaction, that was the primary Soviet influence on the revolutions of 1989?  The 
current scholarship already recognizes Gorbachev’s inaction as decisive, but again attributes it to 
the power of his “new thinking.”340  But what if the reasons for Gorbachev’s inaction were not to 
be found in his idealistic acceptance of the principles of state sovereignty, democracy, and 
human rights, but rather in the economics of the Soviet empire he oversaw? 
 There is good reason to explore such a line of argument further.  At a high-profile 
conference of leading Cold War scholars and diplomatic practitioners as far back as 1998 
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devoted to exploring the end of the Cold War, most participants spent their time discussing the 
importance of Gorbachev and his ideas.  After hours of discussion, Georgy Shakhnazarov, a man 
who had become intimately involved with these issues as Gorbachev’s assistant for Eastern 
European affairs, told the assembled group, “We are underestimating the economic factor.”  
Rhetorically he asked, “When did our leadership become ready…to release the leash by which 
Moscow held its satellites?”  At a certain point, he said, the economic “burden became too much 
for the Soviet Union; we could not carry it anymore.”341  Almost twenty years after his 
comments, scholars have finally begun to follow Shakhnazarov’s lead, but fundamental aspects 
of the economic dimensions of Soviet policy remain unexplored.342  Most importantly, the 
scholarship continues to view perestroika as radical revolution in Soviet foreign policy rather 
than an outgrowth of a long-term evolution in Soviet thinking about the material burden of 
empire.  This chapter will argue that in foreign policy, particularly with regard to Eastern 
Europe, perestroika was an extension of the “main line” first articulated by Andropov: 
Gorbachev and the rest of the Soviet leadership sought to jettison the material drain of the Soviet 
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empire in order to prioritize Soviet domestic interests.  They accepted changes in the political 
identity of satellite governments out of the fear that military, political, or economic intervention 
would only add to their imperial burden.  
 The domestic history of perestroika reinforced this change in Soviet thinking.  As 
Gorbachev completed an evolution in Soviet policy abroad, he launched a revolution at home.  
Perestroika and glasnost upended seven decades of thought and practice within the Soviet Union.  
By 1989, these changes had unambiguously achieved two results, both of which only provided 
further reason for the Soviet leadership not to intervene in the revolutions of that year in Eastern 
Europe.  First, the economic reforms had set the country on a path to bankruptcy, and second, 
Gorbachev had succeeded in introducing a system of limited electoral democracy in order to gain 
momentum and legitimacy for his economic reforms.  Domestic bankruptcy and democracy 
loomed over Soviet decision-making in 1989, and further deterred the Soviet leadership from 
intervening to stop the revolutions of that year. 
 Thus, this chapter proceeds just as Soviet officials during this period did: primarily 
focused on the domestic context, and considering foreign policy only in light of how it would 
affect their domestic interests.  It traces the history of how the Soviet Union came to the brink of 
bankruptcy and democracy, and it considers foreign policy as a subplot of this domestic story.   
The results of such a history stand in contrast to the prevailing historiography on “the Soviet 
Factor” in the collapse of communism: Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership were 
bystanders to, rather than causes of, the revolutions of 1989.  Within the Soviet Union, 
Gorbachev authored a revolution within the Soviet Union, but abroad he wrote the final chapter 
of a book begun by his predecessors.  He and the rest of the Soviet leadership, including those 
who despised Gorbachev’s domestic revolution, accepted the revolutions of 1989 not out of a 
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newfound commitment to Western-style democracy and human rights, but because they were no 
longer capable of bearing the economic burden of empire.  In 1982, Jozsef Marjai had warned 
Andropov that the socialist system would collapse if the Soviet Union did nothing.  Because of 
the economics of that system, nothing is precisely what the Soviet Union did.  
 
The Reasons for Reform 
 “We can’t go on living like this,” Mikhail Gorbachev told his wife Raissa the night 
before he was elected General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on 
March 11, 1985.  Everywhere one looked in the Soviet Union the need for change beckoned, but 
for Gorbachev, the signs coming from the Soviet economy were the most troubling.  National 
income growth, which Soviet economists used as “the summary indicator of the country’s 
economic development,” had declined from 41% during the 8th Five Year Plan in the late 1960s 
to 17% during the 11th Five Year Plan in the early 1980s.343  Although they did not broadcast it 
widely, Soviet economists knew that the economy had not grown at all from 1979-1982 during 
the global economic recession, and it had recovered to achieve at most a 1.5% real growth rate 
since then.344  Far from catching up with the capitalist West, the Soviet economy had clearly 
stagnated, and things were about to get even worse.  Soviet economic growth had always been 
based on an extensive growth model – increasing inputs of labor, capital, and energy to produce 
economic growth without increasing the efficiency of their use.  But by the mid-1980s, new 
inputs to add to the economy were dwindling.  Because the population size had stagnated, there 
                                                     
343 A.G. Aganbegyan, “The Economic Strategy of the 27th CPSU Congress: Social Aspects,” 
Rabochiy Klass i Sovremennyy Nov-Dec 1986, translated in JPRS-UEA, March 1987, pp. 1-16, 
quotes at 2. 
344 Anders Aslund, Gorbachev’s Struggle for Economic Reform (Ithaca, NY, 1991), p. 71. 
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were no more Soviet laborers to add to the workforce, and because new Soviet oil and natural 
gas reserves were harder and more expensive to extract than earlier energy deposits, there was 
less economic growth to be gained from increases in energy supplies.  As the leading Soviet 
economist and advisor to Gorbachev, Abel Aganbegyan explained in 1986, “Up to now, as is 
well known, we have been developing with a predominance of extensive factors – by bringing 
new resources into production: fixed productive capital, capital investments, fuel and raw 
materials, and manpower.”  But this model had “no future” because growth in “productive 
resources” – new labor and energy resources – had stagnated in the early 1980s, and “in the 
[nineteen] nineties the growth of productive resources will hardly increase.”345 
 On top of this faltering economic foundation, Soviet leaders had built an ever more 
expensive global imperial system.  The Soviet Union’s status as the leader of the worldwide 
communist movement and military counterweight to the United States placed unique economic 
burdens on the Soviet state: massive defense spending to counterbalance “the capitalist 
imperialist threat” and the subsidization of the Soviet satellites with energy and raw materials.  
Parity in military forces and nuclear arms with the United States had come at the cost of creating 
a massive military-industrial complex that trapped the nation’s best people in the production of 
the destructive tools of war.  Now that he was General Secretary, Gorbachev could see that the 
military-industrial complex consumed forty percent of the Soviet budget, and military production 
comprised twenty percent of GDP.346  Unlike the West, the planned economy had failed to turn 
its advances in military technology into useful civilian products, so the military industrial 
complex remained a world unto itself within Soviet society.  The confidential excesses of the 
                                                     
345 Soviet labor and energy inputs grew at 0% and 8% respectively from 1981-1985.  
Aganbegyan, “The Economic Strategy of the 27th CPSU Congress: Social Aspects,” 3. 
346 Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 215. 
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military budget were matched by the very public drain of Soviet blood and treasure in 
Afghanistan, where Gorbachev’s predecessors had sent the Red Army to prop up the country’s 
socialist government in 1979, only to get bogged down in a costly and unwinnable war against 
the mujahedeen insurgency. 
 Since the 1970s, the Soviet leadership had paired economic subsidy with military might 
to secure their leadership of the socialist world.  Through the Council of Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA or Comecon), the Soviet Union had provided its allies with energy and raw 
materials at prices far below the world market.  The 1973-74 oil crisis had exploded the world 
price of all manner of raw materials, but to aid their Eastern European allies, the Soviet 
government had established what was known as “the Bucharest formula,” whereby all prices 
within CMEA would be determined based on an average of world market prices from the 
previous five years.  Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, this meant that the Soviet Union 
provided the world’s most valuable natural resources, especially oil and natural gas, at 
significantly reduced prices.  Under this system, Soviet economists calculated that their country 
had given the Eastern Bloc 37 billion rubles in subsidies from 1976 to 1985.347   
 Impenetrable superpower defense and massive imperial subsidy had come at the expense 
of the Soviet population.  By the mid-1980s, the age-old Soviet promise that socialism would 
one day deliver a better material life than the capitalist West had long rung hollow.  Now it was a 
challenge to simply keep pace with the rest of the world.  American intelligence agencies 
                                                     
347 I hope to do more research on this figure in Russian archives and to establish for myself what 
I think the ruble/dollar exchange rate would have been over this period, but I don’t know enough 
yet.  Officially the ruble was slightly stronger than the dollar, so this would be over 40 billion 
dollars.  I actually think this understates the subsidy, but I have to confirm in the archives.  
Memorandum for Files, “USSR: CMEA System,” Sept 10, 1990, File 3, Box 3, Office of 
Managing Director - Alan Whittome Papers (Whittome Papers), IMF Archive, Washington, D.C.  
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estimated Soviet consumption per capita to be one third of the United States and 55% of Japan 
and Western Europe in 1985.  In fact, the intelligence community concluded, the Soviet Union 
“was more comparable to countries such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina” in per capita 
consumption than the developed West, and the Soviet position relative to the rest of the world 
had “not improved in two decades.”  Because the quality of the products produced in the Soviet 
Union was “particularly poor,” the intelligence agencies concluded that even such ominous 
quantitative measures of the Soviet standard of living “probably overstat[ed] the Soviet 
position.”348  Worse than its position in the global economy, the Soviet Union also had the lowest 
standard of living among its own socialist allies.  In 1987, Gorbachev would report with great 
frustration to the Politburo, “In real standard of living, we are now in last place among the 
CMEA countries.” In the early 1970s, their standard of living had at least been “higher than 
Bulgaria and Romania,” but no longer.349  As the rest of the world’s citizens had reaped the 
rewards of economic growth, Soviet citizens had been left behind, and their plight made a daily 
mockery of enthusiastic official proclamations regarding the achievements of socialism.   
 This was the system that Gorbachev inherited – economically stagnant, imperially 
overburdened, and underperforming for its own citizens.  The Soviet model of extensive growth 
had reached a plateau and would only produce worse results in the years ahead.  To fix it, 
                                                     
348 US Intelligence Agencies (Unidentified), “The Soviet Economy in Global Perspective,” 
March 1989, Box 3, End of the Cold War Collection, NSA, pp. 1-21, quotes at 7. 
349 A. S. Chernyaev, Georgy Shakhnazarov, and Vadim Medvedev, eds., V Politburo TsK KPSS 
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Gorbachev turned to two concepts, uskorenie (acceleration) and perestroika, to make economic 
growth faster and more efficient.  To continue to meet its imperial and defense obligations while 
also delivering a higher domestic standard of living, Soviet officials believed they needed to 
accelerate the nominal annual growth rate from three to four percent in the 1986-1990 Five Year 
Plan.  This growth target was ambitious and, in retrospect, too optimistic, but Gorbachev felt that 
the weight of the country’s foreign and domestic responsibilities necessitated such ambition.  
Two months after taking office, he told East German leader Erich Honecker that if the Soviet 
economy did not achieve a 4-5% growth rate in the late 1980s, “cutbacks in either the social 
program or national defense would have to be made.  But how could you go on if you cut social 
expenditure or have to tell the people that you can no longer guarantee their security?”  This was 
a “serious conclusion,” Gorbachev told Honecker, which now was “the basis of all work in the 
USSR.”350  As acceleration pushed growth targets higher, perestroika pushed the economic 
model from extensive to intensive growth.  Abel Aganbegyan, Gorbachev’s economic advisor, 
framed the challenge that lay ahead.  The “only alternative” to the current system was to move 
the economy to a model of intensive development that would require “making the rise in 
efficiency of social production the main source of development.”  Intensive growth – the 
production of more outputs with fewer inputs – was now “the key problem of our future 
development.”351   
                                                     
350 “Vermerk über ein Gespäch des Genossen Erich Honecker, Generalsekretär des ZK der SED 
und Vorsitzender des Staatsrates der DDR, mit Genossen Michail Gorbachow, Generalsekretär 
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  Despite the firmness of his conviction and the ambition of his ultimate goal, the new 
General Secretary’s initial policies fit squarely within the tradition of Soviet economic 
management.  His close aide Anatoly Chernyaev has written that when Gorbachev entered office 
he “had some ideas about how to ‘live better,’ but they didn’t go beyond the limits of the existing 
order.”352  He and his aides were wildly optimistic that the Soviet economy would take off after 
some tinkering to investment allocation, wage policy, and quality control systems.  They 
believed that vast “reserves” of societal potential had gone untapped during the staid and 
incompetent Brezhnev years, and all they had to do was activate them.  “We can really obtain 
rapid returns,” Gorbachev told a Leningrad audience in May 1985, “if we put all organizational, 
economic and social reserves into operation.”  Over his first two years, he introduced a series of 
measures to increase investment at an annual rate of 4.9% rather than the 3.5% annual increase 
of the 1981-1985 period and focus new investment on “retooling” Soviet factories with modern 
equipment in order to increase labor productivity.  In 1986, the government introduced a decree 
on the wage system, which aimed to increase the incentive to work by basing wages on 
performance to a greater degree and to make it slightly easier for managers to fire poor 
performing employees.  To improve the quality of Soviet products, the government created a 
new agency, Gospriemka, to enforce quality control measures that aimed to bring 95% of Soviet 
products up to “the highest world standards” by 1991-93.353  By the end of 1986, however, these 
traditional measures had run aground, as bottlenecks in the machine production industry 
hampered the planned investment increases, and Gospriemka took to its new quality control role 
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with vigor and rejected vast amounts of industrial output as inadequate.  Although the wage 
increases put more rubles in Soviet pockets, there remained few consumer goods to buy with 
their newfound wealth, so workers were forced to save their money and failed to increase their 
productivity. 
 These setbacks certainly did not help the Soviet Union’s economy, but they were not 
what brought it into crisis.  Rather three developments during Gorbachev’s first two years in 
office dramatically altered the fiscal and financial health of the Soviet Union and forced the 
leadership to reach for more radical solutions.  First, almost immediately after Gorbachev’ 
entered office, the party leadership launched a strict anti-alcohol campaign aimed at increasing 
labor productivity by decreasing drunkenness.  It was, as one author has written, “a full-fledged 
disciplinary campaign of the old style,” and Gorbachev fully supported it.354  Between 1955 and 
1979, alcohol consumption per person doubled in the Soviet Union.  By the mid-1980s, people 
regularly showed up to work drunk or failed to show up at all.  90% of missed workdays were 
caused by drinking.355  Gorbachev believed a more productive workforce would only come with 
a soberer workforce.  So, in May 1985, the government dramatically increased alcohol prices and 
penalties for public drunkenness, cutting back the hours and venues at which alcohol could be 
sold, and launching a massive propaganda campaign against drinking.  The Finance Minister 
politely advised the new General Secretary that the campaign would cause a drop in state budget 
revenue of 51.5 billion rubles in over the next five years, and leave Soviet citizens with few 
things to spend their money on (alcohol, sadly, was one of the few consumer goods that was 
readily available).  Gorbachev was undeterred.  “There is nothing new in what you have just 
                                                     
354 Aslund, Gorbachev’s Struggle, p. 78. 
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said,” he responded.  “Each of us knows that there is nothing to be purchased [with] the cash 
held by the people.  But you are not proposing anything other than forcing people to drink.”356  
With that, the debate soon ended. 
 Official sales of alcohol plummeted.  By 1988, they were half their 1980 level.  But 
bootlegging quickly filled the gap left by the fall in official sales, and workplace drunkenness 
failed to decline as workers simply turned to the black market to meet their drinking habits.357  
The social effects of the campaign were modest, but the economic effects were dramatic. With 
much less alcohol in stores, Soviet workers had even fewer goods to buy with their wages and 
even less reason to work harder.  And with the precipitous decline in official alcohol sales, tax 
revenue from alcohol sales collapsed as predicted, and a gaping hole opened in the state budget.   
 World markets compounded Gorbachev’s burgeoning budgetary problems.  From 
November 1985 to March 1986, the price of oil on global markets declined by 66%.  The 
leadership grappled with the implications of this decline immediately.  On July 11, 1986, Prime 
Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov informed the Politburo that the decline in the oil price had cut export 
earnings by 9 billion rubles and added four billion dollars to the country’s hard currency debt.358  
In response, the government increased oil exports to the world market and slashed hard currency 
imports to stabilize the balance of payments, but this left less fuel for domestic production, 
exacerbated domestic bottlenecks in production, and prohibited the import of Western consumer 
goods to incentivize Soviet workers to greater productivity. 
                                                     
356 “Session of the Politburo of the CC CPSU,” 4 April 1985, in “Perestroika in the Soviet 
Union: 30 Years On,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 504, 
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB504/, Accessed December 4, 2016, p. 11-2. 
357 Asland, Gorbachev’s Struggle, p. 79. 
358 Politburo, p. 58. 
  212 
 As the changing winds of the world economy battered the Soviet economy from the 
outside, disaster struck in the Soviet heartland to cripple it from within.  Just after 1 A.M. on 
April 26, 1986, the No. 4 light water nuclear reactor at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in 
Ukraine exploded, sending flames over one kilometer in the air and launching a massive cloud of 
radioactive dust in the direction of Europe.  The Chernobyl accident was a catastrophe of many 
dimensions – human, ecological, and ideological.  Over time the radiation it released would kill 
8,000 people and affect the health of 435,000 more. The secretive and disorganized response to 
the crisis shook Gorbachev’s confidence in the soundness of the Soviet system, and the human 
and ecological toll sharpened his fear of nuclear war.359  The economic dimensions of the crisis 
were not the most important, but they were immediate and dramatic nonetheless.  A little more 
than a month after the accident, Gorbachev was already calculating the cost at three billion 
rubles.360  Over time, the costs would only escalate. 
 With the setbacks compounding, Gorbachev and the Politburo sounded like they were 
overseeing an escalating crisis, not a budding economic revolution, by the fall of 1986.  On 
October 30th, Gorbachev told his colleagues that the country had “lost 13 billion rubles in 1985 
from the fall of export prices,” which had left an annual deficit of 5 to 6 billion rubles.  In the 
past two years, imports had declined from 24 to 13 billion rubles.  “Never before in the history of 
the country has this happened,” he rued.  Yegor Ligachev, the man who would soon lead the 
conservative resistance to Gorbachev, could only agree with the General Secretary at this stage.  
He pointed out that in 1984, 54 billion rubles of vodka had been sold, but in 1985 that figure had 
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dropped to 11 billion rubles.  “The financial economy of the country is in a very difficult 
situation, to say the least,” he said.  Gorbachev concurred that the nation’s finances were “in a 
dire position,” and blamed it on “the fact that a gap has emerged between wages and labor 
productivity.”  There was “more money than goods in the country,” he said.  “The situation has 
us by the throat. People have a weakened interest in work. In fact, if there is nothing to buy with 
the money, why earn it, why work? This is a very serious matter.”   
 At this moment of crisis, Gorbachev professed convictions to his comrades that would 
come to define his entire foreign and domestic policy.  First, with regard to perestroika, “the 
main thing [is] do not retreat, do not waver, no matter how difficult, hard, [or] painful” the tasks 
might be.  Where others may have turned back, he committed to press onward.  Except in one 
area, the most difficult of all.  “Some demand price increases.  We will not go down this road.  
The people have not received anything from perestroika.  It has not been felt financially.  And if 
we raise prices, you can imagine the political consequences – it would discredit perestroika.”  
Instead, the country needed to return to economic health by paring down its international 
commitments. “We must be extremely careful in matters of assistance to other countries.”  There 
should be “no promises to anyone.”  Military spending was also too high and hurting perestroika.  
“The peculiarity of this five-year plan is that it is necessary to combine ‘both guns and butter.’ It 
is difficult, very difficult.”361  In order to produce more butter, Gorbachev believed, the country 
would have to produce fewer guns.  To this task, the General Secretary devoted the entirety of 
his foreign policy. 
 
 
                                                     
361 All preceding quotes from Politburo, p 89-90. 
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Peace Dividends 
 “Perestroika,” Gorbachev writes in his memoirs, “would have been impossible 
without…the creation of propitious international conditions.”362  From his very first day in 
office, Gorbachev held to this fundamental view.  His foreign policy was meant to serve his 
domestic plans, and those plans required a de-escalation of the Cold War and a scaling back of 
the nuclear arms race.  Scholars have long recognized this.  The debate, instead, has centered on 
the question of whether new ideas or the material conditions of the Soviet Union pushed 
Gorbachev to view foreign policy in these terms.  So far, the power of ideas has dominated this 
debate.363 Evidence clearly suggests, however, that Gorbachev’s ideas derived directly from his 
perception of the Soviet Union’s weak and worsening material capabilities relative to the 
capitalist system.  
 As the chapter “The Reagan Financial Buildup” detailed, the Reagan administration had 
launched a massive military build up in the early 1980s in the hope of bankrupting the Soviet 
Union.  The most talked about program in this buildup was the Strategic Defense Initiative 
(SDI), which planned to use the United States’ advantages in science and technology to develop 
a missile defense system capable of shooting down incoming Soviet nuclear weapons, thereby 
erasing the threat of mutually assured destruction that had kept the peace in the Cold War since 
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the 1950s.  Many doubted that such a system was even scientifically possible, but everyone 
agreed that it would be economically and technologically difficult for the Soviet Union to 
develop a similar program.  Reagan had funded this buildup by borrowing hundreds of billions of 
dollars on global capital markets, particularly from investors in West Germany and Japan.   
 For the Soviet Union, no such recourse existed.  If it wanted to match the United States 
by devoting even more resources to its already massive military-industrial complex, it would 
have to take resources away from investment in its civilian economy and the standard of living of 
the Soviet people.  Although Reagan had found a way to eliminate the choice between guns and 
butter for the United States, it remained an all too real consideration for the Soviet leadership. 
From these structural considerations, Gorbachev formulated the foundational goal of his foreign 
policy: to prevent a new stage of the nuclear arms race with the United States.  “We are at the 
limits of our capabilities,” he told the Politburo in October 1986.364  Therefore, “the most 
important task is to disrupt the new phase of the arms race.”  If a new stage began, it would be “a 
loss everywhere, especially wearing down of our economy. And this is unacceptable.” This led 
him to a simple, yet vital conclusion, “If we impose a second stage of the [arms] race, we will 
lose!”365   
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 Gorbachev pursued this strategic conviction with tactical brilliance and a great deal of 
ideological innovation and rhetorical flourish.  First, he recognized that his policy would get no 
where unless it was implemented by people who shared his vision.  So, one of his first acts as 
General Secretary was to replace the long-standing Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko 
with Eduard Shevardnadze, the First Secretary of the Georgian Communist party.  Shevardnadze 
had no foreign policy experience, but Gorbachev had come to know and trust his vision as they 
rose through the ranks of the Soviet bureaucracy together.  The General Secretary also brought 
on Anatoly Chernyaev and Georgy Shakhnazarov as personal aides for foreign and security 
affairs.  Lastly, he elevated Alexander Yakovlev, a leading voice of reform, to the Politburo and 
tasked him with leading the party ideology department.  From that perch, Yakovlev was to 
oversee the entire process of glasnost to open the Soviet public sphere, but his influence 
extended far beyond that role to the formulation of foreign policy as well.  Together, these four 
would be Gorbachev’s primary support as he pursued his disarmament agenda with vigor. 
 It began in Geneva, Switzerland.  In November 1985, Reagan and Gorbachev converged 
on an eighteenth-century chateau on the shores of Lake Geneva to respectively size up the 
opposition and present their first proposals.  In what would become a recurring (and increasingly 
untenable) theme of his public diplomacy, Gorbachev stridently denied to his American 
counterpart that the Soviet economy was in any serious trouble and rejected the idea that the 
arms race could bring the Soviet Union to capitulate.  Both sides agreed that strategic nuclear 
weapons should be dramatically reduced, but Gorbachev irritably told the president that he 
would never countenance reducing the Soviet Union’s defenses as long as SDI existed.  The next 
day, Reagan made a formal proposal to reduce each side’s offensive nuclear stockpile by 50% 
and cutback both sides’ capabilities in other categories of weapons as well.  Gorbachev again 
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assented, but only if Reagan committed to abandon SDI.  This Reagan would not do, so the 
conference ended short on results.  Nevertheless, both sides felt it had been a success merely for 
having established a rapport between the two leaders.366 
 Gorbachev regularly talked about the importance of “the human factor” in his superpower 
diplomacy with Reagan, and scholars have generally followed his lead to argue that the personal 
relationship between the two leaders was essential to ending the Cold War.367  While there is no 
doubt that the warm working relationship between the two leaders was important, it is difficult to 
avoid the fact that all the breakthroughs in arms control were based on strategic concessions 
from the Soviet Union that stemmed from the desire to ease the military burden on the Soviet 
economy.   
The history of the Soviet policy in 1986 makes this clear.  Motivated by the knowledge 
that “industry devoted to the military would have to be cutback to fill shops with goods 
consumers needed,”368 Gorbachev announced a plan in January 1986 that called for a three-stage 
process to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2000.  The Americans rejected the proposal 
because it failed their longstanding litmus tests in any disarmament talks: it said nothing of the 
massive Soviet advantage of conventional military forces in Europe, it failed to independently 
address the intermediate-range nuclear missiles that the Soviets had deployed in Europe since the 
late 1970s, and it continued to insist that the British and French nuclear arsenals be included in 
the mutual reductions.  These had all long been nonstarters for the American side, and they had 
held up arms negotiations since the early 1980s.   
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So, Gorbachev gave ground.  Over the spring and summer of 1986, as the oil price 
collapsed, alcohol tax revenues evaporated, and Chernobyl demonstrated the costs and 
consequences of nuclear fallout, the General Secretary matched the drama of his public call for 
complete nuclear abolition with a series of specific concessions.  The British and the French 
arsenals would not have to be included, he told the Americans.  Conventional forces could be 
considered as part of a general reduction and balancing of the two blocs’ armed forces.  Most 
important of all, laboratory research on SDI could continue, so long as the Americans renounced 
external testing and deployment.369  For Gorbachev, the reasoning behind these moves was clear.  
“If we don’t back down on some specific, maybe even important issues, if we won’t budge from 
the positions we’ve held for a long time, we will lose in the end,” he told the Politburo, “We will 
be drawn into an arms race that we cannot manage.  We will lose, because right now we are 
already at the end of our tether.”370  
 The trail of concessions led to Reykjavik, Iceland, where Gorbachev and Reagan held 
their second summit in October 1986.  Before leaving, Gorbachev sketched out his strategy to 
the Politburo, “The United States is interested in keeping the negotiations machine running idle, 
while the arms race overloads our economy.  Therefore, we need a breakthrough; we need the 
process to start moving.”371  Boldness would beget breakthroughs, he thought, so he flew to 
Iceland with a proposal to immediately halve both sides strategic nuclear weapons and to remove 
all intermediate range missiles from Europe.  When Gorbachev presented his proposal to the 
Americans, they were elated at the extent of the concessions.  Over the course of two days of 
negotiations, the two sides approached the precipice of an agreement to eliminate all nuclear 
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weapons over the next ten years, but it foundered once again on the Strategic Defense Initiative.  
Reagan could not bring himself to permanently cede the right to deploy the system, and 
Gorbachev was unwilling to sign away all of the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons without such 
an assurance.372  The two sides left Iceland stunned at how close they had come to agreement and 
acrimonious about the mutually perceived absurdities that had kept them apart.   
 Three weeks later, the Politburo gathered for their October 30th meeting where all agreed 
that the economy was “in a dire position” and lamented “the necessity to combine both ‘guns and 
butter.’”  Reykjavik had now taught them that if they wanted to escape the burden of guns in 
order to produce more butter, they would have to make more concessions in the years to come. 
 
Shedding Dead Weight 
 By the mid-1980s, a tension lay at the heart of the Soviet Union’s relations with its 
socialist allies.  As Gorbachev told the Politburo on August 14, 1986, the Soviet Union’s 
imperial role was “to extract raw materials and supply them to other countries.”  Under the 
Bucharest formula in effect since 1975, they had supplied these raw materials at highly 
subsidized prices in exchange for globally uncompetitive finished products – machinery, basic 
electronics, automobiles – from bloc countries.  This system artificially propped up the USSR’s 
allies, but it made the Soviet Union’s economy weaker with each passing year.  It left the Soviet 
Union, according to Gorbachev, “harnessed into slave labor.”373  The clearest solution to this 
problem would have been simple: jettison the system under which intra-bloc trade was 
determined under the Five Year Plans and settle trade within Comecon in hard currencies at 
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world market prices, as was standard practice in the rest of the world.  But every Soviet leader 
since the 1970s had known that doing so was sure to bring about one thing - the collapse of their 
empire in Eastern Europe.  The poor quality of Eastern European finished products would be 
immediately exposed as soon as Soviet consumers were no longer forced to buy them because of 
the dictates of the Five Year Plans, and the relative price of Soviet oil would increase 
dramatically, destroying the extensive economic growth models of all the Soviet Union’s 
satellites.  Forcing bloc countries “to pay in [hard] currency,” Gorbachev recognized, “would be 
catastrophic for them.”374  
 Alongside the basic structure of economics in the bloc, the Soviet experience in the 
Polish Crisis and its aftermath had provided the leadership with two other uncomfortable yet 
unavoidable facts.  First, the entire bloc had sovereign debt problems with the West that the 
Soviet Union was financially powerless to resolve.  Second, bloc countries’ attempts to solve 
their debt problems through austerity were likely to lead to social crises.  The Polish Crisis had 
proven that the material burden of supporting allied governments during such crises was 
expensive, and that military intervention to preserve socialism would only add to the material 
burden.  The Soviets had poured $4 billion into Poland during its time of crisis to no evident 
effect, and the leadership had ultimately ruled out military intervention because of its prohibitive 
cost, even if that meant accepting a Solidarity led government.375 
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 Thus, even before Gorbachev became General Secretary, these economic structures and 
historical experiences left few in the Soviet leadership with an appetite to spend further blood 
and treasure propping up Eastern European governments.  Gorbachev’s overarching conviction 
that his foreign policy should serve the domestic goals of perestroika removed this appetite 
altogether.  From this emerged the “new thinking” for Eastern Europe.  As with other areas of his 
policy, Gorbachev’s “new thinking” for Eastern Europe partially stemmed from his genuine 
belief in the primacy of “shared human interests” over “class interests,” his respect for human 
rights, and his general aversion to the old “administrative methods” of Soviet governance.  But 
the cornerstones of the new policy were derived not from the inclinations of idealism, but from 
the realities of economics: the Soviet Union would gradually campaign to move the bloc toward 
mutually beneficial trade; it would encourage bloc countries to solve their debt problems, but 
would provide no further economic aid or preferential treatment to bloc allies under any 
circumstances.  Most of all, it would repeal the Brezhnev Doctrine and respect the sovereignty of 
bloc countries because it could no longer bear the burden of empire.376  
 At his first meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, the Warsaw Pact’s highest 
governing body, in October 1985, Gorbachev analyzed the bloc in economic terms and pushed 
for fundamental changes to its economic system.  He began by telling his fellow General 
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Secretaries, “The possibilities of the Soviet Union supplying raw materials in exchange for 
finished products from other countries are exhausted.”  He reminded his colleagues that “the 
Soviet Union fulfills a special responsibility for the defense of socialism,” and that this “burden 
inevitably has an effect on the country’s economic and social tasks.”  By many indicators “the 
Soviet Union lagged behind other socialist countries in standard of living.”  Going forward, the 
Soviet leadership would meet its economic “obligations” to its allies, but it would now also aim 
for “balanced foreign trade” in the bloc.  “It would “approach the socialists’ countries problems 
as it did its own” and “expected the same” in return. 
 That did not yet mean that he had resigned himself to a weakening of the socialist bloc.  
Far from it.  “The West attaches great importance to dividing the socialist countries,” he said.  
Therefore, “a strengthening of nationalism” in the bloc “would be very negative for the Soviet 
Union and the [socialist] community.”  Instead, he called on the parties to renew their 
commitment to the deeper integration of the bloc by establishing direct connections between 
enterprises in their countries.  He was “surprised that in Romania and Hungary there were dozens 
of joint enterprises with capitalist firms,” but few within CMEA.  “Apparently,” he said, “it is 
easier to come to terms with capitalist firms than it is with socialist ones.”  Integration also 
needed to be promoted through the “price and financial systems” of the bloc. “We are all on a 
single ship, on the same team” he told them. “The course and the goal are clear.  Now it is 
necessary to consistently work to solve problems.”377  In place of commodity exchange, 
economic integration was now the only way forward, Gorbachev was telling his allies.   
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 As with every other area of policy, the drop in oil prices in late 1985 and early 1986 did 
not aid this work.  Just as the five year average made the intra-bloc oil price rise more slowly 
than the world price when oil prices were rising, it now slowed the fall of the intra-bloc price as 
well.  At first glance, this should have increased the value of Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union 
by making oil exports to the bloc relatively more valuable than exports to the world market.  At 
nominal prices, this is what happened.  Bloc countries paid prices above the world market for 
their oil from the Soviet Union from 1987 onwards.  But real prices told a different story.  The 
average selling price of a Soviet barrel of oil within the bloc in 1987 (the first year that the new 
lower world prices were factored into the price average) was 22 rubles per barrel.  At the official 
dollar/ruble exchange rate, this valued the oil at $32 a barrel, 74% higher than the world market 
price.  But because the world valued a ruble much less than the Soviet Union did, the actual 
dollar/ruble exchange rate was much lower than the official exchange rate, and thus the price of 
the oil was much lower as well.  At the market ruble/dollar exchange rate of $.60 to a ruble,378 
Soviet oil was only $12 a barrel, quite a bargain compared to the world market price of $17.  As 
prices stayed low in the late 1980s, the Comecon price kept dropping too, reaching roughly $10 a 
barrel in 1988 at market exchange rates.  As the staff of PlanEcon wrote in 1988, “It is hardly 
surprising that no Eastern European country [has] walked away from ‘overpriced’ Soviet oil – 
it’s not such a bad deal after all.”379  Indeed, it was a great deal for Eastern Europe because on 
top of the cheap oil at the real exchange rates, the declining price at the official exchange rate 
meant that the Soviet Union fell into annual trade deficits with its allies in the late 1980s.  With 
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Gorbachev’s professed desire to have “balanced trade” within the bloc, these deficits, rather 
absurdly, put pressure on Soviet officials to increase their exports to the bloc, even as they (and 
every Eastern European official) knew that the Soviet Union was already providing more 
resources to Eastern European countries than they ever would at world market prices.  A switch 
to hard currency trade would have solved this problem, but Soviet officials were all too aware of 
the consequences that such a move would bring. 
 Needless to say, the Soviet leadership was not pleased with this development, and in 
1986 they began to vent their frustration in the Politburo.  In June, Gorbachev lamented that the 
bloc continued “to be at the commodity exchange stage.”  It needed to “transition from purely 
commercial relations to broad cooperation in production,” he wrote in a policy paper distributed 
to the leadership.  “A radical perestroika of the economic mechanism must be realized, which 
should result in…the broad development of direct connections among associations, 
enterprises…and joint firms.”380  By August, he was making his comment about the country 
being harnessed into slave labor and telling his colleagues that they had “lost their way” in 
economic relations with the bloc and “needed to clean this mess up.”381  
 Hanging like dark clouds over their considerations were the bloc’s debt problems with 
the West.  As the Poles worked to join the IMF in the summer of 1986, Gorbachev sensed danger 
but felt powerless to stop it. “If we don’t hold Poland, then we can’t keep the GDR,” he told the 
Politburo.  “We grumble about the Poles’ relationship with the IMF.  But what can they do?  The 
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debt is $30 billion.”382  By October, Ryzhkov was worried and resigned.  The bloc was “crawling 
to the West – into a trap.”  In Poland, “everyone can see what has happened there. Hungary is 
now on the brink.  Bulgaria stopped in front of a precipice. Saved by us.”  The Soviet Union was 
offering “a way out – their integration,” he said, but “they do not want it.”  They just wanted 
“electronics” and “delicacies” from the West, while “we keep supporting them with coal, oil, 
[and] metal.”383 
 All of these economic dynamics led directly to “new thinking” in politics.  1986 was the 
year that Gorbachev began to advocate letting the bloc countries deal with their problems 
themselves, no matter the political consequences.  In February, he told the Politburo that in the 
Soviet Union’s relations with its allies “instructions, guidelines, teaching - all of this has to go 
into the past.”384  He told a large gather of Foreign Ministry officials, “the time when we helped 
[the socialist countries] to form their economy, their parties, and their political institutions is 
past…. we cannot lead them by the hand to kindergarten as we would little children.”  There 
were “objective interests,” he continued, “which require the socialist countries to be united.”  But 
these interests were “not fulfilled on their own automatically.  More and more, their fulfillment 
comes by means of economic interests.”  Therefore, “mutual economic gain” needed to be the 
basis of socialist “cooperation, consolidation, and unity” going forward.385  In July, he told the 
Politburo, “What went on before could not continue.  The methods that were used in 
Czechoslovakia [in 1968] and Hungary [in 1956] now are no good; they will not work!”  The 
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economy was now “the most important” factor.  “Here there is a major lag in coordination and 
integration.  And this hinders, and will continue to hinder, all other aspects of relations.”  The 
CPSU’s influence could “only be ideological, only through example!  Everything else is an 
illusion.”  They could no longer use “‘administrative methods of leadership’ with our friends” 
because “this kind of ‘leadership’…would mean carrying them on our back.”386 
 Lightening the imperial load became the main theme of a meeting of the heads of state of 
the Comecon countries in Moscow on November 10-11, 1986.  After beginning the meeting by 
laying out the achievements of socialism in a pro forma fashion, Gorbachev quickly added, “but 
we wouldn’t be true communists if we didn’t also recognize the problems facing our countries 
and candidly analyze them.”  He proceeded to do just that.  In the second half of the 1970s and 
early 1980s the development of the socialist system slowed, Gorbachev said.  “The scientific-
technological revolution opened new horizons” in economic production, but the bloc had not yet 
combined these new possibilities “with the advantages of the socialist planned economy.”  Bloc 
countries had “delayed” structural changes in their economies that would lead to intensive 
economic growth.  Most had tried to import technology from the West on credit.  But, 
Gorbachev said, “today one can say that it was false to think that our countries’ problems could 
be solved through the widespread use of loans and technology from the West.”387 
 “We lived on credit,” he told the assembled leaders.  “In the last ten to fifteen years, 
consumption has grown faster than labor productivity in many countries, which means that 
[national] income has simply been ‘eaten up.’”  He recognized the importance of “the social 
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sphere” in communist societies that had, after all, been “created in the interests of the workers.”  
But socialism could not continue to promise more than it could actually deliver.  The problem 
with living on credit, he told his colleagues, was that “sooner or later one must pay for it."388 
 Whenever the debt bill came, the Soviet Union would not be covering it.  Beginning with 
Andropov’s decision not to intervene in Poland in 1981 or provide further economic support to 
Hungary in 1982, the Soviet leadership had rejected all policies that would add to its Eastern 
European burden.  Gorbachev’s speech was the culmination of these efforts.  He discussed the 
Soviet burden in detail.  The expenditure required “to maintain the military-strategic balance 
with imperialism” was “not small,” and “nine tenths of it was covered by the Soviet Union.”   In 
the area of energy and raw materials, “Soviet deliveries…almost entirely fulfill the needs of the 
brother countries.”  But “just maintaining the current level [of deliveries], would require the 
investment of enormous and growing sums in extraction.”  The Soviet Union “will do everything 
possible to maintain the current level of deliveries,” Gorbachev said, but it expected “the 
participation of the brother countries” in the investment in new energy extraction projects.  On 
top of defense and energy, the Soviet Union had also provided the socialist bloc with levels of 
economic aid that it could not sustain – 47 billion rubles in the last Five Year Plan, including 35 
billion rubles alone for the poorest members of Comecon, Cuba, Vietnam, and Mongolia.  All of 
this limited “the possibilities for solving social problems and raising the standard of living” 
within the Soviet Union.  In what was now a familiar reminder, Gorbachev said, “over the last 
two decades the Soviet Union had lagged behind other Comecon countries in per-capita income 
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and this gap continues to grow.”389  Andropov had concluded in 1981 that Soviet leaders needed 
to “be concerned above all with [their] own country and about strengthening the Soviet Union.”  
Now Gorbachev was putting his mentor’s principle into practice. 
 The Soviet Politburo had aired “a wide-ranging exchange of opinions,” Gorbachev said, 
and had decided “to transform relations in the socialist community…to coincide with the spirit of 
the times.”  This meant putting “the entire system of political relations between the socialist 
countries on the foundation of equality and mutual benefit.”  From now on, the “indispensable 
principles” of relations among socialist countries would be “the independence of each party, their 
right to sovereign decision-making about problems of development in their own country, and 
their responsibility to their own people.”  Most importantly, no county would now “claim a 
special role in the socialist community.”390 
 The Brezhnev Doctrine was dead.  Describing the meeting to the Politburo in the days 
that followed, Gorbachev told the group, “we opened the way for the radical reconstruction of 
collaboration within the community.  Everything will be based on self-reliance.”391  The days of 
intervening to ‘protect’ socialism, as the Brezhnev Doctrine mandated, were over.  The Soviet 
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Union “should hold more firmly to the principle of each communist state being responsible for 
what happens in its country,” he said to the Soviet leadership two months later.  “We need this.  
It is in our interest not to be loaded down with responsibility for what is happening, or could 
happen, there.”392  
 This history of when and why the Brezhnev Doctrine was repealed has important 
implications.  Contrary to those who argue that its repeal stemmed from Gorbachev’s unique 
commitment to self-determination, democracy, non-violence, and human rights, it is clear that 
the decision was the culmination of a long-running campaign by the collective Soviet leadership 
to shed the material burden of empire. A policy of non-intervention in the Eastern Bloc 
conformed to Gorbachev’s idealistic plans for glasnost and perestroika within the Soviet Union, 
but it also aligned with the economically driven understanding of Soviet national interests that 
had been coalescing within the Soviet leadership since the Polish Crisis.  In fact, combined with 
Andropov’s decision to foreclose the possibility of any military intervention in Poland in 
1981,393 it is possible to conclude that for economic reasons most Soviet leaders in Gorbachev’s 
position would have withdrawn the Soviet Union from its responsibility to “protect” socialism by 
the mid-1980s.  Scholars have long assumed that without Gorbachev’s “exceptional” view of the 
world, the revolutions of 1989 would not have been possible because the Soviet Union would 
have intervened to stop them.  This has it backwards.  By the mid-1980s, it was the policy of 
intervention in Eastern Europe, rather than non-intervention, that was difficult for Soviet leaders 
to justify.  Completing the work that his predecessors started in 1981, Gorbachev withdrew the 
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Soviet Union from its leading role within the socialist bloc to focus on improving the material 
prosperity of Soviet citizens at home.  
 The same held true for the war in Afghanistan.  Since his days on the Afghan 
Commission within the Politburo before he was General Secretary, Gorbachev had spoken out in 
favor of finding a political solution to end the conflict and withdraw Soviet forces.  He had 
received the support of many within the Soviet armed forces for doing so.  After becoming 
General Secretary, he made ending the war an early priority and told the Afghan communist 
leadership that it would have to begin to rely on its own forces in the summer of 1986.  In the fall 
of 1985, he called for a speedy withdrawal of Soviet forces within the Politburo, and heard no 
objection from the conservative Defense Minister Sergei Sokolov or Andrei Gromyko, one of the 
original advocates of the invasion in 1979.  By 1986, withdrawal was a consensus issue within 
the leadership.  In June, when the Politburo agreed to withdraw 8,000 troops from the conflict, it 
was Gromyko declaring “This is not our war,” and Gorbachev maintaining that “the result must 
not look like a shameful defeat.”  By November, the entire leadership agreed with Chief of the 
General Staff Sergei Akhromeev, who concluded, “We have lost the struggle.”  They discussed 
plans to pull all Soviet troops out of Afghanistan over the next two years.  In assenting to 
withdrawal, Gromyko admitted that the initial invasion had been a mistake.  Shevardnadze gave 
the Foreign Ministry’s approval, and Viktor Chebrikov provided the KGB’s.  Gorbachev said he 
hoped to turn Afghanistan into a “friendly, neutral country,” but was concerned that the United 
States might “creep into Afghanistan.”  Akhromeev convinced him that this was highly unlikely.  
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The war had become an unwinnable drain on Soviet resources, the entire leadership now agreed, 
and the armed forces needed to come home.394 
 
Bankruptcy and Democracy 
They would come home to a financial crisis that was accelerating without relent.  The 
budget deficit reached 6.2% of GDP in 1986, and it was funded entirely by “borrowing” from 
Soviet citizens’ savings held at Gosbank, the Soviet state bank.395  In reality, this meant printing 
rubles and monetizing the deficit – a surefire recipe for inflation and, in the Soviet system of 
fixed prices, widespread shortages of basic goods.  As he looked to 1987, Gorbachev professed 
himself “very worried” about the year ahead.396  And indeed, by springtime, the Finance Minister 
was informing the Politburo, “The financial situation has reached the point of crisis.  Inflationary 
processes have begun.”  State budget losses from the decline in alcohol sales and the oil price 
now totaled 30 billion rubles, he told them.397  Moreover, government subsidies to consumer 
retail prices had set the country on a path to bankruptcy.  The government paid nearly one-third 
of the cost of every loaf of bread, over half the cost of every gallon of milk, forty percent of the 
cost of butter, and seventy percent of the cost of every kilogram of beef.398  “If nothing changes,” 
he said, “the amount of subsidies for food alone will rise to 100 billion rubles by 1990.”399   
The state’s promises to consumers were only one side of the coin.  Its promises to 
producers – the vast network of state enterprises, collective farms, and the military-industrial 
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complex - were the other.  Gorbachev drew the Politburo’s attention here.  “For the last fifteen 
years, 25-30% of enterprises have not been meeting their income targets.  And yet they continue 
to ‘work’ at the expense of the state.”400  This was the so-called ‘soft budget constraint’ that the 
Hungarian economist Janos Kornai had famously argued was the source of all the ills in centrally 
planned economies.  A more pervasive version of the capitalist concept of “too big to fail,” soft 
budget constraints in state socialist economies meant that enterprises did not fear failure; they 
always knew that the state would save them from bankruptcy.401  What Kornai had demonstrated 
in theory, Gorbachev now observed in practice.   
Inefficiencies permeated the economy.  In the wage system, the process of “levelling” – 
whereby an enterprise’s best employees earned little or nothing more than its worst – “was a 
terrible scourge,” Gorbachev said, that killed initiative and allowed free riders to survive on the 
work of high achievers.402  Additionally, the low price of fuel and raw materials gave enterprises 
no reason to use their resources more efficiently.  The Soviet state’s guarantee of the right to 
work and its unwillingness to push underperforming enterprises into bankruptcy meant that few 
workers were ever fired.  Enterprises “are going bankrupt,” Politburo member Vitaly Vorotnikov 
reiterated, “and the state is taking them on its back and keeping them afloat.”403 
This predicament was not new.  Indeed, as Kornai’s work had argued, it was the essence 
of the command economy.  What made this moment different was the fiscal crisis of the state.  
Socialism’s promises to consumers and producers were no longer just hampering productivity; 
they were now also an unsustainable burden on the state budget.  Because the Soviet Union 
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published notoriously poor and misleading statistics, this fact was not widely known, even within 
the Politburo.  Gorbachev changed this, and the Finance Minister informed the Politburo that the 
budget deficit was 80 billion rubles.  21 billion rubles had been printed by Gosbank to help 
balance the budget, but it was not clear where the other 60 billion rubles would come from.  
Members were stunned, and their shock aided Gorbachev’s push for reform.  The numbers “were 
tantamount to a revelation,” Gorbachev later wrote, “because nobody knew about the use of 
credit as an item of income in the budget.”404  Fiscal crisis was, in a Marxist-Leninist sense, now 
an objective reality that both conservatives and reformers could agree was a significant problem. 
Like its Eastern European allies, the Soviet Union was now living on credit, albeit the credit of 
its own printing presses rather than Western banks.  The Leninist question on the minds of Soviet 
leaders was “What is to be done?”  
Gorbachev sought refuge in radicalism.  In the first half of 1987, he explicitly 
transformed perestroika into a campaign of “radical reform” to the economy.  The reform rested 
on a cornerstone that was only vaguely hinted at because of its social, political, and ideological 
implications: incorporating the pursuit of self-interest into socialism. “The chief question in the 
theory and practice of socialism,” Gorbachev told the country’s top leadership at the June 1987 
Central Committee Plenum, “is how, on a socialist basis, to create more powerful stimuli for 
economic, scientific, technical, and social progress than under capitalism.”405  Capitalism had 
four extremely powerful stimuli that produced such progress.  For corporations, there was the 
prospect of profit and the threat of bankruptcy; for individuals, there was the prospect of higher 
wages for increased productivity and the threat of unemployment for poor performance.  On 
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ideological and moral grounds, state socialism had labeled all four tools of capitalist exploitation 
and had used the state to protect enterprises and individuals from their exploitative power.  Now 
Gorbachev sought to redefine them as “powerful stimuli” and reincorporate them into the Soviet 
economy.   
To do so, he would have to get the Communist Party and the state bureaucracy out of the 
economy.  So, severely curtailing the state’s role in the economy became the second, and much 
more explicit, goal of the radicalized reform.  Under the command economic system, the state 
planning commission, Gosplan, set ten to fifteen thousand indicators of production each year to 
guide every aspect of the economy, and then “line ministries” that dealt with specific sectors of 
the economy would determine production targets for each enterprise in the economy.  Enterprises 
received their allocation of investment and production inputs from the ministries, and the 
ministries were their main customers.  Over time, this system had hardened into a series of power 
bases and patronage networks within the ministries, with each becoming its own fiefdom within 
the Soviet economy.  Rather than operating on any principles of economic utility, the economy 
ran on social and political connections – what Russians called blat.406  “Whoever determined 
targets and allotted resources was seen as tsar and god, potentate and benefactor,” Gorbachev 
later wrote.407  If he wanted to activate the “powerful stimuli,” Gorbachev knew he would first 
have to slay the gods and tsars of the command economy. 
His weapons of choice were glasnost and democracy.  At every step of the way, 
Gorbachev paired his economic reform proposals with increasingly bold moves to democratize 
Soviet society.  At first, this fell within the realm of increasing socialist democracy – expanding 
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worker control over enterprises and holding competitive elections between CPSU candidates at 
the local level – and allowing great freedom of the press.  But by 1988, with the economic crisis 
deepening and reform still not taking hold, Gorbachev jettisoned the confines of socialist 
democracy and embraced Western-style competitive elections at a national level.  As with so 
many other areas of his policy, Gorbachev truly believed in the righteousness of glasnost and 
democracy, but that was not why he implemented them.  As he said during one of the many 
Politburo discussions about reform in the spring of 1987, “This is not Bulgaria and this is not an 
academic debate, it is life itself on the scale of the vast country.”408  In the life of the General 
Secretary of Communist Party of the Soviet Union, ideas were only applied if they aided the 
acquisition and maintenance of political power.  Gorbachev implemented glasnost and 
democracy because he believed he could attain more political power through democracy than 
authoritarianism. 
Indeed, the first reason democracy and the freedom of expression emerged in the Soviet 
Union was because of their potential to coerce.  Alexander Yakovlev, the driving force in the 
Politburo behind democratization, wrote to his colleagues, “There is sometimes a 
misunderstanding: when people talk about democracy, they presuppose some amorphous notion, 
like liberalization, the weakening of certain norms, and so on.  However, in reality, democracy is 
discipline, the strengthening of the rule of law, and the development of self-discipline.”409  
Gorbachev echoed his chief of ideology.  “We have embarked on the path of democracy,” 
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Gorbachev told the Politburo in June 1987, because “it provides the strongest grip on power.”410  
At that point, he was only talking about democratization in enterprises and within the CPSU.  
But in his memoirs, Gorbachev writes that he applied much the same thinking to the decision to 
move to full electoral democracy.  He recalls an article published in the Soviet press in 1989, 
which argued that radical economic reform could only be implemented under “the reliable shield 
of strong authoritarian power.” He writes, “For me and my circle this argument was no 
revelation.  We were not so simple as not to recognize” that “significant transformations could be 
carried out” only with “a firm grip on the reins of power.”  He knew that he would need political 
power “to overcome the inevitable opposition to proposed reforms,” and the most power was to 
be found in glasnost and democratic politics.411   
This was the reasoning that underlay his groundbreaking speech at the January 1987 
Central Committee Plenum.  There he announced a radical expansion of glasnost to include the 
freedom of expression as well as elections within enterprises and between CPSU candidates at 
the local level.  “We think that electiveness, far from undermining, on the contrary, enhances the 
authority of the leader,” he told the party leadership.  The Soviet system had always been built 
on “control ‘from above,’” he said, but now it was “of fundamental importance” to increase 
“control ‘from below.’”  This way enterprise and local party officials would “constantly feel 
their responsibility to and dependence on the electorate.”  The activities of trade unions, the 
supreme and local soviets, and other public organizations needed to be expanded because they 
had “immense resources for control.” Glasnost needed to be expanded, he said, because it was “a 
powerful lever” for improving performance at all levels of society and “an effective form of 
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control by the whole population.”412  If democracy made enterprise managers, local party bosses, 
and eventually the entire government and Party leadership accountable to the population, public 
scrutiny would coerce these authorities into implementing economic reform. 
The centerpiece of this reform arrived in the summer of 1987 with the Law on State 
Enterprises.  The law mandated that beginning in 1988, all Soviet enterprises would become 
independent from the state and operate on what was variously called self-financing or full-cost 
accounting.  Enterprise independence transferred control over enterprises from the state to the 
enterprises’ workers, who were now empowered to elect their management.  It also attempted to 
activate the four “powerful stimuli” of market economies – corporate profit, wage differentiation, 
bankruptcy, and unemployment – to produce economic and social progress.  The “central idea” 
of the law, Prime Minster Ryzhkov told the Supreme Soviet, was “to comprehensively satisfy the 
demands of the national economy…at the lowest possible cost.”  Because the enterprise would 
retain its profits, he said, it would now have “an economic interest” in ensuring the “highest 
returns” and “maximum yield” on its capital.413  Gorbachev addressed the issue of wages.  “Each 
worker’s actual wages should be made closely dependent” on productivity and “should not be 
restricted by any limit.”  Those were the carrots, but there were also hints of sticks.  If an 
enterprise consistently failed to maintain solvency “it would be possible to raise the question of 
reorganization or terminating the enterprise’s activity.” And as enterprises became more 
efficient, “the scale at which workers are being released will grow considerably.”414  
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The echoes of capitalism were easy to hear, and the parallels were not lost on the General 
Secretary.  On May 7, 1987, he recounted for the Politburo his discussions with Western 
European leaders, most prominently Margaret Thatcher, about economic reform in their 
countries.  “They too are carrying out a perestroika,” he said.  They “act harshly, rudely, the 
capitalist way, regardless of how it affects the workers.  They move ahead because they see that 
there is nowhere else to go.”  The Soviet perestroika was different, he said, because it was based 
on “other ideas.”  Nevertheless, he told the Politburo that, like Thatcher and the others, “we also 
cannot waver...we need to ensure the mobility of labor.”415   
But Gorbachev was not the Iron Lady, and perestroika was not Thatcherism.  Despite the 
tough talk, the social impact of perestroika rightly made its advocates both ideologically and 
politically queasy.  Two issues in particular – price adjustments and unemployment – were both 
economically necessary and politically impossible in equal measure.  Because the new system 
would rely on markets rather than bureaucracies to allocate resources and capital, prices needed 
to be adjustable to reflect market value.  If they were not, the reformers knew, the enterprise 
reform would fail.  “The question of prices is principle, fundamental,” Gorbachev told the 
Politburo in May 1987 as they prepared the Law on State Enterprises. “If it’s not solved, there 
won’t be cost accounting for enterprises, nor self-financing, and perestroika will not work.”416  If 
prices did not “correspond with reality,” then they would not “have any mechanism of economic 
governance,” he said.417  But he could barely finish recognizing their economic necessity before 
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lamenting their political consequences.  “How hard it is to start a new policy with price 
increases!”  If the leadership announced a price reform, “commotion would erupt.  And people 
will ask, ‘Why do we need all this?”418 
The same held true for unemployment.  In April, conservative Politburo member Vitaly 
Vorotnikov had complained to his colleagues, “surplus labor everywhere is beyond all measure, 
including the defense industry.”  Gorbachev concurred. “Foreigners…are very interested in how 
we will solve the problem of unemployment,” he told the Politburo. “We know how they have 
solved that problem; how will we?  This is the crucial question.” The scale of the potential 
problem daunted him. “In some republics millions of ‘superfluous’ people do not work in 
production.  And if new cuts add to these millions, then will we feed them all for free?”419  He 
deferred the question until the 1990s, saying the “question of what to do with those who are 
released as a result of enterprises working in new ways” would have to be dealt with under the 
13th Five Year Plan.420 
As a result, perestroika’s advocates both privately and publicly maintained the illusion 
that perestroika could be socially painless.  Gorbachev told in the Politburo that “the most 
important thing” about a potential price reform was that it “should not undermine the standard of 
living.”421  And the documents announcing the Law on State Enterprises to the country 
contradictorily declared that “prices should be given a cost restricting character” but “the change 
of retail prices should not lead to a decline in the living standard of the working people.”422  This 
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was theoretically possible (the government proposed to compensate low-income people for price 
increases through subsidies), but ultimately the scale of the subsidies had to be reduced, and this 
implied a decline in living standards for some segment of the Soviet population.  Similarly, the 
party announcement said that the law would “induce the enterprises…to trim their excessive 
workforce,” but would “not bring about unemployment.”  The “specter” of unemployment, the 
document claimed, was only something with which “both our own opponents of perestroika and 
Western ‘Sovietologists’ are trying to scare us.”423 
These denials of the social effects of perestroika did not arise out of an ignorance of 
economics, as many scholars have claimed,424 but rather the pressures of politics. They were 
intimately linked to the first purpose of glasnost and democracy: to coerce the state bureaucracy.  
So long as Gorbachev needed the Soviet masses to exert “control from below,” he could not 
afford to lose their approbation.  But as Gorbachev only slowly realized in 1987 and 1988, 
democracy would have to also serve a second purpose: to legitimize price reform.   He came to 
the conclusion in the spring of 1987, “In general, we should make it a rule now: this kind of 
questions will no longer ever be resolved without careful discussion with the people, without 
consulting the people.”425  And so it was.  The announcement of the Law on State Enterprises 
proclaimed, “The reform of price formation should become the subject of the broadest possible 
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discussion in the country.”426  The problem with this purpose was that its politics directly 
contracted those of using democracy to coerce the bureaucracy.  Using democracy to legitimize 
price reform would have evaporated perestroika’s support among the masses and robbed 
Gorbachev of their use for “control from below.” 
This was control that he could not afford to lose, because for all the fanfare attached to 
enterprise independence in the 1987 reforms, the real political battle at its core was between 
Gorbachev and the government ministries who controlled the economy.  Instead of setting firm 
five-year production targets as they had under the command system, ministries would only issue 
“control figures” and the new system at the start of the five-year plan to “orient” enterprise 
business planning.   And rather than issuing binding annual production targets, the ministries 
would now only issue “state orders” for items deemed essential to the state.  The rest of the 
economy would operate under a system of wholesale trade, where production inputs would be 
bought and sold without state ministries serving as intermediaries.  “Budgetary financing” of 
enterprise operations would be “as a rule, excluded.”427  Instead, enterprises would have to turn 
to a new system of five state commercial banks, one for each broad sector of the economy 
(agriculture, industry, construction, social development, and foreign trade).  These banks would, 
according to the new law, only grant credit based on the creditworthiness of the borrower and the 
proposed investment.  The reform aimed, in short, to remove the gods and czars from their 
perches atop the mountains of the command economy.  It was a monumental task, and 
Gorbachev needed all the public support he could muster to take on the entrenched interests. 
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Even with public support, the 1987 reforms proved to be a disastrous failure.  They did so 
not because of noisy battles in the public sphere, but because of quiet workings in the state 
financial system.  The reform measures produced two devastating financial problems.  First, 
allowing Soviet enterprises to keep more of their profits also meant significantly lowering their 
taxes to the Soviet state. The reform dropped the effective tax rate on enterprise profits, and left 
the government with less money to fund its activities.  Enterprises paid on average 63% of their 
profits to the state in 1986, but that number dropped to 56% in 1987, 46% in 1988, and 40% in 
1989.428  The 1987 reforms were, in essence, a massive tax cut.  Like the oil prices decline, the 
anti-alcohol campaign, and Chernobyl before it, the Law on State Enterprises ripped another hole 
in state budget revenue.  Most observers at the time and historians in retrospect have focused on 
the Soviet government’s proclivity to spend money during perestroika.429  This was a problem, 
albeit a relatively small one.  The state’s increasing inability to collect money, on the other hand, 
was a huge one.  As a percentage of GDP, state budget expenditures crept up from 50% in 1985 
to 52% in 1987 before falling back to 50% in 1989.  But state budget revenues collapsed during 
the same period, falling from 47% in 1985 to 41% in 1989. This was in turn reflected in the 
budget deficit, which jumped from 6.2% of GDP in 1986 to 8.8% in 1987 and 11% in 1988.430  
In exploding the state budget deficit through a massive supply side tax cut, Gorbachev’s reforms 
ironically mirrored those of his rival, Ronald Reagan.  But whereas Reagan could use the Federal 
Reserve’s high interest rates and global capital markets to deliver the United States from 
                                                     
428 My own calculations done from Table D.6, IMF Study of the Soviet Economy, p. 99. 
429 PlanEcon Report, August 19, 1988 takes this approach. Miller, The Struggle to Save the 
Soviet Economy, focuses on increased expenditure, particularly on state-controlled investment, as 
the source of Soviet problems under perestroika. 
430 The 1989 numbers are estimates collected by the IMF from Soviet officials in 1991.  Table 
II.2.3, IMF Study of the Soviet Economy, p. 55. 
  243 
economic ruin, Gorbachev could only turn to his comrades who ran the Gosbank printing 
presses.  Dutifully, they kept printing rubles to fund the General Secretary’s vision of a better 
Soviet future.431   
For the enterprises on the receiving end of a massive profit windfall, the question became 
how to spend it.  This was the second financial problem that emerged from the radical economic 
reforms.  Enterprise financial assets grew an astounding 32.6% in 1987 and another 22.5% in 
1988.432  As one Gosbank official told the IMF, “because money was only a unit of accounting” 
enterprise bank deposits “did not have an economic value,” were not fully fungible, and “did not 
even yield interest.”433  This left enterprises with no incentive to hold onto the rubles that were 
now easily flowing into their coffers.  So, they went on a spending spree, and started stockpiling 
production inputs, giving their employees (who now elected them) wage increases, and 
approving new investment projects, even without a guarantee that they would ever be completed.  
Enterprise managers thought it was better to turn their newfound financial wealth into 
increasingly scarce real assets or boost their popularity with their employees rather than to hold 
on to rubles that were easily attainable and earned no interest.  Income growth skyrocketed, 
jumping from 4% in 1987 to 9% in 1988 and 13% in 1989.434  Total enterprise spending 
ballooned from 243 billion rubles in 1987 to 354 billion rubles in 1988 and 462 billion rubles in 
1989.435   
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Far from forcing failing enterprises to become profitable or face bankruptcy, the 1987 
reforms gave them a blank check.  Gorbachev would eventually conclude that the Law on State 
Enterprises was, in essence, a massive inflation generator. “When we allowed enterprises to 
become economically self-sufficient, we didn’t think about the mechanisms necessary to keep 
this process under control,” he said at the end of 1988. “Incomes are growing but commodity 
supply hasn’t increased…. There’s too much ‘funny money.’”436  Indeed there was.  The soft 
budget constraints of the old command system had given way to no budget constraints at all.   
 
How Do We Keep What We’ve Won?  
 Gorbachev “always considered every significant action or initiative from two 
perspectives – domestic and foreign,” his aide Anatoly Chernyaev wrote in his memoirs.  
Therefore, as he radicalized his domestic reform, “he simultaneously addressed the problem of 
restraining the arms race and the place of the military-industrial complex in [the] system – above 
all, its role in the country’s entire economy.”437  Cuts to the military could only be made in an 
increasingly benign international environment, so Gorbachev went abroad in 1987 to foster the 
conditions that would make this possible.  He attempted to use the tools of idealistic and personal 
diplomacy to keep the international position that the Soviet Union had formerly secured with 
military power through other means. 
 It began with an internal campaign to reform Soviet defense doctrine.  Reducing the size 
of the military-industrial complex could not be justified so long as the Soviet Union held to the 
principle that had grounded the country’s defense policy since the 1950s – maintaining strategic 
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parity in armed forces with the United States. “If we start counting – they have a rifle, we have a 
rifle – then we can forget about building socialism,” he told the Politburo in May 1987 as they 
worked to craft the Law on State Enterprises.  “I ask the question: will we keep turning the 
country into a military camp in the future as well?”  The Americans, Gorbachev said, “clearly 
want to pull us into another round of the arms race.  They are counting on our military 
exhaustion…. They are pulling us into SDI…. Therefore, the approach of one soldier there, one 
soldier here, they have a bullet we have a bullet, is not our approach.”438  Two weeks later, 
Shevardnadze echoed Gorbachev’s link between the economy and national security in a 
memorandum to the Foreign Ministry. “Our power lies not in our number of rockets but in a 
stable and strong economy.  It’s not the missile launchers that guarantee the country’s security so 
much as high labor productivity.”439  In place of strategic parity, Gorbachev now pushed the 
leadership to accept a doctrine of strategic sufficiency – the idea that the country did not need to 
match the United States in armaments, it merely needed to maintain armed forces sufficient to 
ensure that the Americans would be deterred from launching an attack.   
Many in the Soviet armed forces were uncomfortable with such an approach, but a 
bizarre incident abetted Gorbachev’s initiative on May 27, 1987.  West German teenager 
Mathias Rust flew a small airplane from Helsinki, Finland and landed it on Red Square in 
Moscow without being turned back by the Soviet military.  For Gorbachev and the leadership, it 
was a humiliating, if harmless, development that reinforced the public’s perception of the 
government’s overall incompetence.  It was also an opportunity for the General Secretary to 
clean house within the national defense hierarchy.  He was sure not to waste it.  On May 30, he 
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forced the resignation of Defense Minister Sokolov, and in the weeks that followed he pushed 
hundreds of officers throughout the armed forces into retirement.  Gorbachev’s hand-picked 
replacement to lead the Defense Ministry, Dmitri Yazov, now owed his job to the General 
Secretary, and the defense ministry and armed forces struggled to resist the transition to a policy 
of strategic sufficiency thereafter.440 
The move to strategic sufficiency paralleled a continuing evolution in the Soviet position 
on nuclear arms control.  After the close call at Reykjavik in October, 1986, the leadership was 
in the familiar position of having to make further concessions if they wanted to make progress.  
Since his January 1986 declaration aiming for a nuclear free world by the year 2000, Gorbachev 
had tried to attain a comprehensive agreement governing all nuclear weapons.  When the 
Americans had shown no inclination to compromise on the Strategic Defense Initiative at 
Reykjavik, that strategy had failed.  By the spring of 1987, the worsening economic situation led 
a group of reformers and conservatives within the Politburo - Shevardnadze and Yakovlev as 
well as Ligachev and Gromyko – to ban together to advocate ‘decoupling’ negotiations over SDI 
and long-range strategic nuclear weapons from negotiations over intermediate-range nuclear 
forces (INF) in Europe.  They also proposed to support the so-called ‘zero option’ in INF 
negotiations to remove all intermediate nuclear weapons from Europe.  This was a significant 
concession to the Reagan administration, which had first proposed the ‘zero option’ in 1981 
thinking that the Soviet Union would never accept it.  Now the Politburo was proposing that the 
country should, and Gorbachev reluctantly acceded to his colleagues’ new strategy and 
abandoned his earlier comprehensive approach.  With the domestic economy faltering and the 
Americans showing no sign of easing their negotiating position, all Politburo members now 
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agreed that the country needed to escape its military burden through nuclear arms control.  
Piecemeal progress was better than no progress at all.  Gorbachev issued a statement to the West 
proposing to eliminate all intermediate missiles in Europe without linking it to SDI or strategic 
weapons limitations.  In an additional signal of flexibility, his letter railed against the future 
deployment of SDI, but raised no objection to the prospect of research and testing.441 
The Americans were happy to pocket the concessions and ask for more.  US Secretary of 
State George Schultz travelled to Moscow in April 1987 to negotiate with Gorbachev on the 
newly decoupled INF ‘zero option.’  Just one week after these negotiations, the Politburo would 
discuss the country’s rapidly deteriorating financial position, and the Finance Minister would 
conclude, “The financial situation has reached the point of crisis.”442  Desperate to come to terms 
on a treaty that would enable cuts in the Soviet defense budget, Gorbachev gave way on three 
central American conditions for an INF treaty: he agreed to include Soviet Asia in the agreement 
so that the agreement applied globally; he agreed to include short-range, battlefield nuclear 
weapons (an area of Soviet advantage) in the agreement; and he assented to an intrusive 
inspections regime to verify the treaty.  This led the two sides to agreement on the basic shape of 
the final treaty, and they planned to have Reagan and Gorbachev sign it in December when 
Gorbachev was scheduled to travel to Washington for a bilateral summit.443   
As he searched for an escape from the superpower nuclear confrontation, Gorbachev 
believed that Western Europe held the key to his strategy of securing the Soviet Union’s 
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international position through diplomacy. “One thing is clear - no issue can be solved without 
taking Europe into account,” he told the Politburo on March 26, 1987, in a telling conflation of 
Western Europe with Europe as a whole.  “Even in our internal affairs, we need it for 
perestroika. And in foreign policy, there is no substitute for Europe.  Without a partner like 
Western Europe, we cannot do anything.”  Better relations with Western Europe would allow the 
Soviet leadership “to reduce the limits of military confrontation” and “strive to remove U.S. 
weapons from Europe.”  Another “important task” of the strategy would be “to use the scientific 
and technical potential of Western Europe, especially for our friends in Comecon [who are] 
bogged down there.”444  The Soviet leadership had long tried to drive a wedge between Western 
Europe and the United States through peace offensives, and with peace and disarmament 
movements gaining strength in Western Europe in the 1980s, the time looked ripe for success.  
Western Europeans’ perceptions of the Soviet Union as a menacing threat would first have to be 
transformed into visions of the Soviet Union as a cornerstone of peace.  Margaret Thatcher told 
Gorbachev in a meeting on March 30, 1987, “Soviet troops did not hesitate to enter Hungary in 
1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, and then Afghanistan. So why would they hesitate before they 
go somewhere else?”445  Western Europe would never peel away from the American line so long 
as this perception persisted, Gorbachev told the Politburo a month later, as he recounted 
Thatcher’s words.  The Soviet Union needed “to humanize international relations,” he told 
them.446  There was a “war of ideas” going on between the superpowers for the hearts and minds 
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of Western Europeans, Gorbachev said, and if the Soviet Union lost it, it would “lose 
everything.”447 
He hoped his vision of a “common European home” would win this war.  Gorbachev had 
first casually mentioned the idea in a speech to the British Parliament in 1984, but it took on new 
life as the “all-European house” during his trip to Czechoslovakia in April 1987.  “We are 
resolutely against the division of the continent into military blocs facing each other, against the 
accumulation of military arsenals in Europe, against everything that is the source of the threat of 
war,” he said in a speech in Prague.  “In the spirit of the new thinking we introduced the idea of 
the ‘all-European house’... [which] signifies, above all, the acknowledgment of a certain integral 
whole.”448  In combination with the bold Soviet moves on arms control, this call to transcend the 
military division of Europe served its purpose of changing Western European perceptions of the 
Soviet Union.  By the summer of 1987, Gorbachev’s popularity in the West had become a 
political force unto itself, and by year’s end Time magazine had named him their Man of the 
Year.     
But the material realities of the Soviet empire remained unchanged.  While he publicly 
proclaimed the need for a common European home in Prague, Gorbachev privately told the 
Czechoslovak leadership “we will not conduct our perestroika at [your] expense.  But do not 
expect to live at our expense either.”449  Two months later at a meeting of the Warsaw Pact in 
Budapest, all the leaders of the bloc agreed their economic relations were a serious problem, but 
achieved no consensus on a solution.  Gorbachev told the leaders that their “new stage” of 
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relations had brought with it problems, “particularly in economic cooperation.”  These problems 
should not stop them from putting new forms of cooperation into practice, he said, because “we 
can’t solve the new tasks with old forms.”  The Romanian leader Nicolai Ceausescu declared that 
“economic questions” now had “greater weight than military or international matters” for the 
bloc.  “Questions of finance and price formation” needed to be seriously analyzed, he said, 
because “the current financial system” did not “correspond with realities.”  Hungary’s Janos 
Kadar concurred, saying “the question of prices” was essential.  “Without real prices,” he said, 
“it is difficult to realize cooperation.  Prices must approach world market levels.  International 
cooperation can’t be built on anything else.”  But real prices (and the currency convertibility that 
would come with it) would submit each country’s economy to the pressures of intra-bloc 
competition and expose the different standards of living prevailing in the alliance.  Just like 
changes in domestic prices, a reform in bloc prices would be accompanied by social pain.  It fell 
to Polish leader Wojciech Jaruzelski, a man intimately familiar with the travails of price reforms, 
to warn his comrades of the difficulties that lay ahead.  After discussing Poland’s struggles with 
domestic reform, he said, “Comrades, we inform you about the problems that might arise, 
because it will not be a simple operation, particularly with regard to the rationalization of prices, 
which remain an anachronism and make the rational management of the economy more 
difficult.”450   
It is no wonder that Gorbachev returned to the Politburo in June to lament, “everyone 
agrees that something needs to be changed.  But we see: when it comes down to it, nothing 
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changes.”451  His estrangement from the bloc only grew over the summer.  Upon hearing a report 
from Shevardnadze about his difficulties meeting with bloc leaders in July, Gorbachev 
sarcastically said, “Our relations with the socialist countries remind one of inter-ethnic relations 
in the Caucasus: the smaller the nation the more rights and respect it demands for itself.”  He 
called for “a general assessment of economic relations with the socialist countries” because “the 
deciding moment is approaching.”452  No such comprehensive analysis has surfaced in the 
archival record yet, but the trend in Gorbachev’s thinking was clear.  The Soviet Union could 
not, he reinforced in November, use “pressure, the slightest manifestation of inequality, 
disrespect, even the smallest taste of Comintern approaches. That time is long gone. Each party 
must sort things out itself.”453  This included economic support, which Gorbachev told his allies 
the Soviet Union could not provide.  “Jaruzelski is waiting for a lot of help in economic 
cooperation,” he reported after meeting with the bloc allies at celebrations of the 70th anniversary 
of the October Revolution, “Zhivkov [in Bulgaria] too.”454   
The Soviet Union, however, had nothing extra to give.  On October 9, 1987, Ryzhkov 
reported to the Politburo that the country was now “a debtor to our friends. We pay them one 
billion rubles in interest alone…. This is a political issue, a question of national prestige.”  He 
went on to report a litany of economic dismay.  From 1985 to 1987, the country’s annual hard 
currency earnings from exports dropped from $25 billion to $17 billion, even though the 
government had diverted increasing numbers of goods, including oil, from the domestic market 
to exports every year.  Income from foreign trade had dropped from 66 billion rubles in 1985 to 
                                                     
451 Politburo, p. 169. 
452 “Document No. 14: Report on Eduard Shevardnadze’s Visits to Bulgaria, Hungary, and 
Yugoslavia,” July 9, 1987 in Masterpieces, pp. 255-56. 
453 Politburo, p. 236. 
454 Ibid, p. 237. 
  252 
52 billion rubles in 1987.  The state budget deficit was now 84 billion rubles.455 These numbers 
not only prohibited support for the socialist bloc, they also reinforced the main goal of Soviet 
foreign policy – to reduce defense spending.  Ryzhkov told the Politburo just one week before 
his bleak economic report, “If we hold the current level of spending on defense, we cannot 
upgrade industry, we will not give the people welfare.... we must reduce defense spending.”456 
Lowering defense spending would require the completion of the INF Treaty.  Since 
Gorbachev had granted the Americans concessions in April, he had still made vague attempts to 
link further progress in arms control to SDI.  But in September, he abandoned all mention of the 
program in a letter to Reagan on nuclear matters, leaving the Americans to conclude that the 
Soviets had learned “that they would just have to live with it.”  In the fall, the Soviet negotiating 
team formally recognized that the Soviet Union had more short and intermediate weapons in 
Europe, and thus would have to give up more weapons than the Americans to get to zero.  These 
“asymmetrical cuts” had long been deal breaker for the Soviet Union, but not under the 
circumstances that prevailed in the fall of 1987.  In October, Gorbachev made one final attempt 
to tie his attendance at the Washington summit to an American willingness to negotiate on SDI, 
but after Schultz stonewalled this demand, he readily gave way.  Only a year after he had broken 
off the Reykjavik summit over SDI, he would now travel to the next summit without the program 
even on the negotiating agenda.457 
This set the stage for the General Secretary’s arrival in Washington and the signing of the 
INF treaty on December 8th.  It was a historic agreement that made the European continent a 
dramatically safer place, and the crowning achievement to that point of Gorbachev’s strategy to 
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secure the Soviet Union’s international position through diplomacy in place of military power.  
He publicly declared that the treaty demonstrated the importance of “the human factor” in 
building trust between adversaries, and the Americans congratulated themselves for negotiating a 
“fantastic agreement.”458  Hours of personal diplomacy had contributed to its signing, but the 
ultimate source of the treaty lay outside of any negotiating room.  The Soviet leadership had 
drawn a fundamental connection between cutting the country’s military burden and improving 
the domestic economy, and had made a string of concessions in pursuit of that goal.  With the 
signing of INF, Gorbachev had successfully embedded the move to military retrenchment within 
a superpower treaty, and transformed the Soviet Union’s international reputation from menace to 
peacemaker in the process.  At the end of 1987, his strategy of securing through personal 
diplomacy and idealism what the Soviet Union had formerly won with military power appeared 
to be paying off handsomely.    
 
 The Search for Control and Legitimacy 
 When Gorbachev recounted the success of his trip to Washington for the Politburo, he 
said the conference reinforced one of the “foundational” ideas of the new thinking in foreign 
policy, “namely, that its success and its effectiveness is dependent on the things we are doing at 
home, on how perestroika is going.”459  On this score, there was great cause for concern.  The 
June 1987 Central Committee Plenum that introduced the Law on State Enterprises left two 
central issues at the top of the agenda for 1988: price reform and further democratization.  The 
plenum documents had declared that society should undertake a broad discussion of price 
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reform, and Gorbachev had announced that an extraordinary party conference, the 19th All-Union 
Party Conference, would take place in the summer of 1988 to further expand the democratization 
of Soviet society.  He did not announce the extent of that expansion, but made clear that it would 
depend on whether the party bureaucracy and line ministries relinquished their control over the 
economy, as called for under the Law on State Enterprises.  
 By the spring of 1988, it was clear that they had not.  The move to enterprise 
independence exposed the state bureaucracy as even more intransigent than Gorbachev and the 
reformers had expected.  The coercive power of glasnost and limited democracy had been no 
match for the entrenched patronage networks of the old command system.  Gorbachev took stock 
in April 1988 as he thought about how far to take democracy at the coming party conference. 
“What have we done so far? We conducted a strong January [1987] Plenum” to expand glasnost 
and democracy within enterprises. “But…it did not play its intended role.” As for the June 
Plenum’s economic reform measures, “the results are barely visible.”460  The “administrative 
system continues to run the show.”461   To “overcome its legacy,” the reform would have to “go 
to the people.”462  Past reform attempts “failed because they did not include the people.”  He 
returned to the idea that the ultimate attraction of democracy lay in its potential to give power.  
“How to generate power?” he asked rhetorically as the Politburo debated the 19th Party 
Conference, “It is necessary to say that it was entrusted to someone.”463  Wider use of elections 
would bring “the most active and capable people into power” and allow Soviet citizens to 
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interrogate them on a regular basis.  If these officials failed to perform as the people wanted, they 
would lose the next election.   
Faced with the problem of an intransigent nomenklatura, previous General Secretaries 
would have used Central Committee Plenums and party conferences to address “cadre policy” 
and fire party bureaucrats who failed to toe the line.  Gorbachev wanted democratic elections to 
do that work for him.  He recounts in his memoirs how many of his advisers wanted him to use 
the All-Union Conference to undertake a “serious shake-up of the cadres.”  He declined to do so, 
he writes, because “it would have been a one-off operation.”  His plan was different.  The 
conference would instead implement an entirely new system under which “the people could 
participate in solving these [cadre] issues” through “free elections.”464  Gorbachev hoped, in 
short, to use the All-Union Party Conference to institutionalize his preferred method of coercion 
- electoral democracy. 
To use the power of democracy as he hoped, Gorbachev knew he would need to retain 
the support of the masses.  This made the prospect of price reform exceedingly daunting.  He 
was well aware, however, that his economic reforms – the entire edifice of market socialism - 
would fail without it.  Enterprise independence without price reform had made the economy 
severely distorted, a fact readily apparent to the Politburo by the spring of 1988.  Many prices 
were far below their market value; others were far above, particularly state procurement prices.  
Enterprises had begun to use their newfound independence to stockpile low-priced inputs and 
shift their production to higher priced goods.  With consumer prices still fixed, the inflation 
pressures of past budget deficits had begun to manifest itself in scarcity, and Soviet citizens were 
forced to wait in increasingly long lines for all manner of essentials, most of all food.  Indeed, 
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debates about how to solve “the food problem” dominated both private and public debates in the 
spring and summer of 1988.  Shortages threatened to erode perestroika’s support among the 
masses, so Gorbachev took this problem very seriously.      
Prices were “the crucial question at the intersection of politics, the economy and the 
social sphere,” Gorbachev told the Politburo in a discussion of price reform in April 1988.  In 
production, the “main issue of economic reform [is] resource conservation,” Ryzhkov said, and 
resources would not be conserved as long as wholesale goods remained fixed at low prices.465  If 
the leadership moved to free wholesale prices and allow them to be set contractually between 
firms, this would force enterprises to use resources more efficiently and discourage hoarding.  
But if they left consumer prices fixed while doing this, free wholesale prices would only increase 
the subsidies the state would have to provide to keep consumer prices low.  Thus, Gorbachev 
believed, all prices had to be reformed as a single package.   
This meant raising or freeing consumer prices.  Making such a decision would both 
prevent an increase in state subsidies and also solve the problem of shortages.  But the politics, 
of course, were treacherous.  “Hands off prices!” was the first rallying cry of the “radical 
democratic opposition” in 1988, Gorbachev recalled in his memoirs.466  This made price reform a 
no-win situation.  If the Politburo continued to do nothing, production bottlenecks and consumer 
shortages would only increase, and perestroika would be blamed for destroying the economy.  If 
they aggressively attacked the problem of prices, the economy would function much better, but 
they would lose the support of the population.  Gorbachev seesawed between these options in the 
Politburo.  “Remove the food problem in the country,” he said in April 1988 as the leadership 
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discussed price reform, “and 80% of perestroika’s problems can be considered solved.”  But the 
price increases that would solve the food shortage, would “be felt immediately in communal and 
factory cafeterias,” the canteens of the working class, and by “56 million pensioners [and] 92 
million children under 17 years of age.”  72% of the average household budget was spent on 
food, he told the leadership, and because salaries were so “egalitarian,” that statistic described 
most Soviet families.  “It is a difficult task,” he concluded, “to stimulate progress in the public 
interest and at the same time maintain the social balance. But price reform is overdue.”467  In the 
face of daunting politics, Gorbachev hoped that his plans to expand democracy at the 
forthcoming party conference would provide the political legitimacy required to implement the 
social pain of price reform.  “At the Conference, we’ll have to get closer to price reform,” he told 
a group of regional party secretaries in April.  “Without this reform, nothing will work.”468 
  This set the two purposes of glasnost and democracy – to coerce the bureaucracy and 
legitimize price reform – on a collision course destined for the 19th All-Union Party Conference.  
It was a conference that would definitively break the country off from the old authoritarian 
system.  Gorbachev called it “the real turning point, when perestroika became irreversible,” and 
the US ambassador to the Soviet Union, Jack Matlock, viewed it as the definitive point when the 
Soviet Union entered “a whole new ball game.”469  These judgements were so definitive because 
Gorbachev succeeded in gaining the conference’s support for a vast array of changes to the 
country’s political system, including the creation of a strong presidency (which he would of 
course occupy), a dramatic increase of the power of local soviets in place of the party 
bureaucracy, and competitive elections to a newly created parliamentary body, the Congress of 
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People’s Deputies.  It was a total victory for Gorbachev’s first purpose of democracy.  In the 
coming elections, scheduled for the spring of 1989, party bureaucrats would have to earn a 
popular mandate from the Soviet citizenry if they wanted a seat in the new Congress.  So long as 
perestroika remained popular, these elections were bound to punish those who resisted its call to 
economic reform. 
 But it also implied a definitive defeat for democracy’s second purpose.  Gorbachev 
delivered a detailed call for price reform to the delegates of the 19th Party Congress, but nothing 
came of it.  “Much now rests on the reform of price formation” he said in his opening speech to 
the conference. “The fact that this problem is unsolved is greatly complicating the 
implementation of economic reform.  Without price reform, we will not be able to create normal 
economic relations in the national economy.”  This included the low fixed retail prices for bread, 
milk, and meat.  The state paid out “tens of billions of rubles in subsidies” for retail prices, 
Gorbachev told the conference and the country, and their low level “undermines incentive to 
produce these goods and gives rise to thriftlessness toward them.”  The economic necessity of a 
reform was unavoidable, Gorbachev said, so it was “simply essential that we deal with this task, 
however difficult it might be and whatever doubts and fears it might arouse.”  He tried to 
reassure the country by reaffirming his belief that “changes in retail prices should in no way be 
accompanied by a drop in the people’s standard of living.”  Because the population would be 
fully compensated for the price increases, the state would “obtain no direct financial gain from 
revising retail prices and the public [would] lose nothing.”470 
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 The Soviet people did not believe him.  In the months following the 19th Party 
Conference, public opinion hardened against price reform.  By the fall of 1988, a series of 
leading Soviet economists were publishing articles in the newly freed Soviet press arguing that 
price reform should be delayed for “the next few years” because its implementation would “kill 
perestroika.”471  Gorbachev could not resist the logic of these arguments, as he too feared losing 
perestroika’s popularity over the issue of prices.  He needed that popularity to coerce the 
bureaucracy.  Since the spring of 1987, he had waited for glasnost and democracy to produce 
broad social consensus on the necessity of price reform, but such a consensus never came.  And 
because it never did, he was left in a conundrum of his own making: his political power 
depended on his popularity, while his reform plans compelled him to make decisions that were 
extremely unpopular.  He chose to maintain his popularity, and ruined his reforms in the process. 
In November 1988, the leadership abandoned all efforts to achieve a price reform, and set their 
focus squarely on the coming elections to the Congress of People’s Deputies.   
Thus, as the country approached 1989, it was hurtling toward democracy and bankruptcy, 
and the two destinies were intimately linked.  Gorbachev had achieved his goal of using 
democracy to coerce the bureaucracy, but doing so had prevented him from using it to legitimize 
the steps that would save the country from bankruptcy.  Price reform could be temporarily 
delayed, but it could not be permanently avoided.  With a gaping budget deficit, exploding wage 
growth, no enterprise budget constraints, and fixed prices, a severe ‘monetary overhang’ had 
developed in the country by 1989.  Prices would eventually have to be raised to ‘mop up’ all the 
extra rubles; it was simply a question of time.  PlanEcon, a close watcher of socialist economies, 
wrote in April 1989, “By…delaying the inevitable upward price adjustment,” the Soviet 
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leadership was “only making sure that when the adjustment is made, it will indeed be explosive.” 
Once the leadership had “run out of choices” in the future, prices would be the only place left to 
turn.  At that point, PlanEcon warned, “Mr. Gorbachev will face a far greater political threat than 
anything he has faced up to now.”472   
In the meantime, other choices remained, imperial retrenchment most prominent among 
them.  As the budget deficit grew to an astounding 11% of the economy in 1988, cutting state 
spending to close this enormous gap and slow inflation became a top priority for the entire 
leadership.473  They turned again to Gorbachev to create an international environment that would 
make imperial retrenchment possible. 
 
Bystanders to Revolution 
“Force and the threat of force can no longer be, and should not be, instruments of foreign 
policy,” Gorbachev boldly declared to a meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations 
on December 7, 1988.  “Freedom of choice is a universal principle to which there should be no 
exceptions,” he continued. “Denying that right to the peoples, no matter what the pretext, no 
matter what the words are used to conceal it” would transgress peace and justice.  “On the whole, 
our credo is as follows: Political problems should be solved only by political means.”  To that 
end, he announced, the Soviet Union would unilaterally reduce the size of its armed forces by 
500,000 people over the next two years, withdraw six tank divisions from the Eastern Bloc, and 
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reduce its overall military presence in Eastern Europe by 50,000 soldiers and 5,000 tanks.  “All 
remaining Soviet divisions on the territory of our allies…will become unambiguously 
defensive,” he said.  The international system would continue to be defined by “the existence and 
rivalry of various socioeconomic and political systems,” he concluded, but the Soviet Union now 
wanted “to impart to this rivalry the quality of sensible competition in conditions of respect for 
freedom of choice and a balance of interests.”474 
The speech was a sensation in the Western world, the first definitive proof that 
Gorbachev could deliver peaceful deeds to go along with his years of peaceful proclamations.  It 
was also a hint, crystal clear in retrospect but only naively trusted at the time, that the Soviet 
Union no longer sought to control the political and economic destiny of the nations under its 
orbit.  Redefining the longstanding antagonism between the capitalist and socialist worlds as a 
sensible competition based in respect for the freedom of choice did not sound like the Cold War 
of old.  Indeed, it sounded as though Gorbachev was declaring the Cold War’s end. 
This was precisely the General Secretary’s intention.  In planning the speech, he had 
professed a desire to make his address the “anti-Fulton” – one that reversed Winston Churchill’s 
claim in a 1946 speech in Fulton, Missouri that an Iron Curtain had befallen the European 
continent and divided it into two halves.  The speech was the apotheosis of Gorbachev’s strategy 
to use bold vision and idealistic rhetoric to maintain the international standing that the Soviet 
Union had once secured through military might.   
Over the course of 1988, the conviction to reduce the burdens of empire had grown 
within the Politburo to encompass members on both sides of the debate over the domestic course 
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of perestroika.  In June, as the party prepared for the 19th All-Union Party Conference, even the 
conservative stalwart Andrei Gromyko had come to view exiting the arms race as a national 
necessity.  “During Khrushchev’s time we built 600 bombs (nuclear).  He said then: how long 
are we going to do it?”  But the country never stopped making them, Gromyko said, because the 
leadership stuck “to the principle: they are in a race and we are in a race, as in sports.”  
Producing ever more nuclear weapons “was our mistaken position, absolutely mistaken,” he 
concluded. “Tens of billions were spent on production of these toys.” His fellow conservative, 
Vitaly Vorotnikov, concurred.  “We did indeed let ourselves get pulled into the arms race.  We 
found ourselves on the brink of catastrophe…. we are the ones to blame.”  Gorbachev capitalized 
on the prevailing sentiment to press his new thinking.  Is the party’s goal “to race the entire 
world regarding the levels of armaments: cannon by cannon, plane by plane?,” he asked them.  
“Then let us introduce ration cards for food, turn the country into a military camp, and just race 
and race onwards.”  With ‘the food problem’ already set to be a main topic of conversation at the 
party conference, this was a prospect that no one in the room welcomed.475 
As the year progressed, the tradeoff between the domestic economy and the military 
burden became ingrained in the Politburo’s thinking.  It thus directly informed Gorbachev’s 
internal preparation for his U.N. speech.  Yes, he believed in a radically new and non-violent 
vision of international relations, and he hoped to demonstrate that vision to the world by pulling 
Soviet troops out of Eastern Europe.  But that is not what sold his less idealistic comrades in the 
Politburo on the idea.  To them, the worsening domestic economy compelled military 
disarmament.  At the Politburo meeting on November 3rd 1988, Gorbachev reasoned, “Our 
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military expenses are 2.5 times larger than those of the United States.  No country in the 
world…spends more per capita on the military sector.”  As the budget deficit spiraled out of 
control and the Soviet citizenry struggled to find food and basic consumer goods, Gorbachev’s 
claim that “We won’t solve the problems of perestroika if we leave the army the way it is,” 
resonated deeply in the chamber.  If troops were not pulled out of Eastern Europe, Ryzhkov 
warned, then “we can forget about any increase in the standard of living.  No matter what 
government you put in place of this one, it won’t solve this problem.”  Sensing consensus, 
Gorbachev proposed to the group that he announce unilateral cuts in the armed forces in his U.N. 
speech.  Everyone enthusiastically agreed, and Gorbachev concluded, “the main reason we’re 
doing this is perestroika.... without reductions in the army and the military industrial complex we 
won’t be able to deal with perestroika’s tasks.”476 
 Upon returning from the United Nations a month later, Gorbachev held another Politburo 
meeting to assess the speech and the future direction of perestroika.  Yegor Ligachev, 
Gorbachev’s preeminent opponent in the Politburo, praised the policy of unilateral disarmament 
on the grounds of political economy.  Gorbachev had loftily spoken of common human interests 
in his speech, and Ligachev saw the reduction of “the huge burden of military budgets” as an 
important interest of both socialist and capitalist countries.  “We need disarmament most of all,” 
he said. “We took such a burden upon ourselves with relation to the military budget that it will 
be difficult to dramatically solve anything in the economy.”  He did not want to weaken the 
country’s security, he said, but “in the final analysis, the power of the state will be determined 
not by military might but by a strong economy and by the political cohesion of society.”  
Defense Minister Yazov reported that he had not heard “a single question or a provocative 
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remark” from the Soviet high command regarding Gorbachev’s plan to cut back the size of the 
armed forces.  “Everyone reacted with understanding,” he said.  In the spirit of glasnost, 
Politburo members ranging from Ligachev to Shevardnadze advocated telling the party, the 
country, and the world that the domestic economy had necessitated the military cutbacks.  But 
Gorbachev, surprisingly, demurred.  “We keep this secrecy for one reason,” he said.  “If we 
admit now that we cannot build a long-term economic and social policy without [unilateral 
cuts],…this may reduce to nothing [the effect] of the speech at the United Nations.”  Gorbachev 
knew that the idealism of the speech would lose its power if it became clear that it was driven by 
material considerations. “If we take this [glasnost] approach now, then people will tell us: your 
proposal is rubbish.”477  So long as the reasoning behind the UN proposal was secret, people 
were calling it revolutionary and Gorbachev visionary.  If the Soviet Union was going to 
maintain its superpower status in an era of retrenchment, Gorbachev knew that he and the 
country could not afford to lose those acclamations. 
 Nor could they lose the regard of their allies in Eastern Europe.  Since scolding the allies 
for ‘living on credit’ and lamenting the scale of Soviet oil deliveries in November 1986, 
Gorbachev had continuously returned to the questions of oil and indebtedness in discussions of 
the region.  In a March 1988 Politburo meeting, he brought up former Polish leader Eduard 
Gierek, who had tried to spur Polish development in the 1970s by borrowing from the West.  
“What was it all based on?” Gorbachev said.  “On credits from the West and on our cheap fuel.  
The same goes for Hungary.”  Going forward, the allies’ political stability was in the Soviet 
Union’s “vital interest” because if they collapsed “the very idea of socialism [would] be 
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discredited.”  Nevertheless, Comecon integration based in currency convertibility had to begin, 
Gorbachev said, “because we cannot remain a provider of cheap resources for them forever.”478 
Throughout the spring and summer of 1988, Soviet leaders held important bilateral 
meetings on economic relations with Hungarian, Polish, and East German leaders.  These will be 
covered in subsequent chapters.  But in the fall of 1988, as Gorbachev abandoned price reform 
and prepared for the Congress of People’s Deputies at home, it also became apparent that a 
general economic crisis of the socialist bloc was fast approaching.  “There are multiple signs that 
certain similar problems are increasingly plaguing fraternal countries,” Georgy Shakhnazarov, 
Gorbachev’s aide for Eastern Europe, wrote to him in early October.  “The very similarity of the 
symptoms of the disease testifies to the fact that its catalyst is not some kind of malignant germ 
that has managed to penetrate their lower defenses, but factors rooted in the very economic and 
political model of socialism.”  In the past, “whenever any of them was in crisis, we had to come 
to the rescue at the cost of huge material, political and even human sacrifice.”  But now, “any 
option to ‘extinguish’ crises by military means must be fully excluded.  Even the old leadership 
seems to have already realized this, at least with regard to Poland.”  
The current crises were financial, Shakhnazarov wrote.  “We must reflect on how we will 
act if one or even several countries become bankrupt simultaneously,” he wrote.  “This is a 
realistic prospect for some of them on the brink of monetary insolvency (Poland, Hungary, 
Bulgaria, Vietnam, Cuba, GDR).”  This prospect raised a number of questions that the leadership 
needed to address.  “Could the socialist countries come out of the pre-crisis situation without 
Western assistance?  What price will they have to pay for this assistance?  To what extent should 
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we encourage such a course of events or put up with it? To what degree are we interested in the 
continued presence of Soviet troops on the territory of a number of allied countries (excluding 
the GDR)?”479   
 Gorbachev’s announcement at the U.N. of troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe began 
to answer this last question.  But the monumental task of preparing the country for the Congress 
of People’s Deputies elections prevented the leadership from addressing the other three questions 
for the remainder of 1988.  Only at the end of January, 1989 did Gorbachev tell the Politburo, 
“Comrades, we are on the eve of very serious things, because we cannot give [the Eastern 
Europeans] more than we are giving them now.”  But if the Soviet Union did not provide more 
economic and technological support, Gorbachev said, “there will be a split and they will run 
away.”  As populations and politicians across the Eastern Bloc wondered how far they could 
push Moscow without inviting a harsh crackdown, Gorbachev now told his colleagues, “The 
peoples of those countries will ask: what about the CPSU, what kind of leash will it use to hold 
our countries back?  They simply do not know that if they pull this leash harder, it will break.”  
In place of the old policy of domination through economic subsidy, Gorbachev declared that it 
was time to transfer relations with Eastern Europe “to the market.”  In doing so, Gorbachev knew 
he “would break the old rule that we keep them attached to us only by means of energy 
resources.”480  To fully explore the burgeoning crisis in the bloc, Gorbachev commissioned a 
series of reports from the leading foreign policy institutions of the Soviet government, including 
                                                     
479 “Document 1: Georgy Shakhnazarov’s Preparatory Notes for Mikhail Gorbachev for the 
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the KGB, the Central Committee’s International Department, the Foreign Ministry, and research 
institutes in Moscow (the equivalent of American think tanks). 
 Two of these reports have been opened to the public.  The Central Committee’s report, 
“On Strategy for Relations with the European Socialist Countries,” is the most complete analysis 
currently available of Soviet thinking at the highest levels on the eve of Eastern Europe’s 
revolutions.  The Eastern Bloc governments suffer “from a lack of legitimacy,” the authors 
wrote, and “the economic factor, the ability of a country to join and to assimilate into the world 
economy, has moved to the top of their priorities [all emphasis original].”  The desire to join the 
world economy constituted “the primary national interest of the majority of the socialist 
countries right now, and it should be taken into account above all in our relations with them.”  
Because the ruling parties lacked legitimacy, they could not “rule in the old way any more, and 
the new ‘rules of the game’ – of managing the group interests…and finding a social consensus – 
have not yet been worked out.”  Many socialist countries were likely to try to make a “smooth 
movement toward democratization…under the leadership of the ruling parties.”  This would 
involve “concessions” to opposition forces in society, including “a strengthening of the role of 
representative organs in political life.”  The report favored this outcome because “the chances of 
preserving internal political stability and alliance commitments” were high “if the initiative for 
democratic change originates with the ruling party.”  As Poland and Hungary were 
demonstrating, “pulling a portion of the opposition into the official structure and assigning it 
responsibility for constructive solutions to the problems that have accumulated could play a 
stabilizing role.” 
 How should the Soviet Union seek to influence socialist countries under these precarious 
conditions?  “Authoritarian methods and direct pressure have clearly outlived their usefulness,” 
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the authors wrote.  Even if there was “a sharp deterioration in one of the countries…it is very 
unlikely that we would be able to employ the methods of 1956 and 1968, both as a matter of 
principle and because of unacceptable consequences.”    
 In a telling misreading of the possible roads ahead for the socialist bloc, the authors 
wrote, “We should not exaggerate the danger of one of the countries simply switching to the 
capitalist way of development.”  They did not believe this would happen because it was “very 
unlikely that the West would be inclined to take on countries whose economies have been 
marked by crisis elements and heavy foreign debt.”  The West had so far shown no interest in 
“the ‘marshallization’ of certain socialist countries,” i.e. in providing a new Marshall Plan for 
Eastern Europe.  Gorbachev often like to talk about how the Soviet Union was stuck in the 1930s 
and 1940s, and this was clearly an instance of bygone thinking from that era.  The Marshall Plan 
was the grand exception to the general rules of how the West dealt with debtor nations, as the 
Sovereign Debt Crisis roiling the rest of the world in the 1980s clearly demonstrated.  Latin 
America’s experience in the 1980s clearly showed that the “marshallization” of an economy was 
not required to pull a debtor country into the capitalist orbit.  The report failed to grasp this 
fundamental characteristic of the global capitalist economy, and thus Soviet leaders severely 
underestimated the chances of the bloc’s quick departure to capitalism.481 
 The report of the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System, written by its 
director Oleg Bogomolev, paralleled the Central Committee’s analysis.  Bogomolov plainly 
stated that the Soviet government faced “a dilemma:” either “thwart the evolution” toward 
market socialist economies and representative government in Eastern Europe “or take it in stride 
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and develop the policy accepting the probability and even inevitability of this process.”  The 
academician’s answer to this dilemma could not have been more clear.  “Attempts to thwart 
emerging trends would be tantamount to fighting time itself, the objective course of history.  In 
the long term, these kinds of steps would be doomed and in the short run would mean wasting 
means and resources for an obviously hopeless cause.”  Attempts to preserve “the status quo that 
has lost its objective foundations…will weigh as an excessive burden on our economy.”  
Furthermore, “the direct use of force by the USSR…will most evidently signify the end of 
perestroika and the crumbling of trust on the part of the world community.”  If instead the Soviet 
Union permitted its Eastern Bloc allies to reform, then “the economic burden of the USSR 
[would] be alleviated.”  In conclusion, Bogomolov warned his political superiors, that “any 
attempt to stop this evolution by force could have the gravest consequences.”  Any country 
where the Soviet Union intervened would “inevitably acquire…quasi-dictatorial regimes which 
would continuously deplete the material resources of the Soviet Union and effectively exclude 
the prospects for renewal of socialist society in our country.”482 
  For Gorbachev, these reports solidified convictions that had long been hardening.  On 
March 3rd, 1989, he told the Soviet ambassadors to the Eastern Bloc states, “Do not impose 
anything on anybody!...We reject force in everything, in all our policies.”  Echoing the ‘main 
line’ laid down by his mentor Andropov almost a decade before, Gorbachev told the group that 
the leadership would now “think of our own people” instead of assuming “full responsibility” for 
the fate of the satellite governments in Eastern Europe.  Irked by the small slights of daily life, he 
detailed how Soviet citizens consumed less meat than their East German counterparts, and yet 
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the East Germans continued “to demand raw materials for special prices.  This is their 
solidarity!”  Resentfully, he continued, “They resell the specially priced resources they get from 
us to the West for hard currency!  Such is their reciprocity!  This is where I become a 
nationalist!”483  These were not the words of a man who had any thoughts of saving the socialist 
regimes of the Eastern Bloc from their unfolding economic crises. 
 In July, Gorbachev eloquently couched the new Soviet national interest within a stirring 
internationalist call for a Common European Home in a speech to the Council of Europe in 
Strasbourg, France. “The social and political order in some particular countries did change in the 
past,” he said, “and it can change in the future as well.  But this is exclusively a matter for the 
peoples themselves and of their choice. Any interference in internal affairs, any attempts to limit 
the sovereignty of states — whether of friends and allies or anybody else — are inadmissible.”  
His vision for a Common European Home started with dramatically reduced military 
expenditures and the elimination of nuclear weapons, and it extended to “the emergence of a vast 
economic space from the Atlantic to the Urals where [Europe’s] Eastern and Western parts 
would be strongly interlocked.”484  It was a vision of the future international order that 
Gorbachev wanted and that the Soviet Union needed: radically peaceful in its international 
relations and freed from the longstanding material burden of empire. 
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 In the chapters that follow, I will argue that the political transformation of Eastern Europe 
in the late 1980s was the result of a transnational struggle between Western banks and 
governments, Eastern European governments, and Eastern European peoples over who would 
bear the costs of economic adjustment policies.  In this struggle, the Soviet leadership held 
power only to the extent that it was willing to provide economic assistance to its allies or to 
intervene militarily, which would have had its own significant economic costs.  Continuing the 
foreign policy first set by Andropov in the Polish Crisis, Gorbachev and his Politburo were 
unwilling to embrace either of these options.  Motivated to shed the burdens of an empire 
bequeathed to them by history, they watched idly as a wave of economic adjustment, masked as 
political revolution, washed over the nations they had once called satellites.  Contrary to the 
historical memory that prevails today, this wave had not originated in the East with perestroika, 
but rather in the West with sovereign debt.  By the mid-1980s, it had already washed over much 
of the Global South, and was cresting above the concrete walls and iron curtains that separated 
East from West.  Soon it would wash away the division of Europe completely. 
  






The Economic History of a Political Revolution: 
 




“My relationship to economics has been reluctant….I was driven 
into it by the realization, by the growing realization, that most of the 
foreign policy problems have an economic base, and that most of 
the economic problems really require fundamental political 
decisions.” 
     
    Henry Kissinger, Autumn 1983485 
 
 It may seem odd to begin a chapter about Poland in 1989 with a quote from Henry 
Kissinger in 1983.  And indeed, Kissinger himself had no bearing on the momentous events that 
unfolded in Warsaw during that year.  However, the comment above came from a man with a 
notoriously poor relationship to the field of economics (equal parts ignorant and disdainful), and 
it was made at a particularly precarious time for the global economy.  Over the previous year, 
Western governments had fended off the first forays of what would become the defining 
economic problem of the 1980s – variously called the Sovereign Debt, Third World, or Latin 
American Debt Crisis.  Faced with the prospect of the most severe collapse in international trade 
and finance since the Great Depression and fearing the political ramifications that would result 
from such a development, governments had intervened as lenders of last resort in order to 
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prevent countries that were “too big to fail” from defaulting on their debt payments to Western 
banks.486  Through the remainder of the decade and beyond, debtor nations on the brink of 
insolvency sat at the mercy of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which attached conditions 
to its financial aid that were meant to ensure as much of the debt was repaid as possible.  Debtor 
countries were forced to privatize state-owned industries, slash state subsidies for food, energy, 
and housing, and invite foreign capital to invest in their economies.  It was a global economic 
process with profound political implications.  Kissinger’s conversion to economics, therefore, 
serves as a clarion signal of the deepening interdependence between the global economy of the 
late 20th century and the political history of that era.  In addition, his comment offers two 
postulates that historians of this period have yet to incorporate into their work, but that guide the 
history presented here.  Political problems (both foreign and domestic) have an economic base, 
and economic problems require political solutions.    
 What, then, is the subject of the history that follows?  On August 24th, 1989, Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki, a member of the labor union Solidarność (Solidarity), became the prime minister of 
Poland and the first democratically elected political leader in Eastern Europe since the start of 
the Cold War.  His election helped spur the seismic political shifts that rocked the European 
continent in the second half of 1989 and eventually end the Cold War.  How did this happen?  
Among scholars and the public at large, the prevailing view takes it to be something of a miracle.  
Padraic Kenney has written, “Descriptions of 1989 often mystify more than they reveal.  Even 
scholars who know the region very well resort to a bit of the supernatural to explain how 
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democracy and freedom emerge from the communist bloc.  In was a ‘year of miracles’ (or annus 
mirabilis) in which ‘people power’ ‘lit the night’.  Accounts of sudden miracles should make any 
historian suspicious.”487  Yet the miraculous view of popular protest lives on.  Recently, Paul 
Wilson penned a renewal of this shorthand explanation in The New York Review of Books.  The 
Polish communist party, he wrote, was “in effect, talked out of power by groups of dissidents 
and unofficial opposition leaders….[who] were emboldened by huge demonstrations in the 
streets”.488  This consensus holds a strong grip on historical memories because it appears to 
provide evidence of the influence that civil society can exert on totalitarian regimes.  It has 
survived as an explanation because of the unique historical narrative to which it provides a 
bookend – the Cold War in East-Central Europe.  Historians have long insulated the history of 
the Cold War in East-Central Europe from the history of economic change that swept the rest of 
the globe in the late 20th century.  This insulation has allowed the miraculous explanation of 
1989 to persist. 
 This chapter seeks to reincorporate Poland’s history into the history of the global 
economy, and in doing so, provide a new explanation of Poland’s political transition in 1989.  By 
the end of the 1980s, Poland owed its international creditors an incredible $39 billion, and was 
subject to the same demands as other debtor countries had been throughout the decade. The 
quartet of Western financial institutions – the Paris Club, the London Club, the IMF, and the 
World Bank - demanded that the government implement a “structural adjustment” program as a 
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prerequisite to any debt relief.489  The details of such a program will be described below, but it 
suffices now to note that it entailed a dramatic drop in living standards for the Polish population.  
In order to escape its economic crisis, the Polish government would have to impose austerity on 
its own people.  
 After years of unrest triggered by consumer price increases, Polish president Wojciech 
Jaruzelski and his leading cadre decided in 1989 that economic austerity would only be possible 
if it received broad support from society.  They therefore moved to grant limited political 
concessions to their opponents in exchange for the implementation of the government’s austerity 
plans.  From this strategy, the Round Table was born.  Jaruzelski hoped to thread a domestic and 
international needle:  gain domestic agreement on austerity, then receive international relief from 
the country’s debt burden, and only then, implement limited political liberalization.  In the event, 
political and economic liberalization happened in reverse, and communism collapsed in Poland.  
In June, the country held its first relatively free elections; in August, Mazowiecki became prime 
minister; and only in September, did Mazowieki’s Finance Minister, Leszek Balcerowicz, 
announce the eponymous economic plan that would radically transform the economy.  In 1989, 
parliamentary democracy and market capitalism successively arrived in Poland not because of a 
miraculous popular movement for change, but because of Western capitalists’ demand for 
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austerity and a failed government strategy for survival.  Seen in this light, 1989 becomes not an 
exceptional year that ended the Cold War, but one of many chapters in the global history of 
political change that travelled in the wake of sovereign debt. 
 
Global Debt and the IMF in the 1980s 
 As I discussed in the first two chapters, Poland and the countries of the Eastern Bloc 
partook in a global borrowing and lending binge that enveloped the global economy as 
governments adjusted to the two seminal economic shocks of the 1970s.  First, in 1971, the 
United States stopped defending the fixed value of the dollar to gold, which set off a sustained 
devaluation of the dollar and ushered in the era of floating exchange rates.  As the value of the 
dollar fell, the global money supply exploded, and inflation followed quickly.  Then, in late 
1973, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) embargoed oil shipments to 
Western countries in response to the United States’ and Western Europe’s support for Israel in 
the Yom Kippur War, quadrupling the price of oil from $3 to $12 a barrel.  The global economy 
was thrown into imbalance as oil exporting countries garnered enormous surpluses of US dollars 
and oil importing countries sank into balance of payments deficit as the price of their imports far 
outpaced the value of their exports.  Economists and policymakers struggled to find a way to 
“recycle” the “petrodollars” now in the hands of oil producers back into the coffers of oil 
importers.  International institutions, led by the IMF, created credit instruments to aid this 
adjustment process, but the vast majority of this recycling eventually took place through private 
Western commercial banks that accepted deposits from oil producers and then lent the money to 
countries around the world (including back to oil producers).  Awash in liquidity, the world’s 
financial markets became a financial Wild West in the 1970s and a cheap source of capital for 
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governments looking to borrow money in order to pad their domestic popularity by providing 
cheap consumer goods, housing, and energy.  While U.S. dollar inflation remained high 
throughout the 1970s, the real interest rate (nominal interest minus inflation) on sovereign loans 
hovered close to zero, further encouraging governments to avoid difficult policy choices and 
borrow from their future to please their present constituents.   Poland began the 1970s with a 
negligible national debt, but after riots shook the country in 1970, state leader Edward Gierek 
added his country to the global glut of borrowing in the hope of “relaunching” socialism and 
placating domestic foes.  Similar to many governments throughout the Global South, the Gierek 
regime used the borrowed capital to subsidize food, housing, and energy prices, raise workers’ 
wages, and launch extravagant investments in heavy industry.  
 Looking back on the decade of debt in 1983, the staff of the US National Security 
Council graphed the growth of global debt in the following way.  Less Developed Countries 
(LDCs) and Eastern Europe were pictured as part of the same history of the growth of sovereign 
debt.  When combined, LDCs and the Eastern Bloc had $775 billion in total debt, and owed 
about $140 billion in debt service by 1982.  Poland, with its $24 billion in debt, was the sixth 
largest debtor nation in the developing world. 
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Figures 1-3: Graphs from the National Security Council on the 
global debt burden in 1982, as the Sovereign Debt Crisis began to 
unfold.  They demonstrate that the NSC conceived of the Eastern 
Bloc as a special case in point of a larger global process, namely 
the borrowing glut that had unfolded since 1970.490 
 
 
 Bookended by economic shocks, the Roaring 70s of debt ground to a halt at the end of 
the decade through a tripartite jolt to the global economic system.  In October 1979, US Federal 
Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker announced a series of policies designed to restore credibility to 
the Fed’s commitment to lower inflation.  Through two years of extremely high interest rates in 
the United States, Volcker’s policy worked, and with it, the real interest rates on sovereign loans 
skyrocketed.  Volcker’s shock also sent the developed economies of the West into the deepest 
recession of the postwar period, thus eliminating the major export markets for the products of the 
developing world.  Finally, the depressed demand in industrialized nations that accompanied the 
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recession collapsed the high commodity prices of the 1970s upon which developing countries 
depended for hard currency.   
 The result was a perfect storm for global economic crisis.  Poland was one of the first 
countries to reach insolvency in the aftermath.  By 1981 the country’s debt sat at $24 billion, and 
the government was unable to pay back the loans maturing that year.  In the spring, it entered its 
first rescheduling agreements with Western governments and banks, and when General 
Jaruzelski declared martial law in December 1981, his government stood in de facto default on 
its debt obligations.  Poland’s inability to pay shook the confidence of Western banks in the 
entire process of sovereign lending, as it became clear that sovereign loans were not a riskless 
proposition.  Banks stopped making new loans to debtors so they could “roll over” the old ones, 
and the debt dominoes began to fall.  In 1982, the IMF and Western central banks had to bail out 
Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia, while the Soviet Union faced a temporary shortage of hard 
currency; and East Germany was desperate for new credits.  Then in August, the full scope of the 
crisis emerged when Mexico, the second largest sovereign debtor in the developing world, 
announced that it could not make its debt payments.  The two other cornerstones of the sovereign 
debt market, Argentina and Brazil, followed suit in the fall of 1982, and the global economy 
suddenly hung in the balance.  The financial magazine Bank Credit Analyst wrote, “Gradually, 
piece by piece, the international financial jigsaw puzzle is coming apart, and in the process 
destroying the assumptions on which it was built up in the first place.”491  By 1985, US Secretary 
of State George Schultz estimated that $100 billion in capital had fled from Latin America alone 
                                                     
491 Quoted in Norman Bailey to William Clark, “Bank Credit Analyst,” April 28, 1982, RAC 
Box 3, File “International Finance 4/20/1982-11/16/82, RRP, RRPL. 
  281 
since 1980.492  The history of how governments, international financial institutions, and banks 
responded to this crisis cannot be told here.  It is the implications of the collapse in sovereign 
lending that are most important for our purposes.  As Harold James has written, the sovereign 
lending bust “created a ‘debt trap’ from which those countries that had been ensnared found 
escape hard and very painful.”493 
 Into the breach stepped the International Monetary Fund.  By the late 1970s, the IMF had 
developed a principle (conditionality) and a process (structural adjustment) for dealing with 
debtor countries.  When the debtor reached insolvency and came to the Fund seeking assistance, 
the IMF would establish a structural adjustment program (called a standby agreement) that set 
out economic conditions that the debtor would have to meet before, during, and after IMF loans 
were dispensed.  In 1979, as the number of IMF adjustment programs grew in unison with the 
scale of the debt problem, the Fund published its Guidelines on Conditionality.  Noting that the 
Fund would “pay due regard to the domestic social and political objectives” of debtor 
governments, the conditionality guidelines had one primary goal, often referred to as 
“strengthening the country’s external position” or “achieving a current account surplus.”  So that 
foreign debts could be repaid, the IMF sought to make the debtor country a net exporter of 
capital within a year of the implementation of a standby agreement.  To achieve this singular 
goal, the Fund maintained a long list of policy prescriptions that affected every facet of a 
debtor’s economy: devaluing the national currency and eliminating exchange controls, 
eliminating the government budget deficit through cuts in investment and public subsidies, 
raising domestic interest rates to encourage domestic saving and halt inflation, privatizing state-
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owned industry, lowering import tariffs, eliminating domestic price and wage controls, 
strengthening bankruptcy laws to eliminate inefficient enterprises, and eliminating barriers to 
foreign investment.494  The IMF discussed these prescriptions in a language only familiar to 
economists.  Phrases such as “implementing demand restraint,” “eliminating liquidity overhang,” 
and “instituting a decline in the real wage” held fundamental importance to IMF economists, but 
appeared as an Orwellian shield of economic jargon to the populations on the receiving end of 
these policies.  What appeared as “eliminating market imbalances,” “introducing liberalization,” 
and “withstanding dislocative effects” on briefing memos in the Fund’s Washington, D.C. 
headquarters became crippling unemployment and price increases on the streets of Rio de 
Janeiro, Kingston, Manila, and eventually, Warsaw.  In 1989, the Solidarity leader Bronisław 
Geremek would lament to American representatives that the IMF had “a special language” that 
the union was struggling to understand, and it was this rigid economic nomenclature to which he 
referred.495  Nor was he alone.  As the IMF took on a larger role in the politics of developing 
countries during the 1980s, it was often accused of forcing the messy reality of life on the ground 
in a country to conform to its jargon-laden economic models.     
 In addition to erecting a barrier between the Fund’s policy recommendations and their 
humanitarian implications, the IMF’s jargon has also obscured the political implications of 
structural adjustment from all but a few Cold War historians (Latin Americanist and Africanist 
historians, by contrast, have long examined the political implications of the IMF’s policies 
through their varied studies of neoliberalism).  Put simply, structural adjustment toppled 
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governments.  As the debt crisis swept across Latin America, governments did all they could to 
avoid the cost of adjustment but it ultimately caught up with them.  Hal Brands has written, “The 
move toward economic liberalism entailed potentially severe social and political costs, and Latin 
American governments avoided paying this price as long as they could,” often by “leaving the 
truly wrenching decisions to the next government.”  Ultimately, though, few “dictatorial 
regimes…survived the fallout from economic disaster” caused by IMF-mandated austerity.  As 
one Brazilian business publication warned while the country faced economic crisis, “The dark 
clouds accumulating on the horizon…will only be dissipated with an authentic and democratic 
government.”496  Academic research since the 1980s has reinforced Brands’s conclusion that 
“democratization was the product of debt.”497  For the nations of the Eastern Bloc, the effects of 
sovereign debt proved to be no different. 
 
The Road to Reckoning 
 Like its dictatorial counterparts in Latin America, Poland’s communist government did 
its best to avoid the dramatic implications of the global debt crisis for as long as possible.  Cold 
War politics abetted their avoidance.  After the declaration of martial law in 1981, the 
administration of US President Ronald Reagan coordinated a credit blockade of Poland with its 
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Western European allies.  Western governments refused to grant Poland new credits or negotiate 
to reschedule its outstanding debts until the Jaruzelski government released all Solidarity 
members from prison and repealed martial law.  This served to both punish the Polish 
government (it had no access to new credits) while also relieving it of the worst consequences of 
debt (it did not need to pay back Western governments while they boycotted).  By 1985, the 
government had missed over $9.5 billion in payments to Western governments, but faced no 
punitive action for doing so.498 It was impossible for Western governments to do less than they 
were already doing.  Western commercial banks, less troubled by political considerations than 
their government counterparts, did everything they could to get their money back.  A general 
feeling of “acute suspicion” toward Poland’s economic prospects prevailed among the banks, 
and most of them sought to write down their Polish loans as losses, cut their exposure to the 
country, and run for more profitable hills elsewhere in the global economy.499  As an American 
banker put it in 1985, the banks’ strategy for Poland “focuses on draining the country of as much 
cash as possible.”500  This strategy resulted in four rescheduling agreements with the Polish 
government by 1985.  In each agreement, the banks rescheduled 95% of the loan principle, but 
received the interest payments from the government on time.  In addition, to prevent the 
government from walking away from the negotiating table or repudiating the debt outright, the 
banks provided minimal credits to Poland to fund limited amounts of international trade.  These 
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credits totaled about $0.9 billion annually from 1982-1984.501  Additionally, Western 
governments had guaranteed many of the banks’ loans during the period of international détente 
in order to encourage commerce and political goodwill across the Iron Curtain.  Thus, when 
Poland failed to pay a loan on time, a bank could simply turn the loan over to the government 
and receive payment in full.  All tolled, the banks’ strategy paid off handsomely: during the 
1980s it received an average annual “take out” of $2 billion each year in interest payments.502 
 The combination of Western governments’ refusal to negotiate on debt and the banks’ cut 
and run strategy dramatically restructured the composition of Poland’s debt.  At the height of the 
Polish crisis in 1981, banks held about two-thirds of Poland’s sovereign debt to the governments’ 
one-third.  By 1989, these ratios had switched, with the governments now holding two-thirds of 
what had grown to be $39 billion in debt.503  This transition in the composition of Poland’s 
creditors had one profound implication for the country’s negotiating position: it transformed the 
debtor/creditor relationship from one of interdependence to one of dependence.  In 1981, when 
the banks held $16 billion in exposure to Poland, they genuinely feared a Polish default because 
it could send them into bankruptcy.  A Polish default posed a systemic risk to the Western 
financial system.  But as more and more Polish debt moved from Western banks to Western 
governments, the Jaruzelski government lost the only power it had in its relationship with its 
creditors – the threat of mutually assured destruction.  Once governments held the majority of 
Polish debt and banks had limited their exposure, there was no financial reason for either banks 
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or governments to offer the country new credits.  If Poland did not pay back its loans on time (as 
happened throughout the decade) it caused Western governments little harm.  Unlike the banks’ 
balance sheets in 1981, the balance sheets of governments could withstand Poland’s failure to 
pay.  Governments could, and did, simply wait until Poland’s lack of access to global capital 
markets caught up with the government, and it was forced to negotiate on the terms dictated by 
Western states.  The terms of Western financial rapprochement appeared simple: come to an 
agreement with the IMF, and new money could begin to flow.  With the diversity of Western 
capitalist interests funneled into a single organization, the IMF’s relationship with the Polish 
government came to define Poland’s relationship with the West. 
 The extent of the banks’ disengagement and the governments’ disinterest in providing 
new credits was not at all clear to Poland’s Finance Ministry.  In fact, through the end of the 
decade, Polish officials consistently underestimated what it would take to regain the favor of 
both the governmental and financial communities.  It was as though they believed the collapse of 
the sovereign debt market in the early 1980s was a temporary break in the action on the capital 
markets that dominated the 1970s, rather than a fundamental reordering of how international 
finance was conducted.  The same went for government loan guarantee programs – it was only a 
matter of time, Polish officials believed, before Western governments would return to the 
policies of the 1970s.  In addition, the global nature of the debt problem led the Poles to believe 
that eventually Western nations and banks would decide to forgive large portions of sovereign 
debt.  The health of the global economy, it was believed, demanded it.  (In this belief, the Poles 
were not alone – many in the developing world called for such a policy).  One IMF memo noted 
that a segment of the Polish leadership believed the country could ignore its debt obligations 
“and hopefully the impatience of foreign creditors would be contained until such time as there 
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was a global solution to the debt problem.”  With the money saved from debt payments, the 
government could increase imports “and hopefully buy the continued acquiescence of the 
population.” At the time, the IMF concluded that this was not the predominant government 
policy – Polish officials had said all the right things about implementing austerity and reform.504  
But as the last years of the communist period unfolded, this is precisely the strategy the 
government pursued.  By delaying reform and waiting for the West to renew its financial 
largesse, the country fell into a deeper debt trap, as every new rescheduling agreement simply 
compounded maturing debt payments into new future obligations.  Thus, although the country’s 
debt burden grew from $24 billion to $39 billion from 1981 to 1989, Poland received virtually no 
new capital from the West during this period.  It was a strategy that would cost the government 
dearly.   
 The first sign of this strategy came in 1985, when Zbigniew Karcz, the Finance 
Ministry’s international representative, began negotiations anew with Western officials after the 
dark years following the declaration of martial law.  His expectations were wildly out of step 
with those of Western governments and the IMF.  Karcz told Western officials he expected a 
“full normalization” of financial relations with the West, which he defined as not only a full debt 
restructuring, but also $1.3 billion in new credits.  Additionally, he told his interlocutors he 
anticipated raising a fresh $500 million from Western banks.505  Making matters worse, the 
government had little understanding of the depth of reform that would be required before new 
money would be made available, or how to carry it out.  They did not speak the IMF’s “special 
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language.”  After recalling a meeting where Karcz had stated that the Finance Ministry could not 
raise interest rates until inflation had gone down, U.S. Treasury officials lamented to the IMF, 
“Polish officials simply did not grasp the essentials of a stabilization-cum-reform program.”506  
The Fund began accepting Polish economists to its courses for government officials because 
there was “a very real need to familiarize Polish officials at different levels with the theory and 
practice of ‘indirect’ methods of macroeconomic policy management.”507 
 The vast difference between Poland and its Western creditors crystallized in a long-
running debate between the two sides over a foundational IMF priority: the speed with which 
Poland would agree to move to current account surplus; or in other words, the year in which it 
would become a net exporter of capital.  When Poland rejoined the Fund in 1986, the 
government was in the midst of a highly touted “second stage” of economic reform that was 
meant to further the first set of reforms instituted after the declaration of martial law in 1981.  On 
paper, and thus also in government rhetoric, the second stage reforms aligned with the IMF’s 
vision for the country: the achievement of “market equilibrium” through price increases, subsidy 
reductions, tighter credit policies, liquidation of inefficient and energy-intensive enterprises, and 
the reduction of price and foreign exchange controls.   Privately, the Fund would come to deride 
the government’s effort as “a shopping list…put together very quickly” that made no attempt at 
“quantification” and paid “only lip service to external sector objectives.”508  Publicly, the Fund 
reported that it had a “good deal of sympathy” with the goals of the second stage, but criticized 
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the government for devoting “much more attention to the statement of objectives than to the 
means of their attainment.”509  The problem was politics.  In the fall of 1986, Fund economists 
reported after a trip to Warsaw, “there was a rather intense debate…currently in process inside 
the Polish government, in connection with the finalization of the Five Year Plan for 1986-90, on 
the further course of economic policy.”  The staff disappointedly reported, “the variants of the 
plan discussed so far appear to portend no significant current account adjustment – in fact there 
is a possibility of some deterioration.”  Fund representatives told the government this was 
“inappropriate and unsatisfactory.”510  Karcz responded a few weeks later.  Indeed, difficulty 
“lay ahead in the practical application of general principles,” and the government would try to 
reduce subsidies on “coal, milk, and foreign trade.” But as an experienced Polish bureaucrat who 
had lived through the birth of Solidarity in the early 1980s, Karcz feared the “social tensions in 
response to the associated price increases.”511 
 So did the West.  American officials “feared an adverse social reaction in Poland to the 
measures which a Fund program would have to contain,” and the IMF recognized that its policies 
needed to account for “the bounds dictated by the political and social constraints of a country.”512  
In fact, the Fund viewed its challenge in Poland as a negotiation between the demands of capital 
and labor.  Hans Schmitt, a staff member in the IMF’s European department, wrote in 1986 that 
for structural adjustment to be “tenable in Poland it must be acceptable both to bankers abroad 
                                                     
509 Prust to Whittome, “Poland – Your Meeting and Lunch with Mr. Krowacki and Colleagues,” 
April 28, 1987, Box 24, File 1, EUR DCCF, IMF. 
510 “Draft Statement for the Paris Culb – Tour d’Horizon Discussion on Poland,” Sept. 11, 1986, 
Box 24, File 1, EUR DCCF, IMF. 
511 Memorandum for Files, “Poland – Meeting with Polish Delegation to Annual Meetings,” Oct. 
2, 1986, Box 24, File 1, EUR DCCF, IMF. 
512 “Adverse social reaction” in Prust to Whittome, “Poland – Paris Club Meeting,” April 3, 
1987, Box 24, File 1, EUR DCCF, IMF.  “The bounds…” in Memorandum for Files, “Poland: 
Price Realignments – A Review of Issues for Discussion,” Oct. 9, 1986, EUR DCCF, IMF.   
  290 
and labor at home. At the moment the requirements of each seem to be incompatible with one 
another.”  The incompatibility stemmed from a fundamental difference in the direction that 
capital and labor wanted money to flow across Poland’s borders.  The banks (and governments), 
seeking to recoup their investment, wanted to establish conditions in Poland that would allow for 
a sustainable outflow of capital from the country.  Labor, seeking to improve its plight after years 
of economic hardship, wanted capital to remain in the country.  Schmitt noted this difference in 
his memorandum.  “Bankers require a surplus on external current account large enough to ensure 
the progressive repayment of debt, and an adjustment in domestic demand (and in wages) large 
enough to produce it.”  On the other hand, “labor requires a minimum growth in wages (and in 
domestic demand) and a deficit on external current account large enough to finance any shortfall 
in GDP to support it.”  The IMF, he concluded, “need[s] to find where, if anywhere, the twain 
can meet.” 513 
 The Fund was acquainted with the interests of Polish labor because of its communication 
with Solidarity, which began in 1985.  Solidarity leader Bronisław Geremek eventually had to 
remind Western officials that Solidarity was “probably the only labor union in the world” that 
welcomed its nation’s membership in the IMF.514  Indeed, it had.  But it had done so while also 
registering its opposition to austerity measures that would result in a drop in Polish living 
standards.  Through its Coordinating Office Abroad in Brussels, the Solidarity leadership 
informed the IMF that it would “come out strongly against measures leading to the substantial 
reduction of consumption, increases of prices, freezes on real wages or deterioration in social 
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care.”  The organization’s stand against these measures came not from “a trade union bias,” but 
instead out of the belief that such policies would “increase the danger of an uncontrolled social 
explosion.”  Despite its misgivings about austerity, Solidarity hoped that the IMF’s powers of 
conditionality could lead to significant changes in government policy.  The attachment of 
“political conditions” to Poland’s use of IMF resources, the group wrote, was “absolutely 
essential.”  Specifically, the Solidarity leadership encouraged the IMF to embrace their long-
standing policy goal of trade union pluralism – the right of workers to establish and join 
organizations of their own choosing.  Since the declaration of martial law in December 1981, the 
government had outlawed Solidarity and only allowed workers to join the government-controlled 
unions, the All Polish Trade Unions Agreement (Polish acronym, OPZZ).  The reintroduction of 
trade union pluralism, Solidarity wrote, would “ensure an atmosphere and mechanisms for 
peaceful conflict-resolution in enterprises” and avoid the bouts of labor unrest that had 
sporadically struck Poland throughout the postwar period.   
 The IMF did not normally pursue political conditionality, particularly when it would 
result in an increase in the bargaining power of labor, and the discrepancy between political and 
economic conditionality would come to play a significant role in the history of 1989.  But in 
other areas, Solidarity documents read as though IMF officials had in fact written them.  First, 
with regard to Poland’s investment policy, the Solidarity committee declared that IMF funds 
should only be invested in “the manufacture of goods exportable to Western markets, because 
only then the real efficiency can be assessed.”  The communist government was intent on 
restarting the “programme of the 1970’s, which envisaged [the] building of big, inefficient 
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factories” that could not produce internationally competitive products.515  If these investments 
continued, the Solidarity commission (and the IMF) feared that it “may lead to the petrifaction of 
the obsolete and inefficient structure of production” that led the country into its economic 
quagmire.516  Second, both Solidarity and the IMF wanted the government to guarantee equal 
treatment of all sectors of the economy – the private, cooperative, and public.  Third, both 
organizations wanted to end the state monopoly of the banking system and instead create 
“autonomous, self-financing commercial banks.”  Ultimately, to the Solidarity committee, it 
appeared as though its long-term goals aligned well with IMF. “Solidarity would like to see 
Poland in the IMF,” they wrote, because “it would be more beneficial for the country to be 
bound with the West” than with the inefficient Soviet trade bloc, Comecon.517 
 Nevertheless, the impasse between labor and capital remained.  Increasingly, capitalists 
in the West concluded that it would require a political solution.  Specifically, it would require 
political legitimacy in Poland.  Paul McCarthy, a Vice President of Chemical Bank in New York 
responsible for relations with the Eastern Bloc, wrote a prescient article in 1986 that laid out the 
challenges facing Poland from the perspective of an international banker.  “The future actions of 
Western lenders are interrelated with Poland’s handling of its domestic difficulties,” McCarthy 
wrote.  “New money will be unlikely until the Polish government can assure political stability.  
Political stability cannot be guaranteed unless the government can fundamentally overhaul the 
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economy….The economy cannot be structurally reformed without the support of the Polish 
people and workforce.”  If he could make this logical digression, McCarthy assumed Jaruzelski 
could as well.  And with the political implications of seeking the support of the Polish people all 
too clear, McCarthy feared Jaruzelski would be reluctant to undertake reform at all. This was 
where the IMF could play the vital role of catalyst.  “The IMF has a major bargaining chip,” 
McCarthy wrote, “in that it controls the single commodity that Poland currently needs the most 
and is least able to attain.  The Fund can provide substantial credits, ranging to $700 million 
annually.”  Moreover, “IMF loans could begin attracting new credits from banks and 
governments.”  Only with the credibility of an IMF standby agreement could the Polish 
government “refocus the efforts and interests of Western commercial banks on an economic 
growth approach.”  But Western creditors would only change once Jaruzelski gained domestic 
legitimacy for austerity.  McCarthy saw a fundamental connection between structural adjustment 
and political reform.  “If Jaruzelski seeks reform without enfranchising the major constituencies, 
he risks failure.  Meaningful reform will require the support of the Polish people, as further 
substantial cuts in living standards would be inevitable.” 518 
 By early 1987, the Fund was making a timid version of this point to Polish officials.  In 
February, the Managing Director, Jacque de Larosiere, sat down to lunch with the President of 
the Polish National Bank, Wladysław Baka.  Baka reprised the now familiar refrain of the Polish 
government.  There “were no major differences of substance between his Government and the 
Fund,” but Baka believed the Fund wanted Poland to move too fast to current account surplus.  
There were “major political and social obstacles” to austerity, and therefore “it was unrealistic to 
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look for a reduction in consumption.”  Instead, Poland and the IMF should try to grow their way 
out of the current economic problems.  The solution “had to rest on a rapid growth in exports,” 
but this would require “a more modern capital stock and a higher level of imports,” which in turn 
would require new credits from the West.519  Despite Baka’s assertions to the contrary, then, 
there were substantial differences between Poland and the Fund.  Baka told Fund officials after 
the meeting that before the government attempted a domestic austerity program that risked a 
social explosion, it planned to further test the limits of Western resistance to providing new 
credits.  Baka and the government continued to believe they could get both debt relief and new 
credits from the West.520  Indeed, the growth-oriented course that Baka advocated remained 
precisely the opposite of the austerity-laden course favored by the Fund.  De Larosiere admitted 
the government was in a tough position, but both Western governments and banks favored 
austerity, and thus it needed to be “implemented boldly (preferably in one stroke)” in order to 
convince them “that policies in Poland had changed radically for the better.”  This would not be 
easy, and it needed to be “acceptable to the population.”  Thus, “some preparation of public 
opinion would be necessary.”521 
 
Attempting Austerity without Political Legitimacy 
 By the summer of 1987, General Jaruzelski had begun to agree with the Fund that public 
opinion needed to be primed.  At the end of July, he gave an interview to The Wall Street 
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Journal in which he discussed the challenges facing his country.  “As we’ve learned in the past,” 
he began, “even the most beautiful and well-constructed decisions and intentions, if they do not 
command the support of society, they fail.”  Therefore, he was considering calling a national 
referendum on “painful but imperative” steps aimed at bringing the nation into “economic 
equilibrium,” including price hikes, subsidy cuts, and the elimination of the present “centralistic 
[economic] model that hasn’t passed the test of time.”  He cautioned the paper that the 
referendum was only a personal “thought” at present, not official government policy, but he 
stated his conviction to implement a new economic system by January 1, 1988.  The general also 
took the opportunity to reproach the Reagan administration and the IMF for their unflinching 
refusal to grant the new credits that Jaruzelski believed were necessary to spur the economic 
growth required to pay the debt back.  “The question is, can a hen that isn’t fed actually lay 
eggs?” he asked rhetorically, “When no effort is made to meet us half way…my conclusion is 
that all this activity is intentional and masterminded.”522  
 Notwithstanding the poultry-laced rebuke, Jaruzelski wanted the interview to signal to the 
IMF that public opinion preparations were underway.  In a meeting with Fund representatives the 
day after the interview appeared, a Polish official said the referendum would “muster support for 
economic reform and austerity measures,” and that the timing of the interview “was 
influenced…by hopes of a program with the Fund.”523  There were pressing domestic reasons to 
propose the referendum as well.  In the years following martial law, the economy had modestly 
rebounded from its crisis low point, and the government had constructed a national narrative of 
economic progress to justify its repression.  By 1987, the illusion of progress had faded, and a 
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renewed deterioration in the economy was having a stark impact on society.  An internal 
government report from August 1987 warned, “Generally, anxiety is rising due to the prolonged 
economic crisis.  The opinion is spreading that the economy instead of improving is getting 
worse.  As a result, an ever greater dissonance arises between the so-called official optimism of 
the authorities (‘after all, it’s better [now]’) and the feeling of society.”  Furthermore, “the 
opinion is spreading that the government has only one ‘prescription,’ i.e. price increases.  
Against this background the mood of dissatisfaction is strongest among the workers.”  In such a 
situation, the report saw Solidarity waiting to pounce.   From the union’s perspective, “each 
action by the authorities in the economic sphere will be favorable to the opposition…a full 
implementation of reform…will result in a temporary decline in purchasing power, layoffs, etc.”  
Thus, “the adversary has come to the conclusion that it does not have to bother much – it is 
enough to sustain a mood of justified anger and wait and join, at the right moment, the eruption 
of dissatisfaction, as in 1980.”524 
 Best then to head off the dissatisfaction before the eruption.  By the fall, the referendum 
had been officially set for the end of November.  To their surprise, however, Polish officials 
found the IMF hesitant about the move.  In a meeting with Politburo member Marian Woźniak, 
IMF official L.A. Whittome declared the referendum “a decision laden with heavy risk and 
probably unwise.” Woźniak explained that the government believed it had little choice; it could 
not rely on the official trade unions, the OPZZ, to support price and wage changes.  In addition, 
“the credibility of the Party was not adequately strong nor was it easy to persuade the Party of 
the need to make such revolutionary changes.”  The leadership therefore “faced a vacuum and 
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chose a referendum.”  Looking back on the 1970s, Woźniak lamented that the government had 
not taken up reform earlier.  “Events were too favorable and there seemed to be no need to 
change,” he said.  The easy credit of the Roaring 70s had propelled procrastination.  Even at this 
late hour, Woźniak told Whittome of significant resistance to reform within the leadership.  
Whittome reported back to Washington, “The debates in the Politburo had been heated but [the 
leadership] had had some support from the Russians and certainly without Mr. Gorbachev’s 
policies the [proposed] reforms could not have been so bold.”525 
 To signal just how bold the reforms would be, Jaruzelski instituted a “spectacular 
reorganization” of the central state apparatus before the vote.  This included the elimination of 
seven state ministries and a reduction of the country’s deep ranks of deputy prime ministers to 
three.  When referendum day came, citizens were asked two vague questions about “restoring the 
economy to a healthy state” and instituting “a far reaching democratization of political life.”  The 
government set a high threshold for success: a majority of all people eligible to vote, not merely 
those who actually voted, would be required for the referendum to pass.  This made Solidarity’s 
role as the disloyal opposition easy to play.  The union simply encouraged people not to vote or 
vote “two times no.”  In the event, turnout was officially reported at 65%, with 66% of 
respondents favoring action on the first question and 69% favoring action on the second.  After a 
round of national math, it became clear that the authorities had lost their bid for society’s 
blessing by about 5%.526 
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 In true authoritarian fashion, the government did not let defeat in referendum deter it 
from its reform plans.  Jaruzelski told the Central Committee and the press in December that the 
referendum results did not indicate that the population did not want reform.  Rather, he said, “a 
significant and important part of the society has doubts and fears” about the pace of change.  
Despite these societal misgivings, “reforms are a fact of life.”  Thus, instead of “a one-stroke 
radical restructuring,” reform would be carried out over three years and with more attention paid 
to the interests of workers.527  Instead of raising food prices by 40%, the government now 
planned to raise them 27% early in 1988.528  And in a nod to that rather significant portion of 
society with “doubts and fears,” the official trade union was allowed to negotiate a wage increase 
for its workers so that labor would “be fully compensated for cost-of-living increases.”529   
 While the government sought domestic legitimacy at home with the referendum, its 
financial representatives sought debt relief abroad.  In December 1987, the Finance Ministry 
signed a major rescheduling agreement with the Paris Club of government creditors that deferred 
for five years payment on roughly $10 billion in delinquent debt payments that the country had 
accrued since 1986.530  Due to the nature of Paris Club agreements, the multilateral agreement 
signed in the French capital only took effect once a debtor signed bilateral agreements with each 
of its creditors.  Thus, even though the agreement was signed, much work remained to be done to 
seal the deal.  The devil, and Poland’s hopes for debt relief, was in the bilateral details.  Since 
Poland had signed its first rescheduling agreement in 1981, the government had continuously 
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maintained that the interest rates charged on rescheduled debt were exploitative and had 
demanded rate reductions.  Until 1987, this demand had come to no avail.  Now, with the 1987 
agreement in hand and domestic reform beginning to take shape for 1988, the government made 
one final stand.  Reflecting the unrealistic expectations it had maintained since 1985, the Finance 
Ministry pressed Western states, and particularly West Germany, to soften the interest rates 
charged on the debt.   
 It proved to be a miserable failure.  By March 1988, the Polish demand for rate cuts led 
the Paris Club to conclude that the country “was not seriously trying to reach agreement.”531 By 
April, the Poles had added the demand that new credits be attached to the bilateral agreements, 
leading to “fruitless” negotiations with West Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and 
Spain.532  The problem with the Polish strategy was its disregard for Western nations’ concerns 
about setting precedent.  In debt negotiations, Poland was just one of many countries with which 
the West had to deal, so any concession granted to Poland would inevitably have to be granted to 
other debtors.  On top of that, the West already considered its previous reschedulings with 
Poland “unusually generous debt relief.”533  This made Poland’s requests nonstarters.  Even 
Western governments favorably inclined to support reform in the Eastern Bloc, such as West 
Germany, quickly disposed of the Polish proposals.  And yet the Poles continued to make them.  
As late as September 1988, no progress had been made on signing the bilateral rescheduling 
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agreements because the Polish delegation continued the “same impossible refrain” of lower 
interest rates and new credits.534  The Poles could tell themselves that they were the “‘whipping 
horse’ for U.S. animosity to the Soviet Union,” but Western intransigence had much more to do 
with the desire to hold firm in relations with the developing world than it did with fighting the 
Cold War.535 
 The government’s reform efforts at home faired little better than their search for relief 
abroad.  Instead of bringing prices closer to market-clearing levels, the higher prices and wages 
implemented after the referendum set off an inflationary spiral.  Sensing that prices would keep 
moving higher, many workers believed the wage increases were not enough.  So in late April and 
early May, strikes ripped through the country.  By June 1988, prices and wages were expected to 
rise 55% and 60%, respectively, for the year.  This meant that far from declining, as the 
government hoped and the IMF demanded, the real wage of Polish workers was actually rising 
by about 5%.536  Fund officials noted “a deep resistance to change” among the population and 
doubted that the government could withstand “the transitional costs” of economic reform.537 
 Thus, over the summer of 1988, IMF officials changed their tune.  Instead of simply 
encouraging the government to “prepare public opinion,” Fund officials started to suggest, and 
indeed demand, that the government build a “social consensus” around reform.  On June 27, 
1988, the Managing Director, now Michel Camdessus, suggested to the visiting Polish Deputy 
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Prime Minister, Zdzislaw Sadowski, that “increased popular participation in political decision-
making might…reconcile the population to the sacrifices required for economic stabilization.”538  
Sadowski equivocated in response, but IMF officials persisted throughout the summer months.  
After the staff got wind of Polish “discussions of the linkages of economic and political reforms” 
in July,539 the Deputy Managing Director told the Polish foreign minister that “socio-political 
issues” could become a concern of the IMF Executive Board “if they were seen to impinge on 
the viability of the proposed economic program.”540  At the country’s annual meeting with the 
Executive Board in September, directors of the Fund pressed the government to build a “social 
consensus” around a decline in real wages for Polish workers.541 
 Polish workers had other ideas.  On August 15th, miners at the Manifest Lipcowy coal 
mine went on strike, and soon, work halted at many other mines and ports across the country.  
Fearing that it was losing control of the country, the government reached out to Solidarity on 
August 20th to begin exploratory talks on how the two sides could begin a dialogue.  By August 
27th, the Interior Minister Czesław Kiszczak announced the authorities’ willingness to engage 
“representatives of a variety of social and occupational groups.”  On August 31st, the eight-year 
anniversary of the Gdańsk Agreement that had orignally legalized Solidarity, Kiszczak sat down 
with Lech Wałęnsa.  After Wałęnsa committed to halting the strikes currently underway, he and 
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Kiszczak set about planning a collaborative process of political and economic reform.  The 
roundtable was born.542 
 
Trading Austerity for Democracy, but Forgetting the Austerity 
 In the early 1990s, General Jaruzelski reviewed the course of events that had led to his 
personal downfall and the end of communist rule in Poland.  He concluded, “the economic 
failures of 1987-1989 convinced us that our methods were ineffective.  Without letting into the 
power system the so-called constructive opposition, we were unable to overcome social 
resistance to necessary economic reforms.  With this realization a rapid process was launched 
which led us to the round table.”543   From the government’s standpoint, the logic of the 
roundtable was simple.  As the Finance Minister told the IMF,  “the main purpose of the round 
table talks is to offer a political concession so as to facilitate the implementation of the 
authorities’ economic plans” (underlining original).544  The new strategy envisioned 
simultaneous progress on both the domestic and international levels, and called for economic 
austerity to precede political change.  Domestically, the government would co-opt the opposition 
into supporting austerity, and only then offer political concessions.  The American ambassador in 
Warsaw wrote in January, “The authorities, facing seemingly intractable problems and in 
desperate need for broad social support, want to rope the opposition into accepting 
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coresponsibility for the painful measures required.  They do not want to govern alone.”545  The 
problem, as party member Aleksander Kwasniewski put it, was that “economic change requires 
many years, while political reforms are faster and easier to implement.”546  It was a problem the 
government would spectacularly fail to solve. 
 Internationally, Polish officials updated their excessive optimism about financial relations 
with the West to fit the new circumstances: with the roundtable underway, surely the West would 
finally offer new credits and debt relief in support of the evident political progress.  Here was the 
government’s final, critical error in dealing with the West.  Despite the decades of Cold War 
rhetoric about human rights, political freedom, and democracy, Western purse strings were not 
responsive to political changes.  Money moved when economic conditionality was met.  Simply 
holding elections or legalizing opposition groups would not change Western policy.  Polish 
officials from both the government and Solidarity misunderstood the true nature of Western 
priorities, and were therefore dumbfounded when Solidarity’s legalization and parliamentary 
elections did not deliver them from the West’s financial straightjacket.  For this mistake, 
however, they cannot be faulted – as will be shown below, even State Department officials could 
not understand why Western governments did not embrace Poland’s political transformation. 
 As 1988 turned to 1989, Solidarity was reluctant to play ball with the government’s 
attempt to co-opt their position in society.  The leadership hesitated to participate in the political 
process because it understood the challenges that would accompany economic reform.  In 
January 1989, as the country prepared for the roundtable, Solidarity members often expressed a 
desire to suppress the movement’s political ambitions and focus on protecting the interests of 
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Polish workers under austerity.  Zbigniew Romaszewski, a member of the national leadership 
commission, told a crowd in Poznan in early 1989, “political pluralism can wait, and in any case 
it is better pursued by others.”   The union, Romaszewski believed, should focus on achieving 
economic justice in the workplace as the country transitioned to “early capitalism” and softening 
the blow of the inevitable disruptions that would accompany the economic restructuring that lay 
ahead.  In contrast to the union’s previous focus on strikes to improve their workers’ plight, 
Romanszewski now envisioned Solidarity programs emblematic of the startling labor mobility 
that would arise under capitalism: skill retraining, employment counseling, reimbursing 
relocation expenses, and administering small loans for the temporarily unemployed.547  
Bronisław Geremek agreed that Solidarity’s focus should remain on its trade union activity, but 
also noted that political participation in reform was the “price they must pay” for the 
government’s decision to legalize the union.  Andrzej Stelmachowski believed it was necessary 
to “rebuild the social fabric” of the nation through the construction of a new political culture of 
clubs, associations, and political parties before the arrival of political pluralism.  The American 
embassy in Warsaw noted the irony of having “a totalitarian regime begging for opposition 
participation in governing the country, while the opposition resists pressure to become 
involved.”548 
 Before begging Solidarity, Jaruzelski first had to beg the Central Committee to go along 
with the roundtable. Wałęnsa had agreed to undertake the roundtable process on the condition 
that Solidarity, which had been officially outlawed since the martial law declaration in 1981, 
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could retake its position in society.  In practice, this meant legalizing (or relegalizing) the trade 
union.549  Much of the Central Committee, the vast majority of the party rank-in-file, and 
particularly the state-sponored unions stridently resisted this prospect.  After many heated 
debates at the January meeting of the Central Committee, Jaruzelski and three of his top advisors 
offered their resignations if the committee did not want to move ahead with legalization.  After a 
vote, Jaruzelski prevailed, and plans for legalizing Solidarity after the roundtable was completed 
moved ahead.550 
 The roundtable opened with a large plenary session on February 6, 1989, but the 
substantive negotiations were immediately divided into three working groups: one to debate the 
specifics of trade union pluralism; one to negotiate political reforms; and one to discuss social 
and economic policy.  Wałęnsa and Kiszczak had decided on two foundational points of 
agreement that would guide the discussion in the Trade Union and Political Reform Tables for 
the first month of negotiations.  First, Solidarity would be legalized, not relegalized, so that the 
government did not have to admit that martial law was a mistake.  And second, partially free 
elections would be held for the Sejm to ensure that the party retained control of the chamber but 
that Solidarity received a substantial minority.  Difficult and important negotiations took place at 
the Trade Union and Political Reform Tables to finalize these two points, but they will not be 
discussed in detail here, except as they pertain to the economic reform discussions.  No similar 
agreement was reached between the two leaders with regard to the economy.  Given the 
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difficulty of reforming the economy, this was no surprise.  Nevertheless, as the Economic 
Reform Table opened, it had none of the momentum that underlay the budding progress in trade 
union and political reform. 
 Despite their recognition and acceptance of the austerity that would necessarily come in 
the future, Solidarity officials pursued a policy at the roundtable meant to maintain their 
credibility with Polish labor.  Their credibility was in question because Alfred Miodowicz, the 
irascible leader of the OPZZ, had begun to position the state-sponsored unions as the only 
remaining bastion of resistance in Polish society to the imposition of international capitalist 
exploitation.  In this role, Miodowicz posed an equal threat to the PZPR and Solidarity. The State 
Department reported on the eve of the roundtable, Miodowicz “can represent himself as the only 
true defender of workers’ rights against a cabal seeking to introduce free enterprise and impose 
wage restraints.”551  In the Economic Reform Table discussions to come, representatives from 
the PZPR and Solidarity would have to be ever mindful of the ironic prospect that the state-
sponsored OPZZ, which had long appeared to be a naked tool of government manipulation, 
might actually win the hearts and minds of Polish workers. 
 Thus, as the three major parties in the negotiations – the PZPR, Solidarity, and the OPZZ 
– sat down to negotiate economic reforms, all three had scant interest in making concessions.  
Wladysław Baka, the former head of the national bank and now the party’s representative at the 
Economic Reform Table, opened the discussion by inviting “innovative proposals on the 
economy” and proposed that the group be split into two subcommittees - one to address price and 
wage policy and another to address the country’s foreign debt problem.  Solidarity’s 
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representative, Witold Trzeciakowski, protested initially that the foreign debt was the 
government’s problem, and instead focused his proposal on demonopolizing the market, 
strengthening worker self-management, cutting the defense and internal security budget, and 
eliminating the nomenklatura system of preferential job placement for members of the 
communist party.  He also introduced the issue that would come to define the debate in the 
committee: indexing wages across the country to the rate of inflation.  Wage indexation was 
Solidarity’s answer to the chronic problem of strikes.  If wages could be guaranteed to move in 
tune with prices, the union believed it could both reinforce its credentials as a protector of labor 
and head off a “pay race” between different sectors of the economy.552 
 It was not to be.  According to government figures, there were 173 strikes in January 
1989.  Just as the Economic Reform Table was convening in Warsaw on February 8th, coal 
miners in Belchatow went on strike for higher wages, and management caved to their demands 
two days later.  Because it coincided with the opening of the roundtable economic discussions, 
the strike served as a warning to all parties involved that workers would not let their interests be 
negotiated away behind closed doors.  By February 15th, there were roughly a dozen strikes 
going on across the country.553  Both Solidarity and the PZPR attempted to minimize the 
significance of the strikes to their ongoing economic work at the roundtable, with the union 
going so far as to actively and vocally discourage workers from striking.  Speaking to reporters 
in Gdańsk, Walesa told the nation, “every Pole has good reasons to strike,” but warned, “Europe 
and the world are racing forward.  If we start to get involved in the melees, in hustling strikes 
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along….we risk becoming Europe’s and the world’s backyard.”554  Sensing further opportunity 
to position himself and the OPZZ as the true defender of Polish labor, Miodowicz expressed no 
such qualms about the consequences of strikes, and actively encouraged the perception that the 
OPZZ stood behind much of the labor resistance during the roundtable negotiations.  
 With unrest swirling around them, the negotiators in the Economic Reform Table set to 
work.  With Solidarity refusing to become involved in the foreign debt problems of the 
government, the discussion at the second meeting of the group focused on Solidarity’s proposal 
to index wages to inflation.  Against the backdrop of strikes across the nation and ever-increasing 
inflation, neither the government nor the OPZZ was in a position to directly oppose indexation.  
Thus, the discussion hinged on the level at which wages would be indexed.  As the parties 
continued to negotiate, they slowly moved toward agreement on indexing wages at 80% of the 
inflation rate.555    
 Negotiations on prices were another matter entirely. At the second meeting of the 
working group, Deputy Prime Minster Kazimierz Olesiak called on classic tropes on liberal 
economic theory when introducing a proposal to free the retail price of food and the price for 
farm industry inputs, such as machinery and fertilizer.   “Freeing up the prices of farm produce,” 
he told a gathering of the press after the meeting, “will provoke competition and, as a result, 
production and supply of food will grow.”  For Solidarity, resisting price increases and 
demanding wage increases were two sides of the same coin in its quest to maintain legitimacy in 
the eyes of Polish labor.  They therefore balked at the government’s proposal, and a 
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representative later told the American embassy that “taking responsibility for the food price 
issue” made the Solidarity leadership “very nervous.”  Nevertheless, they also knew that prices 
would have to be liberalized in any final economic agreement, and this liberalization would 
inevitably mean higher living costs for Polish citizens.  Thus, in response to the government 
promotion of the benign effects of competition under market capitalism, Solidarity turned to the 
rationale that underlay the modern welfare state – the use of government spending to 
accommodate the unemployment and poverty inflicted by market dynamism.  “Food stamps,” the 
Solidarity negotiating team told the working group, should accompany any price 
liberalization.556  
 Similar dynamics affected the working group’s negotiations over housing policy.  
Housing in Poland had long been a national disaster, and it grew worse with each passing year.  
By the late 1980s, Poles had to wait twenty years to move into an apartment of their own. 
Twenty-year waitlists constituted a problem that transcended political differences, so everyone at 
the working group table agreed that radical reform was necessary.  Because of heavy government 
subsidy, housing prices had long ago stopped reflecting the social value and economic cost of the 
property.  There was thus little incentive for construction firms to build new housing at a faster 
pace.  To everyone at the roundtable, the solution was both obvious and painful – raise the price 
of housing.  As with so many other areas of the economy, however, this solution would hurt 
millions of Polish citizens and force Solidarity to abandon its traditional labor interests.  
Aleksander Paszynski, the Solidarity negotiator in charge of housing policy, noted the 
contradictions of reform.  Solidarity would have to “brutally” tell society that the era of cheap 
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housing was over, and instead work to provide a social “safety net.”  He lamented the apparent 
trade off between “equity and efficiency,” and told American officials, “as trade unionists, 
Solidarity leaders support higher wages and maintaining standards of living, but as supporters of 
economic reform, they find themselves backing higher prices and higher rents, even if this leads 
to greater income disparities.” Solidarity, he concluded, would have to gamble that “more roofs” 
might offset dissatisfaction with “higher rents.” 557 
 Without concrete proposals to discuss, however, the gambles of the working group were 
made without real money and real commitments.  One party at the roundtable needed to take the 
initiative of committing concrete proposals to paper and introducing them for discussion.  At the 
third session of the working group, Baka took such a leap.  Amidst proposed changes in wages, 
prices, and housing, Baka’s draft contained one glaring flaw in the eyes of Solidarity’s 
representatives, a flaw that signaled the ultimate overlap between the economic and political 
negotiations taking place during the roundtable process.  The proposal contained no way for 
Solidarity to participate in the implementation of the agreement, but instead left control in the 
hands of the government. “If we are to sign a social accord,” Trzeciakowski said, “We must 
control its implementation.” The Economic Reform Table, Trzeciakowski reminded his 
tablemates, was not isolated from the work of the trade union and political working groups.  The 
three were instead deeply intertwined.  “A fundamental condition of [an agreement] is 
participation by society in decision-making.”558  This point of contention would outlive the 
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roundtable negotiations.  Ultimately, Solidarity would not agree to any substantive economic 
plan until it had control of the government.  
 By the end of February, the list of complicated interwoven issues had grown so long that 
Trzeciakowski facetiously told the American economic counselor that he was “ready to quit.”  
With the leadership of the OPZZ warning the public of a Solidarity-PZPR pact to sell out 
socialism and impose austerity, government and Solidarity officials had agreed to the 80% wage 
indexation even as they worried it would only increase inflationary pressure. Their economic 
judgment cautioned against such a move, but their precarious political credibility demanded it.  
Beyond wage indexation, however, neither side showed a willingness to sacrifice its core 
interests: Solidarity continued to resist freeing agricultural prices, while the government 
continued to resist cuts in military and investment spending and a reform of the nomenklatura 
system of party favoritism.   Moreover, the government continued to spurn Solidarity’s demand 
for a consultative Economic Coordinating Council to implement the accord.  This left 
Trzeciakowski fearing that no agreement would emerge from the economic committee to match 
the agreements that had begun to emerge from the trade union and political committees.559  
Indeed, had it not been for the progress being made at the trade union and political roundtables, 
the Solidarity economic team likely would have walked out of the Economic Reform Table after 
a few weeks.560 
 In the best tradition of diplomatic negotiation, the solution to stalemate was to place hope 
in the remedial powers of subcommittees.  The Economic Reform Table formed five: economic 
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policy, wage indexation, property rights, cooperation in the implementation of the accord, and 
strategies for foreign debt.  Solidarity entered the roundtable negotiations with a firm belief that 
the country’s foreign debt was the government’s problem, but it had discovered along the way 
that the debt was its “carrot” in the negotiations.  The government wanted Solidarity’s support 
internationally, and this gave the union leverage at the roundtable.  Furthermore, their economic 
discussions in the first month of the roundtable had made clear that domestic reform was doomed 
to failure without debt relief.  And so, in an astonishing turn, the union threw its support behind 
strategy that would have seemed unthinkable just months earlier: making a joint appeal with the 
government for debt relief from the West.561  Taking his cues from the Finance Ministry, 
Andrzej Topinski, a leading Solidarity economist participating in the talks, told the American 
embassy that “there would be no progress on Poland’s foreign debt unless Western governments 
took the initiative” to ease repayment terms.562     
 With the roundtable unfinished, however, officials in Washington at both the IMF and the 
State Department did not let the newly united front distract them from the continued lack of 
austerity.  US Undersecretary of State Tom Simons told a visiting Polish finance official, that the 
main problem in the roundtable appeared to be “the concern over the amount of responsibility for 
austerity the opposition would have to accept and whether the opposition would be allowed a 
place in the political system commensurate with that responsibility.”  Until the level of austerity, 
and the parties’ commitment to it, had been worked out, the United States could not ease 
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Poland’s financial pressure, Simons said.  Instead he renewed a familiar refrain, encouraging the 
Poles to come to terms with the IMF.563   
 Fund officials remained deeply unsatisfied with the state of the economy, and worried 
that the rising inflation caused by the 1988 wage and price increases would bury the hopes of 
anything but the most radical reform.  During a staff trip to Poland in the midst of the roundtable 
discussions in March, IMF economist Jim Prust once again encouraged government officials to 
tighten credit, hold wage increases “significantly” below prices increases, and further depreciate 
the exchange rate in order “to establish the basis for an attempt to finalize agreement on a stand-
by agreement.”  But he feared pressing too hard at a moment of such political fragility.  There 
was a distinct possibility, he told officials in Washington, that an IMF demand for “an ‘x’ 
percent reduction in real incomes” could lead “to the breakdown of the roundtable.”564  He, and 
the Polish authorities, resigned to wait. “The authorities recorded no significant disagreement 
with the thrust of the mission’s suggestions,” he told Washington, “but appeared resigned to the 
continuation of a high level of inflation for some time yet.”   
 In discussions with Trzeckiakowski, Prust also learned of the 80% wage indexation 
agreement emerging from the Economic Reform Table.  Far from impressed, he predicted this 
would only exacerbate the inflationary issues. The indexation merely established “a floor for real 
wages,” he told Camdessus, and any agreement that emerged from the economic group “would 
have as much symbolic as substantive importance.”  Trzeckiakowski told the mission that the 
working group was fighting for survival against extremist challenges from within the 
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government, the party, and Solidarity.  Agreement, even if it was symbolic, was “essential to 
restore social peace and to contain pressures from extreme groups on both sides.”  Looking for 
real reductions in real wages rather than symbolic reductions in nominal ones, Prust could do 
nothing for the Poles except send them to the next stop on the creditor carousel, the Paris 
Club.565 
 The Finance Ministry needed little encouragement, as it had already reached out to the 
Club to see if the opening of the roundtable would finally bring the long-sought interest rate cuts 
and new credits.  An agreement on rate cuts, they hoped, would relieve the country of the 
immediate need to repay maturing debts, reduce the overall debt burden, and encourage the idea 
domestically that the post-roundtable communist government would be able to win concessions 
from the West.  In a letter to the Club, Vice Minister Janusz Sawicki told the members that the 
recent reforms aimed to give the country “a free market character,” but they depended on “real, 
extended cooperation with Creditor Countries.”566  With bilateral settlements of the 1987 
rescheduling agreement still unsigned, however, the creditor countries showed little inclination 
to leniency.  The West German representative at the Club told IMF officials that once the 1987 
agreement had been settled, his country might “be prepared to give sympathetic consideration to 
a request for rescheduling of 1989 maturities on generous terms.”  But “a multiyear rescheduling 
operation,” the official continued, “was out of the question at present.”567  
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 There was one other foreign creditor to which the Poles could turn – the Soviet Union.  
But watching the roundtable process unfold from Moscow, Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev 
knew his country did not have enough money to apply its own conditionality to the course of 
Polish events.  As he told his Politburo colleagues, Poland “is crawling away from us….And 
what can we do? Poland has a $56 billion debt.  Can we take Poland on our balance sheet in our 
current economic situation? No.  And if we cannot – then we have no influence.”568   
 Thus, the roundtable would have to be completed without the cover of foreign relief.   On 
March 2nd, Wałęnsa and Kiszczak met again to break the deadlock building up in the three 
working groups.  The Political Reform Table had become hung up on the government’s proposal 
to create a strong office of the presidency.  Having offered Solidarity an element of political 
diversity in the Sejm, the party wanted to use a strong president to retain ultimate control of the 
country.  Such a president, whom everyone agreed would be Jaruzelski, would have the power to 
dissolve parliament, retain control over the nation’s security forces, and fill the roll of head of 
state.  Solidarity found this bargain unacceptable, so the decision was postponed until Wałęnsa 
and Kiszczak could meet.  When they did, they arrived at a decision that would define the shape 
of the final roundtable agreement and set the course for Poland’s transition to post-communism.  
In exchange for Solidarity’s support of a strong presidency, Kiszczak offered the creation of a 
wholly new chamber of parliament, the Senate, whose 100 members would be freely chosen in 
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open elections.  Although the power to introduce legislation would remain in the Sejm, where the 
party would maintain control, the Senate would be given a “blocking” power on economic, 
social, and environmental matters.  More to the point, it would give Solidarity the ability to 
engage in politics without being co-opted into government programs with which it disagreed. 
The new chamber was a momentous concession that met the union’s most important demands.  
For his part, Trzeciakowski believed that the new Senate would fulfill his demand in the 
Economic Reform Table for a coordinating council to exert “social control” over the 
implementation of the economic agreement.569  With few prospects for agreement on other 
serious issues facing the Economic Reform Table, Trzeciakowski decided to back away from 
pursuing real reform in the roundtable and wait until after the June elections. 
 The roundtable negotiations continued through the end of March and were not officially 
signed until the April 5th, but the basic structure of the final agreement did not change.  Elections 
would be held in June, and the PZPR would control the Sejm because 65% of the seats would go 
to the party and its allies.  The other 35% would be freely elected.  The Senate would also be 
freely elected, and the president would be elected by a majority vote from the two houses of 
parliament combined.  Because the Sejm was much bigger than the Senate, this would ensure 
that Jaruzelski would become president.  This, at least, was how the elections were supposed to 
unfold. 
 As the parties scrambled to get ready for the elections, they renewed their united front 
internationally.  When Wałęsa met with a group of American congressmen in April, he implored 
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them to remove the “necktie” of indebtedness that was strangling his country.570  When the 
Solidarity leader Jacek Kuroń met with US Deputy Secretary Simons in early May, he suggested 
that the West should reschedule Poland’s official debt and “capitaliz[e] Poland’s overdue interest 
in order to reduce the…unsustainable debt-service burden.” In addition, the United States should 
“reduce the mandatory reserve requirement” for new commercial lending to Poland.  The 
Solidarity leader’s technical vocabulary surprised Simon, and he remarked that Kuroń sounded 
an awful lot like Polish government officials.  Kuroń admitted that the communist Finance 
Minister had briefed him on the debt issue the day before.  But, he concluded, “The reds deserve 
some reward for the roundtable.”571 
 
Doomed to the Market 
 The supposed rewards came in a speech by US President George H.W. Bush on April 
17th.  Proposing policies to help Poland transition to parliamentary elections and restart its 
economy, the President did his best to sell the initiatives as worthy of the dramatic change 
unfolding behind the Iron Curtain.  The United States, he said, would “facilitate cooperation and 
direct contacts between U.S. firms and Poland’s private business sector,” pursue “imaginative 
exchange, educational, cultural, and training programs,” and encourage the implementation of 
“creative” solutions to Poland’s debt problem, such as debt-for-equity and debt-for-nature swaps.  
His administration would not, however, press the IMF for leniency.  “A stand-by agreement 
should be subject to the usual IMF standards,” because “IMF conditionality can help Poland 
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pursue needed economic reforms.”572  In this conviction, Bush was not alone domestically or 
internationally.  The AFL-CIO, Solidarity’s long-standing labor ally in the West, believed 
Western aid needed to be “conditioned,” because only conditional aid could “assure that Western 
loans...are not squandered by a corrupt and inefficient communist oligarchy.”573  The West 
German government hoped the IMF would move quickly to come to terms with Poland, but it 
did not want it to sacrifice the Fund’s standards in the process.  Once again, precedent was at 
issue.  West German officials told the U.S. embassy in Bonn they were “very satisfied” with the 
firm American position on the IMF standby agreement because “overly easy terms for Poland 
[would] set a precedent for Brazil and Mexico.”574 
 For PZPR officials who had heard endlessly of the importance of human rights and 
democracy to the West, the tepid financial reaction to the roundtable came as a genuine shock.  
Rather inexplicably, Party Secretary Josef Czyrek told The Washington Post that the leadership 
had expected “more trust” from the Americans “as far as our willingness to undertake reform.  
We did not expect it to be so conditional.”575  After the State Department took offense to 
Czyrek’s comments, a Polish official responded, “the West” had for years urged the Polish 
government “to take exactly those steps the roundtable represented.”  Now that the roundtable 
was complete, the official said the government had expected “more support and less 
conditionality.”576  Privately, Czyrek told Deputy Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger that the 
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government wanted to move ahead with the IMF, but “was very concerned by the effect IMF 
programs had had in Venezuela and other countries.”577 
 The Unites States’ own ambassador in Warsaw, John Davis, was “very disappointed” 
with the paucity of his government’s response to the roundtable.  He wanted a “major 
reinforcement to what [he] perceived as a huge change in Eastern Europe. It was something [the 
United States] had tried to achieve for forty years and here it is and now we can’t respond to it? 
That is unbelievable.”578  Opinions such as Davis’s have led to the historiographic consensus that 
George Bush’s slow reaction to change in Eastern Europe meant that events in that region during 
1989 happened in spite of, not because of, his actions.  Greg Domber has written that Bush’s 
economic plan for Poland after the roundtable “fulfilled the PZPR’s long-term goals.  The 
opposition was left wanting much more.”579  From the history presented here, we can draw a 
much different conclusion.  Had the West dropped its economic conditionality and come forth 
with an enormous financial aid and debt restructuring package at any point before Solidarity took 
control of the government in August, it is very likely that the PZPR would have been able to 
successfully form a government after the June elections.  Poland would have survived as the 
partially reformed, partially democratic, but communist dominated state that the PZPR intended 
it to be when they launched the roundtable in the first place.  The unwavering pursuit of austerity 
led to more extreme outcomes in Poland, both politically and economically. Although the IMF 
and the U.S. government did not consciously pursue austerity in Poland as a means of installing a 
Solidarity-led government, this is precisely what the pursuit of austerity resulted in.  
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 As Bush was calling for “creative” solutions to the debt issue, the American financier 
George Soros announced just such a plan.580  The Soros Plan envisioned a startling 
reorganization of the economy, and it represented the interests of foreign capital par excellence.  
Soros began, “The problem is that the interests of capital are not properly represented.  
Communist systems treat capital as a free good and the function that in a capitalist system is 
performed by the owner is left unfulfilled.”  Economic reform had consistently failed in Poland 
because “owners are missing.”  Therefore, Soros proposed, that “enterprises owned by the Polish 
state” be traded for debt reduction.  This was called a “debt/equity swap,” and it was a concept 
that had been discussed for years as a potential solution to the global debt problem.  In Soros’s 
version, state-owned companies would be put under the control of “an independent Agency,” 
which would be charged with “selecting and supervising management,” reorganizing “state 
enterprises into joint stock companies,” and finding domestic or foreign “final owners for their 
capital.”  The Agency could employ foreigners in an “advisory role,” but it would not “infringe 
on Polish sovereignty” because its creation would be subject to the approval of the Sejm.  
Nevertheless, once created, the Agency would be isolated from “domestic political pressures” by 
the fact that foreign lenders could reject the debt/equity exchange offer if they were not satisfied 
with the terms.  Additionally, price controls and subsidies would be removed all at once in a “big 
bang,” and the zloty would be devalued.  Soros projected tight monetary policy and “tough 
decision taken by the Agency” would cause “a temporary reduction in living standards,” but they 
would “rise rapidly from the initial low point.” 
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 In exchange for this domestic reordering, the Soros Plan foresaw a three-year moratorium 
on Paris Club debt payments.  After three years, if the Club were “satisfied with the performance 
of the Agency,” it would exchange its debt for preferred shares or bonds in the companies 
created by the Agency.  Western commercial banks would continue receiving interest payments 
from the Polish government, but would have to loan half of these payments back to the Agency.  
After 3-5 years, the banks would be asked to give the Agency the option to buy out Poland’s debt 
obligations at 50 cents on the dollar.  If his plan was implemented, Soros anticipated Poland’s 
debt payments would drop by about $1 billion a year, which when combined with $700 million a 
year from the IMF and World Bank, would give the country a dramatically different hard 
currency position.  Together, the measures would create “upward momentum in the 
economy.”581 
 Perhaps because it was operating in a vacuum of financial inaction, the Soros Plan 
momentarily captured the Polish debt agenda.  Claiming that he had already discussed the plan 
with the U.S. National Security Council and the British Foreign Office, Soros traveled to 
Warsaw in late April and presented the plan to the Polish Finance Ministry, the Solidarity 
leadership, and the American ambassador, John Davis.  Ironically, Solidarity initially reacted 
with “keen interest,” while it was the communist Finance Minister, Andrzej Wroblewski, who 
was “somewhat skeptical” because “the scheme was essentially anti-democratic in character, 
taking control of the economy out of the hands of the newly elected parliament.”  For his part, 
Davis believed the country should give the plan very serious consideration because the new 
Agency would bring “an expertise…stature and independence” otherwise unavailable in Polish 
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society, and the three year moratorium on interest payments was far more than the government 
could currently get from the Paris Club.582  Wroblewski followed up with Soros in writing in 
May to inform him that the plan was “convergent, in many respects” with the solutions “being 
adopted by the Polish government.”  But he reminded Soros that, under Polish law, “the transfer 
of control of an enterprise...or the sale of its equity capital” required the “acceptance of its 
employee self-management.”583  He repeated his concerns about the anti-democratic nature of 
the plan. Would the Agency be subject to Polish law, and what kind of role would the Polish 
government play in economic decision-making once the Agency had been created?  Despite his 
lingering questions, Wroblewski declared the government ready to take part in the discussions.   
 After years of experience with Polish resistance, IMF officials believed the plan would 
not be acceptable to Polish labor.  Jim Prust wrote that Soros was “presentationally neat” but “his 
characterization of Poland as a basket case so hopeless that the population will accept any 
alternative to the present mess (including the ‘big bang’) is overdrawn.”  He wished the financier 
well, but told him that the Fund could not be officially involved in a private initiative.584   
 The Soros Plan, however, was doomed to failure not because of Polish labor, but because 
of Western governments.  A three-year moratorium on debt payments, particularly while the 
banks continued to get paid, was too generous for Washington, Bonn, and Paris.  Governments 
kept their focus on the procedures of the Paris Club and the IMF.  Here the economic news from 
Poland, and thus the prospects for relief, remained bleak.  In April 1989, prices rose 73% while 
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incomes rose 110%, creating what the IMF termed an “excessive infusion of purchasing power.”  
In a June visit to Warsaw, the staff continued to counsel a “severe tightening of financial and 
income policies,” but recognized that policy changes were impossible until after the elections.585   
 When the first round of elections came on June 4, their results surprised everyone and 
injected a new level of uncertainty into the country’s immediate political and economic future.  
Foreign and domestic observers (with the exception of U.S. ambassador Davis) entered the 
elections with genuine uncertainty about their results.  Solidarity held the momentum and the 
enthusiasm, it was believed, but the PZPR maintained a vast organization upon which it could 
rely.  In the event, Solidarity won a landslide in the Senate (99 or 100 seats), while in the Sejm, 
the government candidates, who needed 50% of the eligible voting population to avoid 
competing in the second round of elections, failed to achieve their threshold even though they 
ran unopposed.  As the second round of elections approached on June 18th, there was now a real 
possibility that Solidarity might achieve 38% of the seats in the Sejm because if the government 
candidates still could not win in the second round, their seats would go unfilled.  For Solidarity, 
the government, and the West, this was an unwelcome prospect.  As Davis explained, “While the 
regime needs Solidarity, so, at present, does Solidarity need the regime; it does not want to be the 
government, saddled with more responsibility than authority.”586 
 After the second round of elections, the PZPR and the allied United Peasant Party 
achieved enough support to form a government.  By the end of June, however, their alliance had 
broken down as the Peasant Party leadership broke ranks with their communist masters.  By July, 
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Kiszczak, who had moved from Interior Minister to become head of the party after Jaruzelski 
became president, struggled to form a government with only PZPR and United Peasant Party 
votes.  This presented Solidarity with a choice – either join a coalition government with Kiszczak 
at its head or gamble on forming its own government.  On July 3rd, Adam Michnik opened this 
debate by publishing an article titled “Your President, Our Prime Minister,” in which he 
proposed that Solidarity be allowed to form its own government in exchange for electing 
Jaruzelski president. 
 In this seminal debate, the prospect of Western financial assistance and debt relief played 
a crucial role.  “We are in the age of legends…don’t be surprised at whatever you hear,” 
Solidarity activist Wojciech Lamentowicz warned Davis in Warsaw.  The warning was required 
because leading Solidarity and government circles were caught up in the rumor the West was 
preparing a new Marshall Plan for Poland.  Davis reported that the rumor entailed “two Western 
governments – presumably the U.S. and Britain” offering Poland a “Marshall Plan” of $10 
billion on the condition that Solidarity be given the Presidency and the Prime Minister’s job in 
the new government.  “This trade off is somehow connected with George Soros’s plan,” he 
added.  Both “well connected and knowledgeable activists” in the opposition and “some in the 
regime leadership” took the rumor seriously, Davis told Washington.587   
 Even after the Marshall/Soros Plan rumor had been debunked, Solidarity officials 
calculated their political strategy in economic terms.  This calculus cut two ways.  First, as Davis 
reported, “one of the main arguments for the [Michnik] Plan…is the rampant expectation that a 
Solidarity government would be better placed to secure vital economic assistance from the 
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West.”  Although Davis had done his “best to dispel those rumors, the general perception of 
linkage persists.”  Gemerek, in particular, had “been persuaded that significant economic aid” 
was “a possibility to be won with the right combination of moves.”  If those who supported 
Michnik’s plan did so on economic grounds, so too did those who opposed it.  The Solidarity 
spokesman Janusz Onyszkiewicz told Davis “with considerable vigor and evident anxiety” that 
Michnik’s plan was detrimental to the union’s interests because “Solidarity would be ‘trapped’ 
into accepting responsibility for a deteriorating economic situation and the social volatility it 
entailed.”588 
 Even as they continued to resist the formation of a communist government under 
Kiszczak at the late hour of August 1st, the union leadership remained divided over the issue of 
whether a Soldarity-led government should be formed. Tadeusz Mazowiecki told his colleagues 
that he was opposed to Michnick’s idea because “the opposition-Solidarity side has no 
[economic] program and within three months that would become dramatically clear.”  His 
colleague Andrzej Stelmachowski concurred, “If the economic diagnosis is bad, it would be folly 
to take over the government until such a time as the ‘Solidarity’ is the only way out.  If we are 
expecting a deterioration [of the situation], we should not assume responsibility for it.”  But 
Michnik was of a different mindset, and defended his original call for a Solidarity premiership in 
the Sejm on the ground that the country sat at a historic crossroads.  “We have such an 
international constellation, a historical moment, when we can catch something.  We should not 
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use an argument that there is no program – as no one in the world has that recipe,” he told the 
meeting.  “We are doomed for one [program] – a sharp, sudden entrance into the market.”589 
 
Revolution in Poland: The Balcerowicz Plan 
 The Michnik Plan eventually carried the day, and on August 24th, Mazowiecki became 
the prime minister of Poland.  During his inaugural address to the parliament, the new prime 
minister fainted and left the building momentarily to receive medical attention.  Upon his return, 
he joked with the chamber, “Excuse me, but I have reached the same state as the Polish 
economy.  But I have recovered, and I hope the economy will recover too.”590  Despite the 
political transformation, it had not.  In fact, it had gotten worse.   During conversations with the 
Finance Ministry in July and August, the IMF recorded that open and repressed inflation was 
accelerating, output was stagnating, and the budget and current account deficits were ballooning.  
By late August, “an atmosphere of deep concern and, occasionally, gloom” hung over Warsaw as 
annual inflation sat at about 105% over the summer.591  In Mazowiecki, the IMF saw a cautious 
man who understood the need for “economic liberalization and reform to proceed” but had yet to 
take a position on the “essentially political issue of the pace of such processes.”  The pace of 
reform would dictate the scale of the IMF’s support.  If the new government felt “prudence 
required a ‘phased’ approach to liberalization,” then the IMF could offer a one-year standby 
agreement worth about $300 million.  If, on the other hand, Mazowiecki chose to implement 
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“genuinely radical and comprehensive reform,” the IMF would provide a substantially larger 
credit.592   
 The new government began to signal its intention with the appointment of its cabinet on 
September 7th.  Leszek Balcerowicz, a Solidarity economist who had been a chief architect of the 
union’s economic platform before martial law, became Finance Minister, while Wladysław 
Baka, the erstwhile PZPR finance leader, returned to the head of the National Bank of Poland, 
which he had left in 1988 to join the Politburo.  IMF officials noted, “the proposed cabinet may 
imply compromise and gradualism.”  Additionally, the two publicly circulating Solidarity 
economic plans, written by economists Ryszard Bugaj and Aleksander Pasyznski, called for a 
“short-run holding operation to control inflation” and “long-run proposals involving a time 
consuming consensus building process.”593 
 But then there was Jeffery Sachs.  IMF officials noted, “the presence of Mr. Sachs in 
Warsaw, and his proposals for a shock liberalization plan, received wide publicity in the Polish 
media.”594 In meetings with the Mazowieki, Balcerowicz, Baka, and Kuroń (now Minister of 
Labor and Social Policy), the leader of the IMF delegation, Massimo Russo, told his Polish 
colleagues not to couch their requests for Western support in “political terms” as Sachs 
encouraged them to do.  “Governments did not need to be reminded of the global political 
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ramifications of Polish reform,” he told them, “but Ministers of Finance, who controlled the 
purse strings, did need to be convinced that assistance would not be wasted.”595  
 Both in public and behind the scenes, the young American economist Sachs had begun to 
influence the terms of the economic debate in Poland with his doctrine of “shock therapy.”  On 
September 14th, he and his colleague David Lipton sent Balcerowicz “a draft proposal to suggest 
the kind of document that you could circulate to the Western governments, the IMF, and the 
World Bank.”  In the proposal, Lipton and Sachs (writing from the perspective of the Polish 
government) wrote that the government would implement a three part reform program 
comprising monetary and price stabilization, structural adjustment, and foreign economic 
assistance.  With regard to monetary and price stabilization, the government would institute 
within the next 90 days a sharp reduction in domestic subsidies, a rise in interest rates to positive 
real levels, a sharp cutback in investment spending, a rise in housing rental rates.  The 
government would also commit to keeping wages below price increases.  In the realm of 
structural adjustment, the government would end restrictions on the development of private 
firms, privatize “much of the existing state enterprise sector” within one to three years, and shift 
investment from heavy industry to services and construction.  The model for privatizing state 
enterprise would be the United Kingdom, where auctions had been held for shares of the 
enterprise, “with special purchase rights reserved for those directly affected by privatization, i.e. 
workers and managers.”  With only 10% of the non-farm economy in private hands in 1989, the 
government would aim to increase that number to 25% by 1991 and 50% by 1993.  To help the 
government implement this domestic move toward a market economy, Sachs and Lipton had the 
                                                     
595 Massimo Russo to the Managing Director and Deputy Managing Director, “Poland,” Sept. 22, 
1989, Box 62, File “Poland - corresp. + memos August - Sept 1989,” EUR Country Files, IMF. 
  329 
government ask the IMF “to recognize the significance of the historical challenge facing Poland” 
and to apply its conditionality “firmly but also imaginatively.”  The government (Lipton and 
Sachs) hoped agreement could be reached within a month.  Once the IMF program was in place, 
it also hoped the Paris Club would complete “a definitive reduction of Poland’s debt burden” and 
commercial banks would follow suit with a comparable agreement.596 
 So much for the IMF’s concern that Poland’s pleas relied too heavily on political appeals.  
The Sachs-Lipton Plan proposed a radical transformation of the Polish economy in much the 
same terms as Soros’s previous scheme (minus the ominous authoritarian Agency).  On 
September 22nd, the Mazowiecki government sent Western governments, the IMF, and the World 
Bank an almost verbatim copy of the Sachs-Lipton Plan to announce its economic plans.  When 
Russo received the document, he told the Managing Director that it represented “a good basis for 
us to work with the authorities.”597 
 Much work remained before the newly titled Balcerowicz Plan could be implemented, 
but a foundational understanding between Poland and its international creditors had finally been 
reached.  Throughout the fall, negotiations continued between the Mazowiecki government, the 
IMF, and the Paris Club, and by the end of the year a series of domestic and international steps 
had been agreed to.  On December 28th, the Sejm (in which the communist party still had a 
majority) voted on a package of ten laws intended to fulfill the aims of the Balcerowicz Plan and 
bring a market economy to Poland.  On January 2, 1990, Western nations established a $1 billion 
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fund to support the National Bank’s hard currency transactions and maintain the value of the 
zloty.598  On February 16th, the Paris Club signed an unprecedented rescheduling agreement on 
Poland’s debt that stretched repayment out over 14 years, more than twice its normal repayment 
schedule.599  1990 was also the year that austerity arrived in Poland, as gross national product 
dropped 8%, real wages declined 25%, and unemployment, which had previously been 
nonexistent, reached 6%.600  It took some time to reach agreements on debt reduction, but in 
1991 the Paris Club forgave roughly 50% of Poland’s debt obligations and commercial banks 
agreed to a reduction package in 1994.601 
 In 1992, the Polish historical sociologist Jan Gross sat down to assess the course of 
events in his native land over the previous three years.  He wrote, “What is the essential point of 
reference, the short hand designation, the symbol associated today with the Polish revolution?...It 
is…the Balcerowicz Plan.”  With the end of communism in Poland, he wrote, “economics 
revealed itself with a vengeance to be the key determinant of the political realm.”602 
 
 Out of a desire to correct the Reaganite narrative that the United States “won” the Cold 
War, scholars have tried to argue that the West in fact played little or no role in events of 1989.  
Greg Domber has recently written with regard to Poland, “Generally, Washington had little 
control over or impact on moves made on the ground in Warsaw.”603  A focus on the financial 
                                                     
598 Hobart Rowen, “Poland Gets $1 Billion Fund,” Jan. 3, 1990, The Washington Post, C1. 
599 Steve Greenhouse, “Poland’s Foreign Lenders Accept Unusual Extension of Payments,” Feb. 
17, 1990, The New York Times, 1. 
600 Cited in Paczkowski, The Spring Will Be Ours, 512. 
601 Letter to Michel Camdessus, Aug. 27, 1993, Box 1, File “Fund Relations with Commercial 
Banks,” Country Files, Central Files, IMF. Letter to Michel Camdessus, March 25, 1994, Box 1, 
File “Fund Relations with Commercial Banks,” Country Files, Central Files, IMF. 
602 Quoted in James, International Monetary Cooperation, 568-569. 
603 Domber, Empowering Revolution, 254. 
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history of the end of the Cold War brings a starkly different and more accurate picture into view: 
Washington exerted enormous power over the course of events in Warsaw, but it did so through 
the power of omission rather than the power of commission.  Washington, along with New York, 
London, Paris, Bonn, and Frankfurt, withheld money until events conformed to its demands. In 
so doing, it brought an end to communism in Poland.  
 Ultimately a financial history of the end of the Cold War helps answer three central 
questions about 1989: how and why did it happen at that moment?  Why did it happen 
peacefully? And what did the world gain and lose from the events of that year?  Examining 
Poland’s history in the manner presented in this chapter makes the seemingly surprising and 
unprecedented events of 1989 comparable to other times and other places.  As the history 
presented here hopefully demonstrates, the political transformations of 1989 make more sense 
when placed within the global historical trajectory of the sovereign debt crisis of the 1980s, 
rather than the historical trajectory of the Cold War.  If one views 1989 as the conclusion of a 
political and ideological contest begun in 1946, then the speed of political change, and its 
peaceful nature, are bewildering.  If, on the other hand, one views 1989 as part of a economic 
history begun in the early 1970s and affecting countries throughout the developing world over 
the course of the 1980s, then the political change of that year becomes not only comprehensible, 
but perhaps even unexceptional.  General Jaruzelski found himself facing the familiar challenge 
of anti-democratic leaders subject to the demands of the IMF: to legitimize austerity in a political 
system that had no legitimacy.  As he later concluded, the “necessary social support” for 
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economic reform could “be granted only in a system of parliamentary democracy.”  Only such a 
system, he said, could “carry the burden of unpopular decisions.”604   
  
                                                     
604 Jaruzelski quoted in Wiktor Osiatynski, “The Roundtable Talks in Poland,” in Jon Ester, ed. 
The Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1996), 62-63, n 7. 




The Coercion of Creditworthiness: 
 Hungary’s Road to Democracy 
 
 On April 10, 1987, the staff of PlanEcon, the most authoritative Western publication on 
the communist economies of the Eastern Bloc, told its readers in the world of finance, “We may 
sound very cynical, but it is not far from the truth to say that Hungarian economic fortunes in the 
near future do not depend on anything done in Budapest, but will be determined in Tokyo.  We 
doubt very much that Mr. Kadar yet understands this and the implications of such a situation for 
Hungarian economic sovereignty [underlining in the original].”  Over the previous two years, the 
journal noted, Japanese banks flush with the surplus capital from the booming Japanese economy 
had indiscriminately financed the Kádár government’s plush domestic economic policy.  But 
time was running out.  PlanEcon went on, “If and when Western banks finally realize…what 
Hungary is up to, they are likely to bring their lending activities to a screeching halt and cause 
[a] severe economic crisis in Hungary.”605   
 Almost three years to the day after PlanEcon published its stinging analysis, Hungary 
held its first multiparty democratic elections since the start of the Cold War.  This chapter 
explores the history of those years and argues that the financial pressures described in the dire 
warnings of a financial trade publication in 1987 were intimately connected to the momentous 
political changes that shook Hungary, Europe, and ultimately the world in 1989.  In the summer 
                                                     
605 PlanEcon Report, April 10, 1987, Vol 3, 14-15, pp. 3, 5. 
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of 1987, banks finally did realize that Hungary’s debt was unsustainable, and the country lost its 
creditworthiness on global capital markets.  To restore its standing in the eyes of the financial 
world, the Kádár government was forced to come to terms with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) on an economic stabilization and reform plan.  Leading members of the Hungary’s 
communist party, the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (Hungarian acronym, MSZMP), knew 
that such a plan would involve a sharp drop in the living standards of the Hungarian population, 
and they consequently feared that the party would lose legitimacy because of the austerity 
measures.  Therefore, in order to build a “social consensus” around austerity, the party launched 
a process to democratize the state.   
 Scholars of Hungary’s democratic transition and the end of the Cold War have yet to 
sufficiently draw this connection between austerity and democracy.  Important Hungarian-
language scholarship has appeared on the growth of the nation’s foreign debt under János Kádár.  
In Az Eladósodás Politikatörténete (“The Political History of Indebtedness”), György Földes 
provides a wealth of empirical evidence from key actors in the Hungarian Politburo, Planning 
Commission, and the Hungarian National Bank (HNB) about the growth of the debt from 1957 
to 1986.  However, the author purposefully stops short of analyzing the 1986-1990 period 
because his research question centers on whether the Kádár regime could have solved the debt 
problem on its own, without giving up political power.  In Kádár Hitele (“Kadar Credits”), the 
journalist Attila Mong does interrogate the relationship between sovereign debt and the political 
transition of the late 1980s, as well as the effects that the debt of the Kadar era still has on 
Hungarian society to the present day.  Mong’s book is extremely well researched and builds off 
of Földes’s work by including further research from the Hungarian National Archives (including 
the State Security Service), memoirs, and published accounts from the Hungarian policymakers 
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who managed the country’s debt during the communist period.  Despite all of this Hungarian 
language research, however, Mong concludes that his most important source base for his 
monograph was in fact the IMF archives, and he cites IMF sources extensively.  Indeed, Mong 
concludes that researching in the IMF archive was an “astonishing experience” that provided 
“priceless documents,” while sources at the National Archives on Hungary’s debt are 
“particularly sparse” and “filled with jargon, nebulous, rigid, and humorless.”606  This chapter 
shares Mong’s reliance on IMF sources, and in fact expands on Kádár Hitele’s use of IMF 
documents, particularly in the 1988-1990 period.   This allows me to draw a stronger and more 
direct connection between the Hungarian government’s austerity policies and democratization.  
Mong concludes, “The Hungarian payments crisis only became apparent at the end of 1987 when 
the country had to turn again to the International Monetary Fund and finally adopted the 
framework of a new agreement of a broad reform program, which - at least partially - led to the 
1989-90 regime change” [original Hungarian to come, for some reason I do not have the 
                                                     
606 Mong writes, “Az anyaggyűjtés során a legnagyobb izgalmat az okozta, hogy kivételes 
lehetőséget kaptam a Nemzetközi Valutaalap archívumában való kutatásra Washington D. C.-
ben, ahol Magyarországgal kapcsolatban több ezer oldalnyi iratanyagot volt alkalmam átnézni, 
és ezekről fotómásolatot készíteni. Döbbenetes volt megtapasztalni, hogy az IMF archívumában 
a korszak magyar történelmének felbecsülhetetlen értékű iratanyaga szabadon kutatható, 
miközben a hazai levéltárakban egészen más a helyzet. Az adóssággal, a Nemzetközi 
Valutaalappal, a Világbankkal kapcsolatos iratanyag Magyarországon rendkívül gyér. Egyrészt 
mert nyilvánvalóan manipulációk és lopások tépázták meg a gyűjteményt, másrészt mert a 
dokumentumok egy része érthetetlen módon még most is minősített, szigorúan titkos vagy 
szolgálati titok besorolású, a kutatók előtt is zárt, és eredmény nélkül kértem ezen minősítések 
feloldását. Washingtonban ezzel szemben szabadon elolvashatok a Budapestre látogató 
szakemberek feljegyzései, egymás közötti levelei, a magyar tárgyalópartnerekkel folytatott 
megbeszélések részletes jegyzőkönyvei, sokszor még a szállodafoglalás nehézségeiről szóló 
beszámolók vagy költségelszámolások is. Az IMF rendkívül alapos szakemberei mindenről 
mindent feljegyeztek, mindent dokumentáltak, és ezért nem lehetünk eléggé hálásak nekik. A 
korszak magyar pártdokumentumainak bikkfanyelvével, ködösítésével, merevségével és 
humortalanságával szemben ezek az iratok többnyire kendőzetlen őszinteséggel és nem kevés 
humorral beszélnek a magyar tapasztalatokról”, p. 10. 
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original].607  This chapter strengthens this claim.  Instead of “partially” explaining the political 
transition of 1989-90, Hungary’s international financial difficulties at the end of 1987 and 
country’s subsequent IMF program were the primary causes of the government’s move to 
democratization and the ultimate arrival of multi-party democracy.  Surely Hungary’s 
international financial relations were not the only cause of this transition, but they deserve to be 
viewed as the primary factor driving political change. 
 There has not been a great deal of English-language scholarship on Hungary’s democratic 
transition, and the work that has been done was primarily conducted by political scientists in the 
immediate post-Cold War period.  Nevertheless, this chapter changes the debate of the 
scholarship that does exist.  Unlike the scholarship surrounding 1989 in Poland or East Germany, 
where many scholars focus on the role of civil society and mass demonstrations in the political 
transitions of that year, all scholars of the Hungarian transition agree that it was coordinated by 
elites within the MSZMP.  In perhaps the leading English language work on Hungary’s 
democratic transition, Rudolf Tőkés titled the transition a “negotiated revolution” that “was 
managed and brought to fruition by both the outgoing and the incoming political elites in 
Hungary.”608  Even with this understanding of the “negotiated” and purposeful elements of the 
transition, Tőkés does not draw out the direct connection between the economic crisis of the late 
1980s and political reform.  Scholars who have drawn this connection, such as András Sajó, have 
usually misunderstood the connection between Hungary’s economic crisis and political reform. 
Sajó wrote, “In order to solve the economic crisis and the resulting social crisis, [the Hungarian 
leadership] tried to gain Western financial and moral (diplomatic) support.  To obtain that 
                                                     
607 Mong, 225. 
608 Rudolf Tőkés , Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution, 34. 
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support, they had to meet the human rights criteria set by the West.”609  This argument exhibits 
perhaps the most common misunderstanding about the role of the West in the Eastern Bloc’s 
democratic transitions – that Western nations set “human rights criteria,” which communist 
regimes needed to meet before they would qualify for Western aid.  To a certain extent, this was 
true, and certainly Western leaders publicly spoke a great deal about tying their aid to the 
governments’ respect for human rights.  But the human rights conditions were not the criteria 
that drove the Hungarian regime (or any other Eastern Bloc government) toward reform.   
 Instead, through a process I have called “the coercion of creditworthiness,” Western 
nations and banks established a stringent set of economic criteria that the regime needed to meet 
in order to maintain its access to Western credit markets or receive IMF loans.610  Because 
Hungarian officials relied on Western banks to issue Hungarian bonds and attract capital to the 
country, they had little choice but to meet the banks’ demand and work with the IMF.  The IMF 
established a set of criteria that the government would have to implement in order to qualify for 
Fund financing, and these criteria ensured that Hungarian society would experience a drop in 
living standards over a period of 3-4 years.  Thus, in order to meet these criteria, the reform 
communists and eventually the regime as a whole launched a process of democratization in order 
to build social support for economic austerity.  Ultimately, this chapter provides evidence of one 
of the overarching arguments of this dissertation:  when the end of the Cold War came in 1989, it 
                                                     
609 András Sajó, “The Roundtable Talks in Hungary,” in The Roundtable Talks and the 
Breakdown of Communism, 69. 
610 This is an old concept within the field of International Political Economy, although I do not 
know of anyone who has used the phrase “the coercion of creditworthiness.”  Professor 
Katzenstein, perhaps you could steer me toward the relevant literature, but representative studies 
include, Timothy Sinclair, The New Masters of Capital: American Bond Rating Agencies and the 
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was the result not only of communism’s loss of legitimacy among the peoples of Eastern Europe, 
but its loss of creditworthiness on global capital markets.   
 
Liar’s Poker and Goulash Communism 
 By the spring of 1984, János Kádár’s patience with the austerity of the 1979-1983 period 
had worn thin, and he believed the party’s restrictions on the domestic economy had become 
politically dangerous for his regime.  At the April 17, 1984 Central Committee meeting, he told 
his colleagues, “"Believe me, comrades, the two main slogans we cite and reference most often 
‘the international economic environment’ and ‘to preserve the results achieved in the standard of 
living’ can no longer be retained.”  He continued, “Five years ago, we stood before the people 
and said…the current program is meant to ensure a balance between the economy…and 
preserving the quality of life. But that was five years ago! Do we think…that it is now also 
possible for this same program to find acceptance among the people? No! That's not enough! A 
new program must do more than this."  Kádár believed that “the deteriorating standard of living” 
had eroded the political support of the people, and the new economic program needed to restore 
public confidence.  “The current slogans are not enough. Believe me, 0.5% growth in national 
income cannot continue to exist, and it cannot win the support of the masses.”  Instead, Kádár set 
the benchmark for the economy’s performance at 2.5-3% growth in the standard of living, and 
told the Planning Office and the National Bank to use whatever means necessary to achieve that 
goal.611 
                                                     
611 Central Committee meeting quoted on Mong, 238. [„Higgyék el, elvtársak, az a két sokszor 
hangoztatott fő jelszó és hivatkozás, hogy "nemzetközigazdasági körülmények" és az 
"életszínvonal elért eredményeinek megőrzése", nem tartható…” - érvelt Kádár János 1984. 
április 17-én a Központi Bizottság ülésén, majd így folytatta:„öt évvel ezelőtt odaálltunk a nép 
elé, és ezt mondtuk: [... ] most az a program, hogy biztosítsuk a népgazdaság [... ] egyensúlyát, 
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 Lucky for Kádár, global economic and financial changes that were completely out of his 
control brought his thoughts of renewed expansion to fruition.  After the collapse of the 
sovereign lending market in the early 1980s, Western banks were no longer willing to put their 
own capital on the line to fund loans to sovereign borrowers, so they changed the way they 
issued debt from loans (directly from the bank) to bonds, which could be sold to any type or 
class of investor.   For Western banks, there was one group of customers for these bonds that 
stood above the rest: Japanese investors.  Japan was the economic and financial juggernaut of the 
1980s, and its investors fueled global capital markets as a result.  From their perches at Tokyo 
commercial and investment banks, Japanese bankers invested in anything and everything – most 
famously in the United States, government bonds and Rockefeller Center.  But Japanese 
companies made so much money exporting their products to the rest of the world that not even 
the massive United States economy could absorb all of their surplus capital.  Therefore, their 
banks needed to look beyond the US for investment opportunities.  “The Japanese were the 
Arabs of the 1980s,’ Michael Lewis wrote in his famous Wall Street memoir, Liar’s Poker, 
“Japan’s trade surplus left it gorged with dollars it had either to sell or to invest.”612   
 From 1984 to 1987, Kádár’s Hungary was a favored destination of Japanese capital.  
After a trip to Wall Street in 1986, Helen Junz reported back to the IMF on this phenomenon.  
                                                     
[... ] és meg kell őrizni az életszínvonalat. De hát ez öt évvel ezelőtt volt! Gondolják, hogy ez [... 
] most is program lehet, és hogy hitelt találna a népnél? Nem! Ez kevés! Más kell, ennél több 
kell." Kádár szerint „az életszínvonal kopik, olvad"78, vele együtt a nép politikai támogatása is, 
márpedig a bizalom helyreállításához új program kell, „az eddigi jelszavaink nem elegendőek. 
[... ] Higgyék el, hogy a 0,5 százalékos nemzetijövedelem-növe- kedéssel [... ] nem lehet létezni, 
és nem lehet vele a tömegek támogatását elnyerni. [... ] Vagy hiszünkaszocialista rendszerben, 
abban, hogy többnek kell lennie benne, [... ] vagy nem hiszünk benne" - mondta Kádár, és ki is 
tűzte, hogy évi 2,5-3 százalékos gazdasági növekedést kell betervezni, vagyis többet kell kihozni a 
rendszerből. Bármi áron.] 
612 Michael Lewis, Liar’s Poker, 181. 
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“On the whole, the business that was being done was more of a funneling nature,” Junz wrote, 
“with banks issuing Hungarian paper [i.e. bonds] not intending to hold it in their own portfolios.  
So far, little if any resistance was being encountered in placing these assets in the market (mainly 
to Japanese and Arab addresses).”  New York banks particularly welcomed Hungarian business 
because Budapest officials were “willing to pay relatively high up-front fees” in order to satisfy 
“their desire to show very fine spreads,” and thus maintain the appearance of a Western 
European level of creditworthiness.613  
 János Fekete, the Vice Chairman of the National Bank of Hungry (NBH), knew how to 
play this game, and knew how to play it well.  Although investors in New York and London 
continued to shun Hungarian bonds, the country regained its creditworthiness in Japan by the 
spring of 1984.  Fekete planned to use Tokyo’s favor to meet Kádár’s policy demands.  He 
would later write, “Since the events of 1981-1982 warned us against borrowing on short term if 
possible, the main goal was to get long term loans. We could only expect long term loans from 
countries with current balance surplus such as Japan…We could not get any [US dollar] loans 
for 10 years."614  The Japanese bond market – where, in an unwitting demonstration that 
Orientalism was alive and well in the 1980s, the bonds were known in the Western press as 
“Samurai Bonds” – served Hungary’s financing needs quite well.  In 1985, Fekete told the IMF 
“he was not concerned about the balance of payments” because “Hungary had at present no 
difficulty in getting medium and long-term funds.”615 
                                                     
613 Memorandum for Files, “Hungary,” Sept. 23, 1986, Box 159, File 1, EURAI CF, IMF. 
614 Quoted in Mong, 266. This is Mong’s translation (edited for length) sent to the author via 
email. 
615 Memorandum for Files, “Meeting with Mr. J. Fekete, Senior Vice President, National Bank of 
Hungary,” March 27, 1985, Box 32, File 2, EURAI CF, IMF. 
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 Not everyone in the NBH agreed with Fekete’s strategy, however. “Fekete indulges.  Are 
we going to build a plan on sand again?” Bank President, Mátyás Tímár, wrote in his diary in 
May 1984.616   Edo Bakó, the Managing Director of the NBH and a skeptic of renewed economic 
expansion, criticized Fekete for his “excessive optimism,” and told Fund officials there were 
“two different lines among policy makers.  For the first group the financial crisis was over and 
one could safely accelerate growth.  For the second group,…demand management should be 
strengthened…[and the country] should wait before shifting to a more expansionary policy 
stance.”617    
 But with Kádár and Fekete leading the group in favor of an immediate rise in living 
standards and markets readily obliging, the bureaucracy quickly fell in line.  In late 1984, the 
Planning Office formulated a plan called “The Conditions and Possibilities of Spurring 
Hungarian Economic Growth.”  Although the authors of the document warned that the country’s 
debt would continue to rise unless the structure of the economy was changed, they nevertheless 
projected a path toward 3% economic growth.  An official in the Ministry of Finance recalled 
later, the planners “said that especially in the last two years, 3 percent growth can be achieved, 
and it would do something to improve living conditions.  The planners did not make this choice 
spontaneously, but instead because the country was already at the limit of what it would 
tolerate.”  For Havasi, social pressure on the party made this policy a no-brainer.  “How were we 
to allow a reduction in living standards?  Instead, the plan stressed the need to improve them. 
The country’s leadership was under pressure from society. The Congress could not take place on 
                                                     
616 Quoted in Mong, 241. [„Fekete engedékeny. Megint homokra építünk tervet?"]. 
617 “excessive optimism” in Memoranum for Files, “Hungary,” April 16, 1985, Box 32, File 2, 
EURAI CF, IMF.  Other quote from Memorandum for Files, “Meeting with Mr. E. Bakó, 
Managing Director, National Bank of Hungary,” March 27, 1985, Box 32, File 2, EURAI CF, 
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the prospect that five years from now living conditions might improve. In politics, this was 
simply inconceivable.”618   
 Like Fekete, Havasi sought to use the benign international financial environment to 
bolster the party’s domestic legitimacy.  He told the Politburo in December 1984, "The external 
economic equilibrium situation is improving, and we have a good international credit reputation.  
International payments are not a daily problem.…1985 will be the year of the XIII Party 
Congress, elections, and the 40th anniversary of the country’s liberation.  The economy has the 
honorable task of making sure that these major political events go off without a hitch.”619 When 
the XIII Party Congress arrived in March, the party endorsed a renewed effort to raise the living 
standards of the population.  Mátyás Tímár would later explain the dynamics of the congress to 
the IMF. “As in the West,” he said, the elections that took place at the Congress were 
                                                     
618 Quoted in Mong, 242. [„Nekünk Faluvégi Lajos az akkori OT vezetésével esküdött, hogy a 
tervben ez benne van. [... ] A VII. ötéves terv két variációban készült. Azt mondták, hogy 
főképpen az utolsó két évben a 3 százalékos növekedést el lehet érni, és akkor lehet valamit 
javítani az életkörülményeken. Ezt a tervezők nem jószántukból csinálták, hanem akkor az ország 
tele volt már azzal, hogy a tűrőképesség határán vagyunk. Mikor hagyjuk már abba az 
életszínvonal csökkentését? Emelni, javítani kell. Társadalmi nyomás volt az ország vezetésén. 
Egy kongresszuson nem lehet azt kilátásba helyezni, hogy öt év múlva majd javulhatnak a 
viszonyok. Ezt egyszerűen a politika nem tudta elképzelni"99 - emlékezett egyik interjújában 
Havasi Ferenc.] 
619 Ibid, 242. [„Külgazdasági egyensúlyi helyzetünk javul, hitelképességünk nemzetközi 
megítélése jó. [... ] Fizetési kötelezettségeink teljesítése már nem napi gondként jelentkezik. [... ] 
Nem sok hozzánk hasonló ország mondhatja el magáról, hogy fizetőképességét úgy őrizte meg, 
hogy [... ] a belső felhasználásban elkerülte a drasztikus, a társadalmi megrázkódtatást okozó 
visszaesést" - sorolta az eredményeket a KB gazdaságpolitikai titkára a testület 1984. decemberi 
ülésén, majd Havasi azt is nyilvánvalóvá tette, hogy 1985-nek már nem a megszorításokról, a 
nehézségekről kell szólnia. ,Jlz 1985. év a XIII. kongresszus, a választások és a felszabadulás 40. 
évfordulójának éve. A gazdaságra az a megtisztelő feladat hárul, hogy elősegítse a jelentős 
politikai események eredményes lezajlását"101 – mondta.] 
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“accompanied by promises.   The party congress wanted to paint an optimistic picture and 
promised more investment and better living standards.”620   
 But red flags abounded, both within Hungary and across the Atlantic Ocean.  Bakó 
encouraged the IMF’s Managing Director, Jacques de Larosière, to “exert an important influence 
in encouraging the authorities to accelerate the process of reform and in underscoring that from 
the external standpoint the economy remained far from a safe harbor.”621 PlanEcon eventually 
found more biting words: 
“Knowing full well that Hungary cannot go on indefinitely supporting high 
domestic consumption by sliding deeply into debt, [economic] advisors – notably 
individuals responsible for Hungarian external borrowing – have reassured Mr. 
Kadar that there is no problem in supporting his policies and they can raise all the 
money that is necessary.  They have discovered a new source of funds with an 
insatiable appetite for lending at the finest possible terms – Japanese commercial 
banks.  Because the Japanese financial institutions are so flush with surplus funds 
(reflecting Japan’s huge trade surplus) and already over-exposed in their holdings 
of U.S. government securities and debt instruments, they are eager to find 
alternative sovereign borrowers and are not overly concerned with understanding 
the purposes for which they [sic] money is to be used.  In order to please Mr. 
Kadar, Hungarian bankers are supporting unsustainable economic policies and 
deliberately bringing the country ever closer to an external payments crisis….The 
most disturbing aspect of this is that they know very well what they are doing and 
what the consequences might be, while Mr. Kadar may have considerable 
difficulty in understanding the consequences of his own policies.” 
 
 If Kádár was unaware, the IMF Managing Director’s visit to Hungary in the spring of 
1985 should have dispelled his ignorance.  In order to bolster their international standing, 
Hungarian officials had been hoping de Larosière would visit Budapest since the country was 
first admitted to the institution in 1982.  When the visit came three years later, it occurred at a 
palpable moment of transition in the Eastern Bloc, and the Fund saw it as an important 
                                                     
620 Minutes of Meeting, “Meeting with the President of the NBH,” Aug. 17, 1987, Box 32, File 3, 
EURAI CF, IMF.  
621 Memorandum for Files, “Hungary,” April 26, 1985, Box 32, File 2, EURAI CF, IMF. 
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opportunity.  With Mikhail Gorbachev coming to power in the Soviet Union, a briefing memo 
noted, “the reform-minded people…and the conservatives…are closely watching the signals 
from Moscow.  Therefore, there is at present a certain air of uncertainty and anxiety as to the 
course the ‘big brother’ will take.”  The memo concluded, “A successful visit by the Managing 
Director would give a significant boost to the prestige of the reformers.”622   
 The visit was undoubtedly a personal success, and appeared at first glance to be a 
professional success as well.  In a thank you note to Tímár after the visit, the MD thanked the 
bank president for his “weekend visit with you and your wife to Lake Balaton, which combined 
the pleasures of good company, delicious food and wine, excellent fishing, a beautiful Mass, and 
superb scenery.”623  Professionally, de Larosière later recalled the “deep and thoughtful 
discussions” he had with Kádár,624 and declared himself “immensely impressed by the detailed 
knowledge of the economic problem facing Hungary displayed all the way up to the highest 
levels of the Hungarian leadership.”625 
 And yet nothing changed.  As 1985 unfolded, the Kádár regime released the reigns on 
imports from the West, borrowed Japanese capital to pay for them, and rapidly deteriorated the 
country’s current account (net capital flow).  The reason for this resistance to reform, however, 
was not what the IMF had anticipated.   The conservatives in Hungary were empowered not by 
signals from their “big brother” in Moscow.  On the contrary, Gorbachev almost immediately 
made clear to the Eastern Bloc and the world at large that he was intent on reforming the 
command economic system.  And the conservatives were not empowered by some failure on the 
                                                     
622 Gyorgy Szapary to Mr. Whittom, “Hungary,” May 2, 1985, Box 32, File 2, EURAI CF, IMF. 
623 J. de Larosière to Matyas Tímár, Letter, May 30, 1985, Box 32, File 2, EURAI CF, IMF. 
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part of de Larosière to strongly make the case for reform to Hungarian officials.  On the contrary, 
Tímár recorded in his diary that the MD “strongly emphasized the role that reducing debt would 
play in determining Hungary’s perception in the marketplace.”626  Instead, the possibilities of 
markets trumped the prudence of sound financial policy.  Until markets told Budapest to change, 
there would be no reform in Hungary. 
 By the time IMF officials were preparing to meet Fekete at the Annual Meetings in 
October, the head of the European Office, L.A. Whittome, wrote to de Larosière, “As you know 
Fekete talks rather than listens but I have been trying to get home to him the risks he is running 
with renewed heavy borrowing…whilst letting the current account slip into deficit.  
Unfortunately memories in Hungary seem to be very short.”627  In one-on-one conversations with 
Whittome, Fekete defended his practices with the strategies of a Ponzi scheme, noting that debt 
“maturities falling due in 1986 were particularly heavy some $1.9 billion but he had already 
made an advance repayment of $500 million from the proceeds of the medium-term loans” he 
had just taken out.  Because Hungary had gone through a difficult winter in 1984-85 and world 
prices for agricultural exports were depressed (which together increased Hungary’s energy use 
and hurt the value of its exports), Fekete believed that taking out new medium term loans to 
repay old debts was just part of the job description of a central banker in his circumstances.  
Despite Whittome’s insistence on “the foolishness of building up a debt exposure,” Fekete told 
him that he “felt under no pressure.”628  
                                                     
626 Quoted in Mong, 256. [„erősen hangsúlyozta, hogy hitelpiaci megítélésünkben szerepe lesz 
annak, a továbbiakban tudunk-e csökkentést elérni az adósságaink terén"] 
627 L.A. Whittome to the Managing Director, “Hungary,” Oct. 9, 1985, Box 32, File 2, EURAI 
CF, IMF. 
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 By late November the situation had become so worrisome that Whittome convinced de 
Larosière to write a personal letter directly to Kádár.   Noting the serious and informed nature of 
the discussions they had while in Budapest the previous May, the Managing Director wrote that 
he was “particularly concerned to hear that instead of a surplus on the external current account in 
convertible currencies, a deficit is likely to be recorded.”  He continued, “I single out this 
question because it was the achievement of a current account surplus over the two preceding 
years that, more than any other consideration, underpinned the restoration of Hungary’s access to 
international financial markets.”629  Edo Bakó told Fund officials that the letter was “well done” 
because it “highlighted the most negative aspects of the Hungarian economy.”630  Bakó’s 
persistent effort to work with the IMF to influence his own government reinforces an impression 
that a frustrated Helen Junz shared with her IMF colleagues during one of many visits to 
Budapest, “I feel like we are basically message brokers, because these people cannot effectively 
speak with one another.”631  As long as markets looked kindly on Hungary, the IMF could indeed 
only be a message broker.  As soon as markets lost confidence, however, the IMF would become 
a power broker, defining the terms on which Hungary could regain the markets’ favor. 
 But those moments of crisis lay in the future.  As the economy continued to falter in the 
early months of 1986, increasing numbers of Hungarian officials joined Bakó in the skeptics’ 
camp.  Resző Nyers, the economist known as the father of the country’s “New Economic Model” 
in 1968, said the country’s deterioriating economic performance proved “this system and this 
method have been...exhausted.”  And the Secretary of the Planning Office, János Hoos, publicly 
                                                     
629 Letter from de Lariosère to Kádár, Nov. 27, 1985, Box 32, File 2, EURAI CF, IMF. 
630 Alan Tait to Mr. Whittome, “Hungary: Discussions with the National Bank of Hungary,” Dec. 
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stated that planned increases in the standard of living would have to be reviewed if economic 
performance did not meet the targets set for 1986. 632  Whittome told the Managing Director in 
April, “the atmosphere in the National Bank seems to be poisonous,” and a Hungarian official 
disclosed in June that, “at neither the technical nor the political level were the authorities 
happy.”633 
 The man at the top, however, remained steadfast in the face of looming economic crisis.  
Kádár told the Politburo in June, “I say, comrades, we cannot change the decision of the 
Congress, the five-year plan, or the annual plan …. Those decisions pointed us in the right 
direction. Several speakers said that they believe the plan will not be completed this year. I say, 
comrades, we must not stop our work …. The plan must be kept.”634  And to the surprise of 
financial policymakers in both the NBH and the IMF, markets continued to fund Kádár’s 
unsustainable dreams through the summer of 1986.  Whittome declared himself dumfounded.  “It 
is amazing that the banks are prepared to go on lending at very fine terms to Hungary in this 
situation.”635 
 In September 1986, dissent continued to ripple through Hungarian financial and political 
circles. Károly Grósz, a Politburo member and the man many expected to succeed Kádár, 
                                                     
632 Nyers quote and Hoos statement in Mong, 258. [Nyers - „ebben a rendszerben és ebben a 
módszerben [... ] kimerült".] 
633 L.A. Whittome to the Managing Director, “Hungary,” April 8, 1986, and Memorandum for 
Files, “Hungary,” June 2, 1986, both in Box 159, File 1, EURAI CF, IMF. 
634 Quotes in Mong, 258. [Kadar - „Én azt mondom, elvtársak, hogy sem a kongresszusi 
határozathoz, sem az ötéves tervhez, sem az éves tervhez nem nyúlhatunk. Akármennyit is 
gondolkodik az ember, úgy tűnik, hogy abban a helyzetben, amikor ezek a határozatok születtek, 
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mi ne álljunk hozzá a munkához. [... ] Ezek a tervek valójában mind politikai, gazdasági, harci 
célkitűzések. [... ] A tervet tartanunk kell.”] 
635 L.A. Whittome to the Managing Director, April 8, 1986, Box 32, File 3, EURAI CF, IMF. 
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signaled a change in his own thinking in an interview with a small Hungarian publication, Siker.  
Hungary has made “terribly slow progress in today’s fast developing world, against a 
background of accelerating technological revolution,” he said.  “Unless we change our present 
conditions, the economic-technological challenge of the world will impose increasingly heavy 
burdens on us.”  Since launching the New Economic Mechanism in 1968, the party had been 
unable “to modernize the structure of our economy.”  And these eighteen years of persistent 
problems had demonstrated that “it is not just a technical problem…it is a political problem.”   
Reform was a political issue because it necessarily would lead to greater inequality. “If we place 
greater value on bigger and better performance, then some workers will earn more than others.  
And if we penalize performances which are below average, then some other workers will get 
considerably less money than the average worker.  In other words, the differences in earnings 
will increase considerably, a condition which our society still barely tolerates.”  For Grósz, this 
aversion to inequality was a real and important impediment to reform, but it was born of a 
misreading of the very socialist doctrine the country professed to follow. “Marxism has never 
accepted egalitarianism, but rather the postulate of equal opportunity.  This postulate takes into 
account, in all respects, the possibility of considerable inequality…Equality has never been and 
cannot be a feature of socialism.  Its great advantage consists precisely in its ability to 
automatically grant greater opportunity to everyone than does capitalism.”636 
 It was an astonishing reinterpretation of Marxist doctrine, but it was one that fit the times.  
Grósz was not alone.  At the same moment, Imre Poszgay, a headstrong cadre who had been 
banished from the top leadership of the party in 1982 to become leader of the party’s umbrella 
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social organization, the Patriotic People’s Front (PPF), commissioned a report from a group of 
fifty economists and social scientists within the Ministry of Finance and various economic 
research institutions on the causes of the economic crisis and avenues toward reform.  The 220 
page document they collectively produced, titled “Turnaround and Reform,” outlined the leading 
reformist economic thinking at the time and marked the first step in the MSZMP’s strategy to 
develop social and political pluralism as a means of implementing economic reforms.   “The 
1980s, and particularly the experiences of 1985-86,” the report began, “indicate that the 
Hungarian economy is in a serious crisis.”637  According to the authors, the country’s continued 
reliance on extensive growth wasted resources and prevented Hungarian goods from competing 
in the world economy.  Reliance on the stilted trading and financing systems of Comecon, the 
inconvertibility of the forint (the national currency), and significant government restrictions on 
imports had all sheltered Hungarian industries from the competition of the global economy and 
allowed most of the country’s major industries to become globally uncompetitive.  If the country 
was to recover, the authors wrote, the party and the government would have to close inefficient 
enterprises, make the Hungarian forint (Ft) convertible, liberalize imports, cut corporate taxes 
and subsidies, adopt a restrictive monetary policy, and allow for a greater degree of wage 
differentiation between workers based on productivity.  Over time, the system of state ownership 
needed to be reformed as well, so that the economy encouraged firms to focus on building up 
                                                     
637 Quoted in Tibor Kovácsy, “Politikai reformtervek Magyarországon - „FORDULAT ÉS 
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their long-term wealth, instead of just maximizing annual revenues.638  In short, the authors 
believed their country needed to be exposed to the competitive pressures of the world economy.   
 But this process of structural adjustment – a term the report itself used (szerkezeti 
alkalmazkodási) – would not be quick, popular, or produce immediate results.  "Transformation 
of the structure of the global economic adjustment clearly involves victims of the reform policies 
that can be mitigated, and the distribution of burdens must be made socially acceptable. A 
sincere and realistic reform policy cannot promise rapid economic growth and rising standards of 
living in the short term.  In fact, it should be openly said that it might even temporarily bring 
economic losses as well.”639  Therefore, the economists believed it needed to be accompanied by 
social and political reforms to build social support for change.  The reform program should not 
be “limited to the economy in the narrow sense of the term.  Because the program’s 
implementation in society depends on actions embedded in people's behavior, it should cover 
other areas of social relations, including the political conditions.”  Succinctly, the authors 
concluded, “Economic reform and social reform go hand in hand."640   
                                                     
638 This point is emphasized in Ivan Szelenyi, “Eastern Europe in an Epoch of Transition: 
Toward a Socialist Mixed Economy?” in Victor Nee and David Stark, eds., Remaking the 
Economic Institutions of Socialism: China and Eastern Europe (Stanford University Press, 
1989), 228.  
639 [A szerkezet átalakítása, a világgazdasági alkalmazkodás nyilvánvalóan áldozatokkal jár, 
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 In its vision for reforming the economy, “Turnaround and Reform” sounded as though 
the IMF itself had written it.  Unsurprisingly, then, IMF officials were pleased and impressed 
when they learned of its economic contents.  What did surprise Fund officials, however, were the 
political, social, and legal changes also called for in the document.  In a summary of the report 
circulated in the European office, Fund economist George Kopits called it “a remarkable 
document” that presented “daring solutions” because “the reform process is interpreted as both a 
government program as well as a social and political movement.” After summarizing the 
economic program, Kopits noted that the report “suggests a new division of responsibilities 
among the Party, the government, the courts, and interest groups.  In such a system, the 
government would operate effectively and responsibly,…[and be] subject to public scrutiny.”  
Importantly, “interest groups, as well as individuals, would participate openly and democratically 
in the debate on, and thus identify with, the reforms.”641 
 This vision of politics – as a societal forum for interest groups and individuals to express 
their competing interests and arrive at consensus – defined Imre Poszgay’s vision for Hungarian 
reform.  In a theoretical article published in 1987 titled, “Political Institutions and Social 
Development,” Poszgay sought to diagnose “why, despite our earlier initiatives and an economic 
reform launched nearly 20 years ago, we are still coping with problems similar to the ones in 
countries that have not changed meaningfully their…systems of economic management.”  To 
develop an answer, he wrote, “it is necessary to investigate…our political system.”  The failings 
were numerous – “voluntary public and political organizations lack sufficient weight,” “the 
representation of interests is very unstable,” and the “failure up to now to define economic self-
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management and self-government” so that they “ensure local independence and initiative.”  
Ultimately, Poszgay wrote, “the reform of economic management has produced…the realization 
that the interest relations cannot be explored, and sound and necessary policy decisions cannot be 
made, without openly letting the interests surface, clash and be represented.”  This meant, “an 
essential feature of socialist democracy is…the development of a system for the representation of 
interests, based on the variety and division of interests.”  This was not, it must be made clear, 
advocacy for a transition to a “Western-style” (a term often used in reformist circles as a point of 
comparison) multi-party democracy.  That would come later.  In Poszgay’s vision of reform, the 
MSZMP retained its leading role in society.  But what Poszgay did argue, was that the 
communist party could no longer assume or impose social consensus on society, as had been 
done under the Stalinist model.  Instead, consensus had to be arrived at through the open 
recognition and representation of society’s competing interests.642  
 While ideas of political reform expanded under the watchful eye of Poszgay and the PPF, 
financial officials within the NBH rebelled against Fekete’s borrowing strategy.  In October 
1986, the head of the credit policy department at the NBH wrote to Tímár in October, “We do 
not agree with an economic policy that assumes the continuation of the external debt…. The 
increase in debt that occurred in 1985, 1986 and is expected for 1987 has not led to a 
technological renewal…. If the Hungarian economy…does not show appreciable improvement 
in 1987, a deterioration in the international perception of our creditworthiness may be inevitable.  
This could lead to severe consequences.”643  György Zdeborsky, the head of the foreign 
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translated in Joint Publication Research Search – Eastern Europe (JPRS-EER) – 87-060. 
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exchange department at the time, later recalled, “Serious discussion…broke out for the first time 
in September 1986 when it became clear that the balance of payments in 1986 would not be in 
accordance with the plan…. Then the foreign exchange management department went through a 
serious spiritual crisis.”644  
 In November, the Central Committee held an emergency two-day meeting to discuss 
paths out of the economic crisis.  The CC resolution published after the meeting euphemistically 
called for “stabilizing the 1985-86 standard of living” and “selective” industrial development. 
Behind the evasive language were clear signals that wage differentiation would increase, social 
subsidies would be cut, and loss-making enterprises would no longer be supported by the state 
budget.  In an interview after the meeting, János Hoos, the chairman of the Planning 
Commission, said economic reform had “become a life or death issue,” but it was dependent on 
“the existence of a society-wide consensus that supports this type of conflict-ridden economic 
policy.”  Therefore, he said, the Central Committee had decided to increase the role of party 
organs and social organizations in economic life, because the party’s “main task” in the crisis 
was to “establish political conditions in which the economic policy can be realized.”645 
 As these voices of reform coalesced at home, Fekete returned to the international 
financial scene, where he remained admired as “an old soldier” of global finance known for his 
“astuteness and acerbic wit.”  At the IMF Annual Meetings, he lectured audiences of capitalists 
                                                     
magyar gazdaság [... ] 1987-bensem tud érzékelhető mértékű javulást felmutatni, nemzetközi 
hitelképességünk megítélésének romlása elkerülhetetlen, és ennek konzekvenciái súlyosak 
lehetnek.] 
644 Quoted in Mong, 264. [„Komoly vita [... ] 1986 szeptemberében tört ki először, amikor már 
világos volt, hogy az 1986-os fizetési mérleg messze nem a terveknek megfelelően fog alakulni] 
[„Akkor a devizagazdálkodási főosztály komoly lelki válságon esett át…] 
645 “After the Resolution: Interview with Janos Hoos,” Otlet, Dec. 4, 1986; translated in JPRS-
EEC-87-024, pp. 20-26. 
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about their mistaken abandonment of the Bretton Woods system in 1971.  Before the early 
1970s, he said, capitalist countries “enjoyed more or less steady economic growth, relatively 
stable prices, nearly full employment, and flourishing world trade, causing much embarrassment 
and headache to all of us believers in the cyclical crisis theory of capitalism.”  Since then, 
however, the chaos of the post-Bretton Woods system had hurt both the industrialized nations of 
the West and the developing nations of the Second and Third World.  Particularly since the onset 
of the global debt crisis in the early 1980s, Fekete told the assembled financial elite, global 
capital had been flowing in the wrong direction – from the poor to the rich; from the developing 
back to the developed.  “We are today witnessing a reverse blood transfusion whereby the 
healthy get blood from the sick,” he declared.646  
  In a speech a few weeks later at a meeting of global financial elites in New York aimed 
at solving the problem of global debt, Fekete further developed these themes, and made common 
cause with the nations of the Global South. “The economies of the indebted developing countries 
– virtually the majority of the world – are damaged by low raw material prices, high real interest 
rates, high debt servicing burdens, as well as slow economic growth and increasing 
protectionism in the developed countries.”  In a later speech, he would cite important and 
startling numbers, “While during 1972-1982, $147 billion of long-term capital entered the 
developing countries, the tendency reversed during 1983-1987, when $85 billion flowed out of 
these countries.”647  Finance ministers, politicians, and populations of countries across the Global 
South shared Fekete’s sense of injustice, and indeed a Mexican, Nigerian, or Filipino official 
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647 János Fekete, “Statement by the Hon. Janos Fekete,” Sept. 28, 1988, Box 33, File 3, EURAI 
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could have delivered the same exact lines.  For all of these countries, Fekete said, “Severe 
adjustment programs undermine their potential for future growth…[and] the balance of trade 
surpluses attained by so heavy sacrifices are used to service debts.”  Fekete believed the 
populations suffering under these conditions had reached their breaking point.  “For borrower 
countries it becomes politically more and more difficult to sustain severe adjustment programs if 
they do not see the proverbial light at the end of the tunnel.  What we need today is a 
comprehensive program for world economic recovery centered on solving the debt crisis.”648 
 For the historian, this moment in late 1986 is full of irony and explanatory power.  Fekete 
was at once right in the policy he prescribed internationally and wrong in the policy he endorsed 
domestically. Political leaders of all stripes – including US President Ronald Reagan and his 
Treasury Secretary James Baker, who in 1985 launched his own failed effort to solve the global 
debt problem – agreed with or at least paid lip service to the basic points of his analysis.  But 
nothing changed, and developing countries did not attain meaningful debt relief until the spring 
of 1989, when Baker’s successor at the Treasury Department, Nicholas Brady, launched his own 
debt relief plan that succeeded in actually lowering the debt burden of some developing 
countries.  At that point, of course, Hungary was in the throws of political and economic change 
– change it likely would have avoided had Western nations, and particularly the United States, 
“solved” the problem of global debt sooner. Because Western nations did not implement a 
successful debt relief plan, and - to use Fekete’s image - the healthy kept getting blood from the 
sick, Hungary was forced to reckon with its debt burden beginning in 1987.   
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 Despite his justified critique of the international financial system, Fekete endorsed a 
policy at home that shored up the party’s short-term popularity at the expense of the country’s 
long-term economic well-being.  Building up debt from 1984-1986 delayed the implementation 
of domestic structural adjustment.  In 1987, markets finally began to coerce Fekete, Kádár, and 
the reluctant bureaucracies of the Hungarian state into instituting these reforms.  From that point 
onward, Hungary would implement the very adjustment policies that Fekete criticized, all in the 
hope of becoming economically competitive in the global marketplace.  And to do so, the 
Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party would jettison the political system and ideological 
foundation that had guided the state for over forty years.   
 
The Coercion of Creditworthiness 
 In what he termed the “24th hour for decision-making in Hungary,” Fekete took up the 
reformist cause in February 1987 because markets were losing confidence in his country.  He 
now approached the IMF with a request for a three year Fund program to support Hungary’s 
effort at fundamental structural transformation.  Whittome welcomed Fekete’s and the 
government’s newfound interest in undertaking reform, but he told the Vice Chairman that three 
year programs were no longer part of Fund practice, and in any case the conditions that Hungary 
would have to meet for such funding would be too severe for the country’s current conditions.  
More appropriate, Whittome thought, would be a one-year stand by agreement that would 
provide the country with some financing, but more importantly, would signal to the marketplace 
that the government was getting serious about reform.  Fekete countered that “the Government 
would not be impressed with a stand-by for a modest amount of say, US $300 million.”  Instead, 
he believed that a three-year arrangement involving $900 million in new financing would be 
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“more saleable.”  The two sides agreed to defer their differences until an IMF team travelled to 
Budapest in April.649 
 When the Fund team’s visit began on April 13th, Hungarian officials believed they were 
instituting reform and austerity measures as fast as possible without inviting a destabilizing 
social reaction.  In March, the government had devalued the forint by 8% against a basket of 
Western currencies, which made Hungarian exports cheaper but increased the price of the 
country’s imports.  As part of the World Bank’s package of structural adjustment loans, which 
Hungary had been receiving since 1982, the government was also working to establish a system 
of commercial banks that would operate independently of the NBH, but getting the new banks 
off the ground was difficult and added to societal uncertainty.  Finally, and most significantly, 
the government had also announced the introduction of a national personal income tax and value-
added tax that would take effect on January 1st, 1988 and dramatically overhaul how individuals 
and companies were taxed.  There was a great deal of uncertainty and discussion in society about 
the effects of the tax reform on Hungarian standards of living, but the government minister for 
price control projected the tax changes would result in a 3.5-4% price increase and that the 
general price level would rise 12% in 1988.650  While the Fund delegation was in Budapest, the 
leadership committed to holding the current account deficit for 1987 to $700 million, which was 
down from $1.4 billion in 1986, and the state budget deficit to Ft 30 billion, which had originally 
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projected to be Ft 47 billion.651  Thus, in April Hungarian officials felt they were already 
reaching the limit of what they could safely ask society to accept before tensions boiled over. 
 The IMF demanded more.  In his first meeting with the IMF delegation, Tímár told the 
delegation, “There [is] no big difference between the International Monetary Fund and [the] 
Hungarian leadership as to what should be done, the difference being largely with regard to 
timing.  Political stability in Hungary was a very important issue.”  Tímár was concerned that 
although “the population accepted the effects of these measures to a certain degree, one had to 
guard against overloading.”  But Helen Junz, the leader of the delegation, told Tímár she was 
disappointed “inefficient industries were still receiving budgetary subsidies” and “the policies 
did not seem to go far enough in reducing the budget deficit.”  Instead of a deficit of Ft 30 
billion, Junz wanted to see a deficit of Ft 20 billion.  If Tímár was concerned about placating the 
domestic population, Junz reminded him that he needed to placate the market too.  She reminded 
him that based on current projections Hungary would have to borrow $3.5 billion on 
international credit markets in 1987 and 1988 just to stay financially afloat. “The market,” she 
said, “would only be willing to support such needs if economic policies were perceived to be 
effectively channeling resources into productive uses.” Just to reinforce the point, she noted that 
“two recent issues of Hungarian debt on international markets had encountered some placement 
problems.”652 
  Far from resisting these calls for greater reform, some Hungarian officials actively 
sought to use the IMF and the threat of a loss of market confidence to further the reform 
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movement.  Finance Minister Peter Medgyessy advocated reform at a conference of business 
leaders on the grounds that “Hungary’s international financial rating largely depends on 
significant near term accomplishments in structural transformation and the subsequent rate of 
decrease in budgetary deficits.”653  In her letter to Hungarian officials at the end of the April 
visit, Junz warned that “the progressive erosion of ease of access” to capital markets “must be 
counted [as] a clear and present danger.” 654   But after seeing an advance copy of the document, 
Deputy Prime Minister József Marjai told Junz it was “insufficiently critical of the Hungarian 
economic situation and the Government’s policies.”  Marjai believed “the political and economic 
leadership needed to be confronted with a sense of urgency before they would take action.” “The 
Fund,” he told Junz, “could help in producing such a climate among the Hungarian 
authorities.”655 
  There was a fine line, however, between creating a sense of urgency and dictating 
conditions.  Some Hungarian officials, such as Marjai, wanted the IMF to do the first, but no 
Hungarian officials wanted the IMF to appear to be doing the second.  Therefore, the IMF’s 
interlocutors in the NBH, the Finance Ministry, and the Planning Office detailed a careful two 
stage negotiating process with the Fund for a stand-by agreement in order to “make the whole 
process politically more palatable” and “minimize the appearance of outside pressure.”  First, the 
Hungarian officials would use the June Central Committee meeting to gain adoption of a more 
stringent economic and financial plan for the remainder of 1987.  Then, they would hold initial 
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negotiations with the Fund in July, where Fund officials could “comment on the authorities’ 
policy plan” and the two sides could work out an unofficial framework of a stand-by agreement.  
But negotiations to finalize the agreement would not be held until October to “allow possible 
needed changes to the policy program to be agree internally and possible preconditions [of the 
stand-by] to be put in place.”  If all went according to plan, the government could begin 
receiving the stand-by funds at the very end of 1987 “in order to help bridge the import needs 
associated with the implementation of the structural reform measures [the income and value 
added taxes] foreseen for January 1988.”656 
 Having coordinated their actions externally with the IMF, NBH officials now turned 
inward to convince the government of the necessity of taking action at the June 3rd Politburo 
meeting.  Now fully convinced of the urgency of reform, Fekete told his subordinates at the 
bank, “The end of May has created a seriously threatening situation, and it is our duty to share 
our opinion with officials and committed party members.  We believe it is essential for the 
leadership to be aware of [the nation’s] financial position."  In conjunction with Miklós Néméth, 
the party’s new reformist economic secretary, the NBH prepared a bleak report for the Central 
Committee detailing the troubles on the horizon.  “We believe that the [projected] 1987 deficit of 
more than $1 billion cannot be financed in 1988,” the report stated.  “There is acute danger, the 
time to take decisive action is growing short.”  To escape the crisis, the document declared "[we] 
must reach agreement with the IMF on an appropriate stand-by credit and create the political and 
economic conditions" necessary to implement it in 1987.657 
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 János Kádár accepted the eventuality of reform, but remained reluctant to embrace its 
urgency.  He complicated the adoption of the new reform package at the June Central Committee 
meeting when he criticized the language in the reform proposal. “I do not think that we were 
[are?] close to insolvency status. Much of this is a dramatization. Nor would I say that the 
situation is worse today than it was three years ago."658  With the General Secretary dawdling, 
the Central Committee could not agree on a package of reform and austerity measures, and 
Marjai told Fund officials afterwards that their “old line of warning that the banks would lose 
confidence and cease to be net lenders no longer had credibility.”659  To give a jolt to the debates 
going on in Budapest, Fund officials decided they needed to threaten to suspend negotiations on 
a stand-by and to cancel the trip to Budapest scheduled for July.  Upon hearing of Marjai’s 
message, Junz “posed the question” within the European Office of “whether we would not gain 
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véleményünket elmondani. Elengedhetetlennek tartjuk, hogy álláspontunkról a legfelső 
gazdasági vezetés tudomást szerezzen" - írták Fekete János első elnökhelyettesnek a saját 
beosztottai az MNB-ben 1987. június 3-án. Ebben az engedélyét kérték, hogy az általuk 
elkészített, és a fizetésképtelenség rémével fenyegető helyzet leírását tartalmazó jelentést 
eljuttathassák amegfelelő helyre, legfőképpen Németh Miklósnak, az MSZMP KB 
gazdaságpolitikai titkárának. (Az iratot a szerző az egyik korabeli döntéshozótól kapta meg, aki 
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a határozott cselekvés” - írták, és világossá tették, hogy még 1987-ben „megállapodásra kell 
jutni az IMF-fel a megfelelő készenléti hitel nyújtásáról, s ennek politikai és gazdasági feltételeit 
meg kell teremteni"] 
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in leverage by questioning the need for a visit under current circumstances.”660  Two days later, 
she wrote to Fekete, “We believe that, if your authorities have not been able to formulate their 
policy program beyond the general outlines known last April, a visit might not be very 
productive.  In fact, it could be counterproductive…. [T]he markets might react negatively if it 
became known that we had begun talks without any positive outcome.”661  Although the letter 
was addressed to Fekete, its message surely was meant not for him, but instead for the authorities 
wrestling over the fate of the country above him.  It was yet another instance of Hungarian and 
IMF officials collaborating to use the weight of the IMF and the nebulous, but all-important, 
“opinion of the market” to influence the course of domestic Hungarian debates. 
 And their collective efforts worked.  In late June, Káróly Grósz formed a new 
government as prime minister, and the reformers in the NBH and the Ministry of Finance 
received a limited mandate to cut back state subsidies to the economy.  On July 21st, Fekete 
wrote to the Fund to inform them that the government had adopted a new package of policies 
that would cut Ft 5 billion in state spending.  The government cut subsidies to four major 
commodity groups with centrally planned prices.  The price of motor oil and gasoline increased 2 
forints per liter, the price of household energy went up by an average of 20 percent, the price of 
tobacco products went up 20 percent, and the average price of flour and bakery products went up 
19 percent.  Fekete told the Fund that the government would take compensatory measures to 
protect pensioners and families in “justified cases.”  The total cost to the budget of these 
measures would be roughly Ft 1 billion, so the net savings to the budget would be Ft 4 billion.662 
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 Although it was delayed until mid-August, the IMF staff’s visit to Budapest went ahead 
after the announced policy changes.  But having raised prices significantly, the reformist 
coalition now believed society needed time to digest the austerity measures.  Thus, Fund officials 
found themselves in the familiar position of advocating more aggressive action, but this time to a 
new audience – the reformers themselves.  In the delegation’s first meeting, Fekete laid out the 
authorities fears.  The government “needed to be careful and avoid…the limits of social 
tolerance,” he said.  If too many loss-making enterprises were liquidated all at once, “there was a 
risk of a confrontation at the political level.”663  Tímár expected “200,000 lay-offs” over the next 
two years.664  Finance Minister Medgyessy worried that reform would lead to too much 
“redundant labor” and that “tensions might become extreme in some places.”665  Miklós Németh 
agreed that action was necessary, but the reform plan had to receive Parliament’s endorsement, 
which could come no earlier than September, and “the population had to be convinced that there 
was no other option.”666 
 Government officials also needed to be convinced that there were no other options, 
because Fekete still counted the world’s capital markets as his strategic reserve.  In discussions 
with Fund officials on how he was funding the current account deficit, Fekete sounded like an 
inveterate gambler looking for his next stake.  He paid “one eighth a percent more” on the last 
syndicated loan from 39 banks so that it would include “more than just Japanese banks.” The 
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World Bank had just approved a loan for $150 million, the Japanese had just agreed to issue a 
Samurai bond for $270 million, “bilateral deals” would yield another $10 million, and “the 
Austrian banks continued to help.”  British, French, and Italian banks had recently reduced their 
exposure to Hungary, so they “could probably be tapped next year.”  In any case, the way he had 
structured the debt meant that payments would not really start to bite until 1991.  All in all, he 
told the Fund, there was “no financing problem” as long as “there was a perception” that the 
government was committed to reform.667 
 Junz returned to Washington beset by pessimism.  “Whereas policy goals are clearly 
defined and unexceptional,” she wrote to the new Managing Director, Michel Camdessus, 
“policy actions are lagging and lacking in coherence and consistency.”  The authorities have, she 
continued, “a basic reluctance to face off with the vest interests in implementing proposed 
reform measures, [which] is leading to piecemeal implementation with an attendant loss of 
effectiveness and credibility.”  All she could do was hope that the market would eventually 
coerce the government into action, and here there was reason for optimism.  Hungarian 
authorities, she calculated, would need to borrow $6.5 billion in 1988 and 1989 to fund the state 
on its current trajectory, and Junz saw no way this could happen “in the absence of support from 
the multilateral institutions.”668 
 Hungarian officials remained interested in the IMF’s money, if not the pace of its policy 
suggestions, so in September they pushed through Parliament a “Program for Stabilization and 
Evolution.”  In a letter to Camdessus, Deputy Prime Minister József Marjai sold the merits of the 
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plan as “complying with the demand of the foreign markets.”669  Markets were indeed getting 
demanding.  On his way to Budapest in October, Fund economist Patrick de Fontenay heard 
pessimistic outlooks on Hungarian prospects from the New York and London banking 
communities.  On Wall Street, bankers at Manufacturers Hanover told him that they were “very 
gloomy” on Hungary and thought the country was headed for a rescheduling.  The last 
Hungarian syndicated loan “had been very difficult and required some arm-twisting,” because 
banks were generally trying to reduce their exposure to the country.  Making matters worse, the 
Hungarian reliance on Japanese banks was dangerous because Japanese bankers were “known to 
have a herd psychology and could precipitate a crisis if they were all to revise their views” at 
once.  In London, de Fontenay heard tell that the Japanese moment of reconsideration may have 
already arrived.  “Hungarian paper was not selling easily in the markets,” bankers told him, 
because “the Japanese were beginning to reconsider their position.”670  It was no accident, then, 
that Fekete changed his previously confident tune by the end of September and readily admitted 
that the government was “more interested in the effect of a Fund arrangement on financial 
markets’ confidence in Hungary than in the money” provided under a stand-by agreement.671 
 If Hungary was in it for the money, the Western governments that backed the IMF and 
controlled the approval of stand-by agreements were in it for the reform.  By waiting until the 
market’s confidence had evaporated and the IMF remained as the only option, Fekete and the 
Hungarian government exposed itself to the conditions that Western governments could tie to 
any IMF loan.  By the fall of 1987, the two most important IMF shareholders for loans to the 
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European region – West Germany and the United States – both maintained a strong interest in 
using the prospective standby agreement to demand reform in Hungary.  After meeting with US 
and West German financial leaders at the IMF Annual Meetings in September 1987, Patrick de 
Fontenay noted, “We should warn [the Hungarians] that any program will be reform-oriented, 
that prior actions will be required and that reform measures…will probably have to be made 
performance criteria [A/N: conditions of the loan].”  “The U.S. seems particularly insistent on 
this,” he wrote.672  Massimo Russo later wrote to the Managing Director, “The United States is 
keen on a conditionality largely based on structural measures and Germany on front-loading of 
adjustment measures.”673  What did this mean?  In a reflection of their historical interests, the 
Americans wanted more capitalism, and the Germans wanted more austerity.  Neither was what 
Hungarian officials, already fearful of the social consequences of reform, wanted to hear.  But 
with dwindling options on global capital markets, they would have little economic leverage in 
the negotiations.  The leverage they did possess, and indeed used quite well, was political: the 
specter of a conservative (or Soviet) resurgence if the reform movement failed.  An internal 
memo from de Fontenay in February 1988 exemplifies the effect that this prospect had on 
Western discussions of Hungarian reform: “political support for the reform movement is still 
fragile…. [W]hat is needed is continuous and gradual progress rather than abrupt changes that 
would risk a backlash against reform.”674 
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 It is also important to note here that the leverage Western countries sought to exert and 
the conditions they sought to impose on Hungary through the IMF were economic, and not moral 
or political.  The human rights historiography that argues for a “Helsinki Effect” on the end of 
the Cold War is very well developed at this point.675  In the literature on the end of communism 
in Hungary, this argument has its proponents as well.  As noted in the introduction, András Sajó 
argued, “In order to solve the economic crisis and the resulting social crisis, [the Hungarian 
leadership] tried to gain Western financial and moral (diplomatic) support.  To obtain that 
support, they had to meet the human rights criteria set by the West.”676  There is no doubt that 
the Hungarian government had to meet Western criteria, but these criteria were of an economic 
and financial nature.  In order to meet these criteria, however, the communist party undertook a 
series of political reforms that looked very much like they were aimed at meeting Western 
standards of democracy and human rights.  In fact, they were meant to build a social consensus 
around the disruptions of economic reform. 
 
Bringing the Politics ‘Round 
 While financial officials in Budapest and abroad progressed through their summer of 
discontent in 1987, Imre Poszgay was busy building on his vision of democratizing society and 
the state in the service of economic transformation.  After the PPF-commissioned “Turnaround 
and Reform” report was completed in the fall of 1986, it was published in a Hungarian economic 
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journal in June 1987.  In March of that year, academicians and party ideological leaders held a 
theoretical conference in Szeged to discuss the relationship between political pluralism and 
economic reform, and Central Committee member Tamas Kolosi said afterward, “Every shred of 
historical experience suggests that if we strive for an exclusive line of thought…as the self-
proclaimed representative of the public interest…exclusivity sooner or later will produce 
unbearable social tensions.”  In contrast, “Pluralism in the fields of interest representation and 
forms of property ownership…are indispensible in a society…that aims for social consensus.”677   
 On March 15, 1987, Poszgay spoke at a rally of nascent opposition groups 
commemorating the nation’s revolution against Austria in 1848 - the first opposition rally ever 
legalized by the Hungarian authorities.  In front of a crowd made up of members of both the PPF 
and the nascent opposition movement, he declared that the nation faced the task of “reforming, 
democratizing, and renewing” its political institutions, and the “tasks lying ahead that can only 
be accomplished through joint social and national collaborative effort.”678  After the government 
reorganization in June that brought Káróly Grósz into the premiership but did not bring Poszgay 
into the Politburo, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung noted that his absence from the Politburo 
“could be interpreted to the effect that some institutions of the country consciously are to be 
pushed away from the party to achieve a relative importance of their own.”679 
 Parliament was one such institution.  So even as Fekete, Németh, and Medygessy sought 
to gain a rubber stamp on their economic reform package, those promoting political pluralism 
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looked to build up Parliament as an independent voice from the party.  The first issue on which 
members of Parliament struck out on their own was the budget deficit.  They criticized a system 
in which “Parliament must accept responsibility for the deficit, while decisional processes that 
lead to the deficit circumvent the legislative process.”  Had they known the extent of the 
influence of the IMF officials shuttling in and out of Budapest, they could have added the 
processes that would soon aim to reduce the budget deficit to the list of legislative 
circumventions.  Even without this knowledge, they called for rules allowing Parliament to set 
limits on state spending.680 
 In the summer of 1987, the push for pluralism still did not mean a push for multi-party 
democracy or an abandonment of the leading role of the communist party in society.  But it did 
mean raising these questions at the highest levels.  In an essay published in the Hungarian press, 
the party’s new ideological chief and one of two prospective candidates to replace Kádár (along 
with Grósz), János Berecz asked “could our single-party political mechanism…enable, 
generalize and demand the surfacing interests[?]…Would the single party system be capable of 
transforming the recognized diversity of interests into joint societal action in the interest of 
achieving societal goals?”681  At that point, Berecz’s answer was essentially “yes,” but raising 
the question in the first place signaled a changing mentality within the party.  And within 
opposition circles the logic of reform could mean only one thing, as Gyorgy Gado, editor of the 
samizdat Magyar Zsido said 1987. “There is no economic reform without political reform which 
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points in the direction of real democracy, and which limits and promises the total liquidation of 
party dictatorship.”682  
 In September, the PPF published an “action program” aimed at supporting the Program of 
Stabilization and Evolution that the Ministry of Finance and NBH were trying to get through 
Parliament.  The preface to the plan said that, “as the institution for societal dialogue,” the PPF 
was “prepared to serve as a forum for the broadest possible political activity that is necessary…. 
[T]he PPF wishes to provide a degree of openness for the preparatory, decision-making, as well 
as implementation processes…. This way the PPF contributes to the fulfillment of a community 
need to permit greater societal control over these processes.”  This broadening of the political 
role of the PPF was required because “there is a need to establish a consensus.”683 In pursuit of 
these goals, Poszgay gave the introductory lecture a meeting of 150 writers and intellectuals in 
Lakitelek to discuss ways out of the crisis in the fall of 1987. As the ideology chief Berecz later 
said, “Pozsgay went there in all good faith to try to put together a consensus, or to create a 
situation of mutual understanding.”  Although this group would go on to become the Hungarian 
Democratic Forum (known by its Hungarian acronym, MDF, Magyar Demokrata Fórum), which 
was the political party that won the 1990 democratic elections, in the fall of 1987 it was a group 
of intellectuals with an inchoate vision of reform and little support among the population.  With 
Poszgay’s endorsement, the group issued “the Lakitelek proclamation” at the end of the meeting 
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calling on the government to open a dialogue with society, which was published in the party 
newspaper Magyar Nemzet in November.684  
 Although the reformers’ belief in the power of pluralism to bring about social consensus 
was sincere, there was also a more cynical strand of thought that underlay their interest in 
democratization.  It can be thought of as the “if not bread, then circuses” principle: to 
compensate for the unpopularity of austerity, the authorities embraced liberalization as means of 
padding their standing among the populace.  This is the explanation for liberalization that 
Hungarian officials most often gave to IMF officials in Washington.  As one example, Miklós 
Nemeth told IMF officials in 1988, “there was no room for any increase in the standard of living 
for the next three to four years and….the authorities wanted to compensate [for] the pressure in 
the economic field by ‘increasing freedom of choice in the political field.’”685  After hearing this 
explanation consistently from his Hungarian counterparts, Partick de Fontenay briefed the Acting 
Managing Director at the end of 1988 along the following lines. “Political liberalization…which 
was initially aimed at making relative austerity more easily tolerated, has brought to the surface 
demands by various groups and interests, which the government is finding it difficult to resist as 
it seeks popular support.”686 
 Perhaps the best example of the power and problems of this strategy came with the 
government’s decision to ease foreign travel restrictions for Hungarian citizens in the fall 1987.  
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One member of the press wrote of the change, “This recent decision has been explained various 
ways by different people.  There are those who see the spirit of ‘glasnost’ behind it; others see it 
as a result of the relaxation of the international situation…. The most commonly 
voicedsupposition, however, is that the leadership wants to divert attention from other unpopular 
measures.”  The author held out little hope that the government’s gambit would work.  “It would 
be naïve to believe that the new passport regulation will cause millions to forget their concerns 
about the standard of living.”687  Although it would not be clear until a year later, the 
implications of the passport regulation for Hungary’s financial position suggested that the belief 
was not so naïve after all.  Attempting to justify the country’s continued financial precariousness, 
an NBH official told the IMF a central problem was “the spread of information about shopping 
conditions in Vienna (including during post-Christmas sales)” that had occurred as more 
Hungarians travelled abroad.688   Like the Americans and West Europeans before them, 
Hungarians were not immune to the allure of consumerism.  The pleasure and excitement of 
Christmas shopping, it would seem, transcended the rising tensions of austerity.  Even with the 
government literally raising the price on a loaf of bread, there would continue to be circuses. 
 
Striking the Balance 
 But IMF officials kept demanding even higher prices for bread (and energy, housing, and 
every other facet of the Hungarian economy) in their never-ending negotiation of a standby 
agreement.  While Hungarian citizens were rediscovering the joys of Christmas in Vienna, Fund 
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officials were in Budapest keeping the pressure on Fekete, Marjai, and Medgyessy to turn ideas 
of reform into action.  Action was precisely the problem.  Marjai told de Fontenay, “the 
Hungarian authorities had come to realize that implementation was more difficult than the 
formulation of the task to be undertaken.”  The hot button issue that December was raising the 
government-determined interest rate on housing loans, an issue that has the ring of boring 
minutia to the contemporary ear, but augured political revolt in the minds Hungarian officials.  
Time and again, Fund officials told their interlocutors that the rates needed to be raised, and time 
and again their Hungarian counterparts agreed in principle, but refused a change in practice.  
“Too politically sensitive” was the common refrain.  Miklós Néméth informed the Fund, “the 
average price for a home in Hungary (Ft 900,000) required 15 years average income.  For 
comparison, in Western Europe, only 5-6 years income was required and in the United States 3-4 
years income.”689  Also demurring action, Minister of Finance Medgyessy said, “that the price of 
a square meter for an apartment in Budapest was Ft 20,000 and that few people could afford it 
without receiving financing help.”690 
 In was in this context that officials in both Western embassies and the IMF began to 
sense that the reform movement was grinding to a halt.  The British ambassador lamented in 
early 1988, “a loss of momentum for the reform movement…The political situation was 
uncertain…The Politburo was split…The Government was worried by the reaction of the 
population to the measures taken….Fear of workers’ protest marches was a major factor.  
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Generally, the Government was view as weak.”691  Trying to negotiate with a government in 
such a position was difficult, and de Fontenay relayed to Washington that the Hungarians were 
“wearing us down.”692  In the new year, Marjai told the Fund again “the Government could not 
afford to lose the support of the population,”693 and Prime Minister Grósz feared, “the country 
may collapse under its burdens.” Despite the government’s efforts to use the press “to prepare 
public opinion,” Grósz said, “the changes taking place were considerable and the population had 
not been sufficiently prepared for them.”694 
 The key to escaping this trap between creditors’ demands for adjustment and the 
population’s resistance to austerity lay in the IMF’s bank account.  At a meeting with the 
Ministry of Finance, Hungarian officials told the IMF “the higher the amount [of money for the 
standby] the better this would be for the creditworthiness of Hungary” and the easier it would be 
“for the Hungarian negotiators to justify to the politicians the measures they had agree to.”695  
After further negotiation and internal debate within the Fund, more money is precisely what the 
IMF used to achieve its goals.  At the end of January, the two sides finally reached agreement on 
the basic outline of a stand by, and de Fontenay credited the Fund’s willingness to increase the 
stand-by amount with breaking Hungarian resistance to the IMF package of reforms.696  And 
quite a list of reforms it was: freeing 50% of prices to be determined by the market, a 
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commitment to reform the wage system and legalize joint stock companies through Parliament in 
1988, limits on domestic credit issued by the NBH, a ceiling on the budget deficit, quarterly 
increases on bank deposit interest rates.  In addition, Hungary committed to undertaking a 5% 
devaluation of the forint before the IMF board approved the agreement in May.  As de Fontenay 
wrote to a colleague who believed the Fund should have gotten more, “it seems difficult to argue 
that a cut in the budget deficit equivalent to 2 percent of GDP, a marked reduction in credit 
expansion, and a consequent reduction in the current account deficit of half a billion dollars 
represent weak adjustment.”697  In return, Hungary received roughly $350 million in IMF loans 
and held on to its access to international credit markets by its shoestrings.698 
 Strong adjustment ensured difficult politics.  Hungarian authorities again realized the 
difference between committing to a policy on paper and implementing in practice.  By April, 
they were struggling to gain the support in the Central Committee for the 5% devaluation of the 
forint.  Fontenay returned to Budapest, where he was “kept incognito by the authorities,” to 
negotiate a set of policies in other areas that could “compensate” for not going through with the 
devaluation.699  By the IMF’s calculation, the authorities would have to remove Ft 5 billion from 
household disposable income to offset their lack of action on the exchange rate.700  The two sides 
went through a reprise of a now familiar cycle: Hungarian authorities resisting such measures; 
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IMF officials debating how far they could push the country without killing the reform movement 
altogether; Fekete realizing he needed to reach agreement with the Fund in order to shore up the 
confidence of banks advancing him a loan; and as a result, Hungarian officials eventually 
agreeing to “very significant” compensation for not raising the exchange rate in the form of 
removing liquidity from the economy by substantially raising interest rates on all bank 
deposits.701  It was another episode in the long running tension that animated the Hungarian-IMF 
relationship: the Hungarians wanted to move as slowly in reform as possible without actually 
falling over the cliff into bankruptcy, and the IMF wanted to push Hungary as far as it would go 
without extinguishing the light of reform all together. 
 This proved to be a productive tension.  As financial officials raced to come up with 
compensation for the lack of exchange rate action, the Hungarian communist party prepared for 
an exceptional party conference from May 20-22 that would seek to consolidate the reformers 
hold on the party.  This conference that is often marked in the historiography as the beginning of 
the transition period that culminated in the multi-party elections of April 1990 because it 
removed János Kádár as General Secretary of the party and replaced him with Károly Grósz.  It 
is at the very least a suggestive historical coincidence that the IMF Executive Board approved 
Hungary’s stand by agreement on the same day that Kádár submitted his resignation to the 
Politburo, May 19, 1987.  This is not to say that the two events were related in some form of 
quid pro quo (they certainly were not), but the coincidence does suggest the following questions. 
What effect did the IMF and the coercion of creditworthiness have on this leadership change?  
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Was it the IMF’s pressure on the Hungarian government or its patience with the slow pace of 
reform that allowed the reformists to succeed?  Answers to these questions look different 
depending on which side of the Iron Curtain you approach them from.  Kádár’s understanding of 
the power of the IMF is perhaps best revealed by how he described his predicament to Soviet 
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, who later recalled these views to East German Chancellor 
Egon Krenz.  Gorbachev said, “In 1987 Comrade Kádár was given an ultimatum by the IMF; in 
case of non-compliance with the numerous demands a suspension of the loans was 
threatened.”702  In contrast, de Fontenay defended the program after the May removal of Kádár 
by writing, “by averting a possible backlash against reform, which a more ambitious program 
might have produced, [the program] may have facilitated the recent leadership change.”703  As is 
often the case in international diplomacy, what looked to one side like an ultimatum looked to 
the other like a series of concessions.  Attila Mong concludes in his book that the IMF displayed 
consistent “flexibility” and played an important role in “‘financing’ the peaceful transition.”704  
 The conclusion that fits best with the evidence presented here is that it was neither 
pressure nor accommodation alone that influenced reform in Hungary, but instead the productive 
tension between the two.  For the rest of 1988 and 1989, Hungarian and IMF officials went 
through more cycles such as the one described above: a period of ambitious plans for reform, 
followed by the failure to implement them until market confidence once again became 
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precarious, followed by the IMF flexibly changing it performance criteria to prevent Hungary 
from falling out of favor with the markets and the reform movement from crumbling, followed 
by the introduction of different or more limited reform than previously planned, followed by 
momentary restoration of market confidence in response to the new IMF endorsement, followed 
by a repeat of the process until the next crisis developed.  For considerations of space, these 
cycles will not be recounted here.  It suffices to say that for three years from 1987 to 1990, 
Hungary teetered on the cusp of insolvency without ever actually falling into it.  In the 
historian’s evaluation of the international forces that affected Hungary’s democratic transition, it 
is this condition – not human rights discourses, the thaw in superpower relations, or a simpler 
process of the West merely “dictating” conditions that need to be met in order to receive its 
assistance – that affected the Hungarian transition more than any other. 
From Democratization to Multi-party Democracy 
 In the historiography of Hungary’s democratic transition, 1989 is primarily viewed 
through the prism of the communist party’s negotiations with the Opposition Roundtable and the 
development of a myriad of political parties that went on to compete in the national elections of 
1990.  Scholars normally understand the importance of this year and the roundtable process to be 
that it ensured that the “democratized” one-party system, which the MSZMP wanted to preserve, 
did not survive and that a multi-party democratic system took its place.  The predominant 
historiographic narrative contends that because of Hungarians demonstrations in the streets and 
the Opposition Roundtable’s steadfast refusal to compromise with the MSZMP on the freedom 
of any future political system, Hungary achieved a fully democratic system.  Key events and 
people drive this narrative.  Foremost among them are Imre Pozsgay’s reevaluation of the events 
of 1956 as a national uprising, not a counterrevolution in January 1989; the opposition’s decision 
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to coordinate their positions through the formation of the Opposition Roundtable in March 1989; 
the popular demonstrations on March 15 and in conjunction with the reburial of Imre Nagy in 
June; the opposition’s ability to maintain its unity in the face of many MSZMP attempts to divide 
it; popular demonstrations against the building of the Bös-Nagymaros Dam; and the eventual 
conclusion of the National Roundtable talks and announcement of multi-party elections in 
August.705  All of these were important factors, and they had the cumulative effect of changing 
the 1990 parliamentary elections from ones which had been meant to, as Imre Poszgay put it, 
“maintain party hegemony under party pluralism,” into real free elections which the communist 
party could actually lose.  At the level of politics, this was an important difference. 
 But a historical inquiry based in the perspective of debt uncovers new causes and 
consequences of the political transition of that year.  Just like the communist party’s 
democratization efforts in late 1986, the party’s halting embrace of multi-party elections in 1989 
served the ultimate purposes of legitimizing austerity and allowing the party to escape blame for 
unpopular economic measures.  It is primarily these two causes that brought electoral democracy 
to Hungary in 1990.  The history of the transition from the perspective of debt also shows that 
regardless of the election’s outcome at the political level (which parties won, which lost), the 
election’s social, economic, and financial consequences were determined long before a single 
vote was cast.   
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 The most important MSZMP meeting on the issue of multi-party democracy occurred on 
February 7, 1989.  It was at this meeting that the leading reform communists discussed their 
visions for the years ahead.  With cold political calculation, Károly Grósz set the terms of the 
discussion by stating, “I can picture the transition period in two phases.  The first phase would 
come to its end…at the end of 1990…The second phase would be the period between ’90 and 
’95.”  He continued, “The first phase…is going to be around the elections of 1990.  The real test 
comes after the elections and not before them.”  This was because Grósz believed it would take 
some time for the population to weigh the merits of each political party.  “The [economic] crisis 
period would be ’92-’93 when everyone is going to be weighed, and put in their places in the 
political structure, and that is when the MSZMP will be weighed as well – does it have a solution 
to the crisis, does it have a program to put an end to the crisis, and so on and so forth.”  The first 
transition period through 1990, Grósz said, “will not be a solution to the crisis in itself.” Rezső 
Nyers interjected, “It will only change the players in the crisis.”  Grósz agreed, and continued, 
“The big question is whether a change of government…would mean a change of social structures 
as well.  A change of social structures would result in a civil war in Hungary.  And it is very 
difficult for me to imagine that there is any considerable force in Hungary today that would 
intend to set such a civil war as a goal.”   
 Imre Poszgay then acceded to the introduction of a multi-party system because the party 
had “not managed to create pluralism along with the single-party system” as they had envisioned 
at the May 1988 Central Committee meeting where they removed Kádár from power.  Nyers 
attributed this inability to the fact that the economic crisis had been more severe than they 
previously thought.  “I think in May we had been optimistic concerning the time and the manner 
of resolving the crisis.  It can be seen that [the crisis] is deeper.  I agree with comrade Grósz 
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that…it will probably be by ’95 or the beginning of the ‘90s that this crisis can be resolved, until 
then we are going to be a society managing crisis, an economic crisis.”  For this reason, Nyers 
believed elections needed to come soon.  The political crisis, he said, “must not last as long as 
the economic crisis, because that would cause a collapse.”  Building on the idea of Grósz’s two 
phases of transition, Nyers said that after the first phase was complete, “economic crisis 
management would go on.”   
 At this point, the party leadership’s vision for the elections was still not a completely free 
competition of political parties.  Poszgay said, “we should aim at a hegemonic position…it 
should be guaranteed in the first round through some kind of…compromise and we should face 
open competition only in the second round.”706  After much more debate, the Political 
Committee of the MSZMP privately agreed on this strategy to achieve a hegemonic position and 
publicly endorsed multi-party elections.  
 Clearly, with the MDF winning the 1990 election, this vision of a hegemonic position 
within a multi-party system was never realized.  Therefore, the political events and opposition 
efforts that took place between February 1989 and March 1990 can be understood as a successful 
struggle to move the “open competition” elections from 1995 up to 1990.  This was by no means 
a meaningless difference – popular protest and the National Roundtable held significance in this 
regard – but the struggle that transpired during that year was over the question of when, not 
whether, fully free elections would happen.  As Grósz told Gorbachev in a meeting in Moscow, 
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“events in Hungary have lately accelerated.  Their direction is according to our intentions, while 
their pace is somewhat disconcerting.”707 
 For financial officials within the NBH, the Ministry of Finance, and the IMF the 
importance of the election was of an entirely different order.   Who won the election or whether 
it was a fully free competition was immaterial.  As Nyers had said, the vote would merely 
“change the players in the crisis.”  Instead, the value of the election lay in the unique opportunity 
it presented to legitimize austerity and structural transformation.  In practical terms, this meant 
an opportunity to finally agree to an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) with the IMF – the three year 
financing program that Hungarian officials had been interested in since Fekete first approached 
the Fund for help in the spring of 1987.   
 Massimo Russo began 1989 by telling the Managing Director that his European Office 
doubted “that the Hungarians are ready to take the measures that would make it possible to 
discuss an EFF.”708  At the start of the year, Hungarian-Fund relations were in the midst yet 
another cycle of pressure and accommodation, with Hungary failing to meet a number of 
performance requirements that were conditions of their stand-by agreement and Fund officials 
attempting to find ways to redefine the stand-by conditions so that Hungary would not lose the 
market’s confidence.  The particular reform measures at issue in this cycle, or indeed throughout 
1989, do not need to be recounted here.  In November 1989, Russo summed the year up nicely 
for our purposes. “1989 was a bad year for Hungary,” he wrote to the Managing Director. “This 
is due to the Government’s preoccupations with political developments at the expense of the 
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management of the economy.709  The reason for this was clear enough: 1989 had become an 
election year.  Ministry of Finance officials told the IMF, “It is generally agreed that the size of 
the state’s activities…should be reduced…While Parliament generally endorses this idea in 
principle, it has failed to provide any specifics…Nor have opposition parties articulated any 
specifics, given that it would most likely weaken their position in the upcoming election.”710  
With these electoral dynamics in play, it was clear to all involved that 1990 would be “a more 
important year” than 1989 in terms of domestic economic and financial changes.711 
 Much more important for purposes of this chapter are the dramatic lengths to which the 
IMF went in order to keep Hungary in the good graces of capital markets throughout 1989.  
Everyone knew that one pessimistic sign from the Fund would cause an immediate financing 
crisis, and the county would soon become insolvent.  Thus, with the US and UK governments 
stressing “the importance of the political changes under way” and reinforcing “the need for 
continued Fund support for those [Hungarian] officials favoring reform and adjustment,” the 
IMF bent the rules throughout the year to prevent a deterioration of Hungary’s 
creditworthiness.712  In June, for instance, Hungary missed important performance criteria on the 
level of the budget deficit that were conditions of its stand-by loan.  In order to preserve the 
credibility of its conditionality with other countries, the IMF suspended its stand-by financing, as 
was called for under the stand-by agreement.  However, the Fund did not object to Hungarian 
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officials characterizing the suspension as a “temporary…interruption” instead of “a total 
breakdown” in order to “limit market effects.”713  In addition, the IMF published a 
supplementary report that gave “credit to the appropriate actions taken by the authorities to 
confront the imbalances in the economy.”  Fund economist Manuel Guitián told the MD that the 
supplement “will call for delicately balanced drafting to avert the adverse consequences of this 
(hopefully temporary) interruption of our financial relationship with Hungary” because “if 
interpreted wrongly in the markets, such interruption could lead to critical financial strains in 
Hungary rapidly.”714 
 A more serious Hungarian transgression surfaced in November 1989, and once more, the 
Fund worked to minimize the damage to the country’s creditworthiness.  On November 20th, 
Hungarian financial officials informed the IMF that they had been continuously underreporting 
the level of their foreign debt by about 10% since the late 1970s.  Under normal circumstances 
this was a serious offense for members of the IMF, and Hungary could have faced stiff punitive 
action from the Fund.  Over time, the Fund did end up punishing Hungary.  But the immediate 
concern of the European Office upon hearing about the underreporting was to ensure that the 
news did not rattle the investors in Hungarian debt.  Therefore the Managing Director phoned the 
Hungarian Finance Minister to coach him on how to announce this misreporting in Parliament in 
a way that would minimize the effect on the market.  “I am afraid that what you will tell 
Parliament will be widely reported,” Camdessus began, “It is absolutely imperative that there be 
no uproar otherwise you risk a major blow and the only way in my view is to say you are 
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working with the IMF and the World Bank.”  The Finance Minister “agree[d] absolutely” and 
thanked the Managing Director for his “cooperative spirit.”715   
 Thus, the IMF’s effort to maintain non-monetary cooperation with Hungary was itself a 
form of financial assistance from the West.   The mere fact of Hungary’s unbroken association 
with the institution kept global capital in Hungary when it was ready to run at the first sign of 
trouble.  This was not a direct form of assistance from Western governments or the global 
financial institutions.  Indeed, the IMF cut off its stand-by loans when the performance criteria 
were broken in June.  But it was the use of Western financial prestige, embodied in the 
institutional weight of the IMF, to prevent a financial crisis in Hungary during the uncertain 
months of its political transition.   
 Recognizing this has implications for the historiography of Western assistance to 
Hungary during the transition.  Historical work of the foreign policy of US President George 
H.W. Bush remains in its early stages of development, but if there is one lasting impression (it is 
difficult to call it more than that at this point) of Bush, it is that he reacted cautiously to the 
dramatic events of 1989 and that the end of the Cold War happened in spite of, rather than 
because of, his efforts.716 This chapter proposes something different.  When Bush travelled to 
Hungary in the summer of 1989 to show his personal support for the reform movement, he was 
greeted with banners in the streets of Budapest that read, “Do not give money to the communists! 
Let us free from Yalta!”717  Just like Solidarity in Poland, the Hungarian opposition believed that 
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tying Western aid to political and human rights conditions would bring about greater progress.  
And indeed, if one looks only at the actual hard financing that the Bush administration proposed 
in the summer of 1989 (a $25 million “direct investment fund”),718 it is easy to conclude that the 
US government did not provide significant financial aid to Hungary either because of the 
president’s innate caution or his administration’s belief in the power of tying loans to political 
progress on the ground.  Both of these could be true; we will have to await the opening of the 
archives.  But no matter what the archives show, the evidence presented here suggests that the 
financial value of the IMF sustained relationship with Hungary in 1989 dwarfed any financing 
that the US government considered providing.  On a regular basis, the NBH had to “roll over” at 
least $250 million of the country’s sovereign debt.  This could not have happened without the 
institutional backing of the IMF.  Therefore, we can conclude that in 1989, it was not Western 
conditionality, but instead Western willingness to bend conditionality, which supported 
Hungarian reform the most.  By lending the prestige of the IMF to Hungary during the transition, 
Western governments provided the country with a reprieve from the coercion of 
creditworthiness.   
 But it was only a reprieve.  The IMF was only willing to hold the markets’ pressure for 
structural adjustment at bay until the elections.  Thus, by the summer of 1989, the attention of 
both the Fund and Hungarian financial officials turned to negotiating the reform package that the 
new government would use its legitimacy to implement.  In practice, this meant drafting a three-
year Extended Fund Facility.  During a Fund visit to Budapest in August, Ferenc Bartha, the 
Governor of the NBH, told the IMF,  “The Government had already discussed in late July a 
medium-term program covering the three years to 1992.”  A consensus had been reached, he 
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said, on “reform measures tackling…the problems of ownership, budgetary reform, monetary 
reform and decentralization of the banking system, development of a capital market and the 
restructuring of trade with the West and CMEA intended to foster the integration of Hungary in 
the world economy.”  In other words, the entire national economy.  “It would be desirable,” he 
said, “to reach understandings with the Fund on a medium-term agreement covering these issues 
which could be implemented by a government which would emerge from the pending 
elections.”719  In a later meeting, Hungarian officials told the Fund the reform program “would 
be submitted to various parties within the Government” and then “sent for information” to 
Parliament and the roundtable.  “The program could only be approved after the pending 
elections,” the officials said, but “whatever government emerged from the elections had little 
choice but to implement a program of market oriented reform, with a strict monetary regime and 
a reduction in the role of government.”720  In a September follow up meeting, Medgyessy told 
Fund officials, “The Government was resolute to submit the cornerstone legislation for reform to 
Parliament, preferably with full agreement of the Roundtable, but if necessary without such 
agreement.”  He assured the Fund, “the different [political] parties would not come up with any 
fundamentally different programs.”721 
 Which brings us to the opposition.  What did they think of economic reform and the 
foreign debt?  By the late 1980s, Hungary had a hard currency foreign debt of roughly $17 
billion and an annual budget deficit ranging from Ft 30 billion to Ft 60 billion year to year.  Until 
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721 Minutes of Meeting No. 18, “Hungary – 1989 Use of Fund Resources,” Sept. 6, 1989, Box 
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1987, these figures were considered top secret and were restricted to top leaders in the Politburo 
as well as a narrow section of the NBH, Ministry of Finance, and National Planning Office 
bureaucracy. Society at large had no understanding of the nation’s financial position.  An 
important part of the “openness” and “democratization” launched in 1987 was informing the 
country of the nation’s real financial state.  One newspaper described the population as 
“shocked” when the numbers were made public. The numbers were indeed daunting.  As the PPF 
economist Laszlo Bogar told a Hungarian newspaper in 1989, “Hungary today is one of the big 
debtor nations of the world…On a per capita basis Hungary is first in indebtedness among 
CEMA countries, leaving even Poland behind.”  He also warned that if current export and import 
trends continued, “the indebtedness process will come to a halt in 1997, and that the debt service 
rate will end in the year 2004, i.e. it will reach acceptable levels after 30 years from the 
beginning of our indebtedness.”722  Painting a similarly dire picture, Miklós Németh told the 
country in a 1989 nationally broadcast interview, “the interest burden, to mention only this, last 
year and this year amounts to $1.2-1.3 billion.  If we convert this into forints, we see that here it 
is a question of 60 billion, some 60 billion forints.  This money has to be taken out of the 
economy, away from the population or society…But this is a burden to the country.  And we 
have to accept this burden in order to maintain our solvency.”723 
 “We have to accept this burden.” It was a conclusion that went virtually unquestioned by 
all of Hungary’s new political parties.  Two conclusions defined the discussion about the 
national debt after it became a topic of public discussion in 1987: one, the debt was part of a 
                                                     
722 “shocked” and Bogar quotes from “The Plundering of Resources Did Not Begin With Foreign 
Indebtedness,” Heti Vilaggazdasag, March 18, 1989, translated in JPRS-EER-89-050, pp. 42-44. 
723 Nemeth interview with “The Week,” translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service – 
Eastern Europe [FBIS-EEU]- 89-072. 
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global phenomenon; and two, the debt had to be repaid.  In a 1988 article titled, “The State as 
Debtor,” Istvan Garamvolgi wrote, “This decade we have been witnessing the explosion of debt 
in most countries of the world…mounting national debt is a worldwide phenomenon.”724  János 
Kis, a prominent member of the opposition Free Democrats, believed that the global nature of 
the debt problem made the future course of Hungarian development easy to predict.  In a 
published debate with other leading opposition members, he wrote, “Let us not forget 
that…Hungarian crisis processes emanate from Hungary’s Western financial dependence.  In this 
respect Western creditors will exert pressure, the International Monetary Fund will offer package 
plans for the limitation of consumption, there will be Neckermann department stores for those 
who have convertible foreign exchange, and there will be empty Kozert [Hungarian grocery store 
chain] stores for those who do not.”  The point of comparison for Hungary’s future was clear.  
“In brief: the West will mean to Hungary what the United States means to the masses of less 
fortunate Latin American countries.”725  
 Ironically, Kris’s party – the Alliance of Free Democrats – was both the most pro-market 
political party and the only party to even consider asking the international community for debt 
relief.  In an August 1989 article, Tamas Bauer and Marton Tardos, the party’s leading 
economists wrote, “Hungary may be able to manage its current debt burden for quite some time.  
It can do so, however, only at the price of further increasing the frightening impoverishment of 
part of the populace.”  Bauer and Tardos believed – and had the courage to say – that the West 
bore some responsibility for Hungary’s debt.  “The creditors acted in an irresponsible 
                                                     
724 Istvan Garamvolgyi, “The State as Debtor,” Magyarorszag, Dec. 3, 1988, translated in JPRS-
EER-89-012, pp. 35-36. 
725 János Kris in “Reform and Hungary, Szazadveg’s Questionarre Concerning Reform,” 
Szazadveg, No 4-5, 1987, translated in JPRS-EER-88-042, p.15. 
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manner…when they agreed to finance obscure plans which did not assure repayment.” It was 
also “an unquestionable fact,” they wrote, “that high and unpredictably fluctuating interest rates 
were caused by budgetary deficits in certain Western countries and by functional disturbances in 
the global economy, circumstances for which Hungary could hardly be blamed.”  Therefore, the 
economists believed, “there is a continued need for new loans.  It is apparent, however, that the 
financial pressure chocking the Hungarian economy cannot be lifted by granting credit alone.  
The primary need calls for a reduction of the accumulated debt service and for a reduction of 
interest.”726 
 All other parties, including the MSZMP, found such a proposal irresponsible and 
unnecessary.  A typical viewpoint was expressed in the weekly business magazine, Figyelő.  It 
„would be extremely disadvantagous for Hungary” to reschedule, the author wrote, “and in my 
view there is no need for it.  Thus far Hungary has complied with its debt service obligations 
without disruption by using banking methods of finance, even though compliance has always 
required the assumption of new loans.”727 
 Even if this was a widespread view in society, the NBH was not going to leave anything 
about the opposition’s economic and financial views to chance.  Bank officials led a coordinated 
effort to ensure that all parties viewed Hungary’s international debt obligations and plans for 
structural reform as unbreakable promises.  In an August 1989 interview, NBH President Bartha 
reported that he and his team had recently met with all of the leading opposition parties.  “We 
tried to persuade them to include requirements for a strong central bank…in their demand, and 
                                                     
726 Tamas Bauer, Marton Tardos, et al. “Capitalist Support for Hungary: Target Premium,” Heti 
Vilaggazdasag, Aug. 5, 1989, translated in JPRS-EER-89-103, pp. 41-42. 
727 Endre Szanto, “Selling Debts: Casting Aside Declarations,” Figyelő, June 8, 1989, translated 
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told them to regard a tight money policy as a measure in the interest of the entire nation.  We 
tried to convince them not to consider the rescheduling of loans and further increases in the 
indebtedness as passable.”  Asked to respond to the Alliance of Free Democrats’ demand for a 
reduction in the interest rates on the debt, Bartha conceded that Bauer and Tardos were the “best 
prepared” economic team among the opposition, but nevertheless maintained, “the structure of 
Hungary’s indebtedness is such that a reduction of interest payments would be inconceivable on 
technical grounds, if for no other reason.  The bonds issues are dispersed all over the world.”  
More important than the technicalities, however, was what the debt represented.  “We assume 
responsibility for the past,” Bartha said.728    
 With the opposition’s views under control, the financial policymakers of the NBH and 
the IMF, there was just one problem left by the fall of 1989 - the elections kept getting pushed 
back due to pesky political quarrels, and the country was running out of money.  After having 
initially been moved up to the fall of 1989, election day had been consistently moved back over 
the course of the year and was now planned for March 1990.  At the end of September, Bartha 
projected that the country would face a financial crisis in early 1990 unless it received the three-
year Fund EFF by that time.  But with all the important structural adjustment postponed until a 
new government took power, the IMF could not grant the EFF until the perpetually deferred 
election actually took place.  Officials projected that the country would need to borrow $1 billion 
in the first quarter of 1990, and without an EFF program, the NBH likely would not be able to 
find such funds.    
                                                     
728 “The Hungarian National Bank President and the Hungarian Democratic Forum: He’s 
Bluffing,” Heti Vilaggazdasag, Aug. 19, 1989, translated in JPRS-EER-89-104, p. 5.  
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 This set in motion the endgame of Hungary’s communist period.  The European 
Community made available a 1 billion ECU bridge loan (European Currency Unit, precursor to 
the Euro) to “tide Hungary over” until the spring election, and made the loan contingent on the 
current communist government coming to terms with the IMF on yet another stand-by program 
before the election.729  When an IMF team was sent to Budapest in December 1989 to negotiate 
the new stand-by, Fund officials gave up waiting for the elections to happen and demanded that 
the current government take a series of steps immediately.  As Bartha protested in vain that it 
made “no sense to press for additional expenditure cuts” because “getting the budget through in 
its present form would be a major achievement,” Patrick de Fontenay maintained that the 
government needed to do more.  Officials needed to announce cuts in housing subsidies, increase 
interest rates, and provide “a list of enterprises against which liquidation procedures had been 
initiated;” moreover, the government would have to “show that it had the courage to introduce 
these measures itself instead of passing on the task to local authorities.”  Unless it took these 
measures by January, de Fontenay told them, the IMF would not agree to a financing program.730  
With no other option available, Hungarian authorities devalued the forint by 10%, increased 
interest rates, and passed a housing reform program that increased the average rent by 35% in 
December 1989.  In January 1990, the authorities cut enough subsidies and freed enough prices 
to institute a 10% increase in the consumer price level, while also accelerating the closing down 
or restructuring of loss-making enterprises.731   
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 In exchange, the Fund team agreed to abstain from its normal practice of waiting for a 
new government to form before submitting the stand-by agreement to the Executive Board.  “To 
maintain confidence in financial markets,” the IMF agreed to have the Board vote on Hungary’s 
stand-by one week before the election took place in March.  To ensure that the new government 
upheld the stand-by agreement, however, the Fund made each batch of loans beyond the first 
(stand-by agreements are administered in monthly segments) “subject to a review which would 
ensure that the new government endorses the program.”732 And so, one week before József 
Antall and the Hungarian Democratic Forum won the first free election in Hungary since the end 
of the Second World War, the IMF Executive Board approved an agreement that set the course 
of the Hungarian economy regardless of the election’s outcome.   
 In May, the Managing Director visited Hungary and met with Antall, now the country’s 
new Prime Minister.  Antall told Camdessus, “the Government was determined to proceed with 
reform and that it would be done with appropriate speed but not overnight.”  To which the MD 
predictably replied, “while the appropriate speed would have to be determined in light of each 
country’s circumstances (including political and historical factors), a minimum critical mass was 
needed at the outset and there were costs to being to gradual.”733  Clearly, the cycle of pressure 
and accommodation, which had been at the heart of the Hungarian-IMF relationship since the 
country first joined the Fund in 1982, had not ended.  Instead, to borrow a phrase, the players had 
merely changed.  
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 By November 1990, the Antall government had formulated its medium term reform 
program, titled the “Economic Program of National Renewal.”  Hungarian officials told the Fund 
that “strengthening Hungary’s creditworthiness” was one of the primary goals of the program. 
“To this end,” they wrote, “the Government is placing great emphasis on privatization, the 
reduction of the role of the state in the economy, and the strengthening of market mechanisms.”  
They also reassured the Fund, “the Government has also reaffirmed in this context its firm 
intention to continue servicing its external debt without interruption.”734  After further rounds of 
negotiations, the Fund and the Antall government signed an agreement for a three-year EFF in 
February 1991.  Almost four years after PlanEcon had published its warning about the financial 
crisis looming in Hungary, a Hungarian government had agreed to a long term structural 
adjustment program aimed at maintaining the market’s favor.  What PlanEcon and the rest of the 
world did not foresee in 1987 was that the Hungarian government signing the agreement was the 
country’s first democratically elected government of the postwar period.  As this chapter has 
sought to demonstrate, Hungary’s financial crisis and the emergence of its first democratic 
government were intimately related historical processes.   
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Chapter 8 
 
In the Shadow of Austerity: 
The Collapse of East Germany 
 
 
 Public surprises have private histories.  The fall of the Berlin Wall shocked the world on 
November 9th, 1989, and people have debated the history of this stunning event ever since.  Most 
often they have searched for the causes of this public surprise in the public histories of the period 
- the mass protests, mass emigration, ideological crisis, and rhetoric of protest that defined the 
final months of the German Democratic Republic (GDR).  Nothing signifies this focus on public 
histories more than the widespread use of Albert O. Hirschman’s Exit/Voice/Loyalty model to 
explain the collapse of the GDR.  Published in 1970, Hirschman’s book, Exit, Voice, and 
Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States put forth a sociological model 
for explaining how people respond to declining performance in organizations.  Hirschman 
posited that members of an organization can respond to a decline in performance in three ways: 
they can leave the organization (Exit), they can protest to reverse the organization’s decline 
(Voice), or they can keep their behavior constant (Loyalty).  Hirschman’s model was an 
extremely powerful explanatory tool that could be applied to a wide spectrum of social life, and 
it influenced the social sciences throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 
 In the summer of 1989, the Exit/Voice/Loyalty model appeared to receive a real-world 
test in the dramatic dénouement of East Germany.  Beginning in May, East German citizens, fed 
up with the indefatigable deterioration in the performance of their government, sought means of 
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expressing their dissatisfaction and chose precisely Hirschman’s methods to do so.  By the 
thousands, they crossed the GDR’s border with Czechoslovakia and headed for Hungary, where 
the government had dismantled the so-called “Iron Curtain” border fence standing between 
Hungary and Austria, in the hope of being allowed to travel to West Germany (the Federal 
Republic of Germany, FRG).  As the Exit portion Hirschman’s model suddenly appeared, the 
Voice component quickly followed suit.  Over the course of September, groups of protesters 
began to gather every Monday in Protestant churches in Leipzig and Dresden.  At first called 
“peace meetings,” the Monday meetings grew into mass protests throughout the GDR 
demanding political and economic reform.  Soon it appeared that very few people remained loyal 
to the GDR, and when the Wall opened on November 9th, observers naturally drew connections 
between the pressures of Exit and Voice and the government’s ultimate capitulation.735  Over 
time, the pressures of Exit and Voice were folded into a broader narrative of 1989 that stressed 
the important role of civil society and mass protest in peacefully bringing down the communist 
regimes of the Eastern Bloc.736   
 In the two previous chapters on the political transitions in Poland and Hungary, I argued 
that this focus on “people power” and non-violent protest failed to recognize the communist 
parties’ own attempts to use political liberalization as a means of implementing economic 
                                                     
735 The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the leading newspaper in what was then West Germany, 
published an article six days after the fall of the Wall titled, “Abwandern, Widersprechen: Zur 
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736 See Timothy Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern, Domber, Empowering Revolution.  After 
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austerity and structural adjustment.  This chapter builds on that argument in the context of the 
GDR’s collapse by flipping Hirschman’s Exit/Voice/Loyalty model on its head.  
 Instead of focusing on the choices available to the East German population, this chapter 
is structured around the choices available to the East German government.  Exit, Violence, or 
Austerity: these were the three strategies of governance available to the leadership of the East 
German communist party (known by its German initials, SED) in 1989.  As its citizens fled to 
the West through Hungary and mounted protests on the streets of East German cities, the SED 
leadership could either officially sanction their emigration (Exit) or forcefully suppress the 
protests and restrict travel (Violence).  Hanging over each of these strategies was the looming 
prospect of national insolvency and a default on the country’s debt to its Western creditors.  In 
order to prevent such a development and maintain the country’s creditworthiness on international 
capital markets, the government estimated it would have to cut East German living standards by 
25-30% in 1990 (Austerity).  This chapter argues that the East German leadership accepted Exit 
and hesitated to use Violence because it viewed Austerity as the worst of all their options and 
actively tried to avoid it.  In choosing Exit, the leadership believed it could extract new loans 
from West Germany in exchange for opening its borders.  In refraining from Violence, the 
leadership knew that if it cracked down on protesters in the streets, it would lose all access to the 
Western capital upon which the country heavily depended. 
 The German language historiography on the collapse of East Germany has been shaped 
by the exhaustive and pioneering work of Hans-Hermann Hertle.  Hertle began researching the 
collapse of the GDR almost immediately after it happened and has continued to do so ever since.  
His works, ranging from monographs to published interviews and primary sources, leave a rich 
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documentary and interpretative trail to follow.737  Because Hertle pays a great deal of attention 
and ascribes substantial explanatory power to the GDR’s indebtedness in explaining the regime’s 
collapse, our narratives are closely aligned.  This chapter is more single-minded in its focus on 
the country’s debt than Hertle’s most detailed monograph, Der Fall der Mauer: Die 
Unbeabsichtige Selbstauflösung des SED-Staates [The Fall of the Wall: The Unintentional Self-
Dissolution of the SED State].  Additionally, it lays greater emphasis than Hertle on two facets of 
the collapse: the financial causes of the Hungarian government’s decision to dismantle the fence 
along its Austrian border and open its Western border to East Germans, and the East German 
leadership’s fear of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the late 1980s.   
 In the English-language historiography, the opening of the Berlin Wall has become 
intimately tied to contemporary political debates over the United States’ role in the world.  The 
recent work of Mary Sarotte, the leading historian of the collapse of East Germany writing in 
English, exemplifies this trend.  In The Collapse: The Accidental Opening of the Berlin Wall, 
Sarotte makes her political commitments explicit: her focus on the accidental nature of the 
Wall’s opening is meant to serve the political purpose of deflating narratives of post-Cold War 
American triumphalism.  In the introduction to her book, she writes that her history points to “the 
costs of triumphalist assumptions made by outsiders about what happened in divided Berlin in 
1989.  In the United States the opening of the Wall lent credibility to the unfortunate motto 
‘From Berlin to Baghdad.’”  The dramatic images of East Germans streaming through the Berlin 
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Wall on November 9th, she writes, “contributed to a mistaken belief that Washington was the 
sole author of the collapse of the East German dictatorship, and that the United States could 
duplicate that success in other locations around the globe at little cost.”  In contrast, her history 
“shows the need for a more nuanced understanding of the significance of accident, contingency, 
and, above all, the agency of local actors.”  In prioritizing the agency of local actors, Sarotte 
concludes that her work affirms the narrative of “an extremely rare and heartening event: a 
citizenry that peacefully overcame an abusive regime.”738  
 One need only visit the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California, 
where a large section of the Berlin Wall stands as a monument to the late president’s 
achievements, or revisit the cover of the Economist Magazine from the week Reagan died in 
2004, where he was proclaimed to be “The Man Who Beat Communism,” to understand 
Sarotte’s efforts.739  But the attempts to deflate American triumphalism in her work and the 
broader historiography on the end of the Cold War have left the current English-language 
literature on the collapse of East Germany and the end of the Cold War in general without an 
understanding of where power resided in the international system of the 1980s.  For fear of 
adding fuel to the popular fire that Ronald Reagan won the Cold War, diplomatic historians have 
largely concluded that the institutions of “hard” Western power – military, diplomatic, economic, 
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or financial – played little to no role in causing the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern 
Europe.740  Sarotte is willing to grant that “the freedoms of the Western countries played a 
profoundly motivational role in 1989” but sees no place for Western hard power in the collapse 
of East Germany.741   
 This chapter – and the broader dissertation of which it is a part – attempts to recover an 
understanding of the sources of Western power that influenced the collapse of communism 
without partaking in self-congratulatory triumphalism.  It does so by focusing on the most 
important leverage that Western political and financial institutions had in the late 1980s – money 
– and by fully recognizing that this leverage more often than not produced consequences that 
Western actors did not foresee or intend.742  With this leverage in focus, it becomes clear that the 
United States government did indeed play only a minor role in the collapse of East Germany, but 
other centers of Western political and financial power – namely, the West German government 
of Helmut Kohl, the IMF, and the global financial system – played critical roles in undermining 
the GDR’s sovereignty, stability, and ultimately, its existence. 
                                                     
740 Charles Maier’s, Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany, is an 
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741 Sarotte, Location 372. 
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the capitalist world that only loosely coordinated their relations with the GDR, if they did so at 
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to coordinate their actions. 
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Illusions of Security 
 After the tumultuous years surrounding the Polish Crisis in the early 1980s, East 
Germany returned to financial stability in 1983 and 1984 through the two Milliardenkredite 
(billion Deutsch Mark loans) from the West German government.  Alexander Schalck and 
Günter Mittag’s decision to place the loans on deposit with Western banks instead of using the 
funds directly to pay for new imports improved the country’s creditworthiness dramatically.  
Helmut Kohl’s decision to grant the GDR the two massive loans had made clear that the GDR 
had a new, very rich lender of last resort in place of the Soviet Union.   With hard currency in its 
bank accounts and a new Western financial umbrella to stand under, the GDR regained easy 
access to Western capital markets in 1984.   
 However, with the financial crisis of the early 1980s fresh in their minds, Mittag and 
Schalck knew that the country’s problems were far from solved.  Most importantly, the debt 
level needed to recede in the coming years if the country was to maintain its independence from 
the Federal Republic.  Therefore, Schalck and Deputy Finance Minister Herta König devised a 
plan to fudge the nation’s finances in order to make the situation appear worse than it actually 
was to the State Planning Commission, which ran the planned economy.  They hoped that by 
painting a dire picture they could spur an increase in economic performance, particularly in the 
all-important area of exports to the West.  If it did not, Schalck and König believed that their 
model would still ensure the nation’s solvency by holding hard currency secretly in reserve.   
 What came to be known as the Schalck/König model relied on one simple trick – 
changing interest rates.  During the GDR’s most dire months on the brink of bankruptcy in 1982, 
the country had been forced to borrow money on a very short-term basis, usually 90 days, at a 
very high rate of interest.  Short-term borrowing is always more expensive than long-term 
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borrowing, but in the midst of the high interest rates of the early 1980s, it was particularly 
expensive.   Schalck and König would later write, “In the years 1981-1983, during which the 
banks granted absolutely no credits and withdrew their own short-term deposits from our banks, 
all money needed to be generated through extremely short-term trade transactions, whose costs 
ranged from 35-45%, sometimes in Export/Import transactions up to 60% per year.”743  After the 
billion mark loans of 1983 and 1984, however, the GDR could once again get long-term loans 
from Western banks at lower interest rates.  The Schalck/König trick was simply to pretend that 
the billion Mark loans had done nothing to lower the GDR’s borrowing costs.  When Gerhard 
Schürer, the director of the State Planning Commission, then went through his annual process of 
devising the national economic plan, he would calculate the national debt based on the inflated 
interest rates provided by Schalck and König.  From this one change, two vastly different 
pictures of the GDR economy emerged from Schürer on one side and Schalck and König on the 
other. 
 A memo from Schalck and König to Mittag in January, 1985 shows this difference 
clearly.  For the 1986-1990 Five Year Plan, the State Planning Commission proposed to achieve 
wildly optimistic744 annual export surplus targets of 6.6 billion Valutamarks (VM)745 through an 
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aggressive reorientation of the country’s export capacity to the West and a restriction of Western 
imports.  If the economy achieved these surpluses, the planning commission projected that the 
country’s Western debt would recede from 29.2 billion VM in 1985 to 17.4 billion VM in 1990.  
In contrast, Schalck and König proposed a less stringent and more politically palatable projection 
for achieving annual export surpluses ranging from 3.4-4.2 billion VM.  They assured Mittag 
that their plan would nevertheless cause the debt to fall to 15.7 billion VM in 1990.  How was 
this possible?  The two authors knew that the GDR could borrow money at an average annual 
cost of 14%-20%, while the State Planning Commission worked under the assumption that the 
GDR faced annual borrowing costs of 25%.   The authors summed up the magic of their trickery.  
“Thus, despite budgeting for roughly 12.5 billion VM less in export surpluses than the State 
Planning Commission, our projections nevertheless lead to roughly 1.7 billion VM [less] in the 
debt.”  As Karl Marx himself knew well, such was the power of interest.  Despite their 
projection’s good news for the country, the authors felt it was news best kept secret.  “We 
recommend that the State Planning Commission currently not be made aware of the actual 
possible reserves (Einschüsse) and the possible development in [borrowing] costs,” they wrote.  
This way “the pressure to achieve high export surpluses [will be] lessened under no 
circumstances.”746 
 If knowledge is power, then the Schalck/König model significantly concentrated power in 
the German Democratic Republic.  Because the model created a small circle of people with an 
accurate view of the nation’s economic situation – in the mid-1980s, probably only Honecker, 
Mittag, Schalck, König, and the head of the Stasi, Erich Mielke – it delegitimized any criticism 
of the country’s economic situation that came from outside this small circle.  The State Planning 
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  404 
Commission was purposefully kept in the dark, so Schürer’s criticism of the country’s economic 
trajectory now received even less attention from Mittag and Honecker than it had in the 1970s.  
Moreover, because the State Planning Commission’s plans were now built on false premises, the 
entire planning process turned into a farce.  In 1985, the Politburo renewed its call to cut the 
national debt in half by 1990 (just as it had first done in 1980), and tasked the State Planning 
Commission with achieving this goal.  Each year for the rest of the decade, Schürer and the 
planning commission produced the same wildly optimistic plans for exports and imports in order 
to make the debt recede on paper.  When these numbers inevitably failed to materialize, the 
country would be left with a financing gap at the end of the year.  At this point, Schalck and 
KoKo would step in with roughly two billion Valutamarks from the secret KoKo accounts to 
cover the remaining gap.747  If the running joke among workers in communist countries was 
“They pretend to pay us, and we pretend to work,” then the running joke in the East German 
hierarchy could have been “They pretend that we face looming bankruptcy, and we pretend to be 
scared.”   With no sense of the real economic situation and, for the moment, no real threat of 
insolvency if performance targets were not met, the East German nomenklatura resisted 
fundamental change and Honecker refrained from applying pressure for reform.   
 As it ate away at the internal workings of the East German state, the false sense of 
security also fueled Honecker’s resistance to Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost in 
the Soviet Union.  The content of Honecker’s criticism of Gorbachev’s reforms was both 
practical and ideological.  Practically, Honecker believed – and indeed rightly foresaw – that 
Gorbachev’s attempt to modernize the Soviet economy would lead to significant shortages in the 
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domestic supply of food and consumer goods.  He became known among his Politburo 
colleagues for a rhetorical question he often repeated: Do you want perestroika or stocked 
shelves?748  Ideologically, the economic implications of perestroika – greater uncertainty and 
instability for workers in return for higher performance – contradicted everything he had been 
building under the Unity of Social and Economic Policy since the early 1970s.  In addition, 
Honecker saw Gorbachev’s efforts to democratize Soviet society at the local level and open the 
public sphere to relatively free debate as a betrayal of the Leninist ideal of democratic centralism 
and an invitation for criticism from Western “bourgeois propaganda.”749   
 Underlying Honecker’s criticism was a confidence grounded in his sense that the East 
German economy suffered from none of the ills hurting the Soviet Union.  Even in the autumn of 
1988, after his country’s dire position had become clear, Honecker told Gorbachev that the GDR 
had “no difficulties” providing for its population because “the economic development of the 
GDR isn’t going poorly.”750  After Gorbachev once tried to warn Honecker about the dangers of 
the country’s debt to the West, Honecker rejected his concerns as “unfounded.”751  Gorbachev 
later recalled that he “once tried to talk to Comrade Honecker about the GDR’s debt.  This had 
been curtly repudiated, as such problems would not exist [in the GDR].”752    
 In Honecker’s view, economic problems did not exist in the GDR, and even if they did, 
any attempt to solve them would incite social unrest and damage the legitimacy of the SED.  As 
long as he and Mittag had the Schalck/König model’s assurances of solvency, they could afford 
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to avoid the political risks associated with the reforms taking place in the Soviet Union, Poland, 
and Hungary. 
One Last Great Leap Forward 
  Although the Schalck/König model’s interest rate trickery gave the East German 
economy a great deal of leeway in meeting its performance targets, it still relied on the 
achievement of one very hard economic fact: a significant annual export surplus.  If the East 
German economy failed to produce more than it consumed, no amount of accounting deception 
would save it from eventual insolvency.  After the crisis years of 1980-1983, the country’s 
Western trade performance had not met the aggressive targets set by the State Planning 
Commission, but trade surpluses had comfortably been achieved, going from 647 million VM in 
1981 to 4.94 billion VM in 1985.753   
 Then, in the last two months of 1985, the price of oil collapsed on world markets.  The 
trade surpluses of the early 1980s had been achieved at a particularly advantageous conjuncture 
in the global economy for the GDR.  The Comecon pricing principle and the high market price of 
oil meant that the GDR had received crude oil from the Soviet Union at prices well below market 
level since the 1973 oil crisis.  It was then able to sell products refined from this oil on Western 
markets at a handsome profit.  By 1985, mineral oil refined from Soviet crude was the GDR’s 
most important export to the West.  When the oil price lost two thirds of its value from 
November 1985 to March 1986, these advantages disappeared as the price of refined products 
fell in lock step with the price of crude.  In 1985, the GDR earned 2.5 billion VM from its 
mineral oil exports to the West, but that number dropped to 1 billion in 1986 and 900 million in 
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1987.754  Scholars have long looked at this oil price collapse as an important cause in the demise 
of the Soviet Union, but its effect on the GDR remains underappreciated outside the small circle 
of German historians of the GDR.755   
 The oil price collapse quickly changed Schalck’s tune regarding the airtight assurances of 
national solvency he had been presenting in the Schalck/König model.  Before the price collapse, 
in mid-September 1985, he and König presented a confident update of their model to Mittag.  
They assured him that for the upcoming period from 1986-1990 the economy could export 3.2 
billion VM less and import 11 billion VM more than the State Planning Commission was 
projecting.  The nation, they confidently asserted, would still be solvent at the end of the 
decade.756   
 By March 1986, they were far more uncertain.  Rather than assuming a 4 billion VM 
annual trade surplus as they had the previous year, they now were forced to assume an annual 
trade surplus of 1.2-2 billion VM.  As they wrote, “Compared to projections submitted earlier 
there is a significant deterioration.”  Instead of declining by 1990, the national debt would grow 
by 4.4 billion VM to 31.6 billion VM.  To fund this growth in the debt, the annual borrowing 
requirements of the East German authorities would grow to 17.9 billion VM at the end of the 
decade.  Such a development would leave the country open to the volatility of international 
capital markets – one external shock and Western banks might stop lending to the GDR.  The 
main reason for the stormy outlook lay in the collapse of the oil price.  “Based on international 
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developments,” they wrote, “it must currently be assessed that the oil price and therefore the 
prices of downstream products will remain at a low level.”  Therefore, they foresaw no 
possibility that the mineral oil industry could repeat its export performance from the previous 
five-year period in the five years to come.  A dramatic change was necessary.  If the rise in the 
debt was to be prevented, it was “essential” that “exports to the West receive a different status in 
the material distribution of the economy.”  Because the oil price had collapsed, achieving 
improved export performance in other areas of the economy besides oil derivatives had become a 
“vital issue.”757 
  It was time for another attempt to catch up to the world market.  Since the early 1970s, 
Eastern Bloc states had been trying unsuccessfully to produce globally competitive goods by 
importing Western technology.  So far, it had failed in every country in which it had been tried, 
including the GDR.  But with the leadership unwilling to consider cutbacks in East German 
living standards as a means of balancing the nation’s books, growing the economy out of its debt 
problem was left as the only option.  Economic growth, and particularly growth in exports to the 
West, required investment and Western technology.  Therefore, in a series of Politburo meetings 
in May and June 1986, the leadership decided to make another attempt at importing Western 
technology on credit.758  It fell to Schalck and Schürer to figure out exactly how to make this 
happen.  In early August, Schalck wrote to Mittag with his proposal.  “To ensure a rapid increase 
in performance, particularly in select export-intensive companies,” Schalck suggested that KoKo 
be authorized to coordinate the import of “highly productive, technologically state-of-the-art 
computer-controlled machine tools and specialist machinery, automation equipment, [and] the 
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most modern measuring and control devices.”  One of the biggest recipients of these targeted 
investments would be the East German microelectronics and computing industry.  As Silicon 
Valley began its ascent in the United States in the 1980s, the GDR leadership – and Mittag, in 
particular – believed the country could be the Silicon Valley of the socialist world.  All of these 
imports, Schalck wrote, “should be provided to companies as interest-free credits” and should 
not “burden the balance of payments from 1986-1990.”759  Because KoKo maintained large hard 
currency deposits and good relations with Western banks, it could get the Western loans 
independently from the East German state.  Of course, KoKo would have to repay the loans at 
some point in the future, so it would eventually need to be repaid by the East German state.  
Under Schalck’s plan, the day of reckoning would not come until 1991, at which point Schürer 
and the State Planning Commission would be responsible for paying KoKo back, hopefully by 
using the new hard currency profits that the technological investments would generate.  Ghosts 
of the failure of this strategy during the 1970s in Poland, Hungary, and the GDR itself haunted 
the proposal, but with nowhere else to turn, Mittag and Honecker authorized the plan.  Export 
growth to the West was now the only way the GDR could survive as an independent nation-state.   
  
The Inflection Point 
 Instead, the trade balance worsened.  1985’s export surplus of 4.94 billion VM fell back 
to 873 million VM in 1986 and turned to a 1.03 billion VM trade deficit in 1987.760  In the 
autumn of that year, as the year-end trade deficit started to come into full view, Schalck and 
König realized for the first time that they could no longer ensure the solvency of the country over 
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the coming years.  Their model had always assumed at least a modest export surplus, and the 
falling export performance made clear that this assumption was no longer tenable.  They began 
to sound the alarm internally of the country’s impending insolvency.  In October, they wrote to 
Mittag, “Stemming from the responsibility you gave us to ensure the solvency of our republic, 
we must inform you that…the solvency of the GDR can only be secured through 1990 if the 
1988 export and import plan…is completely adhered to and at least the same growth rate in 
exports is achieved in 1989 and 1990 as is planned for 1988.”  They continued, “We must make 
this serious assessment based on the following considerations: in the years since 1982…planned 
exports to the West have not been met.”   The “inadequate development of internal economic 
productivity and efficiency, connected with an insufficient…reduction of imports has led to a 
constant growth in the debt of the GDR.”  Higher debt meant higher interest payments.  They 
informed Mittag, “five to six billion Valutamarks are necessary just for interest payments” every 
year (all underlining throughout the chapter is original to the documents).  “This is the price that 
our republic must pay every year for the anticipated national income of future years.  At the same 
time, this means that any trade surplus below 5 billion VM will lead to a further increase in 
debt.”  Even if the economy achieved similar export results in 1989 and 1990 as were planned 
for 1988, the two officials told Mittag that the annual hard currency financing gap would grow 
from 11.3 billion VM to 21.3 billion VM in 1990.  “We can,” they told Mittag, “guarantee the 
solvency of the republic in 1990” but only if “the planned trade surplus is actually realized.”  
“For the period after 1990,” they told him, “it is a matter of life and death (Lebensfrage), that the 
improved performance of our economy…lead to an export surplus of 5 billion VM.”  If this was 
not achieved, then they told Mittag “we see no possibility of securing the solvency of the 
republic in 1991.  This situation would apply already in 1989 or 1990 if the planned exports to 
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the West are not achieved in 1988 – as has been allowed to happen in recent years.”  If exports 
were “allowed to develop as they did in 1986 and 1987, insolvency will occur already in 
1989.”761  
 Schalck made his newfound alarm even more clear at a working group of the country’s 
top economists and economic managers taking place the same week in October.  “If the GDR 
does not achieve an export surplus in 1987,” he told the group, “the creditworthiness of the 
country will be critically burdened.”  In the 1970s, when petrodollar recycling was in full swing 
and the Western banking community believed in the “umbrella theory” for lending to Eastern 
Europe, all Eastern Bloc countries had been able to run ten consecutive years of trade deficits 
without losing access to Western capital markets.  The Polish Crisis of the early 1980s and the 
subsequent Sovereign Debt Crisis in the developing world had fundamentally changed this.  
Schalck told his colleagues that the GDR’s Eastern Bloc allies were already demonstrating in 
dramatic fashion that global capital markets no longer tolerated long periods of poor economic 
performance.  “The example of Hungary, which for the past two years has not achieved a trade 
surplus, shows that the country’s credit rating has severely deteriorated and it can only receive 
government-guaranteed loans.”  Because such loans came with conditions attached, Schalck 
concluded “this way is not politically or financially viable for the GDR.”762  If the Hungarian 
experience showed Schalck the perils of trade deficits, the Polish experience showed him the 
catastrophic consequences of insolvency.  He later recalled, “[General] Jaruzelski…conveyed to 
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me very clearly that a state which is insolvent loses and must lose its political power, and 
therefore its maneuverability.  It can then govern only through bayonets [and] martial law; 
Jaruzelski…did this, but without success, because every military dictatorship must decide at 
some point how it will move forward - and it is not capable of this. So that [way] makes no 
sense.”763 
 The KoKo chief’s transformation from a beacon of reassurance to a prophet of doom in 
the fall of 1987 was an important development.  Because he, König, and Mittag had done such a 
masterful job hiding an accurate picture of the country’s finances from both domestic and 
international audiences, there were very few people either within the GDR or outside of it that 
could issue a credible warning to Erich Honecker about the country’s approaching crisis.  
Schalck was one of the few who could, and after October 1987, he began to regularly warn that 
the country faced insolvency in the years to come.  The illusions of security that his 
Schalck/König model provided Mittag and Honecker from 1983 to 1987 were now gone.  Any 
continued resistance to beginning a process of economic reform now rested not on confidence in 
the nation’s long-term solvency, but instead on fear of the political instability that reform would 
bring.  Similar to the lessons Schalck learned about global capital markets, the leadership only 
needed to look at Hungary, Poland, or the Soviet Union to see this risk of instability play out in 
real time.  
 Just before Schalck lost his confidence in the nation’s finances, Honecker undertook his 
long-awaited visit to the Federal Republic.  As the General Secretary traveled around West 
Germany in September, 1987, the visit was hailed as a new step in inter-German relations, pan-
European détente, the deepening thaw in superpower relations.  For Honecker personally, the 
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visit was a crowning moment of his career as he received almost all the official honors bestowed 
on a head of state, a sensitive topic for the leader of a country whose sovereignty had always 
been embattled and questioned.  Ever since Chancellor Helmut Schmidt had visited the GDR in 
December 1981 and extended a reciprocal invitation to Honecker, the General Secretary had 
been deeply desirous of travelling to the FRG.  But after the Milliardenkredite in 1983 and 1984, 
the Soviet government had been concerned that the GDR was falling under the orbit of the 
Federal Republic and had prevented Honecker from going.  Gorbachev, despite his rhetoric of 
improving relations between the two European blocs, had shared this concern and prevented 
Honecker from travelling until the fall of 1987.  Thus, the mere fact that a visit took place was 
taken as a sign by observers in both East and West that the European continent was heading 
toward a less divided future.  In their joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of the visit, 
West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Honecker pledged “in light of the responsibility 
arising from their common history” to “make a special effort on behalf of a peaceful coexistence 
in Europe.”  To this end, they established a joint commission to further develop their economic 
relations and “dealt thoroughly with questions of holiday travel and visitor traffic.”764  The 
economic commission “proved to be a farce within a few months,” according to Hans Hermann-
Hertle.  The travel discussions resulted in the Federal Republic’s May 1988 agreement to 
increase its annual lump sum payment to the GDR for “infrastructure” to facilitate inter-German 
travel from DM 525 million to DM 860 million for the 1990s.765  Such was the nature of inter-
                                                     
764 “Joint Communiqué by Erich Honecker and Helmut Kohl,” September 8, 1987, 
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=109, Accessed June 27, 2016. 
765 This payment was a long-standing practice of the détente era and a significant source of hard 
currency for the GDR.  Few believed that the GDR actually needed or spent this sum on 
maintaining roads and trains to facilitate inter-German travel, and most cynically viewed it as the 
GDR’s ransom for maintaining open access between West Germany and West Berlin.  “Farce” 
  414 
German economic relations in the late 1980s – little real economic cooperation, but a great deal 
of cash transferred from West to East in the name of détente.   
 In the juxtaposition of Honecker’s visit to the FRG and Schalck’s conversion to prophet 
of doom, we can see the difference between public histories focused on the end of the Cold War 
as the culmination of détente and a private history focused on the end of the Cold War as the 
product of sovereign debt crises.  Visible to the whole world, Honecker’s visit reflected 
Gorbachev’s embrace of superpower and intra-European détente, and his time in the Rhineland 
clearly improved the political mood in Europe.  By late 1987, with the superpowers signing the 
INF Treaty to ban intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe, and Gorbachev’s declaration 
of his desire to create “a common European home” for both East and West, politics in Europe 
certainly felt different and better.  But it is a central contention of this dissertation that it would 
be wrong to draw a causal line from these visible developments in European détente to the 
political revolutions that happened two short years later.  Détente did not cause democracy.  Debt 
crises did.  And to understand the Eastern Bloc’s debt crises, it is necessary to track the private 
concerns of a quiet operator such as Schalck.  It is Schalck’s private conversion, rather than 
Honecker’s public diplomacy, that points the way to the decisive events of 1989.  If one focuses 
on the outward signs of the Cold War – whether it be a sign of change such as Honecker’s visit 
or an apparent sign of eternal stasis, such as the immovable presence of the Berlin Wall – then it 
is difficult to construct a historical narrative of 1989 that does not end in surprise, namely 
peaceful and quick democratic revolutions.  If, on the other hand, one focuses on the financial 
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history of the late Cold War, which was by its very nature a private - indeed confidential - 
history, then one finds historical antecedents for the surprising public events of 1989. 
 
“Our Republic is Going Bankrupt” 
 At the end of 1987, the troubling outlook on world oil markets received a disconcerting 
jolt from the GDR’s last line of defense, the Soviet Union.  In December, the Soviet Union told 
its bloc allies that due to difficulties in the development and extraction of its oil supplies, it 
would have to reduce its oil deliveries after the current contract period expired in 1990.  
Additionally, in response to the emergence of the Common Market in the European Community 
and the limitations of Comecon, the Soviets proposed transforming the Eastern Bloc into a 
common market, where transactions would be completed directly between companies and settled 
at world market prices.  As a precursor to making their currencies convertible to Western hard 
currencies, the Soviets also proposed making all bloc currencies convertible to each other.  Hans-
Hermann Hertle has written, “The reason for this [proposal] was obvious: about seventy percent 
of the GDR’s imports from the Soviet Union were raw materials, while ninety percent of its 
exports to the USSR were finished goods. The raw material deliveries of the Soviet Union were 
valuable on world markets (“NSW-wertig”), the finished goods of the GDR were not.”766  The 
fact that such a development would result in lower raw material supplies from the Soviet Union 
to the GDR was plain for all to see, but Mittag eventually asked Schalck to think through 
precisely how dire the consequences would be.  His conclusions were unequivocal, the “export 
failures, import increases, stresses on the balance of payments, and cash problems” that would 
result “would inevitably have a significant impact on the continuation of … [the] Unity of 
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Economic and Social Policy.”  A loss of Soviet raw materials “would give rise to fundamental 
political and economic questions regarding the situation of the GDR, as a state right on the 
border between the Warsaw Pact and NATO who confronts the powerful imperialist state, the 
FRG.”  Schalck concluded that his “considerations show the urgent need to safeguard the 
traditional goods and services from the USSR in the 90s.”767 
 In the spring of 1988, however, all signs pointed toward a Soviet abandonment of its 
traditional economic role.  This prospect caused Gerhard Schürer to break his silence and call for 
a change in course.  In preparation for a Politburo meeting in early May, he composed a proposal 
to change the country’s economic direction fundamentally.  “Our conclusion must be,” he wrote, 
that “each object, no matter how important it is” must be confronted with “the harsh economic 
conditions of the world market.”  The “crucial issue has become not what is produced, but at 
what cost and at what profit.”  Specifically, Schürer criticized the 1987 decision to attempt 
another Great Leap Forward by investing in unprofitable areas of the economy, particularly 
microelectronics.  The head of the State Planning Commission foresaw no way that his 
institution would be able to repay Schalck for the recent hard currency loans because he foresaw 
no way that East German industries would be able to produce globally competitive exports in the 
next three years.   
 Seeing no prospect of sufficient economic growth in the future, Schürer saw only one 
remaining option to ensure the country’s solvency – austerity.  Although he believed in the 
state’s mission to provide the working classes with a high quality of life, he recognized that “the 
benefits for the population from the state budget for housing, price supports, fares, education, 
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health, culture, sports and recreation” were far outstripping the country’s ability to pay for them.  
Knowing that Honecker had always rejected changes in this area because they would be 
unpopular, Schürer optimistically wrote that reforms to the country’s subsidized prices and 
welfare system “could find the understanding and support of the population.”   
 They would need to because Schürer believed the party could no longer afford to insulate 
the population from the world market.  He detailed how the GDR’s external economic conditions 
had deteriorated since the mid-1970s.  “The imports from the USSR, for example, increased 
245% from 1975-1985” in nominal terms, “but only 107% at constant prices.”  He noted, “out of 
a total import volume of 260 billion VGW during this period, 145 billion VGW were only price 
increases.”  This meant that the GDR had been forced to divert more of its goods to the Soviet 
Union to pay for the same amount of imports in return.  Left behind in this process had been 
exports to the West.  Here Schürer stated plainly “a fundamental change in exports to the West is 
necessary. The growth and profitability of exports to the West must permanently receive a higher 
priority in the national economy.”768  In sending the document directly to Honecker, Schürer 
later recalled, he wanted to make it clear to the General Secretary, “Our republic is going 
broke.”769 
 Schürer’s proposal was the most direct challenge to the Unity of Economic and Social 
Policy - and by extension Honecker’s leadership - since its implementation in the early 1970s.  
Honecker forwarded it to Mittag and asked him to formulate a response for discussion in the 
Politburo.  Mittag’s reprisal went straight to the point.  Schürer’s proposal would “call into 
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question…the Unity of Economic and Social Policy” and his “suggestions for price changes” to 
consumer goods, rents, and energy were connected with issues of “significant mass appeal 
(großen Massenwirksamkeit)”.770  He sarcastically doubted such changes could find the support 
among the population that Schürer claimed.  With regard to the recently attempted Great Leap 
Forward, Mittag held to the position that the only way out of the current impasse was export 
growth, which required investment in the latest technologies.  Microelectronics, Mittag argued, 
needed to be “a strategic task of the first order” if the GDR wanted “to maintain its social and 
socio-political room for maneuver and to strengthen its position in world markets."771  The 
choice between Schürer and Mittag boiled down to a difference of belief in the ability of the East 
German economy to compete on the world market.  Schürer believed it could not.  Mittag 
believed it had to.  After the Politburo had discussed the two positions, Honecker sided with 
Mittag and declared, “The positions of Comrade Mittag are correct.”  He directed his comrades 
to find a way out of the crisis without implementing austerity.   
 The Politburo meeting in early May began six months of fruitless discussions within the 
leadership about how to move forward.  All the while, the financial straightjacket around the 
country grew ever tighter.  At a Politburo meeting in late June, Prime Minister Willi Stoph told 
the assembled group that the economy needed to achieve a 2.1 billion VM trade surplus in 1988 
and a 4.2 billion VM trade surplus in 1989 in order to avoid insolvency.  Despite the daunting 
numbers, Honecker renewed the strict limits he had set on economic reform.  He would not allow 
state companies to go bankrupt.  “What was already present, must remain.…Why dissolve whole 
companies here?... The elimination of companies that often have a long tradition is a mistake.”  
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Where a reformer might contemplate devaluing the East German Mark to increase the 
competitiveness of East German exports, Honecker held to the long-standing point of political 
pride that one East German Mark should equal one West German Mark.  “The state-owned 
companies must be confronted with the world market in costs and production,” he said, “and 
they must produce what is marketable.  Going forward, however, we cannot value one [East 
German] Mark as worth only twenty-five pennies.”  Because the capitalist countries had high 
unemployment, growing poverty, and deteriorating living conditions for the working class, 
Honecker believed the generous East German social system was “very advantageous” and 
needed to be maintained.  “We must always keep the improvement of the workplace and living 
conditions of the workers in mind."  It naturally followed from this that consumer prices should 
not be increased.  The General Secretary believed the recent events in Poland, where the 
government’s 1988 price increases had spawned widespread strikes, confirmed his point of view.  
He told his comrades, “Countries where price spirals were set in motion find themselves in a 
deep crisis.  Comrade Jaruzelski told [me] that his decision to increase prices was wrong and that 
they are now looking at other options.”772 
 Indeed, as the East German leadership sought a way out of its economic crisis in the 
summer of 1988, it could very easily look at events in Poland and Hungary as direct evidence of 
what lay ahead if they tried to lower East German living standards.  In May 1988, economic 
reformers had forced János Kádár out as General Secretary of the Hungarian communist party in 
order to implement the demands of the International Monetary Fund.  In response, popular 
discontent was rising and opposition groups were taking shape on the ground in Budapest.  In 
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Poland, Jaruzelski tried to quiet the discontent caused by price increases by agreeing to open the 
Roundtable negotiations with Solidarity.  Inflation was accelerating and lines at Polish stores 
were increasing as food and goods became more scarce.  All the while, the prospect of renewed 
labor unrest hung over developments in Warsaw.  
 Thus, by September, Honecker could at once declare that “the decisive issue” was “the 
problem of ensuring the solvency of the GDR”773 while also pointing to the country’s neighbors 
as evidence that price increases and austerity measures were not viable solutions.  “All countries 
that have begun the price-wage spiral have then gone bankrupt, see Poland [and] Hungary - in 
Czechoslovakia, the same thing looms.  We can not go the Romanian way [because] the situation 
with the FRG does not allow for it.”774  In the Politburo on September 4th, Harry Tisch summed 
up the nature of the country’s economic problems with precision, “Our people want social 
security, safety, job security, and education from us and the department stores of the FRG." And 
Werner Jarowinsky returned to the horrible track record of reform in other Eastern Bloc states.  
“Nobody has achieved better solutions with so-called economic reforms.  They all have debts,” 
but their attempts at economic reform destroyed “the basis of trust and optimism” in society.  
Therefore, he said, “We need to keep the GDR stable.”775  Through the end of the year, the 
Politburo did, and the debt to the West continued to grow. 
 In February 1989, Schürer approached Egon Krenz, the heir apparent to Honecker, about 
overthrowing the General Secretary on the grounds that he had run the country into financial 
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ruin.  “Schürer confirmed to me that Honecker bore a large personal fault for the debt of the 
GDR,” Krenz recalled.  “A reduction in the debt is impossible” with Honecker leading the 
country, Schürer told him.  But not yet feeling the sense of dire urgency required to make such a 
move, Krenz declined.776  This left Schürer to desperately report in May to a group of leading 
officials that the country’s debt to the West was increasing at a rate of 500 million Deutsch 
Marks per month and to plead for the adoption of “a series of measures in the area of 
consumption” to ward off the insolvency.  But no one could bring themselves to support 
austerity.  “What would we say to the people?” Harry Tisch asked rhetorically.  Krenz continued 
to see no way out.  “For me it is no question whether the Unity of Economic and Social Policy 
will continue,” Krenz said.  “It must be continued, because it is socialism in the GDR!”777 
 If the experience of Poland and Hungary showed the Politburo that price increases and 
austerity measures were unpopular, it also showed us in the previous two chapters that 
communist leaders avoided implementing austerity until they believed they had no other choice.  
With its creditworthiness still in tact and its borders still secure through the spring of 1989, the 
East German leadership still had choices, so it collectively chose short-term stability over long-
term solvency.  Events along the Hungarian border would soon change these choices.  But as the 
rest of this chapter demonstrates, the leaders of East Germany would choose any path – including 
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Creating the Exit Choice 
 Scholars widely recognize the opening of the Austro-Hungarian border on September 
10th, 1989 as a critically important moment in the collapse of the GDR.  With the Hungarian 
government’s decision to allow East German citizens to cross the border into Austria and move 
on to West Germany, East Berlin lost the power to control the movement of its own people.  But 
why did the Hungarian government betray its ally and open its borders?  Why did it take down 
the barbed wire fence – the so-called “Iron Curtain” – that ran the length of the Austro-
Hungarian border earlier in the spring of 1989?   
 These decisions have traditionally been viewed as part of the broader reform communism 
movement in Hungary – a movement that aspired to join the West, to be included in the 
European Economic Community, and to abide by international human rights norms.  As Mark 
Kramer, one of the leading historians of the end of the Cold War, has written, “the Hungarian 
government sought to burnish its liberal, pro-Western credentials by dismantling ‘the Iron 
Curtain.’”778A group of scholars has also drawn attention to Austro-Hungarian diplomatic 
relations, which they label “a masterpiece of European détente,” as a critical factor in the 
decision to open the border.779  However, the most recent German monograph on this history, 
Andreas Oplatka’s Der Erste Riß in der Mauer (“The First Crack in the Wall”), rightly stresses 
the financial motivations behind the Hungarian government’s decisions. This is central to 
understanding the history of 1989, because it is in Hungarian financial history that we see the 
strongest evidence of how events began to cascade and accelerate in the late 1980s.  Only 
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because of Hungary’s financial problems did its domestic reforms become a question of East 
German emigration.  Only because of Hungary’s sovereign debt did the Exit/Voice and in turn 
the Exit/Violence/Austerity dynamics of East Germany’s dénouement come into being.  
Therefore, an exploration of Hungarian financial history is required to understand the GDR’s 
predicament in 1989.  
 By the late 1980s, the border fortifications separating Hungary from Austria and the 
broader West had become dilapidated.  The electronic signaling system along the border, which 
was meant to alert border guards to any attempted crossing, regularly sounded false alarms 
because of gusts of wind or wild animals.  It needed to be modernized if it was to be maintained. 
In the fall of 1987, the head of the border guard wrote a report for the Hungarian Interior 
Ministry detailing the current system’s failings and annual cost, as well as estimating the costs of 
a system renovation.  In a country with an annual budget deficit of 30 to 60 billion forints, the 
report’s numbers detailed an unwelcome prospect: the annual cost of the system was 42-50 
million forints, and a renovation of the system would cost 1.2 to 1.5 million forints per kilometer 
along a 366 kilometer border.780  The chief of the border guard believed that the cost of the 
system far outweighed the benefits, and recommended that it be removed.  
 The benefits of such a system were particularly low by the late 1980s because of the 
political changes then underway in Hungary.  As discussed in the previous chapter on Hungary’s 
democratic transition, the Hungarian government passed a law in the spring of 1987 that enabled 
all of its citizens to travel to the West and exchange a fixed amount of Hungarian forints into 
hard currency to finance their travel.  As of January 1, 1988, all Hungarians would be allowed to 
travel to the West with new so-called “world passports.”  This new law was an extremely 
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popular measure among the Hungarian population, and it was adopted precisely for this reason.  
At a time when the Hungarian communist party had begun to implement extremely unpopular 
IMF-mandated austerity measures, it sought refuge in the new travel law as a means of bolstering 
its standing in society.781  Hungarians’ newfound freedom to travel called into question the need 
for a fortified border fence separating the country from the West.  Imre Pozsgay, the leader of the 
reform communist movement, called the Iron Curtain fence “both historically as well as 
technically and politically” outdated after a visit to the Hungarian border in October 1988.  Now 
that Hungarians had world passports, Pozsgay said, they would not need to cross the border 
illegally.782  
 As the pressures of IMF-mandated austerity increased in the fall of 1988, the Hungarian 
General Secretary Károly Grósz resigned from his post as Prime Minister and installed the 
reform economist Miklós Németh in his place.  Németh would prove to be the driving force 
behind the decision to open the border in the months ahead.  For the new Prime Minister, there 
was a direct connection between his dealings with the IMF regarding the nation’s finances and 
his decision to dismantle the border fence.  As discussed in the previous chapter, the Hungarian 
government had been under constant pressure from the IMF since 1987 to cut its budget deficit 
and implement austerity measures.  Now, as Németh took office, he went through the country’s 
books line by line to look for areas he could cut.  When he came across the line item detailing the 
annual cost of the border security system, he “unceremoniously” drew a line through it with his 
pencil.  Andreas Oplatka has written, “Today, looking back on the success of the border opening, 
it would no doubt be easy and tempting for Németh to say that he made his decision” as a reform 
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politician “thinking in European dimensions.” But, “the former prime minister openly and 
frankly says the opposite.  He admits that at the time it was all about cost savings.”783 
 Németh still needed the rest of the leadership’s approval for this decision, so in February 
1989 he went to the Politburo with a report detailing the costs of modernizing the border security 
system.  It would be expensive: a simple renovation of the old system would cost up to 560 
million forints; its replacement by a modern system (such as the one in East Germany) would 
cost up to 1.25 billion forints; and building new housing for the border guards and their families 
would cost 2.4 billion forints.  Oplatka writes, this “financial factor was particularly convincing.”  
After hearing of it, “No one opposed the dismantling.”  He concludes that this was because the 
Politburo had “discussed the extremely tense financial situation of the country and the demands 
of the International Monetary Fund five days before.”  At that meeting on finances, “dramatic 
tones prevailed, and a swear word or two were used on occasion.”784 
 Having gained the assent of the party, Németh moved on to seek the next level of 
authorization in the Eastern Bloc’s chain of command: Moscow’s.  On March 3rd, 1989, the 
Prime Minister arrived in the Kremlin for his first visit with Mikhail Gorbachev.  During their 
discussion, the two leaders touched on many subjects ranging from the status of Soviet troops in 
Hungary, to the merits of a multi-party democratic system, to the challenges of Hungarian 
economic reform.  Eventually, Németh broached the issue of the border security, saying, “We 
have decided to gradually do away with the electronic signaling system between now and 
January 1, 1991.”  Gorbachev hesitated, and then responded, “I see, frankly, no problem.”785  
Surprised at the ease of the acquiescence, Németh and his party returned to Budapest resolute in 
                                                     
783 Oplatka, Erste Riß, p. 36. 
784 Oplatka, Erste Riß, p. 46. 
785 Oplatka, Erste Riß, p. 67.  
  426 
their decision to move forward with the dismantling of the border fence.  First, however, they 
would need to inform their socialist comrades of their decision. 
 In mid-March, the Hungarian Foreign Ministry called the ambassadors of the Warsaw 
Pact countries together for a meeting.  There, the leadership informed them that the government 
had decided to dismantle the border fence.  They provided no timeline, but did provide the 
reason for their decision: “The step was required for economic reasons[.] Hungary could no 
longer afford the fence.”786  Despite the change, Hungarian officials told their allies not to worry.  
This was a change in cosmetics, not in practice: the border would continue to be heavily 
patrolled and citizens of other Eastern Bloc states would still be barred from leaving Hungary for 
the West.  
 In April, Hungarian authorities began taking down the border security system to little 
public attention.  It gained increasing notice, however, after the Hungarian and Austrian Foreign 
Ministers, Gyula Horn and Alois Mock, held a symbolic wire cutting in front of TV cameras and 
newspaper reporters on June 27th.  Immediately the image of the two foreign ministers was 
published across Western Europe, and thus beamed into East Germany through West German 
television.  East German citizens began to travel to Hungary with the hope that the Hungarian 
government would eventually relent and allow them to cross the Austrian border.  A Stasi 
analysis concluded that the main motivations for the emigration were a lack of consumer goods, 
the poor state of the medical care, the limited possibilities for travel, the sorry workplace 
conditions, the bureaucratic attitude of the state, and the lack of free media - in other words, life 
in the GDR.787  Many of the refugees holed up in the West German embassy in Budapest (and to 
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a lesser extent in Prague and Warsaw), believing that the West German government would 
eventually pay the GDR for their release to the West, as it had done many times before for East 
German political prisoners stuck in East German jails.  By July, the Exit had begun. 
 In August, local civil societies groups in the town of Sopron along the Austrian border 
began organizing what would eventually be billed as the “Pan-European Picnic.”  Set for August 
19th, the picnic would celebrate Hungarians’ new freedom of travel by allowing residents to 
freely cross the border into Austria for three hours during the afternoon. Hearing of the plan and 
sensing political opportunity, Pozsgay co-opted the local plan and worked with the Austrian 
royal Otto von Hapsburg to raise its profile to become an international symbol of European 
détente.  In the run up to the picnic, Németh nervously endorsed the event as a means of testing 
how the Soviet Union would react to a complete, if temporary, opening of the border.  On the 
afternoon of nineteenth, somewhere between 1500 to 2000 people took part in the picnic by 
crossing the border north of Sopron.  Roughly six hundred East Germans used the temporary 
opening to flee across the border.  The border guards decided not to prevent them from crossing, 
and the refugees freely fled to the West.  In the days to come, the Pan-European Picnic and the 
six hundred East Germans who escaped became global news and another sign of the evaporating 
barriers between East and West.788  
 The event also put further pressure on Németh to permanently solve the refugee problem.  
The picnic had demonstrated to the Hungarians that the Soviets would not intervene, but it had 
also demonstrated to East Germans that the Austro-Hungarian border could be crossed.  This 
only increased their numbers.  Németh was spurred to act.  The choice was between either 
sending the refugees back to East Germany or opening the Austrian border for all East Germans 
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to cross freely.  The Prime Minister began by weighing his country’s commercial relationship to 
the two Germanys.  He asked his team if there was any economic damage that the GDR could 
inflict on Hungary if he acted against East German interests.  They could come up with 
nothing.789  In contrast, the economic benefits of a good relationship with Bonn were obvious – 
the Kohl government held the keys to Hungary’s fortunes in Western Europe and, along with the 
United States, determined the country’s fate in the IMF.  This was enough to convince Németh.  
He would open the border to Austria.  On August 22nd, he confirmed the decision with the 
highest ranks of the leadership, and immediately requested an emergency secret meeting with 
Kohl to inform him of the decision.  
 On August 25th, Németh and his closest advisors departed Budapest under the utmost 
secrecy for Bonn aboard an airplane not normally used for official business.  When they landed, 
they boarded a helicopter of the West German border police to fly to Gymnich Castle outside of 
Cologne, where Kohl and West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher secretly 
waited.  What happened next remains the subject of dispute among the participants.  Genscher 
wrote a memorandum of the meeting, but it fails to mention the refugee issue at all, probably 
because he feared that the Stasi would find out.  Retrospective accounts from Kohl, Genscher, 
Németh, and Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Horn differ in important respects, but Andreas 
Oplatka gives the most weight to the accounts of Kohl and Németh.790  If one trusts these two 
accounts, then the meeting went as follows.  After a discussion of the precarious Hungarian 
economic situation, Németh announced to his hosts that the Hungarian government had decided 
to open its border to Austria for East Germans.  Kohl, with “tears in his eyes,” thanked the Prime 
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Minister for his decision and asked what kind of financial compensation he wanted in return.  
Németh proudly responded, “We do not sell people.”  This was an allusion to the mercenary 
Romanian (and, for that matter, East German) practice of selling the emigration of their 
dissident, German, and Jewish populations to West Germany in exchange for a substantial 
amount of hard currency.  Németh, at least officially, wanted no part in such a practice.  Instead, 
he asked for Kohl’s assistance in bringing Hungary closer to the European Community.  Kohl 
readily agreed and added that the Federal Republic would compensate Hungary for any 
retaliation carried out by its socialist “brother countries.”791  The meeting concluded with both 
sides agreeing to work together to coordinate the logistics and timing of the border opening.  On 
September 10th, the Hungarian government opened the border to the 7,000 East Germans now 
waiting to leave for the West.792  According the one Hungarian estimate, 600,000 East Germans 
followed suit in the weeks to come.793  
 If there was no quid pro quo in fact, there was certainly one in perception.  In the weeks 
after their meeting, the Kohl government granted the Hungarians a DM500 million loan in 
support of “a reform process of pan-European importance” and in recognition of the Hungarian 
decision “against closed borders, and for the free movement of all citizens.”794  The Hungarians 
delayed signing the loan until mid-December to perpetuate the appearance of independence, but 
it fooled nobody.  In a meeting on October 7th, Honecker and Gorbachev discussed the loan and 
lamented Hungary’s betrayal of socialism in exchange for money.  Gorbachev folded the news 
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into a broader explanation of the disintegration of the socialist bloc going on around them.  “The 
West promises great gifts of grace [Gnadengeschenke] in exchange for renouncing positions,” 
the Soviet leader said.  “We were also goaded to borrow more. We have difficult processes 
[happening] in society, but it is not so easy to approach us.  Hungary and Poland are another 
matter.  Their prosperity has been created on an artificial basis over several years, and this has 
now moved them into a position of dependence.”795 
 So why did the Hungarian government decide to dismantle the Iron Curtain and open its 
border for East Germans?  There were many reasons, among them that its leadership had lost the 
ideological conviction to defend the GDR’s repressive brand of socialism.  But as Prime 
Minister, Németh had to think in terms of the Hungarian national interest.  In this regard, the 
financial power of the West and economic weakness of the East significantly shaped his choice.  
From the West, carrots and sticks abounded.  The US ambassador to Budapest Mark Palmer told 
Hungarian officials throughout the summer of 1989 that if they sent the East German refugees 
back to the GDR, “the United States would not invest another cent in this country.”796  In the 
broadest sense, Németh and his closest advisors believed that the country’s future lay in Western 
Europe, not in what remained of the Eastern Bloc. They had been trying to establish ties with the 
European Community for almost a decade, and they now hoped to gain access to the European 
Economic Community and the future European Common Market.  The West German 
government would ultimately decide whether and when this happened.  Kohl could easily 
promise to compensate the Hungarians for any East German economic retaliation because East 
Berlin had few means with which to retaliate.  He did not even have to mention the retaliatory 
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power he could wield if the Hungarians chose in East Berlin’s favor and sent the refugees back.  
The fate of the Hungarian economy, and with it, the political fortunes of Németh and all the 
reform communists, depended on the good graces and financial power of Bonn.  The DM500 
million loan, whether directly tied to Németh’s decision or not, was the most visible 
manifestation of this broader financial context that pushed the Hungarian government to 
permanently open the Exit option.  
 
Avoiding Violence to Avoid Austerity 
 At the Warsaw Pact’s summit in Bucharest, Romania in early July, Mikhail Gorbachev 
officially renounced the Brezhnev Doctrine, the Soviet Union’s commitment to intervene in the 
internal affairs of its satellites in order to “protect socialism.”  The summit’s concluding 
document announced that future relations within the bloc would take place “on the basis of 
equality, independence and the right of each country to arrive at its own political position, 
strategy, and tactics without interference from an outside party.”797  Although this only put in 
writing what Gorbachev had been telling his Eastern Bloc allies since his first day in office,798 its 
official enshrinement arrived to the great consternation of Honecker and Krenz, who represented 
the GDR at the summit.  Adding injury to insult, Honecker fell ill at the conference with a biliary 
colic and had to fly home early for medical treatment.  Although his condition initially stabilized, 
the General Secretary was forced to have surgery in mid-August to remove his gallbladder and 
take a leave of absence until the end of September. 
 Honecker’s illness paralyzed the East German leadership’s response to the constantly 
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deteriorating domestic and international circumstances.  The week after Hungary opened its 
border, the GDR worked with the anti-Western government of Czechoslovakia to end East 
German travel to Hungary all together.  But the Exit movement was now in full bloom, and 
emigrants continued to leave undeterred.  Instead of travelling all the way to Hungary, they now 
simply stopped in Prague and went to the West German embassy.  There, thousands were 
camped out in miserable conditions by the end of September.  As Honecker finally returned to 
work at the end of the month, he agreed to strike a deal with the West German government.  He 
would “expel” the East Germans in the Prague embassy from the GDR, thus retaining his 
nominal control over who got to leave the country, while also allowing them to travel to the 
West.  On the nights from September 30th to October 1st, the refugees travelled by trains from 
Prague through the GDR and on to the Federal Republic.  On October 3rd, Honecker made a last 
gasp attempt to shut down the Exit option by completely closing the GDR’s borders.   
 This decision only served to enrage the domestic protest movement that was now gaining 
steam.  Since the spring of 1989, a small group of dissidents had been using the peace prayer 
service that took place in the Nikolai Church in downtown Leipzig every Monday to organize 
protests against the regime.  By the time of the peace prayers on September 18th, hundreds of 
Leipzig residents had joined in, and the next week, the protesters began to take their voices out 
into the streets and call for reform. On Monday October 2nd, roughly ten thousand people set out 
to march around the city’s ring road, and security forces dispersed the crowd with clubs, dogs, 
and shields.  As the trains carrying a last group refugees from Prague rolled into the Dresden 
train station on October 4th, an estimated 20,000 protestors surrounded the station and blocked 
the tracks until police forcibly dispersed them.  Then, in the days leading up to the SED’s 
celebration of the 40th anniversary of the GDR on October 7th, countless protests in cities 
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throughout the country were put down with force.  In all cases, the authorities stopped short of 
killing protesters, but there was little doubt that their intention was to discourage dissent through 
intimidation and repression. 
 The increasing boldness of the protests and the state’s response set the stage for the 
climatic protest in Leipzig on October 9th.  Since June, when Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese 
leadership had ordered its security forces to shoot protesters in Tiananmen Square, it had been an 
open question among East German citizens and foreign observers whether Honecker and the 
SED leadership would do the same in the GDR.  If there was going to be a “Chinese Solution” in 
East Germany, it was going to come on October 9th.   Why no “Chinese Solution” transpired – in 
other words, why the East German leadership did not choose Violence – owes to a complex 
interplay between domestic and international factors.   
 The country’s precarious financial position played a role.  Krenz wrote in his memoirs, 
and documentation from Schalck’s papers demonstrates, that Schalck had been keeping him 
informed about the real state of the country’s financial situation for many years before 1989.799  
Honecker had been grooming Krenz since the 1970s to be his successor as General Secretary, 
and given Honecker’s advanced age, it made sense to keep Krenz informed.  With this context in 
mind, it is very likely that a memo dated September 18th, 1989 in Schalck’s papers was seen by 
Krenz as well as Mittag and Mielke.  Although the document is not attributed to any author, it 
has all the hallmarks of being composed by Schalck.  In addition to being stored in his papers, it 
also contains a comparison of the “real” economic numbers against those used by the State 
Planning Commission.  
 The document – and the myriad of unrecorded and informal conversations Schalck surely 
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had with leading officials at this time – laid out in significant detail the GDR’s financial 
dependence on the capitalist West and suggested how this dependence affected the country’s 
political sovereignty.  Schalck began by stating that in contrast to the previous year’s urgent 
demands for a trade surplus in 1989, the country would in fact run a 2.5 billion VM deficit.  
Despite the horrific economic performance, Schalck and his team had successfully prevented 
capitalist banks from questioning the GDR’s creditworthiness by refusing to publish information 
on the nation’s financial position.  But the continued flow of capital, Schalck now wrote, hung 
by a thread.  He warned that the country’s solvency depended on whether the “annual borrowing 
of 8-10 billion VM can actually be secured.  Such a credit volume is an extraordinarily large sum 
for a country like the GDR, which means we are highly dependent on capitalist banks to 
maintain our solvency.”  He continued, “The particularly high risk of dependence lays in the 
finance credits [loans not tied to any particular investment or trade transaction] that are 
indispensible for us.  Maturing principle and interest payments can only be made through finance 
credits.”  Like the Hungarians in 1987, Schalck now told the leadership that the country’s 
solvency depended on the continued inflow of Japanese capital.  “Currently more than 75% of 
finance credits come from Japanese banks.  Should the Japanese government no longer allow the 
further granting of loans, for example, if the United States blackmails the Japanese government 
due to its credit boycott policy, there is no way to cover the shortfall in loans through banks in 
other countries.” 
 Beyond American blackmail, Schalck explained that there were other factors that would 
influence the readiness of capitalist banks to keep lending money to the GDR.  These included, 
“the impact of political factors on the lending willingness of capitalist banks, and the position of 
the governments of countries such as Japan and the FRG, which has a signaling effect on banks 
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in other countries.”  With this in mind, Schalck informed his readers, “During the visit with the 
Director General of the Bank of Tokyo on September 13, 1989…the President of [East German] 
Foreign Trade Bank was asked to assess how the departure of so many young people will affect 
the economic development of the GDR.  Similar issues were also discussed with the President of 
Crédit Commercial de France.”  As a final warning, Schalck wrote, “A failure to meet the loan 
repayment commitments of the GDR or a late payment of interest would lead to a total 
suspension of credit by capitalist banks.”800 
 It is impossible to know precisely how this memo affected the leadership (which, at this 
point, was still without Honecker due to his leave of absence), but it is clear that discussion of 
the nation’s financial situation continued to grow within the leadership as the protests grew in the 
streets. “Corresponding to orders given” to them, all of the leading economic officials of the state 
– Schalck, Schürer, König, the Minister of Foreign Trade Gerhard Beil, and the President of the 
State Bank, Werner Polze – composed another extended memo examining the nation’s financial 
position on September 28th.  Sounding the alarm, they began, “we already are significantly 
dependent on capitalist banks to meet our payment obligations of principal and interest as well as 
to implement our yearly import plan.”  The “extraordinarily high sum” of 8-10 billion VM 
needed to “be mobilized annually from approximately 400 banks at any one time.”  This 
mobilization was growing increasingly difficult because “capitalist banks set country limits for 
their credit orientation toward socialist countries, just as they do for developing countries. Due to 
the already high debt, banks are not willing to significantly increase this limit for the GDR.”  The 
GDR’s access to credit markets in the years to come, the authors warned, was “largely 
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dependent” on “the impact of political factors on lending willingness of capitalist banks and the 
positions of the governments of countries such as Japan and the FRG, which are among the most 
important creditors of the GDR.”  Even if the country managed to keep the markets’ favor, it 
would still need to double its exports in the next five years while also holding imports constant.  
As this chapter has shown, such export growth would have been unprecedented in the history of 
the GDR.  Indeed, it must have appeared as pure fantasy to those who wrote and read them.   
 Nevertheless, any deviation from these surpluses would certainly lead the country into 
insolvency, the authors warned, and insolvency would have dire consequences.  “Assuring the 
solvency of the Republic without conditions is the crucial prerequisite for the political stability of 
the GDR and further economic development.”  This was because, “Failure to meet upcoming 
repayment obligations on loans or untimely payment of interest would lead to the total cessation 
of credit granted by capitalist banks. With this, no more loans would be available for the GDR’s 
imports.”  Just as Schalck had drawn lessons from Hungary’s example two years prior, the 
economists now urged the leadership to look to Poland to see the disastrous results of failing to 
maintain solvency.  “The example of Poland demonstrates all this,” they wrote.  “Poland has 
received no new loans from capitalist banks since its cession of payments in 1981.”  The Polish 
example showed that the world of finance had become more demanding of debtors in recent 
years.  Debt rescheduling agreements with few or no conditions attached “no longer exist,” the 
economists wrote.  “For years now, debt rescheduling agreements with capitalist banks have only 
been concluded with the involvement of the IMF.”   
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 As we saw in the “Bailouts of Eastern Europe” chapter,801 East German leaders saw the 
IMF as an organization hell-bent on dismantling socialism.  The economists believed the history 
of socialist countries’ relationship with the IMF in the 1980s only provided new, disturbing 
evidence to support their conviction.  They wrote, “The prerequisite for a possible debt 
restructuring is the fulfillment of conditions that have been issued by the IMF.”  From the 
experience of other socialist countries, it was clear these conditions would include: “the 
renunciation of the state’s right to intervene in the economy (example of Poland); the reduction 
of [state] subsidies with the intention to abolish them (examples Poland, Yugoslavia, and 
Hungary); [and] the liberalization of imports from Western countries, that is, the renunciation of 
the state’s ability to determine its import policy.”  In other words, dealing with the IMF would 
mean the forced repeal of socialism.  This led the group to one overarching conclusion.  
“Therefore, the issue of assuring the solvency of the Republic is to be granted the highest 
political and economic priority.” 
 Here, just as in Hungary and Poland, the coercion of creditworthiness was at work.  The 
economists proposed adopting unpopular domestic policies that would invite social unrest in 
order to maintain the country’s international creditworthiness.  They wrote that the current 
financial situation made the following policies “necessary”: “a systematic change in the basic 
proportions between accumulation and consumption…; a reduction of societal consumption – 
and if that is not enough – also individual consumption; and the development of industrial export 
sectors, including the redistribution of labor for the benefit of…export-critical branches within 
industries.”802  Put simply, maintaining solvency would require the hallmarks of austerity - price 
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increases, cutbacks in social benefits, and unemployment – as well as the continued support of 
the country’s Western creditors. 
 Schalck reiterated this last point in a memo to Krenz four days after the October 9th 
protest in Leipzig.  Although the memo was written after that fateful day, it almost certainly put 
ideas already floating through the two men’s minds on paper rather than proposed something 
completely new.  “The attitude of the FRG government and the business circles of Federal 
Republic influence the attitude of the other [European Community] states and Japan toward the 
GDR to a large degree,” Schalck wrote.  We must take “the political and economic influence of 
the FRG, especially in the European Community and also in relation to financial circles and 
credit markets outside Europe very much into account.”803  Thus, if it was not written plainly on 
a document to be found in the archives, it was certainly plain for Egon Krenz to see that if he 
chose to use Violence against protesters in Leipzig or elsewhere, the country would soon be 
insolvent.  Insolvency clearly meant one thing: a repeat of the Polish experience in the 1980s.  
As this chapter has demonstrated, no one in the leadership welcomed such a prospect.  Perhaps 
we can then conclude that Krenz did not implement a “Chinese solution” because he wanted to 
avoid “the Polish experience.” 
 What Krenz, rather than Honecker, believed in the early days of October is important 
because by October 9th the overthrow of Honecker had been set in motion.  Honecker held on to 
power long enough to celebrate his country’s 40th birthday on October 7th.  But by the next day, 
according to Krenz’s memoirs, the plot to bring him down had finally begun to take shape.804  
On October 8th, Honecker issued orders to all local leaders and security forces that they should 
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prepare “measures” to prevent future “riots” “from the outset.”805  But when decision time came 
the following day in Leipzig to put down the protest or let it go on, the party’s acting leader in 
Leipzig, Helmut Hackenberg, called Krenz and not Honecker because he had already heard that 
Krenz had begun planning Honecker’s overthrow.806  Had the perception still existed among the 
GDR’s rank and file that Honecker remained in full control, it is difficult to know how events on 
October 9th would have unfolded.  Two things, however, are certain – Honecker had always 
shown a low regard for his country’s financial position and he was furious when he learned that 
the October 9th protest had succeeded without any resistance from the security forces.  Had he 
been in full control, he likely would have embraced violent repression and dealt with the 
consequences of insolvency another day.   
 Which brings us back to the protest on the ground in Leipzig on October 9th.  Neither the 
country’s financial weakness nor Krenz’s scheming against Honecker were known to the East 
Germans who gathered that day.  To them, the East German state remained a mass of repressive 
instruments that could be and would be used against citizens who spoke out in dissent.  This did 
not stop roughly 70,000 of them from gathering outside Nikolai Church after the Monday peace 
prayers and attempting to peacefully circle the ring road that surrounded the city center.  The 
ring road had become the weekly battleground between protesters and the security forces.  As the 
protesters began to make their way around, Hackenberg made his call to Krenz to report that the 
protest was far larger than anyone had predicted and ask what he should do.  Krenz hesitated and 
told him he would call him back.  According to accounts of personnel at the scene, it took him a 
half hour or forty-five minutes to call back, by which time Hackenberg had individually decided 
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that he would not order his forces to disperse the protest without a firm order from East Berlin 
and Krenz in particular.  The protesters peacefully and successfully circled the ring road.  The 
next morning, the consequences of the previous evening were clear: the protest immediately 
became a symbol of the growing power of the people in the GDR, and the population lost its fear 
of the state’s power of repression.807   
 In taking forty-five minutes to call back, Krenz ultimately did not decide how events 
unfolded that night, but a more decisive leader would have.  The reasons for his hesitance to call 
back that night are unclear, but the reasons for his hesitance to use violence were manifold.  In 
retrospect, he has always claimed to have had a deep personal conviction to not use force in the 
autumn of 1989, and Gerhard Schürer confirms this conviction in his own memoirs.808  In 
addition, by the fall of 1989 Gorbachev had made his support for non-violence well known and 
had officially renounced any Soviet willingness or obligation to intervene in allied countries to 
defend socialism.  The current historiography is well aware of Gorbachev’s push for peace, and 
has attributed a great deal of explanatory power to it.809  In contrast, scholars have so far failed to 
understand the financial pressures on the GDR,810 and therefore failed to connect this pressure to 
the leadership’s reluctance to use violence.  As this section has demonstrated, if they 
implemented a “Chinese solution,” the East German leadership understood that national 
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insolvency would soon follow, and they would be forced to deal with the IMF.  They stopped 
short of Violence, I argue, because they feared Austerity. 
 
Endorsing Exit to Avoid Austerity 
 Krenz’s official move against Honecker came at the Politburo meeting on October 17th.  
Krenz worked before the meeting to line up support from the entire Politburo except for 
Honecker, Mittag, and the propaganda chief Joachim Herrmann, who would all lose their 
leadership positions. Prime Minister Willi Stoph presented the motion to dismiss the General 
Secretary at the start of the meeting as a fait accompli.  Each member took a turn affirming their 
support for the decision to dismiss the three leaders.  Erich Mielke, the Stasi chief, told Honecker 
plainly, “‘Erich’ it is ‘the end,’” and indeed it was.811  The next day at a meeting of the broader 
SED Central Committee, Honecker announced his resignation due to “health reasons,” and asked 
the committee to elect Krenz as the new General Secretary. 
 Upon his official election, Krenz gave a speech defining the direction he intended for the 
country.  He announced what he called “the Turn,” in German die Wende.  In time, Krenz’s 
Wende would be criticized from all sides for lacking clear priorities, but on the 18th, the new 
General Secretary made a few points clear.  The party should begin “a sincere political dialogue” 
with society, but the discussion should still center on a single priority, “to expand socialism in 
the GDR.”  This dialogue should begin with the understanding that “Our socialist German 
republic is and will remain a sovereign country. We solve our own problems.”  The biggest of 
those problems – the freedom of movement – Krenz committed to resolving through a new travel 
law, though he gave no timeline for its implementation. Lastly and most importantly, Krenz said, 
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“We are guided by the firm conviction that all problems in our society are politically solvable.”  
It remained unclear what the GDR was turning towards with the Wende – Krenz believed such 
direction should be set at the 10th Meeting of the Central Committee coming up in early 
November - but Krenz made clear that wherever the country was headed, it would do so 
peacefully.  
 As he launched his Wende, the new General Secretary clearly felt constrained by the 
nation’s economic and financial circumstances.  On the day the Berlin Wall opened, he told the 
Central Committee, “The balance of payments sets limits for us; it prevents us from making 
political decisions that would be necessary.”  He continued, “Every day new facts become 
apparent that affect our economic situation. And without the economy nothing else works.”812  
 To solve the country’s economic problems, Krenz turned to the problem of Exit.  Even 
before he had officially overthrown Honecker, Krenz had developed (or had someone develop) a 
draft of new travel regulations and asked Schalck to review it for its financial implications.   
Schalck responded on October 13th after reviewing the plan with König and the central bank 
president, Werner Polze.  “The decisions and principles laid out in the draft are of seminal 
importance in order to continue socialist development in the GDR and improve the attractiveness 
of our society.  At the present time, we see no other solutions,” Schalck began.  Furthermore, he 
told Krenz, the government should expect “a significant pent-up demand in East German travel 
to the West, particularly to the FRG but especially also to West Berlin.”  This is important 
because Sarotte, in particular, strongly argues that Krenz and the SED leadership had no 
intention of opening the Berlin Wall at any time before November 9th.  She argues that they 
planned to allow East Germans to exit to the FRG through only one border crossing in a remote 
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location of the inter-German border.813  In contrast, this memo demonstrates that East German 
travel to West Berlin (and its requisite implications for opening the Berlin Wall) were part of the 
leadership’s plan from the very beginning.  Schalck and his colleagues assumed at least 5 million 
East German citizens would want to travel to West Germany in the first year, and a further 5 
million would want to travel to West Berlin.  All of this would cost the East German state money 
that it did not have – 300 million DM in the first year, according to Schalck’s calculations.  
“Immediately after a decision on and before the publication of the regulations, I think it would be 
absolutely appropriate to obtain through informal talks a reasonable financial contribution from 
the FRG government to enable this policy, which the FRG has sought for a long time.”   Schalck 
envisioned a lump-sum contribution of 300-500 million DM from the FRG to fund East German 
travel.  He believed this would solve the immediate travel problem and that the government 
could then return to the travel issue in the mid-1990s, presumably after solving their looming 
debt problems.  “At a later date (possibly the middle of the 1990s) we should examine to what 
extent opportunities exist to provide GDR citizens an amount in foreign currency every three 
years…for traveling abroad in the West.”814  Krenz held a meeting with the rest of the leadership 
(except Honecker and Mittag) on October 16th to discuss the travel question, and the group 
adopted Schalck’s basic strategy.  
 In pursuit of this objective, Krenz sent Schalck to Bonn on October 24th to open 
“informal discussions” with the FRG about new forms of cooperation.  Schalck later wrote in his 
memoirs, “For the past two to three years, it was clear to me that the GDR was headed toward an 
economic confederation with the FRG.  Only with West German financial power could the GDR 
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be preserved.  I certainly knew better than most of my comrades that the economic and financial 
support would come at the price of significant political changes.”  As he left for Bonn, he wrote, 
“I still hoped that the price would not be self-sacrifice.”815  He described his orders from Krenz 
for the negotiations as follows, “I should explore the possibility of closer economic cooperation, 
while upholding [the GDR’s] socialist system.  Meanwhile, it was clear that travel would be 
unlimited – it was only a matter of time.  I thought pragmatically of the costs associated with this 
for the GDR.  New border crossings and an expansion of transit routes [would] increase the need 
for hard currency.  I knew that we did not have the money for this.  One had to get the Federal 
Republic to pay, through a packaged deal if necessary: money in exchange for expanded 
travel.”816 
 Schalck’s first meeting took place with Rudolf Seiters and Wolfgang Schäuble, senior 
ministers in the Kohl government.  In opening the discussion, Schalck attempted to stand by his 
orders to increase cooperation while also upholding the GDR’s socialist system.  He told Seiters 
and Schäuble that it was “the firm intention” of the party leadership to implement “extensive 
renewals and reforms” through “a comprehensive dialogue with all levels of society.” But, he 
maintained, “the socialist system of the GDR is not up for debate” and “the SED will continue to 
play the leading role…in the process of renewal.”  He then informed Seiters and Schäuble that 
the GDR would be implementing a new travel law, which would dramatically expand the foreign 
travel of East German citizens, particularly to West Germany.  In view of the “clear additional 
economic burdens” such a law would impose on the GDR, Schalck told Seiters that the two sides 
should find “shared solutions” to the problem.   In sum, he said that the SED leadership foresaw 
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the possibility of raising inter-German relations to “a new level” as long as it was based on “the 
principles of equality, regard for sovereignty, and non-intervention” in each other’s internal 
affairs. 
 Seiters and Schäuble responded with questions and concerns of their own.  First and 
foremost, they told Schalck that officials in the Federal Republic “observed with great attention 
and also with concern the economic development of the GDR in recent years.”  Here they were 
concerned “particularly about the effectiveness of the GDR economy and the growth in debt.”  
Because any new forms of cooperation between the two states would require West German 
money, they would only be justifiable “from the standpoint of the Federal Republic if the GDR 
thought through important questions in its economic policy” and took decisions that increased 
“the efficiency in the economy.”  To the Kohl government this meant, “it would be necessary, 
for example, to cut subsidies and take steps to ensure the international competitiveness of East 
German companies.”  Seiters and Schäuble also said the West German government would need 
the GDR to clarify the status of all East Germans who had left for the West through Hungary or 
were in West German embassies in Prague or Warsaw.  Lastly, because they anticipated that East 
German travel laws would stress the capacities of West Berlin, both sides should explore “in 
what ways the interests of West Berlin” could be addressed “in other areas.”817  With the first 
hints of conditionality lingering in the air, the two sides parted ways to consult with their 
respective governments.  
                                                     
817 “Vermerk über ein informelles Gespräch des Genossen Alexander Schalck mit dem 
Bundesminister und Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes der BRD, Rudolf Seiters, und mit dem 
Mitglied des Vorstandes der CDU, Wolfgang Schäuble, am 24.10.1989” in Hertle, Der Fall der 
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 Krenz was furious upon reading Schalck’s detailed report of his conversation.  To him, 
the intentions of the Kohl government were now obvious.  As he wrote in his memoirs, “It is not 
about their ‘brothers’ and sisters’’ freedom of movement at all.  Bonn is not interested in whether 
or not East Germans can travel.  Bonn wants everything; Bonn wants the GDR.”818 
 Two days later, on October 26th, Kohl and Krenz spoke for the first time by phone.  After 
an exchange of greetings and well wishes, Kohl said he had high hopes for Krenz’s announced 
Wende.  In particular, he told the General Secretary that he believed resolving three issues was 
“especially important”: a new law on the freedom to travel, an amnesty for political prisoners 
arrested during the recent demonstrations, and “a positive solution” to the question of refugees.  
“If one can connect your name with a generous step,” Kohl said, “it will not only have a very 
considerable effect here [in the FRG], but also in the GDR.”  This was politely veiled 
conditionality, and Krenz saw it for was it was.  He replied, “a turn (Wende) does not mean 
upheaval (Umbruch)” because “a socialist GDR is also in the interest of stability in Europe.”  He 
then informed Kohl that the SED leadership had made the decision “under the complete 
sovereignty of our country” to implement a new travel law.  However, the law would bring 
“considerable additional economic burdens” with it for the GDR, which he hoped the FRG could 
cover.  He pressed Kohl for the earliest possible agreement on financing the law, but the 
Chancellor refused to discuss any specifics or make a clear declaration of financial support.  
Instead, he played for time and committed to making Seiters and Schäuble available for further 
discussions.819 
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 Schalck, who sat next to Krenz during his conversation with Kohl, wrote in his memoirs 
“something decisive happened during this phone call.”  He wrote, “Up to that point, the Federal 
Republic had simply followed the events in the GDR attentively, [but] now Kohl presented 
demands for the first time”820 – new rules for the freedom of travel in East Germany, an amnesty 
for political prisoners, and a positive resolution to the embassy refugee crisis.  “That, and not 
November 9th [the night the Wall fell], was for me the key situation.  That was the Wende.  On 
the same day we came up with a package of measures to implement the points raised by Kohl.  
From that moment on, the Federal Republic ruled the GDR.”821  In the days that followed, the 
Ministry of the Interior and the Stasi began drafting the new travel law.822 
 A key component of Krenz’s Wende was to make the real economic situation of the 
country clear to the full Politburo and Central Committee.  To this end, in late October he tasked 
Schürer, Schalck, and the other economic leaders of the country with writing a comprehensive 
report on the economy for discussion at the Politburo meeting on October 31st.  The report they 
produced, “An Analysis of the Economic Situation of the GDR with Conclusions,” served as a 
stinging indictment of Honecker’s Unity of Economic and Social Policy and an urgent call for 
change.  After swiftly acknowledging the “clear successes” that the GDR had achieved during its 
forty-year history, the authors listed an array of shortcomings and misjudgments.  “The debt to 
the West has grown since the 8th Party Congress [when the Unity policy had been announced] to 
such a level that it calls into question the solvency of the GDR.”  Higher domestic consumption 
than domestic production had caused “debt to the West to grow from 2 billion VM in 1970 to 49 
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billion VM in 1989.”  This meant that “social policy since the 8th Party Congress was not met 
completely by domestic growth, but instead led to growing debt to the West.” 823   
 The economists made plain that the debt now left the country completely dependent on 
Western capital.  “1989’s planned hard currency income can only cover about 35% of the hard 
currency payments….  65% of the payments must be financed through bank credits and other 
sources.”   For a country like the GDR, this was unusual and precarious.  “In the analysis of a 
country’s creditworthiness it is internationally assumed that the debt service ratio…should not be 
more than 25%.  75% of [the money received from] exports should be available to pay for 
imports and other expenses.  Based on its hard currency exports, the GDR has a debt service 
ratio of 150%.”  They outlined the implications of this position for the domestic economy.  “If 
we are to prevent the debt from rising in 1990,…[it] would require a reduction in consumption 
by 25-30%.” An export surplus of 2 billion VM would have to be achieved in 1990, and this 
number would have to grow to 11.3 billion VM in 1995 merely in order to keep the debt level 
stable.824 
 If this did not happen, the economists told the Politburo the penalties would be stiff. “The 
consequences of imminent insolvency would be a moratorium (debt restructuring), in which the 
International Monetary Fund would determine what must happen in the GDR.”  The IMF would 
“demand that the state renounce its right to intervene in the economy, the re-privatization of 
companies, the restriction of subsidies with the aim of abolishing them entirely, [and] the 
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renunciation of the state[’s right] to determine import policy. It is necessary to do everything to 
avoid going down this path.”825   
 What did they propose for the years ahead?  “The basic task of the new economic policy 
lies in bringing output and consumption back into agreement.”  The country could “only 
consume domestically what is available after the deduction of the necessary export surpluses.” 
This meant that in the years ahead the country would need to consume far less than it produced 
“in order to ensure the solvency of the GDR to the West.” 826  Furthermore, wage increases 
would need to be connected to higher performance, price would need to be raised and subsidy 
would need to be cut, and the planning and administrative mechanisms of the state would need to 
be reduced at all levels.   In total, the authors struck an ambiguous note, writing that their goal 
was “the development of a socialist planned economy oriented toward market conditions” that 
used “an optimal design of democratic centralism.”827 
 Even if all of these measures were implemented, however, the authors believed “the 
necessary trade surplus required for the solvency of the GDR is not foreseeable….Just freezing 
the debt would require a reduction in living standards in 1990 by 25-30% and make the GDR 
ungovernable.”828  Therefore, they proposed that the government look for ways to expand 
cooperation with as many Western countries and companies as possible.  “It is essential for the 
assurance of solvency in 1991 to negotiate with the government of the FRG at the appropriate 
time about 2-3 billion VM in finance credits above current credit lines.”829  They ruled out “any 
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idea of reunification with the Federal Republic or the creation of a confederation.”830  But, “in 
order to make the FRG aware of the serious commitment of the GDR to our proposals” they 
recommended that the SED make clear that “conditions could be created” in the years to come 
that would make “the currently existing form of borders between both German states 
superfluous.”831  This last line was struck from the version published after the Politburo meeting 
because of its political sensitivity, but as Hans Hermann-Hertle has written, that “erasure alone 
could not eliminate [the fact] that the leading economists, as a last resort to secure the political 
and economic survival of the GDR, considered a proposal to use the Wall as a bargaining chip 
(Tauschmittel) with the Federal Government for new loans.”832 
 Krenz recalled his reaction to the document in his memoirs, “The biggest problem of the 
analysis for me is the debt to capitalist countries.”  He noted the particular challenge this posed 
to the GDR.  “Is that state bankruptcy? Not at all. A state does not go bankrupt if it has debts. 
Otherwise the majority of the countries in the world would have to perish or would have perished 
long ago. Our problem is that we have debts to a political adversary who is working towards the 
liquidation of the GDR. This is the real danger.”  The looming 25-30% reduction in consumption 
convinced him of the proposal’s urgency.  “With their warning about the ‘un-governability of the 
GDR’, the authors of the document emphasize just how existentially necessary it is for the GDR 
[to implement] a fundamental change in its economic policies.”  The SED needed to implement 
this transformation because the authors made clear that it was necessary “to exclude the dictates 
of the International Monetary Fund from the GDR.”833  He also noted that the economic analysis 
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was “connected with far-reaching political conclusions,” most importantly the suggestion that the 
current borders between the two German states could be slowly dismantled.  Such a change 
would clearly require the consent of the Soviet Union, Krenz wrote, but he nevertheless believed 
the “Analysis” should be put to the Politburo unaltered on October 31st for discussion.  “I know 
perfectly well that my hands are tied in so many things.  The tight straightjacket, which I want to 
take from the economists, I am now putting on policy and on myself personally.”834  As was 
standard practice, no transcript of the October 31st meeting was taken, but Krenz would go on to 
describe the discussion as follows. “With Honecker, [Politburo] sessions lasted two to three 
hours at most.  Today the session lasts almost the whole day.  The discussion is laden with 
emotions.”835 
 In times of crisis, it had been a forty-year tradition for the leader of the GDR to seek 
refuge in Moscow’s protection.  Krenz was no different, so the next morning he flew to the 
Soviet capital for his first meeting with Gorbachev.  He believed Soviet economic, rather than 
military, support was the key to his country’s survival.  “If we are unable to raise the necessary 
economic cooperation with the Soviet Union to a higher level, the renewal of our society will 
remain a dream,” he wrote.836  Packing Schalck and Schürer’s “Analysis” in his briefcase for the 
trip, he knew it would “be a crucial point of [his] talks in Moscow.”837 
 Gorbachev had long been urging the SED, and particularly Honecker, to undertake 
political and economic reforms, but with Krenz now in power, the merits of reform were a settled 
issue.  Instead, the issue that lay at the heart of the November 1st meeting between the two 
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leaders was resources, specifically whether the Soviet Union could increase its economic support 
to its most important ally in its time of greatest need.  After an initial exchange of pleasantries 
and a discussion about the error of Honecker’s ways, Krenz steered the conversation to his first 
priority, the economy.  It was for him “the decisive problem.”838  He told Gorbachev that by the 
end of 1989, East Germany’s debt would reach $26.5 billion or 49 billion VM; he also said that 
the country would have $5.9 billion in income in 1989 with which to pay $18 billion for debt 
service and imports.  This would leave the GDR with a $12.1 billion shortfall, and it meant that 
the GDR would have to take out new loans from Western banks and governments.839  Krenz said, 
“"Our job is to maintain solvency. If the International Monetary Fund gets a say in [our affairs], 
it will be bad for us."840  Through a variety of sources including the Stasi chief, Erich Mielke, 
Gorbachev was well briefed on the state of the GDR economy.  Nevertheless, he was 
“astonished” to learn of these numbers and asked whether they were precise because “he had not 
imagined the situation to be so precarious.”  Krenz confirmed that they were, and he went on to 
explain that the debt had grown so high because of the measures the government had been forced 
to take in the early 1980s to stay solvent.  This had resulted in debt taken out at very high interest 
rates.  In addition, he said, new demands to modernize the economy simultaneously emerged 
alongside “new expectations by the population that could not be satisfied.”  Krenz told 
Gorbachev that if the standard of living was based “exclusively on the country’s own 
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production,” it would have to be lowered “by 30% immediately.”  But, he said, “This was not 
politically feasible.”841 
 For Gorbachev, this was now a familiar refrain - one that he had heard variations of from 
Hungarian and Polish officials in recent years.  The Soviet General Secretary told his East 
German counterpart that he had to come clean with the population and confront them with the 
nation’s economic reality.  The SED leadership, he told Krenz, “had to find a way to tell the 
population that it had lived beyond its means in the last few years….It was increasingly 
necessary to tell the truth….Slowly the population had to get used to this idea already.”842  Just 
as he told his Hungarian and Polish comrades the previous year, the Soviet Union would do its 
best to meet the raw material deliveries it had already committed to in the 1986-1990 Five Year 
Plan, but it could provide nothing above and beyond this.843 
 To fix the GDR’s economy, Gorbachev therefore told Krenz to look to the West.  This, 
he said, was what Hungary and Poland had done.  “They, after all, had no choice in this matter,” 
Gorbachev said, “It was often asked what the USSR would do in this situation. But it could do 
very little in economic terms. It was an absurdity to think that the Soviet Union could support 40 
million Poles. The root of the problem lay with [former Polish leader Edward] Gierek who had 
taken on loans totaling $48 billion.  Meanwhile the Polish comrades had already paid back $52 
billion and still owed $49 billion.”  In Hungary, “Comrade Kádár was given an ultimatum by the 
IMF in 1987; in case of non-compliance with the numerous demands, a suspension of the loans 
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was threatened.”844  These two statements appear to have sent a clear and lasting message to 
Krenz.  In his memoirs, he quotes these words exactly, and then writes, “I understand Gorbachev 
as follows: You cannot expect additional economic assistance from the Soviet Union, but don’t 
let it come to joining the International Monetary Fund under any circumstances. Help yourself, 
as best you can!”845  After four hours of conversation and a comradely lunch replete with vodka 
toasts to the future of socialism, Krenz boarded his plane bound for the GDR with the weight of 
such thoughts on his shoulders. 
 He returned to a country in freefall.  Under the threat of strikes from workers, the 
government decided to repeal its October 3rd decision and reopen its borders to the Eastern Bloc 
on November 1st.  Immediately, the refugee problem resurfaced, as four thousand East Germans 
filled the West German embassy in Prague once more.  Fearing a spillover destabilization of 
their own country, the Czechoslovak leadership now pressured East Berlin to fix its travel 
regulations quickly.  To make matters worse, the Federal Republic’s Permanent Representative 
to the GDR informed the SED that the West German mission in East Berlin would soon reopen, 
two months after closing for “renovations” (in fact, it had closed to prevent refugees from filling 
it like they had the embassies in Prague and Warsaw.)  Its reopening would surely mean a 
massive refugee crisis in the heart of the GDR.  As pressure from east and west mounted, so too 
did it build on the streets of the capital.  On November 4th, an estimated half a million people 
flooded Alexanderplatz in East Berlin to demand reform.846  Continuing the chant first used in 
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Leipzig weeks earlier, “Wir sind das Volk!” (“We are the people!”), they dared their leaders to 
take their slogans about democracy seriously and demanded a say in their country’s future. 
  Amid the public upheaval, Schalck quietly travelled again to Bonn for another 
conversation with Seiters and Schäuble.  This time he arrived with the more concrete offer that 
the GDR was “prepared to implement generous regulations for travel between the capital of the 
GDR and West Berlin via newly opened border crossings” as long as the Federal Republic was 
prepared to cover the “significant financial and material costs.” Additionally, he informed his 
interlocutors that the GDR was seeking “long-term loans up to ten billion VE [accounting units, 
most likely DM]” over the next two years that would be “paid back over a period of at least ten 
years” to support new forms of cooperation, such as “joint ventures and equity investments 
(Kapitalbeteiligung)” from West German companies.  On top of this 10 billion, Schalck said his 
government “saw the necessity of discussing additional lines of credit in hard currencies that 
could begin in 1991 and total DM 2-3 billion annually.”  This would be required “to meet the 
demands” of new levels of cooperation.  The KoKo chief made clear, in short, that if the Wall 
was going to be bought and sold, its price was going to be extremely high. 
 But while Schalck’s price had increased, so too had the Federal Republic’s.  Schäuble 
told Schalck “that much depended on the General Secretary’s speech at the 10th Meeting of the 
Central Committee of the SED” coming up on November 8th.  In it, Krenz would have to make 
clear “the credibility of the Wende course” and would need to appoint “credible and new people” 
to implement the announced reforms.  “A fundamental problem in this context,” Schäuble said, 
“was Article 1 of the GDR constitution, which guaranteed the leading role of the Marxist-
Leninist party.”  Schäuble “strongly advised” that the SED make it clear that it was willing to 
allow a “peaceful transition supported by all political, social and religious organizations” and to 
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constitutionally change “the leading role of the SED into a constructive, consensus-building 
cooperation with all democratic forces in the interests of socialism and the GDR.”  He also told 
Schalck that the “state border with West Berlin” should be made “more permeable,” and that the 
West German government continued to assume that the GDR would “decisively dismantle its 
subsidies” to the economy.  “Among the other issues of development of cooperation, particularly 
in the economic field…further consideration by the Federal Government was still required.”  The 
Kohl government was “not yet able to make concrete proposals for binding agreements.”  In 
closing, Schäuble suggested “urgently once again, that General Secretary Krenz take up the ideas 
expressed [in this meeting] in his speech. Otherwise Chancellor Kohl would not be able to justify 
in the Bundestag financial assistance from West German taxpayers.”847   
 Schalck went straight to Krenz upon returning to East Berlin.  In his memoir, Krenz 
termed the demands made at this meeting “blackmail.”848  Schalck expanded further, 
“Diplomatically it was an outrage (Ungeheuerlichkeit) - an interference in the internal affairs of 
the GDR.  Historically, it was consistent. For the West German government, there were no 
internal affairs of the GDR anymore.  Due to the political upheavals and the desperate economic 
situation of the GDR - I brought to the conversation a demand for credit in the amount of 10 
billion Deutsch Marks - the internal affairs of the GDR had become inter-German.”849 
 While Schalck met with Seiters and Schäuble, East German newspapers published a 
preliminary draft of the new travel law in the hopes of appeasing the population’s demand to 
leave the country.  It failed spectacularly.  Most importantly, the law still required East Germans 
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to obtain a visa from the state before being allowed the exit, and such visas could be denied at 
the state’s discretion.  Even if a citizen received a visa, the law provided no commitment on 
behalf of the state to finance foreign travel with hard currency.  Because Schalck had not yet 
secured from the FRG a means of paying for East Germans’ foreign travel, the government still 
had no way to pay for all the travel that was to come.  Therefore the draft law announced that the 
“approval of an application for travel does not mean that the citizen is entitled to any means of 
paying for the trip.”  Clearly, this was no sign of progress, and more than half a million people 
jammed the streets of Leipzig on the same day in protest.850   
 That evening, having learned of the protest in Leipzig and received a report from Seiters 
and Schäuble about their conversation with Schalck, West German policymakers met to discuss 
their next move.  The document prepared for the discussion noted that the conversation with 
Schalck showed that “the new government [in the GDR] seeks a fundamental restructuring of the 
economy…but would like to avoid fundamental reforms of the political structure.” In particular, 
the GDR leadership did not appear “open to a restriction of the SED’s monopoly on power and 
to concessions in the direction of pluralism.”  Instead, “they expect massive financial and 
material support from us for their restructuring efforts and simultaneously our renunciation of 
efforts to work towards a change in the political system.”  However, the enormous scale of 
Schalck’s financial request also made clear that “the GDR - at least in the short and medium term 
– does not expect to obtain the necessary amounts of economic assistance from anyone other 
than us.  The alternative would, in fact, be a policy of austerity.”851  This left the FRG in a 
powerful negotiating position, and officials in the Kohl government knew it.  After being briefed 
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by Seiters and Schäuble on their meeting, Kohl decided that the time had come to set firm 
preconditions for the his government’s financial support. 
 The next day, Seiters called Schalck to transmit a message directly from Kohl for Krenz. 
The Chancellor told Krenz that he needed to “declare publicly that the GDR is prepared to 
guarantee that opposition groups will be permitted and affirm that free elections will be held 
within a period to be announced if the GDR wants to receive material and financial assistance 
from the FRG. This applies also to the financial arrangements regarding travel.”  The message 
continued, “It should be noted that this path is only possible if the SED relinquishes its claim to 
absolute power.”  The party “should be prepared to work on equal terms, and in consensus, with 
all societal forces, churches and religious communities to discuss a true renewal, with the goal of 
achieving democratic socialism.”  Seiters told Schalck that if these conditions were met, “the 
Chancellor thinks a great deal can be achieved and every option can be explored.”852  Krenz 
again called this “blackmail” and “a crude attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of the 
GDR.”  But he saw no alternative. “Once again it is clear how constrained my political freedom 
of movement is,” he wrote.  “Ultimately, everything depends on the economy.”853  The next day, 
Kohl further increased the pressure by publicly announcing these conditions during his “State of 
the Nation” address in the Bundestag.854 
 With their first attempt at publishing a new travel law proving to be a disaster, the 
Politburo reconvened on November 7th to work out a new policy.  Because their Czechoslovak 
comrades were now threatening to close their border to the GDR if the government did nothing 
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to stop the flow of emigrants, the leadership decided to immediately put into effect the portion of 
the travel law allowing East German citizens to permanently emigrate.  Although the documents 
do not spell out the reasoning for this decision in detail, it appears to have been the most 
expedient choice for two reasons.  First, any East German leaving for the FRG through 
Czechoslovakia had to assume that their exit was permanent, so this law would fix this problem 
(and assuage Czechoslovak concerns) by allowing permanent emigration through the GDR’s 
own borders.  And second, permanent exit required the government to provide no hard currency 
– citizens could expect their government to fund their foreign tourism, but not their permanent 
emigration.  As they moved on to preparations for the 10th Meeting of the Central Committee, 
the Politburo handed responsibility for drafting the revised law back to the Interior Ministry and 
the Stasi. 
 At this point it is worth reflecting on where the GDR was headed on November 8th, the 
day before the Wall opened in dramatic and accidental fashion.  This section has demonstrated 
that the country’s financial position and the Soviet Union’s inability to provide extra economic 
support had driven the leadership to embrace four policy positions.  First, financial dependence 
on the West was not the only factor restraining the leadership from using violence, but it was an 
important one.  Second, Krenz and the Politburo had not endorsed an uncontrolled opening of the 
Berlin Wall, but they had endorsed a strategy of trading the opening of the Wall in return for 
hard currency.  Third, this strategic choice and the anticipated financial shortfall of the early 
1990s had led the leadership to negotiate with the Federal Republic as a means of avoiding 
insolvency and negotiations with the IMF.  Contrary to the widespread historiographic 
assumption that the GDR was dependent on the FRG alone, this chapter demonstrates that the 
country’s financial dependence was much more broadly based in the global financial system.  
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The leadership’s choice to negotiate with the FRG was therefore a strategic decision based on its 
belief that the FRG’s demand for the freer movement of people posed a smaller risk to the GDR 
than the IMF’s demand for austerity and structural adjustment.  Exit was safer than Austerity.  
Lastly, the protests on the ground in the GDR drove the Kohl government to expand its 
conditionality in the early days of November beyond the freer movement of people to include 
demands for a complete reform of the East German economy and a renunciation of the SED’s 
one-party state.  As part of his Wende, Krenz had shown a vague inclination to couple political 
liberalization with economic reform, but by November 7th, the Federal Republic’s conditionality 
left him with no choice but to implement this strategy.  In other words, before the Wall fell, the 
GDR’s circumstances were already pointing the country down the path recently taken by Poland 
and Hungary.  Therefore, by the afternoon of November 9th, the collapse of the GDR was a 
historical certainty.   
 What remained the be determined – and what the opening of the Wall decisively 
influenced – was how and how fast the GDR collapsed.  These were far from trivial 
contingencies.  As the next chapter will make clear, they proved decisive in the Soviet Union’s 
decision to peacefully withdraw from East Germany.  The accidental opening of the Wall, 
therefore, was not essential to the collapse of the GDR, but it was essential to the process of 
German reunification that soon followed. 
 
The Final Accident 
 On the morning of November 9th, officials from the Interior Ministry and the Stasi met 
once more to draft a revised travel law.  This time their orders from the Politburo were to 
immediately authorize permanent emigration from the GDR to the FRG and – crucially - West 
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Berlin as well.  After seeing the reaction to the first draft law, Gerhard Lauter, the senior Interior 
official at the meeting, felt that allowing permanent emigration but not temporary travel would 
only stoke popular resentment, so he rewrote the law to immediately authorize both permanent 
and temporary travel.  All historical evidence suggests that he received no direction from his 
superiors to make this change, and it certainly did not conform to Krenz’s and Schalck’s strategy 
of leveraging freer travel to gain more hard currency.  Thus, it stands as a decisive moment of 
contingency in which a local actor altered the trajectory of his nation.  Nevertheless, as Lauter 
himself would later say, it was a change in how fast policy would be implemented, not a change 
in policy itself.  In explaining his mindset that morning, he said, “we still had the task ahead of 
us to put forth a draft of the travel law in 1989 that would bring about the freedom to travel. In 
principle, November 9th could also have been December 21st, and then it would have happened 
legally and not been surprising. We had all of this in the back of our minds.”855  Under the now 
obsolete title, “On Issues of Regulation of the Permanent Departure of GDR Citizens Across the 
Border of the CSSR [Czechoslovakia],” Lauter’s group sent the new law up the bureaucratic 
chain of command, where it reached Krenz by noon on November 9th.  
 Since he had overthrown Honecker in mid-October, Krenz had placed all his hopes for 
the renewal of the SED and the launch of an economic reform program on the 10th Meeting of 
the Central Committee, which was set to take place from November 8-10th.  The first day and a 
half had not gone according to plan, as the meeting had gotten bogged down in endless debates 
about the reorganization of the party leadership.  In the mid-afternoon of November 9th, Krenz 
interrupted the meeting to gain approval of the revised travel law.  “Comrades!...You are aware 
that there is a problem that wears on us all: the question of exit [from the GDR],” he said.  “The 
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Czechoslovak comrades are increasingly finding it a burden, as our Hungarian comrades did 
earlier.  And, whatever we do in this situation, it will be a move in the wrong direction.”856  The 
General Secretary read the full draft of the new law to the committee, and eager to get back to 
what they considered bigger issues, the members had only minor tweaks to suggest.  The draft 
was quickly approved, and Krenz gave it to Günter Schabowski to announce at press conference 
to be broadcast live on East German television and covered by international news outlets that 
evening. 
 As his press conference came to a close, Schabowski announced the travel law revision 
almost as an afterthought.  Haltingly, he told the world, “We have decided today (um) to 
implement a regulation that allows every citizen of the German Democratic Republic (um) to 
(um) leave the GDR through any of the border crossings.”  After a barrage of questions burst 
forth, Schabowski decided it would probably be a good idea to read the precise law as it was 
given to him.  “Applications for travel abroad by private individuals can now be made without 
the previously existing requirements….The travel authorizations will be issued within a short 
time.  Grounds for denial will only be applied in particular exceptional cases….Permanent exit is 
possible via all GDR border crossings to the FRG.”  Asked when the regulation would come into 
effect, Schabowski looked down at his papers and found the word ‘immediately.’  “That comes 
into effect, according to my information, immediately, without delay,” he said.  And what about 
West Berlin?  “Does this also apply for West Berlin?” someone asked.  Skimming the document 
again, he found the words, “Permanent exit can take place via all border crossings from the GDR 
to the FRG and West Berlin, respectively.”  Well then what about the Berlin Wall?  “What is 
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going to happen to the Berlin Wall now?” someone asked.  Here, at the logical but unresolved 
endpoint of the past four weeks of negotiations over trading the freer movement of people for 
hard currency, Schabowski realized he had no answer and quickly ended the press conference.857  
 As word spread that the government’s new law allowed all citizens to travel or emigrate 
immediately through any border crossing, East Berliners took to the streets to test out the new 
reality.  In droves, they began showing up at crossings in the Wall demanding to be let through.  
Because the travel law was, in fact, not supposed to go into effect until the next day (despite its 
talk of “immediately”), the border guards were caught completely unprepared.  For five and a 
half hours after the press conference, tension and confusion reigned at the border crossings while 
the guards tried to seek clarification about the new law.  Receiving none, Harold Jäger, the 
officer on duty at the Bornholmer Street crossing, ordered his subordinates to open the gates at 
11:30 pm to the thousands of East German citizens pressing to get across.  Within an hour, all of 
the border crossings had been opened and the Berlin Wall had fallen.858 
  
Conclusion 
 Public surprises have private histories.  This chapter has sought to tell the private history 
of two public surprises, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the precipitous collapse of the German 
Democratic Republic.  Since Albert Hirschman’s Exit/Voice/Loyalty model was first applied to 
the GDR in the days following November 9th, 1989, historians and popular memories, 
particularly in the English speaking world, have focused on how the public history of 1989 
contributed to the end of East Germany.  And rightly so.  There can be no doubt that the 
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pressures of Exit and Voice decisively influenced the opening of the Wall and the collapse of the 
GDR.  But the success of the public pressures of Exit and Voice depended on the private 
financial histories of the GDR and Hungary detailed in this chapter.  Hungarian financial 
difficulties first created the Exit choice; the growing East German financial crisis deterred the 
SED regime from responding to Voice with Violence; and the threat of insolvency led the 
GDR’s leaders to choose Exit as a means of preventing Austerity.  The accidental opening of the 
Berlin Wall unexpectedly disrupted these dynamics, but the contingency of November 9th lay in 
how and how fast the GDR would collapse, not whether it would collapse at all.  The 
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Postscript: Knowledge is Power 
 
 Five days after the Berlin Wall opened, Schalck and König wrote to Schürer to tell him 
that they had been lying to him about the debt for the past eight years.  “The debt is actually 12.6 
billion VM lower than you previously thought,” they wrote.  Detailing the secret accounts that 
KoKo and the Ministry of Finance had maintained since the 1970s to store extra hard currency, 
they told Schürer that the actual debt at the end of 1989 would be roughly 38 billion VM, or 
$20.6 billion. Despite the difference, they maintained that the billions of Deutsch Marks stored in 
their accounts were still “not enough to solve the liquidity problems arising in 1991/92.”859   
 Nine years later the German Bundesbank was not so sure.  In 1998, the bank went back to 
examine the GDR’s balance of payments situation in the 1970s and 1980s.  It discovered that 
even Schalck – the keeper of the country’s financial secrets – did not accurately understand his 
country’s financial position.  Rather than the $20.6 billion in debt that Schalck quoted above, the 
Bundesbank found that the GDR in fact only had $10.8 billion in debt at the end of 1989.  East 
German leaders believed they confronted a financial reality in 1989 that threatened the existence 
of their regime, but it was in many ways a false reality.  In retrospect, all of the numbers cited in 
this chapter turned out to be inaccurate.  The GDR’s financial position in 1989 was so 
threatening only because its leaders believed it was.  The real financial picture, although not 
without problems, was much less foreboding.  The Exit/Voice/Austerity dynamics discussed in 
this chapter derived their power from a socially constructed reality built on faulty foundations, 
but they were no less powerful for it.  Social constructions, as forty years of academic theory has 
demonstrated, derive their power precisely from their ability to determine what is real and what 
is not. 
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Conclusion: 
The Triumph of Breaking Promises 
 
 
“Essentially, we are talking about a contract with the entire Soviet 
population, like that of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s ‘The Social 
Contract.’” 
 
- Viktor Nikonov in the Soviet Politburo, June 20, 1988860 
 
 
If there was a single point when the ideological competition between democratic 
capitalism and communism ended, this moment when Lenin’s successors in the Kremlin began 
to approvingly compare their actions to one of the central figures of the “bourgeois” 
Enlightenment would have to be a leading candidate.  Viktor Nikonov was a relatively minor 
member of the emerging disciples of “new thinking” in the Soviet Union.  But the man he 
served, Mikhail Gorbachev, was leading one of the greatest and most unexpected attempts at 
social, economic, and political transformation in modern history when these words were spoken 
in the summer of 1988.  Gorbachev, of course, was spectacularly unsuccessful in this attempt, 
and within three years, both the socialist empire he oversaw and the country he led ceased to 
exist.  With blessed few bullets fired, the Cold War ended and the authoritarian rulers of 
communist societies peacefully withdrew from the halls of power.  People across Eastern Europe 
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and the West celebrated the stunning turn of events, and welcomed the spread of political and 
economic freedom to new corners of the world. 
Or, rather, most people celebrated most of the time.  As the reader will recall, the 
introduction to this dissertation began with an angry and sarcastic letter from one Laszlo Kezdi, a 
Hungarian pensioner living in Budapest, to the Hungarian Minister of Finance, which appeared 
in one of the main Hungarian newspapers in December 1989.  Even as political progress rapidly 
swept across the Eastern Bloc in that year, Kezdi had the more prosaic, but no less significant, 
concerns of daily life on his mind.  How would he pay his mortgage?  How would he heat his 
apartment?  How would he buy his medicine?  How would he put food on his table?  These were 
the questions that drove him to acerbically ask the Finance Minister to send him a rope that he 
could use to hang himself. 
This dissertation has been motivated by the conviction that it was no mere accident that 
these two sentiments – one in the highest reaches of the Kremlin, the other at the level of 
ordinary life in communist societies – appeared at roughly the same time during the events we 
now label the end of the Cold War.  As we have seen in the previous chapters, the spread of 
political freedom and economic austerity went hand-in-hand during the last years of communism 
in the Eastern Bloc, and they did so for a very particular reason.  Although the Cold War had 
begun as a race between communism and capitalism to make promises to their people, it became 
in the 1970s and 1980s a competition between the two blocs to break promises made to their 
people.  The Politics of Breaking Promises favored governments that had political legitimacy, so 
the leaders of the Eastern Bloc went in search of such legitimacy in the late 1980s.  In place of 
the implicit social contracts that underlay late socialist authoritarianism, they instead attempted 
to create public acceptance of their rule using the tools of democracy.  As the Polish leader 
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Wojciech Jaruzelski explained in February 1989, he decided to launch the roundtable and 
partially free elections because the “difficult economic situation…requires unconventional 
methods and difficult decisions… [that] would not be possible without the understanding and 
backing (or at least neutrality) of all significant social forces.”861 
 Gaining the acceptance of society for difficult economic policies had also been the 
challenge of Western societies in the 1970s.  They, too, had been forced to confront the Politics 
of Breaking Promises.  At that time, in a quote that serves as this dissertation’s epigraph, the 
British economist Fred Hirsch had written, “Individuals can be expected to restrain the exercise 
of their individual power in the interest of protecting the fabric of their society if, but only if, 
they believe the society as a whole to be a just one.”862  By the late 1980s, the leaders of 
communist countries had come to fully agree with Hirsch’s conclusion, and they set about 
creating more politically just societies in the hope that the citizens they governed would refrain 
from using the immense power for disruption and resistance that they possessed.  Rather than 
legitimizing the communists’ power, however, the democratic reforms that communist leaders 
undertook merely exposed the fact that they had lacked any true legitimacy all along.  Only the 
likes of Mazowiecki, Antall, Havel, Kohl, and Yeltsin could convince Poles, Hungarians, 
Czechoslovaks, East Germans, and Russians that they were living in a just society, so it was they 
who took up residence in the halls of power throughout the collapsing Eastern Bloc. 
The global intertwined history of oil, finance, and austerity that swept across both sides 
of the Iron Curtain in the wake of the oil crisis of 1973-74 drove these stunning developments.  I 
have sought to reconstruct this interconnected history through the framework of the Privatization 
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of the Cold War.  In the privatized Cold War that prevailed after 1973, nation-states’ guns and 
butter became dependent on loans and oil, so maintaining access to oil and capital markets 
became a fundamental component of preserving a state’s power and legitimacy.  As I have 
shown in the preceding chapters, this dependency on oil and finance placed a social question at 
the heart of the late Cold War: how to revise the postwar social contracts that developed in both 
the East and the West after the Second World War.  States’ ability to discipline their social 
contract proved to be the key difference between those who survived the Cold War intact and 
those who went extinct.   Revisions to the social contract needed to be justified in ideological 
terms to domestic constituencies, so nation-states adjusted their governing ideologies and 
political structures to meet this challenge. 
The pressures to adapt to the privatized Cold War produced the collapse of communism 
and, in turn, significantly contributed to the end of the Cold War.  In the introduction, I identified 
the essential features of the end of the Cold War, defined a number of challenges that a history of 
the end of the Cold War would have to meet, and raised three questions that a compelling 
explanation of it would have to answer.  The end of the Cold War, the reader will recall, 
comprised four distinct processes – the end of the nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union 
and the United States, the end of the global ideological competition between democratic 
capitalism and state socialism, the peaceful and democratic collapse of state socialist regimes in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and the reunification of Germany.  These processes 
occurred both within and between nation-states, and involved changes in both power and 
identity.  The fact that change occurred across these four diverse dimensions led me to argue that 
explaining the end of the Cold War as a geopolitical conflict required an explanation of the 
collapse of communism as a system of governance.   
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Over the last eight chapters, I have put forth such an explanation.  In chapters 4 and 5, we 
saw how changes in oil and financial markets produced a significant disparity in the relative 
power of the United States and the Soviet Union by the mid-1980s, and drove Gorbachev and the 
rest of the Soviet Politburo to seek nuclear arms control agreements with the United States.  In 
chapter 5, it became clear how Gorbachev’s desire to initiate economic reform in 1985 forced 
him to confront the challenges of disciplining the implicit social contract that underlay Soviet 
rule.  To overcome this challenge, the Soviet General Secretary tried to redefine communist 
governance as a system that would be politically legitimate, but also one that would promise its 
citizens significantly less economic security.  These changes left communism with few 
ideological reasons to oppose democratic capitalism, and the global ideological competition 
between the two systems precipitously collapsed.  The economic burden of the Soviet empire in 
Eastern Europe led Gorbachev to repeal the Brezhnev Doctrine in 1986, which in turn left the 
communist governments of Eastern Europe no choice but to confront the Politics of Breaking 
Promises on their own.  Under pressure from global financial markets to discipline their own 
domestic social contracts, the leaders of Poland and Hungary initiated democratic reforms in 
order to legitimize austerity.  Fearful of the prospect of having to implement their own austerity 
program, East German leaders attempted to leverage the opening of the Berlin Wall for more 
Western loans, only to see the Wall accidentally open on November 9th, 1989.  Taken together, 
these chapters have demonstrated that state socialist regimes peacefully collapsed in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe because their governments tried, but failed to implement the Politics 
of Breaking Promises.   
In light of this history, answers to the three central questions of the end of the Cold War 
can be given succinctly.  Why did the holders of imperial and authoritarian power in the Eastern 
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Bloc willingly give up power?  Because they decided that Politics of Breaking Promises could 
only be successfully implemented if their citizens deemed communist governance to be 
politically legitimate.  Why did they do so at the end of the 1980s?  Because the global history of 
oil and finance made the challenge of disciplining the domestic social contract unavoidable in the 
Eastern Bloc by the late 1980s.  And why did electoral democracies and market economies 
emerge from the ashes of state socialism?  Because they were the best political and economic 
systems for breaking promises. 
 Ultimately, then, the history presented here changes our understanding of both the causes 
and meaning of the end of the Cold War.  These changes in causes and meaning can best be 
discussed by returning to the two issues I briefly raised in the introduction and committed to 
return to in the conclusion.  First, in contrast to the prevailing historiography, which places a 
great deal of causal weight on Mikhail Gorbachev in explaining the end of the Cold War, I 
suggested in the introduction that all of the conditions for revolution in Eastern Europe would 
have been present in the late 1980s had Gorbachev never become General Secretary of the Soviet 
Union in 1985.  Historians often believe that considering counterfactuals place them on tenuous 
footing, but as Fredrik Logevall has noted, “thinking about unrealized possibilities is an 
indispensable part of the historian’s craft…. All historians, whenever they make causal 
judgments, are engaging in speculation, are envisioning alternative developments, even when 
these alternatives are not stated explicitly.”863   
Best then to consider at least one very important alternative explicitly.  What if Yuri 
Andropov had lived longer?  The Andropov counterfactual is one often raised by scholars of the 
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end of the Cold War to argue for the unique and essential influence of Gorbachev.864  If 
Andropov, the former head of the KGB and General Secretary for a short thirteen months in 
1983 and 1984, had not succumb to an untimely death on account of kidney failure, these 
scholars argue that the end of the Cold War would not have occurred.  He would have continued 
the arms race, maintained the ideological competition, not launched political liberalization within 
the Soviet Union, and not allowed Eastern Europe to choose its own fate.  As a result, the state 
socialist regimes of Eastern Europe would not have collapsed and Germany would not have been 
reunified.  
How does the history presented here alter our understanding of this counterfactual?  First, 
and most importantly, this history has demonstrated that the collapse of Eastern European 
regimes in 1989 was not a result of Gorbachev or perestroika and glasnost.  The revolutions were 
dependent on only one Soviet decision - non-intervention – and were instead driven by 
international pressure emanating from the global economy to discipline the social contracts in 
Poland and Hungary.  These pressures would still have pressed upon the leaders in Warsaw and 
Budapest in 1986 and 1987 regardless of who was leading the Soviet Union.  Because military 
power was of no use in resolving this pressure, the only way the Soviet Union could have 
prevented the leaders in Poland and Hungary from reacting to the pressure to break promises 
would have been to provide them with further economic aid.  But as we have seen in chapters 3 
and 5 of this dissertation, this was a step that every Soviet leader from 1981 onward refused to 
countenance.  Thus, the central tension that drove the revolutions of 1989 would still have been 
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present, even if Gorbachev had never become General Secretary.  How would Andropov have 
responded to a push for reform in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s?  There is no reason to think 
that the decision he reached in the crucible of the Polish Crisis would not have held in the years 
that followed.  As was discussed at the beginning of chapter 5, Andropov concluded in 
December 1981, “Even if Poland falls under the control of ‘Solidarity’ that is the way it will be.”  
Soviet intervention to prop up the government in Warsaw would “be very burdensome for us.  
We must be concerned above all with our own country and about strengthening the Soviet 
Union.”  As the pressure on Poland, Hungary, and eventually East Germany mounted to 
discipline their social contracts and the Soviet Union grew even weaker economically in the late 
1980s, there is no reason to think that Andropov would have acted differently than Gorbachev to 
stop political revolution in Eastern Europe. 
And those revolutions very likely would have occurred anyway.  To this day, basic 
misunderstandings persist in the minds of the leading scholars of 1989 over what caused the 
events of that year.  “Unlike Poland in 1980,” Timothy Garton Ash has written, “it was not a turn 
of the economic screw that precipitated mass popular protest in any Eastern European country in 
1989.”865  But a turn of the economic screw, in the form of cuts to Polish real wages, is precisely 
what motivated the only popular resistance that played a decisive role in actually causing the 
revolutions – the May and August 1988 strikes in Poland that led the regime to seek the 
roundtable negotiations.  What caused the regime to seek to impose a cut in real wages?  
Pressure from the global economy delivered through the institutional mechanisms of the 
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International Monetary Fund.  Thus, even in an alternative world where Mikhail Gorbachev 
never becomes Soviet General Secretary in 1985, the causes of the revolutions of 1989 would 
still be present.  This does not mean that Gorbachev did not influence how those revolutions 
unfolded, but it does mean that he and his reform efforts in the Soviet Union did not cause them.   
If it was not Gorbachev, but rather pressure from the global financial markets, that drove 
the collapse of state socialist regimes in 1989, then this dissertation has revised our 
understanding of the West’s influence on the end of the Cold War as well.  Historians have been 
extremely reluctant to ascribe any Western influence to the end of the Cold War for fear of 
reinforcing notions of Western triumphalism, but this dissertation has detailed an unmistakable 
Western influence on the end of the Cold War.  As I described in the introduction, one of the 
strongest levers of statecraft in the privatized Cold War was powerful states’ control over other 
states’ access to capital markets.  Because the state socialist regimes of Eastern Europe had lost 
their access to global capital markets by the late 1980s,866 Western states exerted enormous 
power over the course of events in Warsaw, Budapest, and East Berlin because they controlled 
the conditions under which Eastern Bloc governments would regain access to global capital 
markets.  Through the IMF, the United States and West Germany demanded that the Polish and 
Hungarian governments implement the Politics of Breaking Promises, which set off a chain of 
events that led to the collapse of those regimes.  The need for further Western credit is what 
drove the East German government to negotiate the opening of the Berlin Wall in the fall of 
1989, and the GDR’s desperate need for credit is what allowed the Kohl government to demand 
fundamental political changes in the GDR in return for further access to credit.  Taken together, 
these moments of Western financial leverage amounted to significant power, and they signal a 
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decisive Western role in precipitating the collapse of communism and causing the end of the 
Cold War. 
 Lastly, there is this.  If we think of the end of the Cold War as the triumph of breaking 
promises, then our understanding of its meaning changes as well.  Since the Cold War’s end, 
scholars and the public at large have been tempted to see it as a fundamental turning point in the 
international system, the definitive end to a bygone era or the fresh start of something new.  “I 
see 1989 not as an end, but as a beginning.  It created the international order that persists until 
today,” Mary Sarotte writes.867  But 1989 was neither the end of an old international order nor 
the beginning of the order that we currently inhabit.  It was rather a chapter, albeit an extremely 
important one, in the global history of oil, financial, and austerity that flowed from the oil crisis 
of 1973-74.  Indeed, that was the moment that an old order slipped away and a new one, the one 
we still inhabit, began to take shape.  The basic elements of the privatized Cold War – nation-
states’ dependence on finance and oil to fund their domestic social contracts, the international 
pressures to implement the Politics of Breaking Promises – are still with us to this day, even if 
the Cold War is not.  
Our understanding of the West’s triumph in the Cold War changes too.  Democratic 
capitalism won the competition to break promises because its societies were more just and its 
governments were more legitimate than those in the communist bloc.  Liberalism, electoral 
democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights were decisive advantages in fostering a 
shared sense of justice within Western societies and granting legitimacy to Western 
governments.  But this shared sense of justice and legitimacy could be used under the Politics of 
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Breaking Promises in both East and West to restrain individuals from, as Hirsch said, “using the 
exercise of their individual power” to disrupt “the fabric of their society.” 
That, ultimately, is the contradiction that lies at the heart of the collapse of communism 
and the end of the Cold War.  Government, as Václav Havel told the people joyously gathered in 
Prague on New Year’s Day 1990, was returned to the people in a wave of peaceful revolution.  
But it returned to them only so that their power to resist could be overcome.  The end of the Cold 
War was both a moment in which the people’s power peaked and a moment in which it was, in 
the end, transcended.  
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